David Lewin’s *Morgengruß*
David Lewin’s
Morgengruß

Text, Context, Commentaries

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Hearing David Lewin lecture in the early 1980s, I was amazed and impressed by his musicality, intellectual acumen, and ethical clarity with regard to music theory and analysis. A member of my doctoral committee, Roger Graybill, provided me with access to a typescript that Lewin had written in 1974 and used as a text in a graduate course at Yale: an extraordinarily detailed and meticulous study of Schubert’s “Morgengruß.” Following Lewin’s advice to the reader, I worked my way through the text at a piano, played the examples, and tested them against what I heard in the music and what Lewin was encouraging me to hear, or to question. I thought at the time that Lewin’s essay should be published, and hoped someday to edit and present it to the community of music scholars and other interested readers. After David Lewin died in 2003, I approached his widow, June K. Lewin, who encouraged me to pursue publication of the essay. On the advice of Suzanne Ryan, Music Editor at Oxford University Press, I contacted Richard Cohn, who was in the initial stages of a related project concerning Lewin’s correspondence. Merging our projects, we conceived the volume in its present form.

At the core of this volume stands an edition of David Lewin’s *Morgengruß*. It is preceded by an introduction, which reconstructs the essay’s genesis and reviews some aspects of its reception. The essay is followed by three critical essays that situate *Morgengruß* with respect to selected issues in European intellectual history, to the development of American music theory in North America, and to Lewin’s own evolution as a music theorist. Brian Kane explores *Morgengruß*’s relationship to Lewin’s 1986 publication, “Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes of Perception,” and shows that, despite the near-identity of the analytical material at the intersection of the two essays, the perspective on that material has shifted in ways that shed light on aspects of Lewin’s intellectual development during the dozen years that separate them. Richard Cohn proposes several antecedents for Lewin’s construction of the listener, explores tensions in Lewin’s conception of
listening, and situates those tensions in relation to his shifting methodological priorities during the 1970s. Henry Klumpenhouwer reads Lewin’s essay against some strands of German philosophy, psychology, and educational history, including the science/humanities duality and ideas about personality formation.

I have transcribed the text from the Graybill copy as faithfully as possible, resisting the temptation to alter the text even where I suspected or imagined that an older David Lewin might have endorsed such alterations, particularly with respect to the universalizing male-gendered pronouns discussed in the introduction. I have fixed a small number of obvious errors, such as word omissions, according to common sense and common usage. Reiner Krämer, a PhD student in the College of Music at the University of North Texas, typeset Lewin’s hand-drawn musical examples, using note-processing and graphics software but preserving all aspects of details and layout to the extent possible.

One unusual feature of this essay is the embedding of graphic images into sentences, where they act as subjects and objects that integrate into the textual flow. Lewin furnished numbers for many of these images, including them in the ordinal count along with those graphs that, following standard practice, are offset from the text for display. In print, those captions tend to distract the eye and clutter the space, undermining the fluid quality that Lewin sought. Accordingly, we have furnished numbers only for those 56 graphic images that are referenced directly in the text, leaving the remaining 196 images without number or label.

The introduction and Cohn’s essay refer to, and the appendix reproduces excerpts from, letters that Lewin wrote to Oliver W. Neighbour in 1973 and 1974. After Lewin’s death, Neighbour gave the letters to June Lewin, who included them in the David Lewin Papers, which she donated to the Library of Congress. The letters, most of which were typed, contain aborted words or phrases overstruck with a series of letters “X.” Where the overstruck text is legible, and indicate a change of conception or wording rather than a mechanical error, we have reproduced them with a strike-through line.

The introduction and the essays make frequent reference to Morgengruß, as the title of Lewin’s essay, of Schubert’s song, and even occasionally of Wilhelm Müller’s poem. To avoid ambiguity, the title of Lewin’s essay is italicized throughout this volume, while the titles of the song and the poem are presented in quotation marks.
We are grateful above all to June K. Lewin for entrusting us with the preparation of the essay and the excerpts from the correspondence, and to Oliver W. Neighbour, who lovingly curated Lewin’s letters through the decades, and then generously donated them for public use. We also wish to acknowledge and thank Roger Graybill, who introduced Bard-Schwarz to the essay three decades ago; Suzanne Ryan, Music Editor at OUP, who helped us find the right shape for this material; Stephen Soderberg, who archived the Lewin papers at the Library of Congress; Paul Sherrill, who inventoried those papers, and provided Cohn with access to the Neighbour correspondence in a usable form; and Edward Gollin, whose perspectives helped to shape the introductory essay. We also wish to thank Berthold Hoeckner, Marianne Kielian-Gilbert, Nathan Martin, Patrick McCreless, John Muñiz, Judy Lochhead, Edwin Spark, and Susan Youens for help on a variety of matters.

David Bard-Schwarz
Richard Cohn
This volume publishes for the first time an extended analytic essay from 1974, whose title matches that of its musical subject, a twenty-three measure strophic song from Schubert’s *Die Schöne Müllerin*. The essay initially consisted of 160 pages of text, hand-written continuously without section breaks, supplemented by 252 diagrams and musical sketches. It was eventually typed for classroom use, and copies of a typescript have been in circulation among music theorists for decades. During all these years, esteem for the author’s work has grown, to the point where one theorist could write that “David Lewin is doubtless the most significant music theorist of the last half century” (Clampitt 2006, p. 340). Lewin’s reputation attained that status with the publication of a 1986 article, “Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes of Perception,” and a 1987 book, *Generalized Musical Intervals and Transformations*, which are seen to stand as the respective culminations of two distinct strands of Lewin’s work, the one interpretive and broadly humanistic, the other technical and expressed to a large degree in a mathematical mode.

Steven Rings has challenged the distinctiveness of those strands, arguing that they represent two faces of a unified project (Rings 2006, pp. 115–117; see also Hook 2007). Rings models that project as a connected network with three nodes: Theory and Interpretation, which inform each other in an iterative loop, and Methodology, which sets that loop “in motion and keeps it going” (Rings 2006, p. 118). Although most of Lewin’s writings leave one or two of these nodes in the background, Rings suggests that all of those writings are most richly read with an awareness of all three nodes “thrumming away behind the scenes in each interpretive, theoretical, and methodological discussion” (p. 119). It is not difficult to understand why Lewin would have suppressed particular nodes in a given piece of writing. One cannot write about everything all at once. Moreover, hermeneutics, mathematics, and epistemology occupy distinct discursive registers, and the transition between them can be disjunct and awkward.
One of the characteristics that distinguishes *Morgengruß*, while also underlying its extended proportions and Proustian form, is its integration of all three nodes of the network. *Morgengruß* is the most fine-grained analysis of a single work that Lewin ever committed to paper. It contains what was, at the time of writing, an original contribution to the theory of musical meter, providing an informal but comprehensive exposition of the author’s approach to metric reduction. And it provides the most extended exploration of the methodological questions that underlie Lewin’s mature work.

The essay also has other singular attributes. It seeks to convey a complex music-theoretic argument to a readership of nonspecialists and amateurs with “exposure equivalent to an academic semester’s work in a basic harmony course” (p. 13). It advances a vision of the analyst as an interlocutor who draws the reader into his deliberative processes, rather than an oracle who spouts truths. It shines a persistent light on the analytic process itself: how we come to intuitions and how we come to problematize them; what sorts of inquiries yield evidence; what sorts of evidence make an analytic argument. And it explores and demonstrates aspects of representation and communication: what gives analytical evidence persuasive force, and why; how to organize and order an analytical argument; how to explore and assert through graphs, and how to coordinate graph with text. Its weave of text and graphics provides the most fully worked out realization of an expository mode characteristic of many of Lewin’s writings. Yet ultimately the essay’s most remarkable accomplishment may be its ability to move smoothly between analysis, theory, and metatheory, artfully braiding the three network nodes while maintaining a continuous argument about each across a protracted span of unbroken prose.

**Genesis**

David Lewin (1933–2003) grew up in Manhattan. His father, Bertram Lewin (1896–1971), was a central figure in the Freudian psychoanalytic community.\(^1\) His childhood piano teacher was Edward Steuermann (1892–1964), an esteemed concert artist who premiered a number of Schoenberg works, and who counted among his pupils Theodor Adorno, Russell Sherman, and Gunther Schuller. Although Steuermann did not normally expose his students to Schoenberg’s music (Steuermann 1989, p. 208), he made an exception with the young David Lewin, who studied Schoenberg’s *Klavierstücke*, Opus 11, under Steuermann’s tutelage (Lewin’s letter to Oliver Neighbour, October 18, 1973). Lewin later wrote that “on first exposure to Schoenberg’s music, at age 11 or so, I was seized with the

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\(^1\) Their intellectual relationship is explored in Klumpenhouwer 2006.
immediate conviction that THIS was the music of our time that was compelling, that expressed with complete mastery the sorts of ideas that were meaningful to me as a point of departure for whatever I might have to say as a composer” (Lewin to Neighbour, May 14, 1974).

Lewin attended Harvard, where he studied mathematics, and then Princeton, where he pursued graduate work in composition, primarily with Roger Sessions. The music department at Princeton in the 1950s was a hothouse of imaginative thinking about atonality and serialism in particular; its faculty and students included Milton Babbitt, Edward Cone, Godfrey Winham, and Benjamin Boretz. At Princeton, Lewin initiated a steady stream of writings about Schoenberg, beginning with an analytical essay on the Violin Fantasy in 1958 and enduring straight through until his final publication on the Klavierstück, Op. 23, No. 3 (Lewin 2008).

After returning to Harvard for three years as a member of the Society of Fellows, in 1961 Lewin joined the composition faculty at the University of California at Berkeley, where his colleagues and friends included musicologist Joseph Kerman (1924–2014) and composer Andrew Imbrie (1921–2007), both of whom play significant roles in the Morgengruss story. In 1967, Lewin assumed directorship of a new graduate program in music at the Stony Brook campus of the State University of New York (SUNY). In the summer of 1973, having earned a sabbatical and a grant from the Guggenheim Foundation, he relocated with his family to Paris. Kerman had introduced Lewin to Oliver W. (Tim) Neighbour (b. 1923), a music bibliographer at the British Library, who was in the process of drafting the Schoenberg article for the New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians. A correspondence between them began in early 1973, and continued at an intense pace throughout Lewin’s sabbatical year in Paris. Lewin’s half of the correspondence, the only part to survive, chronicles his intellectual and personal activities during the year in which Morgengruss was drafted.

The Guggenheim Foundation had funded Lewin to write a treatise/textbook on mathematical applications to music theory, developed from teaching materials and intended for publication with Indiana University Press. Lewin’s heart was not in the project. In correspondence to Neighbour he referred to it variously as

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2 Lewin 1967b. The 1958 genesis is indicated in Lewin’s letter to Neighbour of May 22, 1974.
3 Martin Scherzinger (2004) has observed that the methodological attitudes of Lewin’s writings from the 1980s are closely allied with aspects of the poststructuralism of Jacques Derrida. Seeing those attitudes fully worked out in this unpublished essay written in Paris in 1974, we are tempted to attribute significance to their genesis in the place where poststructuralism had developed, at the time when those ideas dominated the discourse of scholars and intellectuals there. Yet there is no evidence, from letters or other biographical materials, that Lewin was exposed to Parisian intellectual society during his sabbatical year. In this connection, it is worth observing that it was in the early 1970s that French poststructuralism began to wash up onto American shores.
4 Concerning these letters, see p. viii supra [the Preface].
“a pain” (November 16, 1973), “my goddam book . . . [which] I will dig in and finish . . . , but I feel grumpy the while” (January 7 or 14, 1974), and “mainly . . . a housecleaning job” (February 6?, 1974).\(^5\) In early February he wrote,

I have to get my Frankenstein monster into galleys as soon as I can, to get it off my back. Then, I would really like to tackle a collection of Schubert song analyses, along the lines I told you about last Fall. I don’t expect publishers to line up to pet that doggie. [February 6’, 1974].

Lewin refers to a handwritten letter of the previous August, in which he wrote that “so many of [Schubert’s] songs are among the most profound and subtle, powerful dramatic conceptions in music that I know, that I unhesitatingly place him in my private first rank without even considering the instrumental music.” Continuing in what was evidently a white heat, the next two pages sketch central musical insights into three songs, “Ihr Bild,” “Morgengruß,” and “Auf dem Fluße.” Lewin concludes, “I seem to be going on. Better not get to the C maj. symphony, G maj. quartet, etc.” (August 21, 1973). Excerpts from this letter are provided in the Appendix.

On May 8, Lewin reported that work on the math book was essentially complete. He spent the next two weeks working intently on the Morgengruß chapter of the projected book. The focus and scope of the project, however, were shifting. On May 22, he wrote that “so far I have 70 longhand pages all on Morgengruß, interspersed with much discussion on what the analysis is and is not doing, . . . how to hear ’both/and’ instead of ’either/or’ without intellectual confusion, why a ’larger context’ is not the same as a ’more important context,’ what Schenker sketches do and do not mean in the latter regard, how to handle them for what they are worth without anxiety that they should be worth more, and without pretending they are either worth more or worth-less, etc. etc.” With these methodological issues competing with analytical ones, he wonders to Neighbour about the practicality of the projected book. “I thought I would do seven or eight songs, but now I feel that four or five will already be a pretty hefty project” (May 22, 1974).

By June 10, Lewin had completed the essay, which now ran to 160 handwritten pages, and was writing the chapter on “Ihr Bild.”\(^6\) A month later, he characterized the scope of the project: “By now, I guess the enormity of the monster

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\(^5\) Lewin heads this letter merely “Wednesday evening,” and Neighbour ordered it between letters of January 31 and February 17. Thus February 13 is also possible. But the proximity of February 13 to February 17 is inconsistent with the periodicity of their exchanges. Moreover, in the letter of February 17 Lewin indicates that he “got back last night from a few days in Switzerland,” suggesting that February 6 is far more likely.

\(^6\) The David Lewin papers in the Library of Congress contain a handwritten draft of that chapter’s first forty pages.
has dawned on you. Tentative title: Four Schubert Songs/analytic studies at an introductory level. The songs, after Mgngrs: Ihr Bild, Einsamkeit, Wasserfluth Auf dem Flusse” (July 11, 1974). But his pessimism about publication prospects was intensifying. Morgengrüß was too long to serve as a chapter in a balanced book of analytical essays, and too short to stand on its own as a monograph. Contacted about the possibility of publishing the Schubert volume in some form, his editor at Indiana “cold-shouldered me and then grudgingly volunteered a maybe” (July 11, 1974), echoing a discouraging earlier response from Kerman. His sabbatical year drawing to a close, Lewin’s energy for the Schubert book dissipated.

Dissemination and Influence

The truncation of the Schubert project was not the only disappointment from Lewin’s sabbatical year. In addition, the mathematics textbook never found its way into print. Yet the longer-term consequences were considerably more salutary: the two Parisian writings formed the core of Lewin’s graduate teaching for the remainder of his career, at Stony Brook, Yale, and Harvard, serving respectively as central readings for biennial courses on “Mathematical Approaches to Music Theory” and on “Analysis of Music with Texts.” Although disseminated as a self-standing document, in its circulated form the essay contains remnants of its origin as the first substantive chapter of a longer book. The two-page “Introduction and Preliminary Remarks” refers to plural analyses, songs, and scores. There is also a reference to an “appendix to the present book” (p. 54) that refers to “this and other analyses.” That projected appendix, which contrasts graphing procedure to Schenker’s, is likely a close relative of the technical manual on durational reduction that concludes Lewin’s famous paper on “Auf dem Fluße,” initially published in 1982.

Immediately after leaving Paris, Lewin spent 1974–1975 as a visiting professor of composition at Harvard. Among his colleagues was Fred Lerdahl, who was in the early phases of his collaboration with linguist Ray Jackendoff. That collaboration eventually produced A Generative Theory of Tonal Music, still one of the central texts in music theory and cognition decades after its 1983 publication. Endnotes to that book indicate that one of the four analytical components of their theory, the time-span reduction, was significantly influenced by Lewin’s work on metrical reductions in Morgengrüß (Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983, p. 339). Lerdahl elaborates in a recent retrospective assessment: “Ideas of

7 Lewin also developed a significant volume of teaching materials on the three remaining Schubert songs at the core of the projected book. I am grateful to Nathan Martin for sharing his transcriptions of these materials from the Library of Congress.
rhythmic reduction were in the air. We took particular notice of Lewin’s (1974) version, in which events within a given metrical frame were selected, proceeding strictly from the bottom up. His method, however, lacked a grouping component or any special treatment of cadences, causing awkward results” (Lerdahl 2009, p. 190).

Morgengruß also anticipates Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s work in arguably more fundamental ways. Like GTTM, Lewin’s Morgengruß invests meter in the listening subject rather than the musical notation (p. 84). Moreover, Lewin’s seven principles of durational reduction (pp. 57, 94–97) lay a basis for the time-span reduction preference rules not only in their substance, but, more significantly, in their status as flexible principles that “are in tension one against another” (p. 58), a status that is also shared with the preference-rule architecture as it is deployed across all of the parameters that Lerdahl and Jackendoff explore.

Lewin harvested aspects of Morgengruß in his own published work, as it developed over the next fifteen years. The material from pp. 35 to 53, which offers conflicting interpretations of the chromatic measures 12–14, formed the analytic backbone of “Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes of Perception” (Lewin 1986), one of the most influential papers in recent music theory. As already noted, the material on metric reduction, the focus of the middle of Lewin’s essay, reappears in condensed form in Lewin 1982. In the late 1990s Lewin gathered those two essays, together with a new one on “Ihr Bild” and fourteen analyses of works by other composers, into Studies in Music with Text, published posthumously (Lewin 2006).

Morgengruß also holds the seed of an abstract idea that is central to Lewin’s mathematical/technical writings. After assigning the song “a familiar sort of three-part form” (p. 16), it introduces considerations that challenge that judgment. By p. 33, the initial assignment is reversed: the music has two parts, not three. Lewin has now positioned the reader face to face with the question to which he returns throughout the essay (and indeed through thirty years of subsequent writings): how do we reconcile analytic observations that appear to be mutually exclusive?

Consider now in this connection the way that Generalized Musical Intervals and Transformations introduces its central distinction between an intervallic/Cartesian and a transformational approach. In the simple graphic figure that begins GMIT, an arrow (i) connects two dots (s, t). The intervallic perspective, which dominates the first half of GMIT, assigns the dots primary status.

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8 Lewin’s epistemic procedures are freer than Lerdahl indicates. Although Lewin’s reductions systematically progress from the bottom to the top, on p. 94 he writes that “metric ambiguities in smaller contexts should be resolved in a large context.” I have elsewhere argued that Lerdahl’s time-span reductions have an underemphasized top-down component. See Cohn 2007, p. 102.
Introduction

The arrow measures the distance between two dots that are already present. The transformational perspective, developed in the GMIT’s final chapter, assigns the arrow primary status, as an action on dot \(s\) that, secondarily, produces \(t\).

Figure 1.1a joins Lewin’s graph with its translated image, producing three dots \((s, t, u)\), and two connecting arrows \((i, j)\). Figure 1.1b realizes the dots as prolonged diatonic harmonies in C major, and the arrows as triadic transformations that Lewin defines in GMIT.9

Whether “Morgengruß” divides into three segments or two depends in part on whether one prioritizes the prolonged harmonies (as in the unnumbered Ex. on p. 22) or the progressions between them (as in the unnumbered Ex. on p. 116). The ternary-to-binary shift across the opening pages of the essay involves a prolongation-to-progression shift, which anticipates an object-to-process shift across the book-length span of GMIT. Thus the issue that Lewin belabors through the first substantive part of Morgengruß can be seen to harbor, in a nutshell, the meta-transformation from a Cartesian perspective to a transformational one.

Genre and Gender

Morgengruß’s status as an essay, rather than a piece of scholarly research, is signaled by the absence of scholarly apparatus. Lewin was characteristically scrupulous about citing related writings from both historical sources (of which his knowledge was prodigious) and contemporary scholarship. Morgengruß mentions no music theorists, historical or contemporaneous, except for Schenker.

Readers will likely be caught up short by the universalizing male pronoun, which is present from the very first sentence: “Having acquainted himself with the song, the reader. . . .” These pronouns may seem particularly incongruous to

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9 Lewin 1987, 176–77. DOM transposes a consonant triad up by a perfect fourth, so that the input triad becomes the dominant of the output. DOM’ (equivalently written DOM\(^{-1}\) or SUBD), its inverse, transposes a consonant triad down by a perfect fourth, so that the input triad becomes the subdominant of the output.
theorists aware of Lewin’s activities as President of the Society for Music Theory from 1985 to 1988, when he actively supported the founding of its Committee on the Status of Women, helping to lay the groundwork for its enduring role in the profession, and particularly encouraged the institution of Guidelines for Non-Sexist Language. Were he to have been involved in preparation of the current edition of the essay for publication, we suspect that he would have revised the pronoun usage in accordance with his later predilections for avoiding gender reference altogether (e.g., “the reader will notice . . .”), which he preferred to counterbalanced language that draws attention to gender (“she will notice . . .” or “he/she will notice . . .”). Tempting as it was to intervene in this matter, the editors of this edition ultimately determined to preserve the text according to its author’s last known intention, fearing that rewriting would risk de-historicizing the essay and transforming some aspect of the author’s voice.

Leaving the pronouns unaltered has the secondary benefit of drawing attention to those passages (I count four) when Lewin addresses the reader directly as “you.” The passages in second person, which flow so easily that they raise the question of why the entire essay was not written in this way, foreground the dialogic character that sits just below the surface throughout much of the essay. That character becomes explicit late in the essay, where Lewin refers to “the sort of dialectic that one frequently goes through internally . . . in trying to work out a consistent overall context for one’s various impressions” (p. 99). Although such internal dialectics have the cast of a conversational dialogue among equals, most of the essay more closely resembles a conversation between teacher and student. Indeed, a number of passages from Lewin’s essay convert with an unusual degree of ease and comfort into a catechismic dialogue in the manner of Fux’s Gradus ad Parnassum (see Bent 2002, pp. 570–572).

Philological Issues

The flexible play evident in Lewin’s interpretation of the song contrasts with the determinate interpretation of the poem in the essay’s opening pages. He asserts that the optimistic psychological trajectory initiated in the second stanza 2 is reversed in the final lines, which he paraphrases as “the pain and care of (my) love is summoning you” (p. 19). The history of the poem’s reception, however, suggests that the meaning and mood of the poem’s final line are anything but clear. There are pessimistic interpreters, for whom “the lark is singing of love and sorrow” (Drinker 1970, p. 192) or “love declares pain and grief” (Phillips 1996, p. 84). And there are optimistic interpreters, for whom “love calls away pain and worries” (Ezust) or “the morning brings you love to free your heart from sadness”

10 Lewin’s analysis of “Ihr Bild” (2006, pp. 136f) shows that he was attuned to the significance of shifts from third to second person.
Orthogonal to this ambiguity of mood is one of syntax: the subject of the poem’s final phrase is variously interpreted as the lark, love, or pain and grief.

Lewin’s interpretation is complicated by his anomalous transcription of the first word of the poem’s final line. In a copy of the score that Lewin sent to Neighbour, Lewin struck through the published word and overwrote a substitute, converting “die Liebe Leid und Sorgen” to “der Liebe Leid und Sorgen.” This substitution is reproduced in Lewin’s translation, provided here on pp. 15–16, and also in the textual references to that line of the poem, on p. 19. The substitution converts the case of Liebe from either nominative (“love calls up pain and worries”) or accusative (“the lark calls love and pain and worries”) to genitive (“the pain and cares of love summon . . .”). The substitution is philologically supported neither in Müller’s poem nor in the various editions of Schubert’s song. Moreover, it is grammatically improbable, since “ruft” takes a singular subject, and Sorgen alone (a fortiori Leid und Sorgen) is plural. Lewin’s substitution may perpetuate a tradition of unknown origin and motivation. Der Liebe is preceded in at least two sources, Garran 1946 (p. 54) and Coffin 1966 (p. 346), both obscure and neither with strong claims to scholarly authority.

Schubert’s setting of Die Schöne Müllerin exists in two stemmata that originate respectively in the first published edition of 1824, and in the hand-copy of Karl von Schönstein, the cycle’s dedicatee (Youens 1992, p. 17). The copy of the score that Lewin evidently sent to Neighbour is in the Schönstein lineage, suggesting that this was the one with which he primarily worked. That he also had access to the alternate version, perhaps the Neue Schubert Ausgabe edited by Walther Dürr, is suggested by an annotation that appears on the Neighbour copy: the tenor b in the piano at the end of measure 17 is circled, and annotated “D?,” the pitch that appears there in the original 1824 publication. The motivic parallelism that Lewin indicates on p. 81 requires a D rather than a B in that position, and in the corresponding position of measure 19. (The B is also less likely because it doubles the leading tone in the voice.)

Another philological issue pertains to the register of the vocal line. The genders of Müller’s protagonist, of Schubert’s dedicatee, and of the first performer of Die Schöne Müllerin conspire to suggest that the vocal part is to be sung an octave below its notated pitch. Lewin’s analytic sketches nonetheless present the vocal

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11 The photocopy appears in the Library of Congress papers directly after Lewin’s letter to Neighbour of July 11, 1974. There is indirect evidence that that letter accompanied a complete draft of the Morgengrüß essay, in which case Lewin would have been providing the score as a courtesy. It is possible that Neighbour himself made the copy, and the annotation in response to Lewin’s text, although the librarian’s otherwise scrupulous curation of the letters suggests that it is more likely in Lewin’s hand.

12 The caveat in the final sentence of note 11 applies here as well.
line in its notated treble register, and his text indicates that the version of the song that he is analyzing is one in which the singer matches that notation. This leads to some analytic claims that do not apply to the score as it is usually performed. Lewin writes, for example, that the imitation between singer and pianist at measures 16–19 “keeps the high e sounding at each bar line until measure 20” (p. 82), and refers to the vocal gesture at measures 19–21 as “a descant over the piano” (p. 117 and passim). This raises the question of the relationship of the song that Lewin is analyzing to the one that Schubert intended and that a concert audience usually hears.

Although he counts performers among his target readership (p. 13), in only one passage does Lewin explicitly address an accomplished singer preparing a public performance (pp. 60–61). Although he figures that singer as male, it is unclear what significance to grant that gendering, given the universal male pronouns noted earlier. The many other references to “the performer” imagines “him” as a solitary reader of modest musical ability who is acoustically realizing some version of “Morgengruß” in private. This is the reader who “has sufficient performance skill to be able at least to fake the effect of the song to his own moderate satisfaction by some combination of his own playing and singing. (p. 13)” One possibility is that Lewin imagines that reader singing falsetto. More likely, he is performing piano and voice part together at the piano, while speaking or imagining the text. (Although sometimes Lewin exhorts the reader to “play or sing” through a reduction, more frequently, he ask him to simply “play” it.) This score reader might render the vocal line in the treble register not only because the notation seems to be directing him to do so, but also because such a rendering makes the vocal line more prominent, avoids registral crossing between the parts, and lies more comfortably under the hands in the final measures.

In any case, Lewin’s flexibility with register has a pertinent precedent. In a fair hand-copy of the song that immediately follows “Morgengruß” in a performance of Die Schöne Müllerin, Schubert reportedly wrote “The accompaniment to this song may conveniently be played an octave higher.” Susan Youens comments that “clearly, he was not particularly fastidious about such matters in performance” (1992, p. 17). If Schubert encourages the performer to transfer octaves in response to pragmatic considerations, perhaps Lewin intuited that a corresponding license was granted the analyst.
PART I

DAVID LEWIN’S MORGENGRÜß

The Text
Introduction and Preliminary Remarks

In presenting these analyses, I have attempted to keep several imaginary readers in mind. First is a musical amateur who likes the songs and would be interested in deepening his appreciation. Second is a performer, singer, or accompanist, who might be interested in the analyses for the light they could shed on performance problems. Third is a music student who could find the discussions useful as paradigms for musical analysis, particularly the analysis of songs. Fourth is a critic, literary or musical, who is interested generally in musical text-setting, or specifically in Schubert’s settings.

The musical backgrounds and skills of these readers will vary greatly. I have tried to assume as little as I can about the reader’s capacity in those respects. I do assume that the reader has sufficient performance skill to be able at least to fake the effect of the songs to his own moderate satisfaction by some combination of his own playing and singing. Equipped with that much ability, he will also be able to perform the analytic musical examples, and to test the effect of alternate possibilities in a way satisfactory to his aural imagination. The examples are all intended to be performed, and the reader should early on cultivate the habit of performing them.

I also assume that the reader has some familiarity with the basic concepts and vocabulary of music theory pertinent to tonality. Exposure equivalent to an academic semester’s work in a basic harmony course should be sufficient; certainly a year’s work. I am not concerned that the reader should be able to “identify” (i.e. label) every harmony or progression which appears in the song. What does

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1 In the original manuscript, Lewin refers to “songs,” since he intended to write about more songs than “Morgengruß.” See Introduction. All footnotes are from the Editors; there are no footnotes in Lewin’s manuscript.
David Lewin’s Morgengrùß

concern me is that he should be familiar with the aural sensations corresponding to such terms as “phrase,” “cadence,” “strong beat,” “moving from tonic to dominant,” etc., and that he should not feel alarmed when he encounters such terminology. To the extent that further theoretical background is desirable, either generally or in regard to specific passages, I will supply it.

To make the discourse clear for those readers who have had little or no previous experience with the techniques and problems of musical analysis, I have tried to proceed as carefully and deliberately as possible in the opening stages. Later on, I shall suppose that such a reader has acquired enough familiarity with the techniques and especially enough sophistication regarding the pitfalls, so that I can proceed more briskly. Meanwhile any reader, regardless of experience, may find parts of the opening chapter overly ponderous; for this I ask his indulgence. If he feels I am belaboring certain methodological preliminaries to his annoyance, he should follow his natural inclination to skim on ahead to more solid matters. My reasons for being so fussy at an early stage of the analysis will not become clear to him until he has finished the chapter. At that point, if he wishes, he can return to the early material with a better idea of why these preliminary considerations are important, as influencing where the analysis eventually does or does not lead.

A score for the song to be discussed is within the first volume of any of the standard editions; the keys indicated in the text will be those in the editions “for high voice.” I shall suppose the reader to have familiarized himself thoroughly with both the poem and the music for the song before reading the analysis. As far as the music is concerned, he should have reached the stage where he can at least fake through the piece to his satisfaction, using some combination of keyboard and voice as discussed earlier. I have written out the poem in standard verse format preceding the analysis. I have also written out fairly literal translations alongside. A translation for performance purposes is often forced to distort the literal meaning, and this can be a serious hindrance to analysis.

“Morgengrùß” (C major)

Guten Morgen, schöne Müllerin!
Wo steckst du gleich das Köpfchen hin,
als wär’ dir was geschehen?
Verdrießt dich denn mein Gruß so schwer?
Verstört dich denn mein Blick so sehr?
So muß ich wieder gehen.

2 Concerning Lewin’s use of the male pronoun, see Introduction.
3 On the reference to “chapters,” see Introduction.
4 We have converted the German “ss” to “ß,” as we imagine Lewin would have done had he been using a typewriter with German typography.
Morgengruß

O laß mich nur von ferne steh’n,
nach deinem lieben Fenster seh’n,
von ferne, ganz von ferne!
Du blondes Köpfchen, komm hervor!
Hervor aus eurem runden Thor,
ahr blauen Morgensterne.

Ihr schlummertrunk’nen Äugelein,
ihr thaubetrübten Blümelein,
was scheuet ihr die Sonne?
Hat es die Nacht so gut gemeint,
daß ihr euch schließt und bückt und weint
nach ihrer stillen Wonne?

Nun schüttelt ab der träume Flor,
und hebt euch frisch und frei empor
in Gottes hellen Morgen!
Die Lerche wirbelt in der Luft,
und aus dem tiefen Herzen ruft
der Liebe Leid und Sorgen.

Good morning, pretty miller-maid.
Why do you at once pull your head in
as if something had happened to you?
Does my greeting oppress you so?
Does my gaze disturb you so?
Then I must again be off.

O let me but stand far away
looking at your dear window,
from far, far away.
Dear blonde head, come forth!
Come forth from your round gate,
ye blue morning-stars.

Ye sleep-drunk little eyes,
tiny dew-laden flowers,
why hide from the sun?
Was the night so good
that ye close and bow and weep
for her quiet charm?
Now shake off your veil of dreams
and rouse yourselves, fresh and free,
to God’s shining morning.
The lark warbles in the air
and, from the heart’s depths, call
love’s pain and cares.

Having acquainted himself with the song, the reader has most likely formulated
an impression along the following lines: this is a basically simple and straightforward piece, with a familiar sort of three-part form:

( introduction: measures 1 - 4 )

strophe, repeated three times:

\[
\begin{align*}
A & : & 5 - 11 \\
B & : & 12 - 15 \\
A' & : & 16 - 23 \\
\end{align*}
\]

Subsequent analysis will modify such initial impressions considerably, even radically. But they are a good working point of departure, since they evidently reflect aspects of the piece that one is reasonably sure one actually hears and considers characteristic. The point of further analysis is not to dismiss such intuitions nor to raise artificial barriers against them, but rather to explore how they can be made richer and more exact, so that one can hear more and more clearly.

Let us begin then with the impression that the song is simple and straightforward. And let us ask: what specific features of the piece create such an impression? In this way, we can test the general impression against description of concrete aspects of the work. We can then check the descriptions to see how accurate and valid they really are, and also what they highlight. Our impressions might be revised or qualified accordingly.

One way in which the piece projects “simplicity” is in the textures of the accompaniment. Those consist to a large extent either of blocked chords or of simple arpeggiation of such chords. By and large, one does not hear any independent melody emerging from the piano to contend with that of the voice. When there is independent melodic activity in the accompaniment, it emerges as literal imitation of some figure which the voice has just sung. This occurs at measures 10–11 and 21–23. At those points, the voice has stopped singing and one hears the piano as an echo. The phenomenon also occurs at measure 17 and following. There, however, the voice does not stop singing; rather it repeats its own figure yet once more, and the piano repeats its imitation. This creates a simple round. Aside from that round, there is nothing going on in the song which one would intuitively call “melodic counterpoint” between the voice and piano.
The above descriptions are reasonably accurate and valid. They highlight particularly the two echoes at measures 10–11 and 21–23, and the round after measure 16.

Another way in which the piece projects “simplicity” is in its harmonic vocabulary. The introduction and the A section of the strophe (measures 5–11) are mainly built on simple diatonic harmonies and progressions. Toward the end of the A section, in measures 9–11, substantial chromatic ornamentation of the basically diatonic harmonies is introduced, but the underlying diatonic sense is clear. In the B section (measures 12–15) the harmony does, to be sure, become more adventurous. Chromaticism now affects entire chords, not just ornaments to diatonic chords. But that ultimately makes the sense of harmonic simplicity all the stronger after the return to A at measure 16. From there to the end of the strophe, only diatonic tonic and dominant harmony is heard. And the whole section essentially takes place over a static tonic c in the bass.

This description is also reasonably accurate and valid. No amount of caviling over exactly what one means by “simple” harmony is likely to change one’s intuitive impression that the introduction, the A section, and particularly the A’ section do in fact constitute a “simple” harmonic frame for the song. The description highlights the contrasting nature of the B section, and to an extent the end of the A section, in this respect. We become specifically aware that the chromaticism of the B section was already beginning to set in with the a♭ in the bass of measure 9.

Another respect in which the song appears “simple” is in the gist of the text. The poet greets the maid as she stands at her window in the morning; she withdraws abruptly and, after a bit of coaxing, he concludes that his wooing is in vain and decides to leave. The little scene is quite straightforward, indeed almost trivial.

This description, however, is not accurate. It is valid enough as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. Most crucially, it ignores the last three stanzas of the poem and the concomitant music. At the end of the first stanza the poet has indeed concluded, with substantial dramatic resolution and considerable musical resolution to support it, that he must go. Yes, as the major-general says, but you don’t go! Instead, the poet remains to deliver three more stanzas of text. And the music repeats the first strophe three more times, essentially literally.

From these observations, we can extract two questions for consideration. First, what, if anything, is the poetic function of the last three stanzas? The first one constitutes a complete and self-contained little scene. It contains a fair amount of implied physical activity, and it certainly contains its own dramatic resolution. It could be put on the stage or used as a scenario for an exercise in an acting class. What “happens” beyond it in the last three stanzas?

Second: depending on one’s answer to the first question, what effect is created by Schubert’s setting those last three stanzas each to the same music as that for the first? (Such a setting is called “strophic,” a term which we can use as a handy shorthand in future discussion.)
At this point, I suspect a number of readers will protest: surely these are no weighty issues; they are simply matters of convention. Specifically, there is a poetic convention of the rejected lover’s pouring out his heart in lyric expansion of his feelings. Such lyric expansion needs no dramatic “explanation.” There is also a musical convention of setting poems strophically when they fall into stanzas. This practice also needs no “explanation” beyond our simple pleasure in hearing music we like repeated several times after having enjoyed it once.

The problem with this attitude is that it evades considering the work of art itself. Is the lover simply “pouring out his heart” here? If so, can we let the matter rest there: do his pronouncements have no structure, his feelings no progression as far as any effect on us is concerned? As regards the second question, do we in fact respond to the last three strophes simply as repetitions of the presumably pleasurable musical experience we had in hearing the first?

It may be so. But in that case we can describe what is going on perfectly well in those words without having to evoke any external conventions. And it would be dubious to assume at this stage in the analysis that we need investigate the last three stanzas and strophes no further because we can take them as completely conventional. Why should we choose to listen to the piece in only that way if we might in fact find further values in it beyond the conventional ones? It is worth at least exploring what more there may be.

Let us then examine specifically what the conventional explanations have to say about the last three stanzas and the strophic setting. Invoking the poetic convention would assert that dramatic time essentially freezes at the end of the first stanza, and that the last three constitute only dramatically static lyric expansion of the poet’s state of being at that point. Invoking the musical convention would then assert that we feel no aesthetic incongruity at hearing the music for the first stanza over and over in this situation, that action being exactly what the poet is lyrically mulling over.

Now these assertions (without referring to “conventions”) seem quite pertinent to the actual effect of the piece. Nevertheless, they are not entirely adequate in describing the effect of the last three strophes. To consider the poem first: it is quite true that “stage” action ceases after “So muß ich wieder gehen”; we have already noted the self-contained structure of the first stanza as a stage scene. But the lyric expansion of the last three stanzas itself has a definite form and progression, one which we should certainly not ignore in considering the total effect of the song.

Before proceeding, though, we should ask: is the text simply lyric expansion, or is there still some persistence of dramatic action? The poet, after all, does continue to exhort the maid to reappear at the window. Does he really expect that she might? If so, he is still a dramatic agent and not just a lyric vehicle. One could argue the point somewhat, but let us suppose for present purposes that he really does not believe she might return. Whatever one might argue here from
the poem, Schubert’s setting strongly supports that reading. The repetitions of the strophes indicate that action is (in some sense) completed by the end of the first stanza. And this is reinforced by the power of the musical resolution at “So muß ich wieder gehen.” Schubert extends both text and music there considerably, supporting an inference that this resolution is definitive even if reluctant. So we may suppose that the poet is no longer a dramatic agent, at least in the stage sense of the term.

Now let us see how the text is actually structured over the last three stanzas.

Stanza 2: “O laß mich . . . von ferne!”. This half of the stanza still contains a residue of stage action. One can imagine a stage direction: the poet starts to leave, then turns and continues. Beyond that, the metaphorical suggestion of “von ferne” supports the notion that what follows will be lyrically “distanced” from the preceding action.


The grammar of the stanza as a whole is cast in the form of imperative sentences: “let me”; “come forth.” This contrasts notably with the real dramatic wooing of the first stanza, which was all interrogative: “why do you withdraw?”; “do I disturb you?” The change in grammatical mood is noteworthy, as the wooing passes from practical reality to lyric fantasy.

Stanza 3: The poet continues to build the metaphors associating the maid with awakening Nature. The grammatical mood returns to the interrogative throughout, paralleling the wooing of the first stanza.

Stanza 4: “Nun schuttelt . . . Morgen!”: The mood returns to imperative, now with the sense of command rather than request. The poet drops the Nature metaphors and addresses the maid directly (in fantasy at least).

“Die Lerche . . . Luft”: The mood returns to declarative for the first time since “So muß ich wieder gehen.” The reference to Nature returns, for the moment only as a non-metaphorical description.

“[U]nd . . . Sorgen.”: The declarative mood is sustained. The lark’s song, as one expects, is led to another Nature-metaphor. What is unexpected is the specific metaphor that is formulated. The lark’s song is calling all Nature to arise, just as . . . what? Not “I call on you to arise and greet me joyfully,” but rather “the pain and care of (my) love is summoning you.”

The final twist is a strong punch line. The inversion of the metaphorical cliché is surprising and makes a pronounced poetic accent. One expects the song of the lark to be linked with joy, and the text from stanza 2 on has further built up that expectation here. Metaphorical ornithology would supply for “the pain and cares
of love” not the lark, but the nightingale—a bird who seems strikingly out of place in the scene the poet has so far painted.

The poetic accent emphasizes the position in which the poet sees himself. So far, all the nature metaphors have associated the maid with awakening Nature. The final metaphor, now in declarative mood, associated the poet with the awakening force itself, but in a curiously inverted way. He will awaken the maid not to the joys of love, but to its pain and cares; furthermore her awakening will be as natural and inevitable as the response of Nature to a new day. This is pretty heavy business: no wonder (his fantasy suggests) she withdrew in alarm at my approach.

The developing system of Nature metaphors over the last three stanzas builds to the final inverted metaphor, where the poet finds his own position in the situation at last. So does the progression of grammatical moods: from the questions of stanza 1, through the requests of stanza 2, through the further questions of stanza 3, to the command at the first half of stanza 4, to the final declarative announcement at the end. Apart from that final sentence, the only other sentence of the poem in declarative mood is “So muß ich wieder gehen.” The grammatical play also highlights one other sentence, which is uniquely neither declarative, interrogative, nor imperative. Namely, “Guten Morgen, schöne Müllerin!” itself. That occurred at the unique moment when the poet was actually acting in his role as awakener. It elicited the one decisive physical event of the scene, as the maid abruptly withdrew. The content of the poem from stanza 2 on is suggestively taken in this regard as an extended analysis by the poet on the emotional meaning for him of his “innocent” greeting and her strange reaction. This idea is particularly reinforced by the recall of the word Morgen itself in the last stanza, to rhyme with the final Sorgen.

In sum, while the dramatic (stage) activity of the poet can indeed be taken to end with the declarative resolution “So muß ich wieder gehen,” the psychological action continues on for three more stanzas, to the only other declarative sentence of the text, set to the same music. The goal of the poet’s psychological action is not to handle the “real” situation (at least we have so assumed); rather it is to reach a certain stage of insight into how he regards himself in that situation. The psychological action is carefully structured by the poem into a clear progression with a strongly accented goal.

From an unsympathetic point of view, one could say that the poet is simply finding a way of salvaging his wounded pride by identifying himself in grandiose manner with inexorable natural forces. Reading the poem alone, one might conjecture that he at least partly expects that his emotional exploration over the last three stanzas will be so compelling as to cause the maid to reappear. This notion lends a certain tension to the situation which could be useful to a singer in projecting a performance. But as we have already seen, Schubert’s setting seems rather to support the reading that the poet is basically talking to himself, not to the maid, over the last three stanzas. Specifically, we noted the forms of the musical resolution of “So muß ich . . .,” indicating the resolution of the dramatic (stage) action
proper. We also noted how the strophic setting suggests that the poet, over the last three strophes, is simply mulling over the material of the first.

The latter remains true to some extent. But we have just seen also that psychological action definitely and clearly continues on over the last three stanzas of text, leading to a new, psychological resolution. The strophic setting is apparently oblivious to that portion of the poem which, after all, is three-fourths of its total span. What are we to make of this?

The most important methodological point to be made is that we should reserve judgment at this point. Before we speculate at all about what Schubert did not do, we have first to examine just what he did do. In light of the textual analysis so far, we can certainly say that the strophic setting is striking, to a much greater extent than the reader had probably felt at first. We need not be concerned with how Schubert arrived at such a setting (whether e.g. through carelessness or haste or calculation or inspiration). What should concern us is to explore the actual effect of the strophic setting, as it interacts with the progressive and non-repetitive aspects of the text over the last three stanzas in creating a certain aesthetic result. And we cannot explore that effect to any great extent until we have analyzed the actual music itself in considerable depth, as it turns out in this case.

In particular, one should resist any temptation to assume, in advance of such exploration, that Schubert was simply being careless and the piece is flawed as a result. Or to assume that Schubert was careless, but that it doesn’t matter because the musical convention will automatically override any awareness of that on the listener’s part. At the present stage of the analysis, both of these assumptions would amount only to excuses for avoiding the responsibility of carefully examining and hearing what, if anything, does actually happen in the piece as a result of what Schubert actually did. The time for such critical judgments is after the analysis, not before. At that later point, if we have still found nothing more to say about the strophic setting, we can then formulate a critical response to our perception in that regard. We shall in that case presumably keep in mind the possibility that it might be our perception rather than Schubert’s craft which was deficient. This since if we do not believe that Schubert’s craft has something to teach our perception, we have no sensible reason for wanting to study his songs in the first place.

Our examination of the inadequate original description of the “simple” text has thus led us to some interesting fresh observations as regards the text itself and the manner of Schubert’s setting. At present, we have only to keep those observations in reserve, awaiting possible future occasions to bring them into play at a later stage of the analysis.

To pick up the music itself here, let us return to the initial impression of a “three-part A B A’ form” for the strophe. Following our procedure in investigating the song’s “simplicity,” we should start by trying to describe more exactly just which specific features of the music project that form so clearly.
To begin with, there are three clear musical phrases within the strophe. The A and A’ phrases (measures 5–11 and 16–23) are each articulated by a piano echo at the end. The B phrase (measures 12–15) has a fermata at its end, as does the A’ phrase.

Each phrase has its own characteristic accompaniment figuration. A is accompanied by block chords, basically, until toward its end; B is accompanied by eighth-note arpeggiation of the harmonies; A’ is accompanied by triplet-eighth arpeggiation, and by the little round, up to the end of the voice part.

The last description highlights two things. First, the accompaniment rhythm becomes more and more active through the entire strophe, right up to measure 20. This happens mainly by stages corresponding to the phrase structure, at measures 12 and 16, but it also already happens within phrase A itself: the dotted halves of the accompaniment over measures 5–8 already quicken into (ornamented) quarters at measure 9 and after, before breaking into eighths at measure 12. This aspect of the strophe is continuous and progressive; it does not fit very well into the statement/contrast/return frame of the ABA model. Second, the progressive rhythmic treatment of the accompaniment leads directly to measure 20, which it brings out with particular force: the rhythmic flow abruptly halts and the accompaniment returns to dotted half. Further, the voice itself sings a dotted half there, by far the longest note in the piece. And yet further, that note, the high f, is the highest note of the entire vocal line. The voice had reached the f before, but it never has been or will be any higher. There should presumably be some special “point” about this gesture which the discussion has highlighted. We tuck the observation away for future reference: we cannot find any immediately concurrent suggestion for the musical gesture in the text.

As already discussed, the three phrases are clearly distinguished in harmonic vocabulary. Phrase A constitutes a direct diatonic progression, with some chromatic ornamentation of basically diatonic harmonies toward its end. Phrase B involves more adventurous harmony, the chromatic tones being actual members of the chords rather than ornaments. Phrase A’ returns to simple harmony, in fact almost to static tonic harmony.

Following up this description more carefully: it is true that there are certain aspects of harmonic structure which lead us to hear A’ as a “return” of A. Specifically, their relative harmonic simplicity. Also the fact that both phrases begin with tonic harmony, in contrast to B. But there are also striking differences between A and A’ in harmonic effect. First, A’ is essentially static harmonically, while A moves. And second, A’ essentially remains on tonic harmony throughout, while A progresses away from its opening tonic to a dominant goal. It is worthwhile sketching the large harmonic actions, in that sense, of the three phrases:

```
I  V   V   I
```

phrase A  phrase B  phrase A’
Inspecting the little chart, we become aware of a point of similarity between A and B: both end on V. And a point of similarity between B and A': both essentially elaborate on large harmony (V or I respectively), rather than moving dynamically from one large harmony to another, as did phrase A. The chart thus highlights the fact that A' is not just a simple "reprise" of A in its musical function. This in spite of the features which led us to associate them, hearing the B phrase as a "contrasting middle section." The harmonic actions of the three phrases are three distinct gestures.

Another feature of the music which distinguishes the three phrases is the large direction of the vocal line. In phrase A, the register of the voice gradually rises overall. In phrase B, the vocal line gradually sinks downwards. And in phrase A', the vocal line circles around and around its one figure, up to the gesture of measure 20. As with the large harmonic actions of the phrases, we have here three distinct varieties of behavior rather than two similar ones separated by a contrasting third one.

Nevertheless, we do hear A' as a "reprise" of A to a considerable degree; we would not describe the three phrases as ABC rather than ABA'. Partly this is due to factors already cited: the return of tonic harmony and harmonic "simplicity" at measure 16. But doubtless our strongest reason is the reappearance at measure 16 of the same contour motive we heard at the opening of the A phrase (and the opening of the piano introduction). The alliteration of the textually stressed "M" syllables is also striking in this connection.

The initial leap of the motive, from g up to e, makes a particularly strong impression here, especially when heard in contrast to the contours of the vocal line during the B phrase.

However, the above citation displays not only how the motive returns at measure 16; it also displays how radically the motive is transformed rhythmically and metrically. As before, we note striking contrast between A and A' here along with similarity in certain respects. The strongest aspect of the transformation is that the musical stress is displaced from the original low g at the bar line of measure 5 to the high e at the bar line of measure 16, a displacement which the alliteration also brings out.

The resulting emphasis on the high e at measure 16 is of evident importance over the whole A' phrase. The high e recurs in either voice or piano at every
entrance of the round figure: that is in fact at the bar line of every measure right up to measure 20. The high f there in turn resolves back to the high e in the voice at the bar line of measure 21. This whole aspect of the large melodic behavior of A′ is in notable contrast to the melodic behavior of A.

We can, however, now note that a strong high f does appear as the melodic climax of A, at the bar line of measure 9 in the voice. Perhaps there is some large-scale relationship involved; let us work on the idea a bit. We hear that the bar line of measure 9 is precisely where the quickening of the accompaniment rhythm begins, to stop ultimately at the high f of measure 20. The bar line of measure 9 is also exactly where the first chromatic note of rhythmic substance in the piece appears: the a♭ in the bass. That is an ornament to the subsequent g, which remains over measures 9–11 as the bass of the “big dominant harmony” that is the goal of the harmonic action over the first phrase as a whole. With the qualifying a♭, we can thus hear the entire A phrase reaching its harmonic goal precisely at the bar line of measure 9. And, to that big dominant, the high f of the voice provides a seventh:

![Diagram showing the progression of chords and tones](image)

The big dominant in itself has considerable tonal tension, that is, an urge to resolve back to an equally big or bigger tonic. The tension is all the greater with the high f in the harmony, forming a dominant seventh chord. Specifically, one feels a natural strong tendency for the dominant seventh chord to resolve according to the norm of Example 1.

*Example 1*

![Diagram showing the resolution of a chord](image)

We can note a suggestive candidate to supplant the question mark in Example 1: measure 16. There, with considerable force, we do in fact hear exactly the phenomenon symbolized by the resolution of the example, as an appropriately “big” tonic. But, numbers of readers may ask, how can we possibly actually hear a chord and vocal tone at measure 9 “resolving” to a chord and vocal tone seven measures later, when there has been so much musical activity in between?
In the sequel we shall (among other things) expose an analytic procedure which will in fact allow us to entertain exactly that notion in an aurally sensible manner. It would be premature to go into the technical aspects of the procedure at this point. For the reader to whom the idea may be novel and startling, suffice it to say that the underlying conceptual basis is to hear the music intervening between measures 9 and 16, in a suitably large context and from a certain point of view, as a highly elaborated ornamentation of the gesture of Example 1. The qualification “in a suitably large context and from a certain point of view” is important. It is not necessary to hear the intervening music as having no other functions or as being “less important.” In fact it is necessary not to fall into that pitfall, as we shall see.

The reader can perhaps already get some sense of the notion under consideration by reviewing the sketch for the “large harmonic action” of the strophe which we made earlier:

![Harmonic Action Sketch]

Considering the musical impetus leading up to the dominant at measure 9, one can not hear any opportunity for that dominant to resolve to tonic with commensurate weight until measure 16. The bass g, once attained at measure 9, remains through measure 11. The peripatetic harmonies of the B phrase, whatever they are doing (we shall examine that eventually), certainly do not resolve that dominant, and at the end of the B phrase we are again (or still) on dominant harmony, under a fermata. In this sense, we do in some respect “hear” the force of the dominant persisting from measure 9 through measure 15.

The urge of dominant harmony to resolve to tonic can be loosely analogized with the urge of a question to find a resolving answer. Here the analogy is very suggestive in connection with the text of the first stanza. The push of phrase A to its dominant goal coincides with the posing of the first question in the text. The B phrase, which moves about within the realm of the dominant harmony without resolving it, can be thought of in that sense as “elaborating” the dominant; concurrently, there are two more questions in the text, elaborating the question posed before. And the answer, “So muß ich wieder gehen,” coincides with the resolution of dominant to tonic at measure 16. So we can think of a “dominant section” of the strophe, from measures 9 through 15 coinciding with the “question section” of the stanza. Considering particularly the significance of the interrogative mood through the poem, and of the declarative mood through the poem and especially at “So muß ich . . . ,” the notion seems suggestive.

It also fits well with the function of chromaticism in the strophe. That is, beginning with the a♭ in the bass at the bar line of measure 9 and continuing through the end of the B phrase at measure 15, our putative “dominant section” is not only the
“question section” but also the “chromatic section” of the strophe. Measure 16 of course liquidates all the chromaticism with its answer; phrase A’ is ostentatiously diatonic.

The idea of articulating measures 9–15 as a “dominant section,” however, does not fit completely with the earlier ABA’ articulations. Specifically, it would override the articulation at measure 12. Should we entail a different articulation of ABA? Say

A: 5–8 (Good morning; diatonic; progression from tonic to
B: 9–15 (dominant section; chromatic; question demanding
A’: 16–23 (resolution by tonic, diatonicism, and the declarative “So muß . . . ”)

The trouble with this reading is that it rides roughshod over the obvious phrase structure of the piece, which articulates very clearly at measure 12. However, the reading does highlight a deficiency of the “clear ABA’ form” from which we began. That original impression does not have anything to say about the whole complex of aspects of the piece which we have just been discussing in connection with the “dominant section.”

Let us return to one of those, the putative large-scale connection of measure 9 to measure 16 as in Example 1. We have clarified somewhat the senses in which one can hear the dominant force of measure 9 persisting until measure 16, both purely musically and in connection with the text. But we have not yet discussed how one might hear the seventh of that dominant, the high f of measure 9, persisting in force until its putative melodic resolution to the high e of measure 16. Can one really “hold onto” the f aurally, as one can “hold onto” the general dominant sense, until measure 16? Does not the force of the seventh dissipate itself harmonically beforehand, say into the harmony on the third beat of measure 9? Or melodically, say onto the e in the voice at the bar line of measure 10?

Once again, our subsequent procedures will show how, if one wants, one can “analyze through” such events, holding onto the structural force of the high f. And the technique will allow one actually to “hear how one hears” this happening, if one does in fact hear it happening. But why, at this point, should one even suspect hearing such a relationship, even subliminally? Well, first of all there is the dominant-to-tonic feature underlying the relation of measure 9 to measure 16; if that aspect of the relation, as we have so far explored it, is functional, we should at least entertain the possibility of a concomitant functional melodic connection between the high voice tones supported by the harmonies involved. Second, if we entertain that possibility, we will immediately be struck by the f–to–e gesture of the voice in measures 20–21. That gesture, which struck us earlier in another connection, seems to make excellent “sense” as a capsulized summary of a putative relation between the f of measure 9 and the e of measure 16. We have noted that
the e of measure 16 is kept sounding, by voice or piano, at each bar line until that of measure 20, so that the f there is easily heard in relation to the e of measure 16. And, since the f is the highest note of the voice part, there will be some at least subliminal association of the f at measure 20 with the f of measure 9. Also suggestive here is the fact that the accompaniment rhythm began to quicken exactly under the f of measure 9, and continued to quicken progressively until stopping short exactly under the f of measure 20. For the singer, of course, all these associations will be much more than subliminal.

Later on, we shall see yet another reason why relating the f at measure 9 to the e in measure 16 seems suggestive. Meanwhile, let us sum up the investigations through which our descriptive exploration of the “three-part form” has led us. The three-part form is certainly there as regards at least phrase structure and a number of very audible features of the piece. The notion that we hear the third phrase as a sort of reprise of the first, writing ABA‘ instead of ABC symbolically, is also viable, though investigation reveals strong contrasts between A and A‘ as well as points of similarity. So far we have noted only two aspects of the piece which do not fit more or less comfortably within the scheme. One is the continuous and progressive build-up of the accompaniment rhythm, starting at measure 9 and going through measures 12 and 16, up to the abrupt halt at measure 20. The other, much more formidable, is the strength of the relation in various respects between a putative articulation at measure 9 and the articulation at measure 16. This certainly does not affect our perception of the phrase articulation at measure 12, but it does indicate that things of importance are going on in the piece which cannot be described in terms of the ABA‘ model alone.

For methodological purposes, I will now set up another straw man who argues from convention. At this point, he might say: look, thousands of songs had already been written in ABA‘ form by the time of Schubert. As we all know, Schubert composed very quickly, often setting several songs in one day. Naturally he just seized whatever conventional form occurred to him to set this piece. And naturally, as a result, the form basically “works” in some respects and does not in others. If it works well enough, there is no point agonizing over the things in the piece that don’t fit it, attributing subtleties and complexities to the compositional procedure of a man who was basically an inspired tunesmith.

I hope that, at this point, the initially naive reader already has less patience with such an argument than he may have had earlier. That is, I hope he finds the putative articulation at measure 9, as it relates to measure 16, intriguing and suggestive; that he is interested in exploring further how this aspect of the shape of the piece coexists and interacts with the ABA‘ form. And that he will at least mildly resent someone’s telling him in effect that he ought to forego such an exploration on the grounds that it is bound to lead nowhere. This just as the Vatican astronomers refused to look at the moons of Jupiter through Galileo’s telescope because they knew that Jupiter had no moons and could not have any.
But let me meet my straw man more directly yet. I can say to him: very well, let us suppose that what you say is all generally true, and let us pretend that you are Schubert. That is, you are an inspired tunesmith grinding out one song after another with the aid of stock conventional forms. You decide to set “Morgengruß.” You read it over quickly and, as such a composer would do, you get a general sense of the meaning, plus the rough outlines of its metric form and rhyme scheme. In the latter respects, for the first stanza, you read:

\[(U) U/\quad U/\quad U/\quad U/\quad -\quad in.\]
\[
U/\quad U/\quad U/\quad U/\quad hin\]
\[
U/\quad U/\quad U/\quad -\quad schehen?\]
\[
U/\quad U/\quad U/\quad U/\quad schwer?\]
\[
U/\quad U/\quad U/\quad U/\quad sehr?\]
\[
U/\quad U/\quad U/\quad gehen.\]

The following three stanzas have the same metric structure: \[\begin{array}{ll}
a & a \\ b & b \\ A & A \end{array}\] and the same rhyme-scheme \[\begin{array}{ll}
a & a \\ A & b \\ A \end{array}\]. And now you “automatically” reach for a musical form which will set this stanza with a minimum of effort, namely: \(ABA'??!!!\) This is obviously a preposterous reconstruction, unless one believes that Schubert was a complete dolt, and not even an uninspired hack.

I have gone through this disputation with my straw man because it highlights very strongly, particularly for the reader who may be a novice in such matters, the pitfalls involved in arguments from convention. In general, one should mistrust any argument that tells you not to examine the piece any more. Such an argument is always specious, an excuse for evading analytic responsibility and (worse) aural receptivity. Beyond that, as in this case, it can lead at times into substantial misapprehension of a musical experience.

Here we have seen specifically that Schubert did not automatically reach for the musical form which would set the text comfortably, so far as the \(ABA'\) form is functional. As earlier, we need not concern ourselves here with the reason he conceived a three-part \(ABA'\) phrase structure for a text which clearly suggests a two-part \(AA\) or \(AA'\). (Whether he did so, e.g. by calculation or by inspiration; he could hardly have done so as a matter of careless routine.) What will concern us, as earlier, are the results of his conception as they affect our perception of the piece.
Once having noted the metric structure and rhyme-scheme of the text, we can no longer consider the “three-part form” for the strophe to be so self-evident. The strongest feature of the music so far examined which did not fit well with the ABA′ was the complex of relationships associating measure 16 with a putative articulation at measure 9. If we now go back to that notion, we see that it fits extremely convincingly with the two-part structure of the text, measures 9 and 16 corresponding to structurally parallel moments in the stanza: \( \begin{array}{c} \text{A} \\ \text{a} \end{array} | \begin{array}{c} \text{a} \\ \text{a} \end{array} | \begin{array}{c} \text{b} \\ \text{a} \end{array} \) (Above, I have written “a′ a′ b” as a sort of symbolic compromise between “a a b” for the metric structure and “c c b” for the rhyme scheme.)

In light of this parallelism, the conjectured structural relation between measure 9 and measure 16 is probably now convincing even for the reader who has trouble hearing the large-scale musical relations discussed before. Simply reciting the German text while looking at the above diagram and even vaguely imagining the music should be enough to carry conviction. By articulating a a | b a a | b, instead of the more “obvious” | a a b | a a b|, Schubert both reflects the two-part text structure and at the same time groups together those lines of text, in the first stanza, which end with question marks. Symbolically, we can sketch:

\[
\begin{array}{c|cccc}
  & a & a & b & a' & a' & b \\
9 & \text{I} & \rightarrow & v' & \rightarrow & ? & ? & ?
\end{array}
\]

The above diagram brings out what we have referred to as the “dominant section” of the strophe, in the form of a sort of “large measure” governed by the dominant harmony. The idea of a “large measure,” reflected by vertical lines as symbols on the diagram, seems appropriate in that one experiences the arrivals of the tonal impetus, first at the dominant of measure 9 and later at the tonic resolution of measure 16, as large “beats.” The notion is not at all inconsistent with the phrase structure. Just as one is familiar with phrasing slurs in ordinary music which can begin at a bar line, or end just before a bar line, or go over a bar line, so can one hear larger musical phrases which begin with a large beat, end just before a large beat, or go over a large beat. All three types would be in evidence here:
In sum, the articulation of the three-part form at measure 12 is a phrasing articulation, while the articulation of the two-part form at measure 9 is metric, both on a large scale.

Having observed that the relation of measure 9 to measure 16 fits well with the two-part form of the text and the large metric sense determined by the tonal “arrivals” in the music, let us look for other, hopefully less sophisticated, ways in which the music projects two-part form. The big problem facing the untrained analyst here is that once he has heard the three-part form clearly, it is hard for him to shift gears and listen for manifestations of two-part form. The trick in overcoming the problem is to realize that it is basically an intellectual and not an aural difficulty. There is no reason, that is, why the strophe must be “in” either three-part or two-part form. The mistaken notion to the contrary, propagated all too assiduously by all too many academics, is yet again a manifestation of a desire to stop listening at a certain point, shutting out the musical experience in all its richness rather than coming to grips with it. The textbook forms are useful analytically only in so far as they describe certain aspects of large numbers of interesting pieces. In that respect, they are a convenient mental shorthand. Their only analytic value, however, is to help us perceive and enjoy what is going on in the music itself; when they inhibit that process, one should ignore them.

The untrained reader may well respond: I grant your point, but I don’t need any Fourth-of-July speeches. Admitting that I have been brainwashed, by myself and/or others, into a state where I cannot hear certain musical projections of two-part form in the strophe which I suppose must be there, then how do I now go about hearing them? Here, alas, the only remedy is experience. Experience, that is, in keeping one’s ears open and in learning how far to trust and mistrust the force of one’s partial impressions, before they become more of a liability than an asset.

That is, I do not expect that the reader who is in difficulty at this point will be able to get out of it by himself. So I shall help him along. To the extent that he responds, after that nudge, by saying “Ah of course; how could I have not noticed that?” he should not feel intimidated by his own supposed denseness. The experience is well-nigh universal among analytic novices and, I hasten to add, among experienced analysts as well. Rather, he should take note of the experience itself for future use in finding an adjustment between his ear and his mind which will enable him to respond to music in a psychological state which is neither brainless nor aurally overpowered by intellectual preconceptions.

Probably the strongest manifestation of two-part form in the foreground of the music lies in the rhythmic construction of the voice part. One might, in retrospect, expect this. For the voice has to sing the text and the “b” lines of the text are rhythmically contrasted to the “a” and “a’” lines, being half a foot shorter. But I do not think one could “deduce” that this was where to look further for two-part form in the music, nor do I think that such “deduction” is to be recommended as a method for solving aural problems . . . quite the contrary. One might simply note,
for future reference, that it was helpful here to examine that aspect of the song. One will then become more sensitive to that aspect of songs generally. Writing out the vocal rhythms here, we observe the following scheme:

Using the above sketch, we hear that a certain “a-motif” is basically employed, with slight variations, for each of the “a” and “a’” lines of text, while a certain “b-motif” is employed for the “b” lines. The motifs begin exactly the same way. What distinguishes b from a is, first, the triplet figure and, second, the two quarters at the end, with a “falling” feeling from the first to the second which I have symbolized by a slur not always written out in the voice part (but that is a notational convention; the slur is always written in the piano). I will call the latter the “falling element” of the b-motif. The a-motifs are presented in straightforward run-throughs during the music which covers the a and a’ lines of text. In contrast, the b-motifs, setting the third and sixth lines of the stanza, are echoed and/or extended. The two piano echoes, which we noticed long ago, neatly demarcate the two parts of the text in parallel fashion.

The echo in measures 10–11 specifically echoes the two characteristic aspects of the b-motif which distinguish it from the a-motif: the triplet and the falling element. That of course fixes those characteristic elements of the b-motif in our ears after we hear the motif for the first time. The first extension of the b-motif in the second half of the stanza repeats the entire motif (measures 18–19). The second extension, like the earlier piano echo, seizes only on the distinctive triplet element
and falling element. The sighing effect of the latter is now rhythmically swollen in measures 20–21. The final piano echo, in measures 22–23, echoes the triplet once again and then swells the falling element even farther rhythmically.

There is a great deal of care lavished on elaboration of the b-motif, especially its distinguishing features, in contrast to the straightforward run-throughs of the a-motif. This is quite consistent with the large metric weight which the music puts on measures 9 and 16. Both the metric weight and the motivic exfoliation are very much to the point in specific connection with the crucial declarative resolution “So muß ich wieder gehen.” The elaboration of the b-motif there is even more profuse, considering its two further appearances during the round in the piano, and its extension in the piano together with the voice in measures 20–21 with the pickup. Is all of this motivic luxuriance only to reinforce the strength of the musical and dramatic resolution there? Or does it also suggest something unresolved as yet, something that the incessant motif is worrying over? Something that makes us perhaps feel that the motif “doth protest too much,” which makes it plausible that the singer should remain to sing some more? We can tuck that thought away for future reference. At this point, it is not clear how something which is not yet musically resolved when we first hear measures 16–23 might become resolved later on, over the course of simple threefold repetition, so that “Der Liebe Leid und Sorgen” could sound conclusive. We will pick up this issue much, much later on.

Our analysis of the rhythmic motifs has made the rhythmic gesture of measures 20–21 stand out very strongly. We had already noted that the melodic f–e capsulizes the relation of measure 9 to measure 16 in the voice. Now we have observed that the rhythm expressly swells the characteristic falling sigh at the end of the b-motif. It is this component of the motif that stops the round, which is threatening to go on forever. The rhythmic swelling is given extra preparation by the coincidence of triplet pick-ups in both voice and piano melodies immediately preceding, on the last beat of measure 19. As a matter of sheer compositional craft, the extra impetus allows the subsequent falling sigh to relax out over more time. The coincidence of triplets in voice and piano at the end of measure 19 is heard also coinciding with the rhythm of the incessant triplet figuration that has been going on in the inner voice of the accompaniment since measure 16: all three voices are now caught up together in triplet activity, and all three come to a simultaneous halt at measure 20. This suggests that we can explore the notion of hearing the accompaniment triplets at measure 16 as already related to the triplet component of the b-motif. One’s perception of the relation would be subliminal at measure 16, but it is subsequently clarified by the events on the last beat of measure 19. In that connection, then, even the figure in the inner voice at measure 16 and following can be heard as governed by the rhythmic exfoliation of the b-motif over the final phrase.
The motivic rhythmic idea, of transforming \( \text{echoing} \) indefinitely, is extraordinarily bold. The isolated plaintive questioning melodic turn is transformed thereby into an incessant resigned internal harmonic resonance. The notion of “internal resonance,” which can be taken as strictly technical musical description or also psychologically, seems a useful metaphor to describe the effect. The notion expands the idea of “echoing” the triplet component of the b-motif, this echo continuing to resonate rhythmically inside the poet from measure 16 up to measure 20. Of course the motor quality of the figure there also tone-paints the notion of the poet’s resignedly walking away. Schubert is notorious for such obsessive melancholy “walking” figurations in his songs; Winterreise is the apotheosis of the practice. What is particularly interesting here is the specific psychological burden invested in the hypnotic kinesis.

Having made some observations and speculations prompted by our investigation of rhythmic motive-structure, let us return now to that overall structure itself, which we approached as projecting the two-part form of the text. The reader can go over the earlier rhythmic sketch in this connection, simply reciting the rhythms with nonsense syllables: da da dum da da dum-biddle dum, etc. He should then feel no difficulty whatsoever in hearing the two-part form of the text projected thereby. In particular, he should feel no further qualms about the association of measure 9, with its b-motif, to measure 16, with the next b-motif thereafter:

We can recall the transformation of the voice’s initial contour-motive, so as to put metric stress on the high e at measure 16, rather than the low g: the high e is to “answer” the corresponding high f from measure 9. We have still not gone through the analytic procedure to hear the f persisting for so long, but the idea probably now seems a good deal more plausible to the initially skeptical reader.

Far from feeling any further doubts about his ability to hear the two-part form of the text projected in the music, the inexperienced reader is probably now wrestling with exactly the opposite problem. That is, he may now hear the two-part form so strongly that he is amazed at his initial impression that the strophe had a “three-part form.” “How could I ever have heard it that way?” he may be saying to himself, feeling some despair over his aural capabilities. Once again, he should not despair at this natural and widespread problem. It is caused not by any deficiency in aural sensitivity, but by the pernicious tendency of the mind to try to tell the ear...
what *not* to hear in the course of telling it what *to* hear. Only experience will enable the afflicted reader to handle such problems with some confidence, experience which he is now accumulating. The strophe has both a three-part phrase structure and a two-part large metric structure. The latter is supported by the most obvious aspects of the text and by the concomitant treatment of rhythmic motifs in the voice part. There is no reason to deny any of this, including the three-part phrase structure. The two forms coexist perfectly happily, since the phrasing can function independent from metric context, as suggested in an earlier diagram. It is only the abstract and false intellectual notion, that a piece must be “in” one and only one form, that may be causing the reader difficulty in hearing both aspects of the strophe in their joint effect. To reassure himself that the three-part form really is there too, he can go back and review our earlier descriptions of concrete aspects of the music which supported that form: these, while apparently rather simpleminded and obvious at the time, will now stand him in good stead. The trick is to hear all of this at once.

In that connection, let us now devote some attention to the B phrase, measures 12–15. The two-part reading says that the large tonal function of the phrase is to elaborate the V harmony already stated in measures 9–11. This is valid enough, and our later techniques will enable the reader to hear that function very clearly—all too clearly, in fact. What we have to beware of now should be familiar: the temptation to inflate the assertion so as to claim that this is the *only* musical function of the phrase, or that its function in that respect must overshadow all other functions in musical significance. The temptation is particularly great here because the expression “large tonal function” sounds pleasantly awesome, as if we were getting at the “real meaning” of the passage, a sort of guild secret accessible only to true initiates in the art. Our subsequent exploration of the “large tonal function,” using analytic tools of considerable power, will add yet greater intellectual force to the temptation. But this only means that it is to be all the more resisted, as yet one more invitation to stop listening to other things once you have heard one thing.

The B phrase, that is, has indeed the “large tonal function” of elaborating an already established dominant harmony. But to go further, saying “and that is all there is to the B phrase,” is manifestly to distort, rather than report, what one hears in the music. Because the immediate and strong impact of the B phrase is not at all that of harmonic stasis, but rather precisely of harmonic richness and variety. The richness and variety, it is true, can be analyzed validly, in a certain context, so as to show how the whole progression ultimately works out all to the greater glory of the dominant. But it is simply silly to pretend that the richness and variety are not there, or not worth our attention in themselves, no matter how fascinating and revealing we find the analytic process that shows how our ears, in a certain context, can boil them all down to an ultimate “V.”
Let us then look specifically at the harmonic structure of the B phrase as it impinges immediately on our ears:

**Example 2**

The function of the chord in measure 15 is easily enough described as “V,” even for the reader with a minimum of technical vocabulary. What is there to say about the function of the other three chords in the phrase?

One aspect of the chord at measure 14 is readily heard: it supplies a subdominant harmony to precede the dominant chord of measure 15. The progression of 14–15–16 is then a variation on the familiar cadence formula IV–V–I. Working out the variation for the reader with little background in formal harmonic jargon:

**Example 3**

The first stage of transformation on the model is that the diatonic subdominant harmony, IV, is replaced by the minor subdominant iv, as in “transform 1” of Example 3. This changes the color of the chord, but not its subdominant sense. The second stage of transformation inverts the chord so that a♭ rather than f appears in the bass. This does weaken the force of the harmony somewhat: subdominant feeling is more direct with the actual root of the harmony, the f, in the bass. But one still hears the root function of the f and the subdominant function of the harmony. Summing all this up for future considerations:

1. the basic function of the chord in measure 14 is to provide subdominant harmony preceding the V of measure 15 and the I of measure 16, as a variant on a familiar cadential formula. And
(2) the chord is transformed so as to emphasize a♭, and specifically a♭ in the bass, where the a♭ inflects the following g melodically.

The observations of (2) will eventually be picked up in connection with hearing the B phrase, in a larger context, as an elaboration of V. For the moment, though, we are concentrating on hearing the phrase as harmonically autonomous, each chord with its own function. In that respect, it is (1) that engages us: the chord of measure 14 provides subdominant preparation for the dominant of measure 15.

Because of the parallelism between measures 12–13 and measures 14–15 in both text and music, with the text articulating 12–13/14–15, one naturally hears an analogous subdominant-to-dominant relation between the chords of measures 12 and 13:

As a disembodied progression, we could hear the chords in either D major or d minor. In the context of the present piece, we will hear specifically d minor as the key (or chord) of which measure 13 is the dominant. This because the key (or chord) of d minor is much more closely related to the main key of C major, and in a way pertinent to the context of the B phrase. Specifically, the d minor chord, ii of C major, has a very compelling relation to the dominant harmony, as in another familiar cadential formula, ii–V–I:

Having heard a powerful V harmony over measures 9–11, which we expect to cadence eventually, we will organize our tonal sensations so as to refer the chords of measures 12–13 to d minor, the “ii” of C major which will interact with that V, when it returns, so as to build the sense of the cadential ii–V–I. That is, supplying the “understood” d minor chord after measure 13, we can hear the following harmonic sense underlying the B phrase:
Now this is of course not the actual progression we hear in the piece. But we can derive our aural experience from the above model by a series of transformations demonstrating how our ears compress the “understood” d chord together with the actual chord that appears in measure 14:

“Transform 4” here would be the actual chords of measures 12 through 15, hearing a special sort of accent on the third chord to reflect the “understood” d-goal of the preceding two chords, coexisting with the a♭, c, and f actually sounding acoustically at that moment.

For the reader with little vocabulary in the way of harmonic jargon: it is not necessary to know the nomenclature for the new chord a♭/d/f/c that arises in connection with these considerations. For him, and also for some readers who may have had considerably more formal exposure to harmonic theory: it is also not necessary to worry intellectually about how the chord in measure 14 can be at once an “f chord” and also an understood “d chord,” particularly when no d is actually sounding in the acoustical sonority. These matters have been investigated in generality by theorists since the early eighteenth century, and terminology has been developed to discuss them. For present purposes, though, we need not know the jargon. Nor need we speculate about why our ears can hear this way in general. We need only note that we in fact can hear the phenomenon functioning in the passage under consideration, and that to a considerable extent we do. To become aware of that, it is sufficient simply to play over the preceding musical examples and test their aural implications against the effect of the actual music.

Let us review what the harmonic analysis of the B phrase so far has highlighted. First, we can now hear the chord of measure 14 as carrying much more weight,
both structurally and expressively, than that of a momentarily highly colored subdominant. The chord also carries the structural weight of the two preceding measures, in that it represents or substitutes for the resolution of those measures, constituting their harmonic goal. And, since it does the work of two harmonies at once (ii and iv), it receives an expressive accent from the compression. In these respects its effect is very unique, much different from that of the chord in measure 12 (of which we shall also have more to say later).

Second, the analysis highlights the extent to which the B phrase, over its first three chords, builds cadential preparation for the dominant of measure 15. We do not have just one measure of such preparation (measure 14). Rather, we have what we might describe as three measures of “ii-or-iv” force preceding the V of measure 15. The cadential progression “ii-or-iv” V–I is already accumulating drive at measure 12, in the sense that the chords of measures 12–13 can be heard as all to the greater glory of the eventual ii function. Actually, the psychological force of “ii-or-iv” is even more than three chronological measures’ worth; it is more like four, when we take into account the “missing” measure of ii harmony that is compressed into measure 14.

For convenience in discussion, we can refer to the harmonies ii, IV, iv, iv\(^6\), ii\(^6\), etc. in a major key as “4th degree harmonies.” All of them contain the fourth scale degree of the key (e.g. the tone f in C major), and this is an important aspect of their aural effect when they precede V in a cadence situation. Theorists have examined the general phenomenon extensively. As before, the reader need not concern himself here with theoretical “explanations” of it. It is a good idea for him to become generally sensitive to the phenomenon over the course of a variety of musical experiences: other things being equal, the key-defining sense of a cadential tonic harmony is felt as considerably stronger when the harmony is preceded not just by a dominant, but also by a pre-dominant 4th degree harmony. More specifically to our present purpose is to hear how that phenomenon functions on a large scale over the B phrase as a whole, in connection with the approach to measure 16. This gives the B phrase a certain autonomous musical action which in fact supports the three-part phrase structure very strongly:

**phrase A**: goes from I to V.  
**B**: builds a powerful 4th degree sense; then touches V again.  
**A’**: resolves to I with strong cadential force and sits there.

Hopefully the insecure reader is now feeling secure again about the validity of his initial impression of “three-part form.” “But,” he may say, “I am now more confused than ever. The two-part reading, which I recently found so overwhelmingly strong, interpreted the B phrase as an elaboration of V in its ‘large tonal function.’ And you hinted darkly at sophisticated analytic techniques to come which would make me in fact hear the phrase clearly that way. But you have just made me hear
the large tonal function of the phrase as something quite different: building up 4th degree harmony to prepare the dominant at measure 15. How can the phrase have two very different ‘large tonal functions’ both at one and the same time?"

I am going to frustrate the reader deliberately here, for what I believe to be his ultimate benefit. That is, I am going to withhold any response to that question for some time. I could, to be sure, explain right now in intellectual terms how one in fact can (and does) hear the phrase both ways without musical confusion. The trouble with my doing so at this point would be that either the terms would do little to remedy his aural confusion, or else (worse) that he might take an intellectually convincing explanation as a “solution” for an aural problem which he has in fact not resolved. What is important in any case is not that he understand how one can hear the phrase both ways in the piece, but rather that he actually be able so to hear it. Once he can do so, with both ways making good sense to his ear, there will be ample opportunity to examine and discuss how he is doing it. As yet, however, the “elaboration of V” way of hearing the phrase has not been explored with anything like the care we have devoted to the “4th degree preparation” way of hearing it. The notion that the phrase elaborates V, so far, is mainly just a vague aural sense we infer from the force of the V arrival at measure 9 and the feeling that that V does not resolve until measure 16, together with these features of text and music that reinforce the large impressions. Let us see now how we can maintain that aural attitude to the section while actually listening to its specific component events.

We can begin by reconsidering the chord in measure 14 from yet another point of view. When we first examined that chord, we formulated two observations: (1) the subdominant function was important in preparing the following dominant chord, and (2) the chord is not a simple “IV,” but is minor, containing a♭ rather than a; also the chord appears in an inversion which places the a♭ in the bass, where it inflects the following bass g melodically.

Our pursuit of (1) led us fruitfully in one direction; let us now pursue (2). Hearing the bass a♭ of measure 14 melodically inflecting the bass g of measure 15 reminds one forcefully of the similar and striking earlier gesture in the bass of measure 9: The rhythmic expansion of the gesture here is exactly that process by which we earlier heard the falling element of the b-motif expanding in measures 20–21 and 22–23: exactly the same rhythmic values are involved. So the rhythmic component of Example 4 is highly motivic. Furthermore, the melodic relation makes good sense as a signal that we are to hear the V of measure 15 in some sense as “the same V” which we were on at measure 9, expanded forwards in the piece. It will be recalled that the a♭ in measure 9 is the first substantial non-diatonic event of the piece. In that connection, we had toyed with the notion that the entire span from measure 9 through measure 15 was the “chromatic section” of the strophe, as well as the “dominant
section” and the “question section.” The relation of Example 4 indicates how the chromaticism of the whole section can be regarded as growing out of the initial chromatic gesture ornamenting the V of measure 9. This at any rate as regards the bass line:

\[ \begin{align*}
  & \quad \begin{array}{c}
    \text{generates } \begin{array}{c}
      \text{which expands to }
    \end{array}
  \\
    \begin{array}{c}
      \begin{array}{c}
        \text{between measure 9 and measure 12 the bass remains on g throughout, first low g, then high g. So, playing over the bass line from measures 9 through 15 at a reasonably brisk tempo:}
      \\
      \text{Example 5}
    \end{array}
  \\
  \end{array}
\end{align*}
\]

The reader can begin to form a more exact aural impression of how the whole section can be heard as “elaborating V.”

Now let us re-examine the effect of the chord in measure 12. So far, we have discussed its harmonic effect only as it pushes forward toward an implied d minor = ii in C major. That is, we would label the chord as “iv\(^6\) in d,” or as “iv\(^6\) / ii in C.” That function of the harmony, as confirmed by the “V of d” in the next measure, is clear enough aurally. And it is hardly to be overridden as long as we listen to the B phrase by itself, apart from any preceding context. And, further, the phrase articulation at measure 12 (to which the accent on the b\(^\flat\) contributes) makes it very natural for us to listen to the B phrase in just that way to a considerable extent.

However, we in fact hear the harmony of measure 12 not only in terms of where it is going, but also in terms of its relation to what has preceded it. Particularly, of course, to the harmony that we heard governing the end of the preceding phrase. Here that harmony was an extremely forceful dominant that set in at measure 9, and we still hear the dominant sounding acoustically after the echo finishes in measure 11. So one is much struck by the effect of measure 12 in this connection:

Our immediate reaction is certainly not “oh yes, iv\(^6\)-of-ii,” though our ears eventually perceive that possible function in retrospect later on, as the phrase progresses. Rather, at this point we perceive primarily that the g-chord is sounded yet once more, but is startlingly altered from major to minor. To reflect that immediate and very strong impression, we would label the chord of
measure 12 as “v⁶” rather than “iv⁶-of-ii.” The effect is so startling because one of the essential aspects of “dominant sensation” is the melodic push of the leading tone of the key, with its urge to resolve melodically to the tonic tone—b₃ to c, in C major:

*Example 6*

![Example 6](image)

We have just been experiencing very strong dominant sensation over measures 9–11, and we anticipate an eventual resolution of that dominant to a tonic. As one component of the resolution, we anticipate that the b₃ within the dominant harmony will move to c within that tonic; the b₃ is correspondingly “charged” with an urge to move upwards.

Instead, measure 12 pulls the rug out from under b₃, baldly substituting b♭ instead. Not only does this contradict our expectation, it does so in the most apparently perverse fashion: we expect the b to move up a half-step; instead it moves down a half-step. Actually it does not “move” at all; it simply vanishes and b♭ appears in its stead. The gesture is even more striking because of the way Schubert highlights the b♭ by the shift in accompaniment texture. Instead of hearing a complete chord at the bar line of measure 12 (as we have with every measure so far), we just hear the lone b♭ in the piano. The tempo must be slow enough to allow the ear fully to savor that shock.

Now eventually our ears will make sense out of the harmony of measure 12, as leading to an emphasis on ii; they will also eventually make sense specifically out of the b♭, as part of the large bass-line structure already discussed. But the initial impression of the harmony, which strikes us with great shock, is that of another “V” in C, but with the b₃ altered to b♭: as a substitute for And, to the extent that the force of the shock persists, we can hear the overall bass line from measures 9 through 15, sketched in Example 5, as a concomitant substitute for:
Since we evidently hear the a and a♭ in Example 7 as accessory tones within the line, we can reduce the harmonic sense of the gesture according to:

Example 8

Of course there is no problem whatsoever in hearing the force of V persisting through the sketch of Example 8. The reader should remember that he is to play and/or sing through all of these sketches with the indicated rhythms, checking their effect against his aural impressions of earlier pertinent sketches, back all the way to his aural impressions of the song itself. The question we are considering now is precisely the extent to which the last sketch in some way symbolizes validly one sense in which we can actually hear the force of V persisting, not just through the sketch itself (which is trivial), but through the actual music.

The implication of the preceding sketches is fortified and confirmed when we consider the essential tones of the melodic activity going on above the respective bass notes. It is not hard to hear that, as the bass moves b♭/a/a♭/g over measures 12–15, the essential melodic line moves in parallel above it: d/c♯/c/b. Those are the melodic tones which receive greatest metric weight within their respective measures, over the corresponding bass tones. Further, the tones are not ornamental. They are supported by the respective harmonies of the measures, rather than ornamenting them as, say, the stressed a♭ in the bass at measure 9 ornamented the subsequent g of the basic harmony. In writing out a little “chorale” to represent the harmonic effect of the measures earlier (Example 2), these were the tones we heard as the functional “soprano line” of that chorale.

These considerations may appear pedantic formality to the reader who hears the melodic “essence” of d/c♯/c/b clearly enough. They are worth exploring here, though, to investigate just why it is that we hear that melodic essence so clearly in the present context. Later on, when we are trying to hear the melodic “essence” of less clear gestures, the considerations will serve us in good stead.

For instance, the essential tone of the melody over the bass g of measure 10 (or 11) is d, not e. The e is metrically stressed, but it is not a member of the basic harmony-of-the-measure, which is V. The d is a member of that harmony, and the preceding stressed e ornaments it, resolving to it as an appoggiatura. The validity of this hearing is clinched by the dissonant f♯ appearing under the e, further emphasizing the accessory nature of the metrically stressed event:
Without yet worrying about the high f of measure 9 which (if it has not yet resolved) would add a seventh to the above harmony, we can now hear the essential melodic gesture of the music from measure 10 through measure 15 as

In this context, it is not difficult to hear the d / c♯ / c / b of measures 12–15 as “passing through” the V harmony. That is: the line moves directly and smoothly from d, one constituent of the harmony, to b, another constituent. In that sense, this gesture also “elaborates the V harmony.” Reducing out the accessory tones, as we did for the earlier bass-line sketch, we can arrive symbolically simply at

Combining earlier sketches, still deferring consideration of the high f in measure 9, we can sketch an essential two-voice framework for the section:

Example 9

The reader should play over Example 9 until he can hear its relation to the actual music quite clearly. It will help to play the sketch first at a relatively slow tempo, imagining the rest of the notes and hearing how they hinge around various tones of the sketch, particularly melodically and/or harmonically. Gradually increasing the performance tempo of the sketch, the reader should then be able to hear how the gesture of the sketch reflects a large-scale progression going on in the music, which he should now be able to “hear.” Then he can proceed from Example 9 to its further-reduced form:
Example 10

Playing over Example 10 (at first slowly, then more briskly), he should be able to hear its relation to Example 9, and thence to the actual music. Accordingly, he will then “hear how he hears” the passage as “elaborating V.”

Before returning to discuss further the “large tonal function” of the B phrase, now apparently more elusive than ever, let us note one particular thing which the foregoing analysis has highlighted. As the reader plays over Example 9, he will notice that it generates a strong expectation for its melody to resolve to an essential c for the voice in measure 16, to go over this c in the bass there and coincide with the big tonic arrival. But the vocal c does not appear at measure 16. Instead, the essential tone of the voice there is the high e we have discussed so much already; the essential vocal c is withheld until measure 17. The middle c in the inner voice of the piano during measure 16 is of course no adequate substitute for the expected vocal c, as the piano in fact emphasizes by the abrupt silence in its right hand over the measure. One recalls that the urge of b♭ over V harmony to push melodically to c was also thwarted at measure 12 (cf. the discussion around Example 6); this makes the effect here all the stronger. In light of the fact that the eventual essential c, at measure 17, a measure “too late” and off its supporting arrival-beat, sets “gehr,” all the musical difficulties the singer experiences in getting to that c seem suggestively connected to the fact that he has a great deal of trouble making up his mind to “go” (and in fact does not, even after saying he will). We shall pick this up later, in connection with the notion of what might be musically “unresolved,” at the end of the first strophe.

Returning specifically to the B phrase now, we can observe two more of its features which our most recent analysis has brought out. First, the sketch of Example 9 displays in stark form the parallel motion between the essential melody and the bass over the phrase. This parallel motion emphasizes the sense of one basic linear gesture in which both lines are participating (here, “moving through V”) at the expense of the autonomous harmonic profile of the phrase (“building 4th degree harmony”).

Second, the shock of the b♭ in measure 12, which makes us hear the tone as a substitute for b♭ and hence ultimately enforces the “passing through V” sense
of the phrase, at the same time creates an enormous accent which strengthens our hearing the B phrase as an autonomous unit beginning there. And the latter phenomenon, in turn, supports our other sense of the phrase: as an autonomous gesture-in-itself, the phrase builds 4th degree harmony.

The reader who was confused earlier about the "large tonal function" of the B phrase must now be close to despair. "It was bad enough," I can imagine his saying, "being unsure as to how to hear a whole phrase. Now you have got me in such a muddle that I am not even sure how I hear one note, the b♭ in measure 12." To which I reply, good! Not that the confusion itself is good; but that will pass. What is good is that your ears are now open to all aspects of the musical experience, not shutting off some of those aspects in order to cling to whatever one of them happened to strike you first, or last.

Let us begin to clear up the confusion constructively, working specifically around phrase B and the b♭ of measure 12. As a preliminary, it will help to examine more precisely the difference in effect between the beat at measure 9 and the phrase-articulating accent created by the shock of the b♭ at measure 12. That accent does not create a similar "beat." We do experience considerable contrast and surprise, which focus our attention on the moment. But that moment is not felt as demarcating the goal of a larger tonal impetus: we do not feel that any of the preceding music has been "pushing toward" measure 12. We do, though, have that sense about measure 9. As yet, we have not concretized the feeling much beyond a general impression that measure 9 was the moment at which phrase A attained the goal of its overall harmonic action. To concretize the sense a bit more, it should be sufficient for present purposes to listen to the bass line approaching that measure and subsequently relaxing:

\[\begin{matrix}
5 & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 10 & 11 \\
\end{matrix}\]

I \rightarrow V

Evidently no preceding impetus of this sort leads to measure 12.

We shall now review various of our sensations about the B phrase and the b♭ of measure 12, this time proceeding chronologically, as the sensations impinge on us in the course of actually listening through the piece.

Stage 1: At measure 12 itself, in light of the V-beat of measure 9 and the V harmony of measures 9–10–11, we hear the b♭ as a substitute for b♮ and the chord as a minor substitute v⁶ for V⁶. The sense is "elaboration of V" but the method of elaboration is startling. The resulting accent of surprise contributes to articulating the
beginning of a new phrase. We can represent these aspects of our hearing, in this
context, as:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Stage 2: Once we have reached measure 13, we can hear a new context building: measures 12-and-13 as a unit, initiating a new phrase. In this context, we can hear the shocking } b_\flat \text{ of measure 12 “resolving” to } a \text{ in the bass of measure 13, and we hear the two harmonies in relation “iv}^6-\text{to–V in d.” Our ears naturally seize on the chance to do so, because we can then make sense in retrospect out of the apparently perverse accent of measure 12: the } b_\flat \text{ was looking forward in function, rather than relating backwards. The accent is dissipated in its subsequent “resolution” to } a \text{. Since we do retain, from the past, the sense of C major as the main key of the song so far, we will hear the d minor above as ii-of-C. In this new context, we then hear:}
\end{array}
\]

However, we can not hear in the new context with complete assurance. This because the context of stage 1 still persists in our impressions with some force. Specifically, our ears cannot immediately shake off, in the context of only measures 12–13, the force of the V-beat at measure 9 and the persistent V harmonies of measures 9–10–11, all of which underlay our “stage 1 hearing.” First of all, the two measures of the new context cannot compete rhythmically with the four measures of the old one (actually eight measures, in a sense, since the beat at measure 9 carries the arrival of the entire progression from measure 5 on). Nor can the new context compete metrically: to contend against the definitive V-beat of measure 9, we have as yet had no commensurately powerful new large beat (say a “ii-beat”) to support the new context.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Stage 3: As we hear the attack of measure 14, we can now experience a small ii-beat. That is, as discussed earlier, we can hear the harmony of measure 14 as compatible with a ii-sense, discharging the impetus-towards-ii of the preceding two measures. The stage 2 context grows accordingly:}
\end{array}
\]

This ii-beat, with only two measures of preceding impetus, cannot as yet contend completely with the more powerful V-beat of measure 9. But it certainly functions, accordingly reinforcing our stage 2 hearing of measure 12 and its b_\flat .

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Stage 4: As measure 14 develops in a manner parallel to measure 12, we anticipate more and more the analogous parallelism between 15, yet to come, and 13. That is, we already sense that the iv}^6 \text{ harmony of 14 will resolve to V in 15, “just}
\end{array}
\]
as iv\(^6\)/ii resolved to V/ii" in 12–13. The “new context” from stage 2 thus broadens forwards even farther to include not just measure 14, as we hear it, but our anticipation of measure 15, starting from measure 12:

Our anticipation of iv\(^6\)-V for measures 14–15 reinforces our impressions from stage 2 and 3 that the parallel structure iv\(^6\)/ii–V/ii was a valid hearing of measures 12–13. In particular, our anticipation that the a♭ in the bass of measure 14 will resolve to g in the bass of measure 15 reinforces our impressions, from stage 2 and 3, that the parallel bass motion over measures 12–13 did in fact “resolve” the problematical b♭ to a analogously. This moment is where the force of the “4th degree harmony” sense of the B phrase is at its peak for the listener.

Stage 5: Either simultaneously with or possibly shortly after stage 4, we become more aware aurally of just why it is that we are so strongly expecting the V harmony to come in measure 15. The residual power of the V-beat at measure 9 and the three measures of V harmony at 9–10–11 are strongly influencing our ear to hear the harmony return, once it has a thematically appropriate moment to do so. The parallel thematic design involving 12–13 and 14–15 provides just such an opportunity, and the anticipated V for measure 15 springs into our expectation accordingly with an almost magnetic impulse. We are aware that when the expected occurs, we will be closing the circle back to where we started in measure 9, approaching the bass g in a chromatic manner expanding the ornamental a♭–to–g gesture of measure 9 itself. The latter is an important component of our specific expectation that the a♭ in the bass of 14 “is going to resolve to g,” which influenced our stage 4 hearing.

Our aural context thus expands again, spreading back now to embrace the entire span from measure 9 up through the anticipated measure 15. Accordingly, we begin to orient our tonal impressions for measure 12 etc. now towards the “big V” which governs that span as a whole, and away from the “ii” center of stages 2–4. In this connection, the elision of the “understood” d minor harmony into the chord of measure 14 is much to the point. We anticipate the return of the “big V” in the next measure, and the elision reflects our aural sensations turning away from the little ii-beat, which is robbed of its proper harmony, to elide into a harmony which we hear as directly ancillary to the anticipated return of the “big V.”

Stage 6: Measure 15 occurs as anticipated. This confirms our expectations both at stage 4 and at stage 5. Since the expectations of stage 4 do materialize, the b♭ did indeed “resolve to a” in that context, just as the a♭ resolves to g. But we are already
turning away from that context now to a yet larger one: the entire span of measures 9–15 as governed by the large V. In that context, we retrospectively revise our impressions of measure 12 yet once more, reverting somewhat to our impressions of stage 1. In the new large context, b♭ is a substitute once more for b♮, now within the large V; the harmony is again v⁶ and not iv⁶/ii. So in this context, b♭ did not “resolve” to a at all; rather the a was a part of a chromatic line passing down in the bass from the b♭ to the g of measure 15. All this as in the earlier bass-line sketches for the passage.

The impressions of stage 1 are now altered, though, in that the shock of the b♭ has been largely dissipated. This partly by the extent to which we have almost heard it resolve in a different context, and partly by sheer psychological fatigue in sorting out the aural impressions over the intervening stages in all their complexity. What remains of the effect of the b♭ is mainly its minor, “blue” quality:

This makes a certain accent in the context, but of a much more tired and melancholy than shocking sort.

“Blue,” “tired,” “melancholy”: all the terms seem apt to describe the psychological state of the poet at the end of measure 15. In fact we can read the whole little musical journey we have just made as an allegory for the poet’s psychological processes over the phrase. Thus, the musical shock of measure 12 at stage 1 corresponds to the poet’s shock: “is that how my greeting strikes you? Am I so alarming?” The attempt to “resolve” the shocking b♭, over stages 2–4, corresponds to the poet’s attempt to resolve his psychological shock, narrowing the psychological context as those stages narrow the musical context (ignoring measures 9–10–11 and the beat at measure 9). The rewidening of the musical context at stages 5 and 6 corresponds to the poet’s emerging back into the broader situation, out of his ambivalent internal musings on the questions. At the ultimate stage 6, the b♭ has not really resolved. But so be it; it is at least now only a melancholy ache, no longer a traumatic shock. The poet is back just where he was at measure 9 (the big V), only more so . . . 12–15 extending, elaborating and ornamenting the big V in the stage 6 context. His extraordinary exploration of that dominant having been exhausted, there is nothing for it but to resolve the dominant in resignation, to tonic: “So muß ich . . .” It is of course the rich complexity of the musical peripatetics here and elsewhere that interests us, by allegorical association, in Schubert’s protagonist to a far greater extent than in Müller’s. The bland banality of the latter person is in fact an asset to the composer,
who is correspondingly free to fill the comparatively empty vessel with whatever musico-dramatic content he finds appropriate.

Let us see now how the journey we have made through the various stages above can help clear up some of the earlier possible confusion. That confusion arose from the fact that there appear to be two compelling readings for the strophe, each internally self-consistent and each apparently inconsistent with the other. We can review some aspects of the readings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The strophe is in three parts</th>
<th>in two parts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>as determined by</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>its phrase structure,</td>
<td>its large metric structure,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>which articulates the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strophe at measures 5, 12 and 16.</td>
<td>9 and 16.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The large tonal sense of the B phrase is</td>
<td>to elaborate the dominant harmony which was already present at measure 9.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to build up 4th degree harmony preceding the cadential dominant of measure 15.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The b-flat of measure 12 is heard</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resolving to a in measure 13, in the progression iv⁶/ii – V/ii.</td>
<td>as a substitute for b-natural in the large V harmony, giving rise to the chord v⁶.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The a in the bass of measure 13 is heard</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as resolving the preceding b-flat</td>
<td>as starting to pass down chromatically from the preceding b-flat, on the way to g.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etc., etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now, when we present our various sensations in that format, we unwittingly place ourselves in the position of voters or jurors. It seems that we have no recourse but to review all the “evidence,” grit our teeth, vote one way or the other, and abandon the rejected reading however reluctantly. It is precisely this format
which is responsible for feelings of confusion and unhappiness: we do not want to deny any of these sensations, but do not see how we can avoid having to do so.

The point is that the format itself is not legitimate as a way of presenting our aural sensations for intellectual consideration. Our journey through the stages has, I hope, made it clear that we do not actually perceive these readings, so far as they have any musical meaning for us, as abstract scholastic themes to be argued one way or the other. Rather we perceive them as reflecting various ways in which we organize our sensations in the course of listening through the piece. Some of these modes of organization group together into one “reading,” reinforcing one another. Others group together into another “reading.” At certain moments, we are aurally more under the structuring influence of one mode; at others, another. At yet other moments, our aural sensations are being heavily influenced by more than one mode... e.g. at a moment intermediate between stages 4 and 5 above. It is the play among these modes of organization that actually constitutes our response to the piece as a whole, as in the dynamic process we followed through the stages above.

A large part of the conceptual problem arises from the fact, I think, that the logic of the musical experience is not completely congruent to the logic of (the English) language. If we are careful, we shall of course avoid saying that the strophe is “in” two parts or “in” three parts. We can do somewhat better by saying that it has a two-part aspect and a three-part aspect, which interrelate dynamically and organically in the course of the listening process. But it is not easy to go much beyond that, to formulate a prose description of how those two “aspects” are subsumed by the piece into the projection of one coherent experience. This may be only a deficiency in technical vocabulary. But I do not think so myself. I believe the problem to be inherent in the attempt to use language in describing the effect of music. Beyond a certain point, I think the best one can do is to use language to stimulate a reader’s aural imagination to perceive those things which the language cannot begin adequately to describe. Or, of course, one can project one’s insights in performance rather than verbally.

We have not, however, yet reached that point in the present analysis: we can describe and discuss a good deal more in words, and hopefully dispel further possible confusion thereby. Our tour through the stages of hearing measures 12–15 brought up a matter of importance. Namely: the way in which the ear responds to an aural sensation is a function not simply of the sensation itself, but also of the context in which it is being heard. Specifically, e.g., one responds to the effect of the harmony of measure 12 in isolation as simply “g minor chord in inversion.” The same chord, heard in the context of

```
C: \[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{C} \\
\text{C} \\
\text{C} \\
\end{array} \]
```

```
C: \[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{C} \\
\text{C} \\
\text{C} \\
\end{array} \]
```
is experienced as “v in C,” with a decided shock. The same chord, heard in the context of

![Musical notation]

is experienced as “iv in d” (or possibly in D, if we have no further context). The same chord, heard in the context of

![Musical notation]

is experienced as “iv/ii in C.” The same chord, heard in the context of

![Musical notation]

can again be experienced as “v in C,” but now with rather a “blue” effect than a shock, by the time one reaches the end of the context.

The idea that one chord (or more generally one musical stimulus or group of stimuli) may have such an ambiguous meaning, depending on its context, is a theoretical truism to which the reader has very likely already been exposed. Possibly it is striking him here with more force. In any case, what our trip through the stages has brought out is not just that phenomenon itself, but also and more crucially an awareness that the ear is constantly constructing new contexts and revising old ones in the course of the musical experience. We noted the construction of a new context at stage 2. We noted a context provisionally extending forwards in anticipation, at stage 4. And we noted a context extending backwards at stages 5 and 6. The latter phenomenon is of particular interest. By means of it, the ear can reinterpret in a different light material it has already heard and organized in another way.
We can now return to make some earlier statements more precise. When we say “the B phrase has the overall tonal action of building 4th degree harmony to precede the cadential dominant of measure 15,” we are saying something quite valid, which can be put more precisely as follows: the B phrase, in itself, constitutes a “context” within which one organizes aural sensations in the course of listening. Within that context (of measures 12–15 alone), one’s sensations are organized as described generally above.

When we say “the large tonal action of the B phrase is to elaborate the V already present at measure 9,” we are also saying something quite valid, which can be put precisely as follows: measures 9 through 15 of the piece constitute a “context” within which one organizes aural sensations in the course of listening. Within that context one’s sensations regarding the material of measures 12–15 are organized as described generally above. In saying the large tonal action,” we mean the following: first, the indicated context covers a span of the piece which includes every span in which we hear the B phrase as organized in some other fashion. And second, considering any yet more extensive context will not alter the essential impressions of the B phrase we have in the present context.

Aha, the reader may exclaim, but does this not mean exactly that the latter reading for the B phrase is “the correct” one, superseding all others? No, it does not. It means just what it says and no more. The temptation to draw inferences about “correctness” therefrom is still and again an effort of the mind to tell the ear not to hear some things in the course of hearing others.

Our description of “the large tonal action” above says: when all is said and done, the basic frame on which you hang your tonal impressions of the B phrase is that of “elaborating V.” “When all is said and done” has a very strong temporal component. Specifically, it refers to the basic frame for your impressions as you listen at stage 6 and thereafter. From measure 15 on, that is, you do not revise your listening context so as to alter the sense of that basic frame in retrospect; the frame (for the B phrase) remains as at stage 6.

Now two points are to be stressed. First, there is nothing in the above assertion, valid enough as far as it goes, to imply that your impressions at stage 6 and thereafter are in any sense more “correct” or even more “important” than were your impressions at say stage 4. We can say that they are “different,” at this different stage in the listening process. And they have a particular structural significance, as being “final” in the sense that further listening will not revise their general framework. But that is another matter.

Second, the assertion discusses only the “basic frame” on which you hang your impressions at stage 6 and thereafter; it does not by any means claim that the frame is the same thing as the impressions themselves. The latter, as they fill out the framework, include everything that has gone through your perception
since stage 1, in a very complex sort of dialectic process. In that sense, if one wants to conceive of one’s ultimate impression as a sort of Hegelian “synthesis,” that is legitimate enough (though I personally do not find the notion very suggestive aurally). But then one must take care that one does not attribute the force of that imposing concept to the frame on which the whole synthesis is hung. The frame is simple and clear: it could be represented by the “reduced sketch” of Example 10, or more baldly simply by the symbol “V.” The “synthesis” of one’s listening from stage 1 through stage 6 is complex, full of dialectic tensions and ambiguities which the frame itself does not suggest in the least. The synthesis hangs on the frame, but is not the frame itself.

Hopefully, this discussion has dispelled some of the confusion for those readers who were earlier unsure as to “how to hear” e.g. the b♭ in measure 12. It has also, I hope, clarified just what significance we are to attribute, and not to attribute, to the sketches showing how measures 9–15 elaborate V. The latter considerations are particularly important for the reader to whom the analytic tool of such sketching was novel, the more so to the extent he found it intellectually engaging and aurally compelling.

Most readers, however, have probably been at least loosely exposed to the notion of such sketching, in association with the name of Heinrich Schenker, a Viennese theorist, analyst, editor, and pedagogue of the first part of the twentieth century. They may be wondering: were those sketches examples of “Schenkerian analysis”? Yes, they were. However, in the future I will construct similar sketches with which I am sure Schenker would have disagreed. As far as the present purposes are concerned, all this is beside the point. But I feel it would be intellectually irresponsible to let the matter drop there. Schenker’s substantial insights and achievements are widely used and misused without proper attribution, particularly in the United States; they are also widely misunderstood, mispraised, and miscriticized. I would feel strong distaste at the thought of adding myself to the ranks of the many who implicitly allow their readers to give them credit for ideas which were Schenker’s, and who also allow their readers to attribute to Schenker, for better or for worse, ideas which in fact were not his. But it would interrupt the thread of the present business unduly were I to launch into the extended theoretical discussion at this point that would be necessary to clarify for the reader first what Schenker’s ideas actually were, or became as they developed over several decades, and second, to what extent my own procedures in the sequel follow those ideas and/or diverge substantially from them. Accordingly, I have written an appendix to the present book in which these matters are discussed at appropriate length. The appendix will refer to later sketches in this and other analyses. So it should be read after all the analyses, when too some of the general theoretical ideas will make more sense to many readers.
Meanwhile we can remark that the sketches for the large V in measure 9–15, and for the bass line approaching measure 9, were helpful in focusing our hearing of certain significant features of the music, particularly in connection with aural frameworks for large contexts. It will be helpful to review just how we arrived at those sketches, both to clarify what they symbolize and as a paradigm for future procedure.

We began, not with any mechanical manipulation of this note or that on the score, but rather with a general clear but as yet unelaborated sense of the large context we were to explore. That is, with a large harmonic sense; this corresponding to “actions” heard in connection with the phrases:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{I} & \rightarrow \text{V} \rightarrow \text{V} \rightarrow \text{I} \\
\end{align*}
\]

And also a concurrent large metric sense:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{I} & \rightarrow \text{V} \rightarrow \text{V} \rightarrow \text{I} \\
9 & \rightarrow 16 \\
\end{align*}
\]

The “big bar line” at 16 above reflects our sense of a large tonal impetus which reaches its goal at that point. Here the phenomenon is basically harmonic: we are aware of large-scale dominant pressure preceding the bar line of measure 16, and of corresponding large-scale discharge of that pressure at the big “tonic beat.” To distinguish such a beat from smaller-scale metric stresses, either aural or simply notated in the score, let us call it an “arrival.”

We also fixed a dominant arrival at the bar line of measure 9. The sense is different; I has no inherent tendency to push towards V, as V has to push towards I. Rather, the large-scale bar line here reflects our hearing somewhat as follows: we do feel that phrase A “moves from I to V.” The moment at which the goal of that action is attained will be heard as a large beat, specifically a V-arrival. The exact location of that beat is not as obvious, on first listening, as was the location of the beat at measure 16. But after further listening, we can hear the beat at the bar line of measure 9, the in the bass there already “representing” the g which it ornaments as an appoggiatura. Various features of music and text, as we become more aware of them, confirm the sensation. E.g. the two-part form of the stanza and the concurrent rhythmic motive-structure in the vocal part, associating the bar line of 9 with the bar line of 16; the collation of the questions and of the chromaticism within the span 9–15; the structure of the bass line over phrase A; the suggestive relation between the high f of measure 9 and the high e of measure 16.
So the embryonic state of the sketch was not at all melodic, in respect either to the bass line or the tune. It was rather harmonic and metric, on a very large scale:

Example 11

At this point we also considered a conjectural relation between the high f of 9 and the high e of 16, which we have not as yet explored further. We might add the notes to Example 11, with an arrow from f to e, a question mark on the f and a parenthetical “(7?)” qualifying the “V” at measure 9 of the sketch.

We next began to fill in Example 11 rhythmically and melodically. In this piece, the bass line moves regularly throughout the strophe at one note per measure, except for the a♭ at measure 9 and the parenthetical g in the next-to-last measure. (We can note how strongly the a♭ and measure 9 itself are thereby accented.) Furthermore, the basic harmonic rhythm of the strophe is one harmony per measure. The notable exception here again involves measure 9. But there we are in no doubt of the overriding sense of the basic V governing 9–10–11, especially since the bass remains on g. Summing up: we have a clear sense of functional rhythm in the piece at the level of one beat per written measure of music. We can reflect that level symbolically by quarter notes in the sketch. We have no problem representing the bass line in that regard:

Example 12

And when we do so, and play or sing over the sketch (!), the musical effect is perfectly congruent with the large harmonic/metric sense underlying the “embryonic sketch” of Example 11.

Example 12 indicates yet another way in which the three phrases are differentiated: the bass line rises diatonically over phrase A, falls chromatically over phrase B, and remains essentially static over phrase A′. As with earlier aspects of the phrases, these are three distinct types of behavior, rather than two similar gestures separated by a third contrasting gesture. As earlier too, A′ nonetheless associates somewhat with A because of the return, at measure 16, to the c in the bass of measure 5.

On the way to Example 12, we noticed the highlighted quickening of the harmonic rhythm, along with the accompaniment rhythm, at measure 9. We can
actually hear three harmonies within that one measure: we can hear the a♭ on the first beat as part of a diminished seventh chord, as well as an ornament to g (within a subsequent slightly larger context). The harmonies of measure 9 are all dissonant: diminished seventh chord, dominant seventh chord, and six-four chord. The chord on the first beat of measure 10 (which is not exactly a “harmony”) is also dissonant. So we have no chance to pause harmonically, from the first beat of measure 9 on, until we reach the consonant pure dominant harmony on the second beat of measure 10. Most of this gets swallowed up by the much larger context of Example 12. But, as earlier, that does not mean that it is less correct or important as an aspect of our listening experience. Specifically, the heightened harmonic rhythm and the chain of dissonances very strongly affect our sense of the psychological urgency of the question in the text. The dissonances, in particular, each demand “explanatory” resolutions. But we have no chance to hear any such ultimate consonant resolution even locally until we get at least to the middle of measure 10. And, if the force of the dissonant high f has not yet been resolved before that point, until the high e of measure 16. We shall of course return to all this later, investigating just that possible hearing. There is a lot more going on over 9–10–11 which remains to be more carefully explored aurally.

Meanwhile, let us return to the sketch as we left it in Example 12. It reflects rhythmic activity at a certain level in the music, but it does not as yet reflect any metric context for that activity beyond the big bar lines already on the sketch. To that extent, I have notated the bass for 9–10 on the sketch as one half note rather than two quarters. Because of the large beat at measure 9, one is sure that the relation of the two symbolic quarters for measure 9 and 10 is metrically strong-to-weak. The symbolic half note is a plausible substitute for symbolic strong quarter and symbolic weak quarter here, especially because the music of measures 9–10, with its quickened harmonic rhythm and chain of dissonances, seems to bind the two measures very closely together as a rhythmic unit.

Otherwise Example 12 makes no symbolic metric assertions, beyond those of the big bar lines. Of course one intuitively hears other metric articulations, at this rhythmic level, clearly enough. For instance, there is clearly some sort of metric articulation, on this level, at measure 12. But there is no need to go into such subordinate metric detail as yet. In general, it is wise not to do so until one has completed the rhythmic sketch in all pertinent voices, not just one (here the bass line). One’s metric impressions might be considerably affected as a result.

We should also particularly note that the presumed metric articulation at measure 12 is not at all an “arrival” in the sense of 9 and 16. A symbolic bar line on the sketch at measure 12, then, would symbolize a quite different musical sensation. We shall reserve discussion of that significant difference until later, as regards eventual further metrizing of the sketch. To be pedantically secure, then, we shall
for the nonce complete a bass-line sketch for the strophe simply in unmetrized symbolic quarters:

\begin{music}
\begin{musicnotation}
\begin{musiccontext}
\begin{musicphrase}
\begin{musicnote}
\begin{musicwarp}
\end{musicwarp}
\end{musicnote}
\end{musicphrase}
\end{musiccontext}
\end{musicnotation}
\end{music}

We do not, N.B., put a symbolic bar line yet at the repeat. Measure 5′ is certainly not an "arrival."

Having found a melodic/rhythmic sketch for the bass line over measures 9–15, reflecting our perception of tonal activity there at a certain rhythmic level in the music, we then investigated analogous activity at that level in the principal melodic line. Specifically, for each rhythmic unit (measure of the piece), we tried to hear one note in the line which carried the structural “essence” of the line over that unit. More precisely: we were trying to hear a “frame” for the line over the large context; we tried to fix a participating member of that frame for each rhythmic unit. As often before, that does not mean that we should ignore what else is going on in the line as relatively “insignificant.” It means only that we are trying to hear in this connection those tones which are particular constituents of the large framework.

In the process, we invoked harmonic and metric criteria very strongly. In terms of the rhythmic unit under consideration, with its one basic harmony, the essential tone of the melody over that unit

\begin{enumerate}
\item was a constituent of the basic-harmony-of-the-unit and
\item carried the metric weight of the unit.
\end{enumerate}

By (b), I mean roughly that either the essential tone appeared at the bar line of the measure (unit), where it received the stress of the pulse; or else, if it did not, the tone that did take that stress could be heard as an accented ornament to the later essential tone. The latter consideration obtained in connection with hearing d as the essential tone for the melody in measure 10 (and measure 11). The tone which actually appeared at the bar line was e, but the e was heard as an ornament to the subsequent d, which was a constituent of the basic harmony-of-the-measure. The e on the first beat thus already “represents” the d to which it will subsequently resolve. One can “reduce out” the ornament symbolically:

\begin{music}
\begin{musicnotation}
\begin{musiccontext}
\begin{musicphrase}
\begin{musicnote}
\begin{musicwarp}
\end{musicwarp}
\end{musicnote}
\end{musicphrase}
\end{musiccontext}
\end{musicnotation}
\end{music}
When this is done, the symbolic half note chord of Example 13 does indeed put d “at the bar line of the measure,” supported by the pertinent harmony.

There are other ways in which criterion (b) above might be qualified. For instance, in certain musical contexts, one hears syncopation against the basic meter, or different metric sensations in tension one against another. This would of course qualify where we actually hear the “metric weight” involved in (b).

In general, criteria (a) and (b) are subject to considerable qualification, depending on the complexity of the musical texture under consideration. The basic ideas that underlie the criteria are generally reliable, though. In particular, the criteria emphasize that in hearing “essential tones” within a tonal melody, we are not only listening to the melody in its own context, but crucially to the melody as it is embedded in a total context that involves overall harmonic and metric sensations. This is very important: an individual line when heard in isolation may suggest certain harmonies and metric articulations that are not in fact those heard when the line is experienced in the total context of a passage. We shall have ample opportunity to study instances of this phenomenon, which underlies the richness of tonal counterpoint, in the sequel.

At present, we need only recall that criteria (a) and (b) contributed strongly to our intuition that the tones d, c♯, c, and b were those “essential” to the melody for measures 12, 13, 14, and 15. As for measures 10 and 11, we have discussed how the criteria support our hearing d as the essential tone, with the qualification just reviewed concerning the preceding ornamental stressed e’s.

Except for measure 9 itself now, criteria (a) and (b) support our aural intuitions in basically straightforward fashion regarding the essential tones of the melodic line over the strophe as a whole, measure by measure.

Example 14

The f as essential tone for measure 9 must remain speculative to some extent until we have investigated more carefully the actual complexities of measures 9–10. In connection with the criteria, it is not so clear aurally that the f is a constituent of “the” basic harmony of measure 9, and if the f resolves within the measure (into say the e of the third beat in the piano), the weight of the measure-in-itself would be carried by the harmony of resolution. We shall later have to consider even more convoluted possibilities. But one thing we can say for now is that the f
does not sound musically illogical when one plays over the sketch. (The reader, as always, should do so.) Further, the effect does not seem incongruous with one’s large sense of the strophe. All of that should make us take the f seriously as a possibility for the essential tone of the melody at measure 9. Beyond that, the hypothetical f produces yet another suggestive analogy between 9 and 16, when heard as in Example 14. That is: the falling f–d in the sketch for measures 9–10 is answered by the falling e–c at measures 16–17:

The melody of the sketch brings out this (hypothetical) relation very strongly, even though the melodic contours involved in the actual music for measures 9–10 and 16–17 are very dissimilar. In light of the sundry parallelisms of a question/answer sort between 9 and 16 which are not at all tentative in our hearing, the above observation is suggestive. It suggests specifically that there is a connection not only between the f and the e of 9 and 16, but also between the melodically cadential d of 10 and the melodically cadential c of 17; and it suggests that these connections are bound together as components of the overall V-I relation between measures 9–10 and 16–17. We can store that thought away for future reference, pending clearer hearing of measures 9–10 as regards the ultimate destiny of the high f.

Before getting to that, though, two other essential tones of the melody for Example 14 deserve comment. One is the f at measure 20. There is of course no doubt that this f governs the melody of its measure: it can hardly do otherwise. But there is something here which the context of our discussion highlights: one does not really have a sense of “a harmony” within the measure itself here. Of course the sense of governing tonic harmony within any larger context (e.g. 20–21, 16–21, 16–23, the strophe as a whole) is overpowering. But our analytic method and the formulation of criterion (a) as an important aspect of our listening process bring to our attention the unique character of measure 20 itself in this regard. With the exception of the echoing measure 22, all other measures of the strophe contain at least one intrinsic governing harmony, in most cases exactly one. Except for measure 9, the governing harmony is consonant. This means that we can perceive each measure, in its own context, as a self-referential harmonic unit. That we “can”; not, once more, that we “should” or “should not” do so: those mini-contexts are
audible, however they are qualified in relation to larger audible contexts. This phenomenon, in fact, underlay our sense of corresponding rhythmic units: measures of the piece or symbolic quarter notes on the sketches. Measure 20, however, is a notable exception, being fundamentally ornamental to measure 21. It cannot be heard as harmonically self-referential at all, even as a dissonant “harmony.” It has harmonic meaning only in the two-measure context of 20–21 and in yet larger contexts.

This observation leads in two pertinent directions. First, it highlights another aspect of our aural experience of measure 20, particularly in connection with the extreme duration of the high f (if it were not so long, it would resolve within its own measure). That is, we experience here a unique and abrupt cessation of the harmonic/rhythmic beat at the one-measure level. This in significant and striking contrast to the earlier occurrence of the high f at measure 9: the latter measure was unique in precisely the antipodal respect, containing three distinct harmonies within the measure. What impinges on us with particular force is the rhythmic effect of reminiscence: instead of the exceptionally quick harmonic rhythm associated with the f at measure 9, we now have exceptionally slow harmonic rhythm. In a crude sense, the f at measure 9 was “too short” psychologically: too much happened too soon after it. In contrast, the f at measure 20 is “too long”: too little happens too late after it. We can entertain, in this connection, an as yet vague notion that measure 20 releases some sort of tension associated with a feeling of tautening about measure 9, or about measures 9–10–11 as a whole, the span over which “too much happens too quickly.” We will pick up that idea later, when we have developed appropriate tools to handle it.

The singer will be particularly aware of the “too little too late” feeling about measure 20: not only is he missing his wonted solid harmonic support, he is also missing any rhythmic activity at all in the accompaniment over the measure. We earlier noted the striking way in which the accompaniment rhythm (starting precisely from measure 9) builds up to the abrupt halt at measure 20. For the singer this is more than an aural experience. It is a real vocal problem to maintain the high and exceptionally long note without flagging, given such tenuous harmonic support. I have heard trained singers flag, falter, and even wobble here. The solution is to take one’s psychological impetus not from the bar line of measure 20 but from one’s memory of measure 9. Of course that will not give one the necessary physical equipment for the vocal task, but it will help in marshalling and controlling those technical resources.

The other direction in which our discussion of the f at measure 20 leads is methodological. If one were to try to program a computer to extract the essential tones of the melody according to criteria (a) and (b), the machine would balk at measure 20. First, it could find no “basic harmony” within the context of that
measure alone. Second, even if it could fall back on some other criterion telling it to consider the tonic to be the basic harmony there, it would find no note in the melody during the measure which was a constituent of that harmony. So it could not apply criterion (a). The best it could do would be to analyze the “basic harmony” of measure 20 not as I but as V⁷, of which the f would be a constituent. It would accordingly put a g, not a c, in the bass for its sketch at that point. Now, this aspect of the measure is of course there to some degree, recalling the V⁷ of measure 9. But insofar as the machine’s analysis here would assert first that there is a “basic harmony” for the measure at all and, second, that the harmony does not involve the c in the bass, the analysis would distort a good deal more than it reveals. The whole point here is precisely the attenuation of the harmonic force of the V⁷ and the f, in contrast to their power at measure 9. Rather one hears the f in measure 20 as a melodic ornament to the e of measure 21, over a harmonic/rhythmic unit of two measures. Within that larger context, the analog of criterion (a) will again function: the e is the essential tone for the two-measure unit, which is governed harmonically by I. The e will also carry the metric weight of the two-measure unit, in exactly the same way that the d carried the metric weight of measure 10 in its own context:

![Diagram of music notation]

A clever programmer could enable a computer to shift harmonic/rhythmic levels in this way. But there is no need for us to pursue that train of thought any further here. For present purposes, the point of hauling in the computer was to illustrate that criteria (a) and (b) are not mechanical instructions telling you “how to do it,” “it” being to construct the sketch. First of all, constructing the sketch is not primarily what we are trying to do. What we are trying to do, in analyzing the piece, is simply to hear more of what we can in it, more perceptively. To the extent the sketch is helpful to that end, we are interested in it; otherwise not. In particular, we should be constantly on guard lest we become preoccupied with the sketch as a thing-in-itself, with a meaning or interest for us that exists apart from the piece. To be sure, from a theoretical point of view, the sketch represents something that appears to be meaningful and interesting. This in that it apparently reflects general aspects of our listening habits, apart from the piece. It is very legitimate to study such aspects of our general listening processes. Just so, it is very legitimate to study e.g. how we can generally hear certain classes of chords in certain general situations functioning as both “ii” and “IV” simultaneously.
Or e.g. how we naturally tend to be sensitive to ABA′ forms functioning in many musical contexts.

All of this, however, is a very different domain of investigation from our present one, which is simply: Schubert’s “Morgengruß”. Any and all of these theoretical concepts are useful here to the extent that they help illuminate how our general listening processes are brought to bear on our perception of that one musical experience. And only to that extent. In this connection, we should take criteria (a) and (b) specifically only as guidelines that can help us better to focus certain aspects of our listening processes both in general and, more to the point, as regards the piece to which we are currently listening.

Of the eventual sketches that result, we shall demand basically only two things. They should make musical sense in themselves, though of course we are not to consider them as pieces of music. (They are symbolic frameworks.) And the musical sense which they make should be congruent with our perceptions of frameworks for the pertinent “large contexts” of the music itself. To these ends, performing the sketches is a practice which can not be recommended too frequently. At a slow tempo, each sketch ought to feel congruent with the overall aural sense of an appropriately large context of the music itself. At first, this may be perceivable only indirectly through a chain of earlier, more detailed, sketches which have in turn been checked against the music. Eventually, though, any larger-scale sketch must be aurally referable to the piece, or else it is useless for present purposes. At a fast tempo, each sketch ought to make musical sense in itself. That is, it should be plausible syntactically, no matter how trivial its aesthetic content.

This methodological excursion from the f in the sketch for measure 20 should not distract us from remembering that consideration of the f led us to some new insights into the effect of measure 20 in the music itself. This apparent “side benefit” of the sketching is really not such at all: it is of the essence of the analytic value which the process of sketch-construction has for us. Again, our aim is not to make sketches, but to hear the piece in all its interrelating contexts. We could in fact have noted everything we discussed about measure 20 without having made any sketch. The sketch proved useful, though, in creating an analytic context in which those things were highlighted to our attention.

The second essential tone of the sketch which needs further discussion is the a in measure 8. Criteria (a) and (b) obtain to support the a here with no “problem.” But the attentive listener’s ear was perhaps caught by the d later on in measure 8, which seems to distract from the uniquely “essential” character of the a in connection with the melody of the measure-as-a-unit. The d receives equally strong support from the harmony as did the a—in fact, stronger support, since it is the root of the harmony. Beyond that, the d takes a stronger rhythmic accent than did the a, commensurate with the strongest rhythmic accents so far in the melody. Also the d receives a miniscule but audible chromatic lift from the preceding c♯. (This perhaps swells into the larger chromaticism of the “pass at ii” in measures...
12–13, just as the a♭ and g in the bass of measure 9 swell into the approach to V over the bass of measures 14–15. The idea is easier for me to entertain intellectually than aurally though: the c♯ has none of the rhythmic, metric, and harmonic support of the a♭ in measure 9, to keep it in one’s aural memory so well.) Finally, the d in measure 8 takes a considerable accent by virtue of its substantially activating a new register in the vocal line, which to measure 8 has been heard as basically organized melodically around the statements of and returns to its low g.

On the other hand, the a of measure 8 does take some rhythmic accent. More important, appearing at the bar line as a constituent of the new harmony, it takes the accent of the harmonic contrast. And yet more important, as per criterion (b) it carries the metric weight of the measure from that position. Also, by virtue of the rhythmic motive structure, it is heard as motivically analogous to the essential g at the bar line of measure 6; this before the d has yet been heard. Finally, the a reflects an intuitive sense that the preceding static low g of the essential vocal line is beginning to move up stepwise, rather than at once by a leap up to d. Whatever we eventually decide about the essential melodic line at measure 9, it is clear that our intuitive sense of “leap into the high register” is reserved for that moment, with considerable effect. It would destroy a good deal of that force if we already heard the voice too unequivocally “on the d” at measure 8. I.e., supposing that we maintain the essential f for measure 9, the sketch-melody projects our sense of where the leap occurs in the pertinent large context, while does not do so very adequately. It is important to keep contexts clear and distinct here. We do of course hear a leap to the d within the smaller context of measure 8 itself: And we do hear some of the force of that leap spreading back to embrace not just the preceding a, but the yet earlier g’s as well. What we have to consider in forming the sketch though is the context of at least the whole phrase, from measures 5 through 11, as regards our sense of the overall contour-frame for the vocal line. Here, the force of the arrival at measure 9, involving the harmony and the bass line very clearly, supports an intuition that the “essential melodic leap” occurs into measure 9, rather than a measure sooner.

As a practical working expedient, the analyst who is not sure as to whether a or d is more “essential” to the voice in measure 8 can defer aural and intellectual judgment by sketching both. (This is still assuming we have fixed the essential f for measure 9.) The expedient can be generally helpful whenever it becomes clear after exhaustive local listening that one’s hearing of the eventual large context will not be definitive enough until later, to decide which of the melodic tones is “framing” in that context and which is elaborating the framework in smaller contexts. One should be careful though not to use the expedient as an excuse to avoid confronting the aural problem here, for not listening to what
the a is doing and what the d is doing, each in various subcontexts. The habit is all too easy to slip into, leading to “sketches” such as \[\text{music notation}\]. This suggests nothing that we cannot get as well and better from the score itself.

Once again, our sketch is to represent symbolically only the framework for a certain large context one hears functioning. By its very nature and purpose, it cannot reveal or even suggest everything that is happening in other, smaller (not less significant) contexts, nor can it present more than the framework on which we eventually hang the synthesis of our ultimate perceptions regarding that large context. The temptation to over-elaborate the sketch is a manifestation of anxiety in these respects; it should be watched if it becomes a habit. It is “too bad” if our sketch does not include the d in measure 8; it is also “too bad” if it does not include the a. It was “too bad” that the sketch which showed measures 9–15 elaborating V did not also show how the B phrase builds 4th degree preparation for the dominant harmony of measure 15. But why is all of this “too bad”? Do we really expect that the few strokes of the sketches should really convey the entire complexity of the listening experience in all its pertinent or important aspects? If so, we had better disabuse ourselves of that manifestly preposterous notion, the sooner the better.

Then we can use the sketches for what they are really worth to us, rather than trying to make them do more and ending up with less as a result. What they really worth is the symbolic insight they offer into certain broad aural frameworks. So we should concentrate on trying to sketch the frameworks as simply as possible consistent with their aural relevance, not expecting in the least that we shall not have to omit a great deal of musical importance in the process. In fact, the “ultimate sketch” for the piece:

\[\text{music notation}\] omits virtually everything of characteristic importance to us about the piece itself, without being the slightest less valid as a symbolic framework. (I am assuming, of course, that one hears the pertinent “large context” to that sketch quite clearly in the piece already. If one did not, the sketch would be of analytic utility in focusing one’s hearing of that context.)

Returning now to the a and the d in measure 8: there is of course no law that says we cannot hear both tones as “essential,” sketching or, as I would prefer in light of the rhythmic unit underlying the symbolism, \[\text{music notation}\]. If this really reflects symbolically what one hears in the large context, one should by all means sketch it in without hesitation. Only one should be quite aware of what one is saying, in this case, about how one is hearing the frame of the context: in three essential voices rather than two at that point. The above symbolism does not reflect my personal hearing: for reasons already discussed, I hear the a as an essential constituent of the framework and the d as an accented event occurring outside the frame. Fortunately for the art of music, people do not
all hear in exactly the same way. What is important about your sketches ultimately is not whether they agree with mine, but whether they describe your hearing.

I omit the d from my sketch, then, because it does not belong there as I hear the frame of the large context. At the risk of being overly repetitious, I will point out again that this was not a matter of contention between the d and the a as to which was “correct” or “more important.” Having decided to omit the d on the sketch, I cannot flush all the “evidence in its favor” down the drain: everything I heard then I still hear now. In fact, having decided that I do not hear the accent on the d as functioning to fix that tone in the large framework, it is all the more incumbent on me to explore what the accent does bring to my attention, in relation to the d. There are several such phenomena.

One has already been mentioned in connection with the c♯. While I cannot hear the chromaticism of 12–13 growing out of that tiny inflection, I can hear how the whole “pass at ii” in those measures swells the extra accent on the ii harmony of measure 8, in particular the accent on its root d in the melody. To that extent, the sense of the B phrase as providing 4th degree harmony is supported by the hint that the phrase expands not just measure 9, but measures 8-and-9. The ii⁶ of measure 8 gets extra accent anyway, by the doubling of the bass and its activation in the lower octave (like an orchestral string-bass entrance underneath the ’celli). I would not make too much out of this, however. It does qualify the sense of the B phrase a bit. But to the extent one hears that phrase in one context that suggests “ii”–V, one is bound to associate it somewhat with measures 8–9 in any case, regardless of accent on measure 8, once one associates the V of measure 15 with the V of measure 9.

What is more forceful to my ear about the accent on the d is its urging upwards of the essential melodic line from its preceding quietus on the low g. I hear the line essentially moving only to a at measure 8, but the accented d, following hard on the heels of that a, is goading the rise on impatiently. The effect is rhythmically strong, since the voice has been lazing around its g for three previous measures; the a is already quite a bit of rising action in this context, and the d does not even wait for the a to last over the measure, or even two-thirds of the measure, before attempting to prod the voice even higher. The abrupt rising sense is strong enough for my ear so that I would not deny the possibility of hearing both the a and the d as essential tones for measure 8, even though I do not go so far myself. The sense of the push up coincides with the question in the text: wo steckst du gleich das Köpfchen hin (?). To the extent that the question is felt as complete at this point, the d carries and sets the rising tone of the question mark. But the question is not in fact complete, it takes further qualification: ... hin, als wär’ dir was geschehen? Accordingly, the rise of the vocal line continues past measure 8,
to the problematical high f of measure 9 on the subjunctive wär’: as if there were (???) something the matter?

In this connection, no matter what one makes musically of the f at measure 9, one thing emerges very clearly: when the smoke of the accelerated and dissonant harmonies clears away in the middle of measure 10, the voice is unambiguously once more on d at the actual final question mark. So an important function of the accented d in measure 8 is to anticipate the essential d of measure 10, both having to do with the first question in the text. This is consistent with hearing the earlier d as nonessential for the sketch. The essential d of measure 10, which carries the actual question mark, is supported by the appropriate large “question harmony,” V. The d in measure 8 is not. Correspondingly, the second line of the poem, while it could be read as a complete question in itself, is not treated as such by the text. It is not yet of great urgency to the poet. “Why do you tuck your head back in (?)” explicitly formulates only surprise, not yet dismay; it could have any number of prosaic answers (for which the poet presumably hopes). E.g. “Because I saw a bee flying at me,” “Because I just remembered I left the coffee boiling,” “Because Daddy was calling me,” etc. It is only with the elaboration of the third line that the question acquires psychological urgency: “…as if something were wrong?” The urgency involves two components. First, “is something wrong?” I.e.: “Oh, oh, something is wrong.” I.e. “Maybe I am bad news for her.” (Though the latter nuance is reserved for elaboration only in the fourth and fifth lines of text.) All of this is carried by the d at the question mark in measure 10, with the V harmony under it.

The second component involves the subjunctive wär’, set by the climactic high f: “…as if something were wrong?” I.e.: “there really isn’t anything wrong, so why are you behaving as if there were?” Followed up by: “or maybe there really is something wrong after all?” The latter little train of thought and doubt has time to work itself through, from wär’ at the bar line of measure 9, by the time the question mark is actually reached at the middle of measure 10. The psychological process can be taken suggestively in connection with the accelerated harmonic rhythm and the chain of dissonant chords exactly between wär’ and the question mark. In connection with the musical problem “does the f resolve before the middle of measure 10, or not until measure 16?” we can consider the textual analog: does the doubt of the subjunctive resolve before the question mark at the end of the sentence, or does the sense of that doubt continue unresolved until the poet decides to leave? (But he does not leave.)

Now we are finally getting into an appropriate context in which to examine measures 9–10. The end result of our examination will be a decision to let the f stand on the sketch to represent the essential tone of measure 9. But it need hardly be emphasized yet again that that decision in itself is not the primary goal of our investigations.

Picking up our examination of the vocal line hereabouts, we can hear that, along with the intensification of harmonic and rhythmic activity, there is also
intensified “quasi-essential” melodic activity. Specifically, in the sense of the earlier criteria, we can hear during these two measures a “quasi-essential” tone in the voice for each *quarter note* of music, each quarter carrying its own harmony.

I have not drawn the bar line of measure 10 in the above sketch, for reasons which will become clear later.

The little melodic figure is interesting in several respects. To begin with, it shows clearly how the d of measure 10 is heard as the goal of local melodic action. The d is approached from above by the linear component f–e–d of the figure. It is also approached from below by the linear component b–c–d of the figure. The two components converge on the d in a symmetrical way, which is particularly striking when one recalls the melodic “marker” which the accented d of measure 8 has laid down just before the figure sets in.

Beyond that, the rising linear component approaching the d can be heard as beginning all the way back at measure 5: the b in the middle of measure 9 picks up the a from the beginning of measure 8, which in turn had risen from the initial g of the phrase. The result is an overall stepwise rise g–a–b–c–d over the A phrase as a whole, the rise accelerating all the way:

This is certainly the largest and most characteristic linear impulse we hear embedded in the overall vocal line of phrase A. It contributes to our earlier intuition that the voice “basically rises” over the phrase, even through measure 9. The d of measure 10, then, is not just “a goal of melodic action” over measures 9–10; it is such a goal in a much larger context, indeed the context of the melodic action for the entire A phrase.

But stop, some readers may say, this is very inconsistent and confusing. You began the sketching process by emphasizing the importance of fixing, at the very opening stage, a harmonic and metric context for the sketch that was to be determined by the big “arrivals” in the music. Each such arrival was to be heard as a moment when some “large tonal impetus” reached its goal. We have just heard exactly such a large tonal impetus: the overall melodic rise of the vocal line through phrase A. The gesture, moreover, is certainly a melodic projection (g–a–b–c–d) of the “V” that is the harmonic goal of the phase: the harmony is clearly implied by the line alone, when it gets to the d and sits there. According to your criterion for “arrivals,” then, we ought to hear an arrival, specifically the big V-arrival, on the second beat of measure 10, not at the bar line of measure 9. If you can produce the melodic action of the bass line to support the latter, why is it not equally or even more cogent to
produce the melodic action of the vocal line to support the former? Even hearing
the e that begins measure 10 as an ornamental appoggiatura to the following d, this
would only displace the arrival sense back one quarter: the “V-arrival” should then
be heard at the bar line of measure 10, still not at measure 9.

The sense of this confusion should be quite familiar by now, even though its
species is new. As before, the source of the confusion is the simultaneous func-
tioning of different musical contexts. The new element here is that we are now
considering contexts-within-contexts not just in time, but also in musical “space.”

Schematically:

A better geometrical analog yet would be to conceptualize the extraction of
melody-and-its-rhythm from the total context over a fixed span of time not in
terms of the excision of a smaller area from a larger, but rather in terms of regard-
ing a very multidimensional structure as it projects onto only some of those
dimensions. The picture this sort of projection yields can often be very startling
when compared to one’s intuition about the whole. Startling in that it is both
unexpected and at the same time reveals aspects of the large structure which one
had not noticed before.

For instance, I take a solid piece of wood in the form of a cube and pass it
through a bandsaw, cutting it in half. What is the two-dimensional form of the
cross section? Of course it is a square. Or is it? Suppose, instead of holding the
cube by two opposite faces as I pass it through the saw, I hold it by two opposite
corners, bisecting the line between those corners perpendicularly by the plane of
the saw-band. The cross section will be a hexagon.

What is the moral? First, if one were given a hexagon and asked to infer a
three-dimensional figure from it, one would not likely suppose a cube. But it
would not be impossible to do so. Second, the hexagonal cross section reveals
something about the structure of the cube which many people do not intuit
immediately (aside from professional artists and mathematicians): the object
has a quality which involves symmetrical “6-ness” as well as symmetrical
“4-ness.”

The little metaphorical experiment should not be taken too exactly for present
purposes. First, the total context of a span of music has a great many more than
three “dimensions” in any intuitive sense; and the melodic/rhythmic subcontext
over that span has a good deal more than two. More important, those contexts
are not static objects like cubes, squares. and hexagons; they are forms critically
immersed in time. That aspect of the forms, in fact, is of the essence in the present
discussion of various “goals of tonal action.”
But the analogy is still useful in reducing preliminary confusion. If certain features of the purely melodic/rhythmic contexts under consideration, over measures 9–10 and over measures 5–10, appear to “contradict” our earlier intuitions for the total musical contexts over those spans, the nature of the phenomenon is somewhat analogous to that by which a hexagon “contradicts” a cube. The analogy suggests that what we have to hear now is analogous to the insight that the hexagon “qualifies” rather than “contradicts” the cube, without being any the less a hexagon. We certainly do not want to force ourselves to pretend that we are seeing a square rather than a hexagon, or a beehive rather than a cube.

In this spirit, then, let us examine our “hexagons” more closely. We have, first, the little melodic/rhythmic context created by the frame of the “quasi-essential” tones of the voice over measures 9–10. If one plays or sings over that little fragment in its own context, ignoring as best one can the familiar surrounding total context, one becomes very aware of a clear harmonic and metric implication, caused by the wedging effect, which brings out the d as a very strong goal: \( \text{\textit{Cohn}} \). The harmonic implication is quite compatible with the actual harmonies in the total context surrounding. The metric implication, however, is strikingly at odds with the meter of the surrounding total context. It “contradicts” (i.e. qualifies) the total metric sense of the passage quite noticeably. In particular, by adding an extra \( \frac{2}{3} \) “measure,” it reinforces the sense of “too much happening too quickly” hereabouts. The resulting tension is yet again another musical aspect of the poet’s internal tension between \( \text{\textit{wär’}} \) and the question mark.

The harmonic/metric implications of the figure-in-its-own-context suggest that the f can resolve to e (in that context) before the d of measure 10 is reached. Specifically, in that context,

**Example 15**

In the latter reduction, the f can be heard as an appoggiatura resolving to and hence ornamenting the e. The possibility is especially easy to entertain aurally here because the \( \frac{2}{3} \) scansion of the melodic figure makes the e metrically very weak (suitable as the resolution of a metrically strong appoggiatura), in contrast to the actual \( \frac{3}{4} \) scansion of the total context, which makes the e much stronger
metrically (putting it on, instead of just before, a bar line). Hearing the f as an appoggiatura to the e, the pertinent part of the last stage of Example 15:

![Diagram of appoggiatura](image)

could be heard as ornamenting either an “essential”

![Diagram of variation](image)

or an “essential”

![Diagram of variation](image)

The harmonic/metric implication of the complete little melodic/rhythmic figure, in its own context, would correspondingly be “essentially,” on this level, either

![Diagram of variation](image) or ![Diagram of variation](image)  

Example 16

The first of these alternatives receives no support whatever from the rest of the total context surrounding the figure: we can hardly hear all of measure 9 and the first beat of measure 10 as representing “tonic” in the total context. In particular, the bass is certainly “essentially on g” at measure 9.

That, however, is still consistent with the alternative of Example 16. Reviewing how we got there: the little melodic/rhythmic figure suggested hearing the following hierarchy of contextual frames:

Example 17

![Diagram of variation](image)

And this possible implication is not at all implausible in connection with the total effect of the passage. It is of course highly syncopated in that respect. But the implication is perfectly compatible with the arrival of g in the bass line at measure 9. It is also compatible with the large sense of V-arrival at measure 9. For one could
continue the hierarchy of frames by analyzing the melodic e–d, at the last stage of Example 17, in an appoggiatura-resolution relation; the e would then ornament the d on a higher level of the hierarchy, and would become “essentially” at that higher hierarchical level.

We would thus reach the following analysis, reflected symbolically by Example 19 and the preceding hierarchical stages leading up to it: the big V-arrival occurs at measure 9, with an essential g in the bass and an essential d (not f!) in the yet larger framework of the vocal line. That d is represented by a preceding ornamental appoggiatura e (Example 18), not just within measure 10 itself, but in that everything in the melody from measure 9 to the second beat of measure 10 hangs about that e in the framework of an appropriate hierarchical sub-level. In particular, the f of measure 9 in turn already represents that e, as an appoggiatura to it (Example 17). The f has thus resolved before the d of measure 10 is heard. As a result of the piling up of appoggiature (consistent with the chain of harmonic dissonances leading to the consonant harmony under the d of measure 10), that d in fact ultimately carries the metric weight of the big beat at measure 9, albeit in highly ornamented fashion on quite a large structura scale.

This analysis is given added force by its consistency with our earlier observation that d was “the goal of the large melodic action” over the entire A phrase. We pondered: why does not the d of measure 10 then carry the weight of the big V-arrival at measure 9? The preceding analysis indicates a sense in which it might in fact be heard as doing so. It says that the d is already there at measure 9 “by implication,” but that its actual acoustical appearance is delayed by a measure-plus of complex ornamental activity. That notion, in turn, is suggestive because it hooks up with our earlier observation that the vocal c of measure 17 (the analogous moment to measure 10 in the two-part form) was itself expected as a goal of melodic action at measure 16; but it was also delayed an extra measure.

And we have already played with the idea that the c in measure 17 could be heard as an analog, in the question/answer structure of the strophe, to the (essential) d of measure 10, just as the e of 16 answered the (hypothecated) essential f of “measure” 9.

However, it now seems that we might not hear the f at all as the essential melodic tone for measure 9. Rather we are contemplating a hearing which would
be represented on the overall sketch by putting an “essential e” in the voice for measure 9:

*Example 20*

![Diagram of Example 20]

The e of Example 20 does not actually appear in the voice part during measure 9; hence the quotation marks around it. It would represent either the e in the piano on the third beat of measure 9, to which the putative “appoggiatura” f at the beginning of the measure would resolve obliquely, within the measure; or else it would represent the actual vocal e of measure 10, heard as syncopated so that it belongs “essentially” to the preceding measure. Or it might represent elements of both. However, the fact that the e of Example 20 does not actually appear in the voice part within measure 9 should give us considerable pause, particularly when the f is so strong. Let us try now to work out the hearing of Example 20 more carefully, as it might be tenable in the total context, with its actual $\frac{3}{4}$ meter. (We evidently do not actually hear the $\frac{2}{4}$ implication of the little melodic figure persisting into that total context, no matter how strongly the metric implication of the “hexagonal cross section” highlights the latent possibility of e as the essential tone for measure 9.)

We are to try to hear the singer’s f of measure 9 conclusively resolving before the d of measure 10, this either to the e in the piano on the third beat of measure 9 or to the e in the voice at measure 10. In the latter case, we are to hear the “resolution” as a syncopation of something that occurs “essentially” within measure 9, before the f has acquired too much metric weight. Let us consider the latter possibility first. The difficulty is that the voice’s e, as it is presented in the total context, belongs so clearly and strongly to measure 10. It ornaments the following d completely within measure 10, looking forward to that d; it is very strained to hear it looking backward also to the f “as if” it belonged to measure 9. We have already noted how clearly the e ornaments the d, in hearing d as the essential tone of measure 10. The impression is greatly augmented by the attack of the f$^{\#}$ under the e. The f$^{\#}$ evidently has the overwhelmingly strong function of “looking forward” to its resolution, all as a part of measure 10; it emphasizes that sense for the entire chord on the first beat of that measure. In fact, the f$^{\#}$ has the effect of completely destroying harmonic support for the e. This is the one chord of the progression under consideration (measures 9–10) which is not a clear (even if dissonant) “harmony.” In that respect, the chord is like the chord at measure 20 which we discussed earlier: it cannot be
Morgengruss

heard as a self-referential harmonic unit in itself, but only in a larger context including both itself and the chord which it inflects. The latter here being of course the second chord of measure 10: we hear the two chords not as two distinct harmonies, but as one harmonic unit. This just as we heard measures 20–21 on a larger rhythmic scale. The association is not a bit fortuitous, since in both cases we are considering chordal support for the falling element of the b-motif: within measure 10 as that motivic element first appears; in measures 20–21 as the final rhythmic expansion of that element within the voice part. We shall develop the association much farther later on.

Now since the first two beats of measure 10 are heard as one harmonic unit, the first beat having no independent harmonic meaning except in reference to what follows, it is accordingly very difficult to hear the first beat, even as possibly syncopated, resolving something which happened earlier. The “resolution” ought to have better and clearer harmonic meaning, and some sense of relating backwards rather than, or as well as, forwards. The total context here pulls the rug out from under the sensation we could entertain earlier in this regard. We have no problem hearing f resolve to e, that is, in the context of . We can even hold that sense if we enlarge the context to include the f#, as long as we hold the metric sense: In Example 21, the accent of the f# is somewhat puzzling, interfering with the desired metric sense of resolution. (Appoggiatura—to-resolution is characteristically strong-to-weak metrically.) But we can still handle the f# aurally as if a passing tone.

However, once the f# sense has been overpowered in the larger total context (by the attack of the bass g in measure 10, together with the 3 sense of the music so far), the accent on the f# e itself occurs in too strong a metric position, to maintain the heard sense: And we hear Example 22 clearomently.

And in the framework of Example 23, the high e is swallowed up, as an ornament to d; it cannot resolve the preceding f, which still persists in force within the frame of the example.

Let us now consider the other possibility we discussed before: that the f resolves to the e in the piano obliquely, within measure 9. I.e. that one can hear Example 23 implying . One might even hear the voice’s e of measure 10 subliminally reinforcing that sense to an extent, as an “echo” of the actual

These example numbers still look at bit awkward. Maybe reduce and move closer to example, or possibly delete because they are mentioned in the text anyway.
resolution a beat earlier, even while it also inflects the subsequent d. (As only an “echo” effect, it would not need any harmonic support).

To the extent we can hear the sense of Example 24, we can in fact maintain the sense of our earlier notions, hearing the f resolve to e, etc. Going through an analogous hierarchy of stages, now beginning from the actual $\frac{3}{4}$ of the total context: Example 24 ornaments which in turn ornaments the latter would then appear on the basic sketch we have made as Example 25.

And this, at a higher level of the hierarchy, can be reduced to

All of this essentially just as earlier, following the hypothetical implications of the melodic figure in $\frac{2}{3}$. Except that now we have heard how we might be able to maintain essentially the same hearing in the actual total context of the music over measures 9–10, and even over measures 5–11.

Example 25 represents the essential tone of measure 9 by e, the heard harmony-governing-measure-9 being $I_6$, which is about to resolve to the large-context V which it ornaments. The overall gesture of measures 9–10 as two “units” could by symbolized more ornately by Ex. 26. If we extend Example 26 by a quarter rest, to symbolize the dropping-out of the voice in measure 11, we will hear a group of three “units” forming one symbolic “measure”: . And this way of hearing measures 9–10–11 “in essence” is evidently appealing, in light of the structure of the echo-measure 11 within itself:
That is, the context of the echo-in-itself here would summarize the frame for our hypothetical ultimate perception of the somewhat larger context of the three measures themselves, closing off the latter context neatly before the B phrase begins.

The attractive aspects of hearing d carrying the weight of the V-arrival on some suitably high hierarchical level have already been discussed at length. And the context of the little melodic figure need not concern us more, now that we have heard one of its possible implications able to maintain itself in the total context with the sense. We have, in sum, found a suggestive and viable large context, one which we should frame with an e, rather than an f, in the overall sketch at measure 9.

The context is at its strongest as regards the span of phrase A, over measure 5–11. First, the notion of putting ultimate weight on the d rather than the f in connection with the V-arrival is at its most forceful when one hears the d as the big melodic goal of phrase A, in the context of that phrase by itself. Second, since we have not yet heard measure 16 in the context of phrase A alone, our natural urge to resolve the forceful and dissonant high f has no alternative means of satisfaction, within the given phrase, other than in the fashion we have just explored. Since the forcefully accented dissonance demands “explanation” (resolution), we are correspondingly all the more willing to hear any reasonable candidate for that resolution within the phrase, even if that means dipping into an inner voice of the accompaniment, to fetch out an “essential tone for measure 9” which is not actually sung in measure 9. The alliteration of was with wärf’ may help us a bit here. Wagner would have been pleased, not least by the alliterating phoneme itself.

But the ear nonetheless balks considerably at this hearing. Even with all the musical and textual convolutions about measures 9 and 10, it still seems too strained to whisk away from one’s ultimate frame of hearing the f which actually appears at the bar line of measure 9 as the climactic crux of the whole phrase, supported with an enormous beat and accent very directly. And to replace that f by an e which the voice never sings at all in that measure, which appears only buried within an inner voice of the accompaniment. And, further, to do so in such fashion that that e appears as the symbolic climax of the phrase on the sketch. The fact that the soprano voice of the piano doubles the singer just here (measures 9–10, plus perhaps the preceding accented d of measure 8), and nowhere else in the strophe, also makes one feel uneasy at hearing an inner voice of the piano doing such
substantial substitute labor for the singer here. To the extent that one must hear precisely all of this within the hypothetical context under discussion, the context remains incomplete and unfulfilling in spite of its provisional viability and the several insights it carries.

But if the f of measure 9 does not resolve within that measure in the way just described, its dissonating force must persist right up to the e of measure 16. There is no intermediary opportunity for it to resolve in any musically sensible way. This leads us back to the overall sketch as originally written in Example 14, with the question mark over the f removed. The gesture of this framework in resolving the f of measure 9 to the e of measure 16 is correspondingly appropriate for our aural sense not of just phrase A but of the strophe as a whole. As earlier, we have two temporal contexts under consideration: the one recently examined has maximal impact over the span 5–11; the one now under discussion involves the entire strophe, in which we can hear measure 9 relating to measure 16. As earlier, we take the larger context as governing in our sketch for the strophe as a whole, “when all is said and done,” with full awareness now of what this does and does not imply as to the “correctness” or “importance” of the other reading in the smaller context.

We are almost finished with our micro-analysis of measures 9–10, but not quite. We have noted that we can, with some strain, hear the f resolving to e within measure 9. It remains to assure ourselves that, as required by the larger context, we can also hear the f resolving to that e, in some more exact sense than a vague dissatisfaction about the result of the former hearing.

We can indeed hear the f not resolving, specifically by hearing the third chord of measure 9 as “passing through” the V\(^7\) harmony rather than “resolving” it. We can, if we wish, even hear this in the context of the little melodic fragment:

\[\text{Example 27} \quad \text{ornamenting} \quad \text{Example 28}\]

The sense of the melodic fragment is neutral as regards these possible alternatives, even though (by providing a subcontext in which the high e was metrically weak) it did help us hear the earlier possibility more strongly than we might have otherwise.
That $\frac{3}{4}$ should then be taken basically only as a metric complication going on over measures 9–10, along with all the other complications, specifically intensifying the feeling that “too much happens too quickly.” In bidding farewell to it, we might note that the accented d of measure 8 already begins the metric complication, since it is consistent with the $\frac{3}{4}$:

Ex. 31

This is logical in light of our earlier observations about the way in which the d of measure 8 binds with the d of measure 10 both musically and in relation to the text: the provisional question “…hin(?)” extending through the high f at the doubting subjunctive “wär” to the ultimate d at “…geschehen?”

The basic sense of Examples 27–31 carries over in pretty much analogous fashion to the $\frac{3}{4}$ total context of measures 9–10:

This analysis leads to an interesting melodic ornamentation of the basic sketch:

Example 32

The ornamentation within measure 16, for Example 33, has been included to preserve the motivic correspondence with measure 9 in that sketch. It is important to play the melody of Example 33 together with the bass. Its purely melodic “hexagonal cross section” gives quite a different impression when heard in isolation. We shall explore that later.

Meanwhile we should emphasize something for the reader with little formal background in music theory, who may be somewhat ill at ease with the jargon
of “appoggiature,” “passing tones,” etc. Those terms, like other theoretical concepts, have analytic relevance only in so far as they describe aural sensations one actually hears in the piece under consideration. Specifically, given say the abstract musical context

![Ex. 34]

it is meaningless to say that the f “is” an appoggiatura to the e. It is equally meaningless to say that the e “is” a passing tone from f to d within the V\(^7\) harmony. The context is not large enough so that one hears it unequivocally either way. Its intrinsic ambivalence is of the essence of its musical effect; to pretend the ambivalence is not there is to distort reporting the actual effect of the context.

There are certain larger contexts, including and qualifying Example 34, in which one can hear the f relating to the e with the sense that theory labels “appoggiatura-resolution.” There are certain other larger contexts in which one would hear the f–e–d gesture with the sense that theory labels “harmonic tone–passing tone–harmonic tone.” There is nothing sacred about the labels themselves. To the extent that we can hear Example 34 itself either way, it is appropriate to use either set of labels, depending on how we are hearing the passage in various possible larger contexts.

Actually, while the c in measure 9 was heard in our most recent context as a “passing tone,” one would not so describe the e on the last beat if one were being very finicky. Technically, one would label its sense in that context as an ornamental “anticipation” of the e on the first beat of measure 10, according to the model

![This ornamental anticipation of an appoggiatura is also sometimes labeled as a “preparation” of the appoggiatura. There is nothing magical about all this mumbo-jumbo either: “anticipation” and “preparation” are only more labels which musicians have found it convenient to attach to certain classes of aural sensations, for the purpose of saving time in discussing specific musical passages within which one has such sensations. As long as the sensations themselves are clear and convincing, one can always find appropriate theoretical labels to attach to various of their aspects. If one hears the same events differently in different contexts of a piece, one can accordingly use different labels to describe the different sensations. In this connection, the “reduction technique” we used in analyzing measures 9–10, to hear what is ornamenting what, are themselves strictly neutral where there is any possible ambiguity in a given context. E.g. if one hears the abstract context:
one would reduce the passage to \( \text{Ex. 35} \) in extracting “essential tones” for the frame of a larger context. If, on the other hand, one hears Example 35 as

\[
\begin{align*}
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This context, the “hexagonal cross section” for the voice part alone over the entire strophe, is larger than the earlier vocal cross section involving only phrase A. It does not have to worry so much about resolving the f at measure 9 (where the earlier cross section and in fact the total context for phase A itself contemplated hearing an essential e); it has measure 16 available to resolve the f “when all is said and done.” It is correspondingly freer to follow the basic gestures of its linear impulses as determinant, specifically following the line g–a–b–c–d over phrase A, downgrading the structural importance of the f at measure 9 correspondingly.

This behavior leads to a big melodic arrival at the essential d of measure 10. In its own context (of Example 36) the melody is not aware of the “V-arrival” at measure 9: as far as it is concerned, it has been elaborating V from the beginning of the strophe (of Example 36). It then continues, as discussed earlier, to put the next big melodic arrival at measure 17, where the melody also hears the implication of the resolution to I. The tune is perfectly content to hear the large melodic implication of V continuing right through the high e of measure 16. That implication arises from the emphasized points of reference in the large melodic structure:

Example 37

The e in the lower sketch of Example 37, as one hears it ornamentally, is labeled as an “échappé.” The aural sense of the ornament is familiar.

We have referred before to the “melodic arrivals” at measures 10 and 17, but we have not as yet heard their full force, which is only now clear in Examples 36 and 37. One is much struck in particular by the force of the melodic arrival of c at measure 17. It resolves not just the d from measure 10, but the “elaborating V” melodic structure that has been functioning in this context all the way from measure 5: only here do we hear the melody in itself implying any harmonic change.

While we are in this context, we can notice the strong role which the melodic turn-motive plays in the large approach to the vocal c of measure 17: that is, a melodic ornamentation of the melodic turn on the last beat of measure 9 which coincided with the first appearance of the triplet-element in the rhythmic b-motif. Of course, the rhythmic/metric context is
very different in Example 38, and the reader may hesitate at drawing the melodic association. But it can be followed through, using as a link the figure \[ \text{Ex. 40} \]

That is how the written vocal line actually approaches the c of measure 17 from the last beat of measure 16. The rhythmic/metric sense here, as well as the melodic sense, corresponds quite closely to that of the turn in the sketch of Example 38, as it approaches the same c on a higher rhythmic level. And one can of course hear the transformation of Example 39 into Example 40 without much strain.

We have already discussed how the triplet rhythm is boldly taken from the figure of Example 39 for application to the walking-figure in triplets that sets in at measure 16. One can note that the melodic aspect of the turn-motive, which we are currently discussing, also persists within the walking-figuration, latent in a larger context. Compressing the walking-figuration into chords:

One hears that the turn-motive governs the top voice of those broken chords in the music. The lowest voice of the chords oscillates on the e–and–f, which of course has its own melodic significance as a motivic resonance of various f–e relations in the music (measures 9–to–16, measures 20–21, etc.)

In sum, the little gesture of Example 39, whose rhythm generates the triplet-orgy of measures 16–19, can also be heard as generating a great amount of melodic motivic material involving measures 16 and following, in various small and large contexts. This particularly in connection with the voice’s approach to the c of measure 17. All of this evidently qualifies the question/answer relation of text and music very strongly.

After all our excursions, we have now finally established a sketch for the frame of the total context of the strophe as a whole:

Example 41
We have “established” the sketch not so much in having decided e.g. that the f for measure 9 is “correct,” but rather in that we now have a clear and fairly complete idea of what we are and are not saying in putting that f in the sketch, along with the a in measure 8, etc. Actually, since we have included the piano’s echoes of measure 11 and measures 22–23, we could also include the essential tones of the piano part for the round after measure 16; thus:

As we noted earlier, the fact that the imitation keeps the high e sounding at each bar line until measure 20 is significant. As we shall note later, the fact that the imitation also keeps the c sounding at the bar lines of measures 17–18–19 is also significant. It does not seem inappropriate to include both e and c in the sketch hereabouts, as essential tones for the melodies of two different instruments. The idea seems suggestive in light of something recently discussed: the notion that the voice, in its own cross section of the large context, hears the big arrival on its c at measure 17. The piano of course “hears” the arrival at measure 16, on the voice’s e. The following round prolongs the sense of the instruments’ being “one measure off” from each other. Correspondingly, it keeps both the critical e and the critical c sounding as essential tones.

We shall refer to Example 41 as a “first-level reduction.” This terminology reflects the fact that we hear rhythm and meter functioning at different levels in the music. The written score, e.g., reflects the level on which we hear a rhythmic beat for each quarter note and a metric pulse organizing those beats into regular groups of three quarter notes; a pulse at this level occurs at each bar line of the score. Given the conventions of notation, the score also reflects metric organization at smaller levels. For instance, hearing each written quarter note as carrying a “mini-pulse” on its attack, any rhythm in eighth notes is heard as metrically organized by those pulses. And, hearing each eighth as a “mini-mini-pulse,” any rhythm in sixteenth notes is heard as metrically organized by those pulses. These various levels of rhythmic/metric activity are organized in an interrelated hierarchy: a pulse on one level being experienced as simply defining the rhythmic unit on the next higher level:
The dotted half note of the score in this regard is the rhythmic unit on a yet larger level: the level of the sketch in Example 41. Hence the term “first-level reduction”: this rhythmic level is the first (i.e. most detailed) one whose metric organization is not reflected in the actual notation of the music. There is no notation, that is, to tell us which dotted halves are metrically “strong” and which are “weak,” as they group together on this rhythmic level. Nonetheless, we certainly hear rhythm organized metrically at this level. For instance, we are in no aural doubt that measure 16 is a “strong measure” and measure 17 a “weak measure,” because of the strength of the heard pulse at the bar line of measure 16, created by the tonic arrival. Similarly for measures 9 and 10. The overriding metric strength of measures 9 and 16 in this connection is symbolized by the bar lines currently on Example 41. Beyond those biggest metric stresses, we can hear the sketch organized metrically on yet smaller levels. E.g. we would intuitively put a smaller-level bar line before measure 12 on the sketch, similarly for measure 5, etc. We shall presently metrize the sketch at all pertinent levels, investigating just what theoretical criteria are prompting our intuitions here (measure 12 and 5 are certainly not “arrivals,” as were 9 and 16). Before proceeding to that, though, some preliminary observations are in order.

First, the reader to whom these ideas are novel may have to overcome a certain unease at the notion of analyzing aspects of the piece which are not reflected in its notation. This, however, he will probably recognize himself to be an artificial anxiety, arising from a hesitancy in trusting his ear. To point the absolute necessity of doing so, one can observe that metric analysis on any rhythmic level is basically independent of visual notation, as opposed to harmonic, melodic, or rhythmic analysis. For instance, we hear that the second quarter of measure 7 is a “weak quarter”: why? Not because Schubert notated the passage

![Example of notation](image1)

but because the total context of what we actually hear organizes our rhythmic impressions in a fashion corresponding to the metric implications of the notation. Suppose that Schubert had notated the passage

![Example of notation](image2)
Would our aural metric impressions be any different? Obviously not. In particular, we would not hear the quarter in question as being any “stronger” for having a visual bar line behind it on the score. Far from revising our aural impressions to conform to the notation, we would at once wonder why the composer used that metric notation. In contrast, if the notation of pitch or rhythm on the score were altered, one would immediately hear a corresponding alteration in one’s aural impressions.

That is, with regard to pitch and rhythm, a composer’s notation exercises a direct effect on what we hear. With regard to metric structure, however, the situation is generally the reverse: the notation reflects what we hear, or at least what he hears. Metric notation, in fact, is primarily only a convenience for performers, particularly in ensembles where they have to synchronize their various activities. There is no reason other than that why a piece could not be performed without any notated time signature or bar lines. If a composer wanted a dynamic accent on each heard metric pulse, he could write the accents accordingly. (More harm than good is generally done, anyway, by the performance convention of accenting metric pulses in this fashion.)

Of course there are numbers of instances in which a composer’s metric notation either actually or apparently does not reflect the heard metric sense of a passage. On comparatively rare occasions, one can take this as an extra-musical “poetic” suggestion to the performer, projecting anxiety, palpitation, Sturm und Drang (as at the opening of Schumann’s Manfred), etc. More generally, the practice is due to one of two reasons, or a combination of them. First, performers generally find it convenient not to have to switch visual metric notation if only a short span of time is involved, when a syncopation or new meter is heard over that brief a period. The same is true when various meters are simultaneously heard in ambiguous tension over a more extended period, in different “contexts” of a piece. Second, an apparently perverse metric notation may be designed to reflect the overriding sense of a preceding, or more often subsequent, “big beat” that is reflected accurately by the notation. So, for example, with the opening of Brahms’s Horn Trio. The passage consistently “mis-bars” the music, during an extended elaboration of dominant harmony, reserving the coincidence of written and heard pulses for the entrance of the first big tonic beat as a result. Brahms is notorious in his predilection for musical ideas which involve such complications in metric notation. By and large, however, Schubert does not involve himself in such situations; his metric complexities, as we shall see, generally occur on higher rhythmic levels than those involving metric notation in the scores.

In this regard, then, what we are doing when we put bar lines on a reduction sketch is exactly analogous to what Schubert was doing when he put bar lines on his score: we are reflecting heard pulses at a certain rhythmic level by convenient visual symbols.

Let us return now to a crucial observation made a bit earlier about our perceptions of rhythm and meter on various levels. The levels “... are organized in an interrelated hierarchy: a pulse on one level being experienced as simply defining the rhythmic unit on the next higher level.” This phenomenon is intimately involved with our
ability to hear certain tones, at any such level, as “essential,” and others as ornamental. “Essential tones” at the given level are precisely those which become involved in the rhythmic flow at the next higher level. Since the higher-level rhythmic unit corresponds to the lower-level pulse, the essential tone at the lower level will be heard as carrying the weight of that pulse. This is our earlier “criterion (b).” And to the extent that the rhythmic unit of the higher level is defined by a basic harmony functioning over that time span on the lower level, the essential tone will contribute to the harmony, so as to contribute to the articulation of the unit. This is our “criterion (a).”

We have seen how these considerations obtained in passing from the rhythmic level of the written quarter note to the rhythmic level of the written measure, in making our first-level reduction sketch. Exactly analogous considerations obtain in the process of “reduction” at any rhythmic level. For example, let us reduce Example 42 from the sixteenth to the eighth note level. We shall suppose that we actually hear the “large-scale pulses” in this context symbolized by the bar lines on Example 42, as in fact we actually do in the piece.

Our hearing works as follows: first, we do hear rhythm functioning at the eighth note level, each eighth note corresponding to a sixteenth note pulse. We consider first the group of two sixteenths, corresponding to one eighth note unit. The basic harmony of that unit is I. The sixteenth note e of that group is a constituent of that harmony; the f is not. The f occurs at the pulse, but is heard as ornamenting the subsequent e, which thus “receives the metric weight of the unit” in the sense of criterion (b). In similar fashion, we reduce the sixteenth-pair to an “essential” eighth note c. Our eighth note level reduction of Example 42 is accordingly Example 43.

We can notice two particular analogs to our earlier larger-level reductive procedures. First, we considered the whole passage involving sixteenth notes in a much larger harmonic/metric context. The analog to the written bar lines
of Examples 42 and 43 would be our symbolic bar lines at measures 9 and 16 of the first-level reduction sketch. The analogue to “the big I⁶” in the former case would be the big: \( V \) ( \( \text{-----} \) \( V \) ) in the latter. In reducing Example 42 to Example 43, we made sure we were very clear as to the large underlying harmonic/metric context before proceeding, just as in reducing the score to the first-level reduction.

Second, we did not consider the melody of Example 42 in its own context, but rather in the total context of the example. The melodic fragment \( \text{f} \cdot \text{e} \cdot \text{d} \cdot \text{c} \) in its own context allows a number of harmonic and metric implications. It coexists perfectly well, e.g., with

![Example 42 Melody](image1)

or with

![Example 42 Melody](image2)

In either of the latter two total contexts, one would reduce the sixteenth note figure \( f \cdot e \cdot d \cdot c \) not to the eighth note figure \( e \cdot c \) but to \( f \cdot d \). This because the underlying harmony of the eighth note units supports the latter sense.

Both the preceding considerations are familiar from our work on the first-level reduction. The analogies are exact; we are only applying the same listening process to a different rhythmic level of the music. A third analogy: in reducing Example 42 to Example 43, we left out the high f ornament to the essential e. This does not mean that we should consider the little gesture “insignificant.” On the contrary, in the light of what we have so far heard going on in the piece involving relations between high f’s and high e’s in the vocal line, we should be particularly struck by that gesture, even in the context of a detail.

In reducing Example 43 to the quarter note level, one probably hears it as syncopated ornamentation:

**Example 44**

![Example 44](image3)
This illustrates a phenomenon mentioned earlier in passing: that criterion (b) can be modified by a sense of syncopation. One should note here that the larger harmonic/metric context is again essential (perhaps on even a larger level than that of Example 44 by itself), in order to hear the quarter note units of Example 43 as syncopated.

The reader can now appreciate more fully why we began our sketching with a very large harmonic/metric “embryo”: the large context provides a firm basis for our hearing reductive frameworks at any smaller rhythmic level of the piece.

Having gone through these preliminaries, we are now ready to begin further metrization of the first-level reduction sketch. Our intuitions are clear enough regarding many further bar lines to add to that sketch. But, as a model for procedure in future cases where our intuitions are not as clear, it is a good idea to be very careful and explicit about what we are doing. In putting more bar lines on the sketch, we are saying that we hear the rhythmic units (symbolic quarters) of the sketch organized by pulses. Those pulses reflect our sense of rhythmic activity at yet a higher level in the music. Intuitively, we perceive such activity at the “two-measure level”: e.g. measures 12-and-13 are intuitively heard as one rhythmic unit, measures 14-and-15 as a commensurate unit. Measures 16-and-17 are such a unit; measures 18-and-19 another such, etc. We also perceive rhythmic activity at a higher “four-measure level.” Intuitively, measures 16–19 form such a unit; so do 20–23; so do 5–8; so do the four measures of the piano introduction. At present, we will be well-advised to work only at the two-measure level; otherwise we risk confusing levels of rhythmic activity in metrizing the first-level reduction (there is a serious such risk here, as we shall notice later). The two-measure level is the next higher level of rhythmic activity beyond that of the first-level reduction itself: each unit of two measures on the higher level will correspond to a \( \frac{2}{4} \) measure on the first-level reduction, a pair of symbolic quarters heard in a strong-to-weak metric relation. When we say that “measures 18-and-19 are heard as a rhythmic unit on the two-measure level,” we are saying that we hear the first-level reduction at that point as \[ \begin{array}{c|c} 18 & 19 \end{array} \] , the pulse at the bar line of that measure defining the beginning of the perceived rhythmic unit at the next higher level. Or conversely, if we hear measures 18 and 19 in that metric relationship, we are implicitly hearing a two-measure unit at the next higher rhythmic level, whose beginning corresponds to the pulse we hear at measure 18.

Now why are we so sure at this point that we do in fact hear measures 18 and 19 in that way? There is no arrival at measure 18 to help us hear the pulse. Furthermore, while 18-and-19 are governed by a harmony-of-the-prospective-unit, I, so are 18-and-19-and-20; and so are 17-and-18; and so are 17-and-18-and-19. Why are we so sure that we do not, accordingly, hear the first-level reduction at point as \[ \begin{array}{c|c|c} 18 & 19 & 20 \end{array} \] or \[ \begin{array}{c|c} 17 & 18 \end{array} \] or \[ \begin{array}{c|c|c|c} 17 & 18 & 19 \end{array} \] ?

In this context, our ear works roughly as follows: 18-and-19 are a clear variation of 16-and-17; likewise 22-and-23 are a variation of 20-and-21. This phenomenon establishes rhythmic activity at the two-measure level: we will hear measures grouping together here in twos, not threes. Furthermore, since there are no arrivals or even changes of basic harmony to contradict our natural inclinations, we will tend to hear
the metric relation of 18-to-19 the same as that of 16-to-17, the model which it varies; likewise we will hear the metric relation of 22-to-23 the same as that of 20-to-21.

However, all of these considerations are perfectly consistent with hearing \( \frac{1}{16} \mid \frac{1}{17} \mid \frac{1}{18} \mid \frac{1}{19} \mid \frac{1}{20} \mid \frac{1}{21} \mid \frac{1}{22} \mid \frac{1}{23} \). That reading simply makes all the cited metric relations weak-to-strong instead of strong-to-weak; they are all equally consistent among one another. In fact, we have no problem hearing that portion of the first-level reduction itself so metrized, in its own symbolic context:

According to this hearing, the rhythmic units at the next higher level are not 16-and-17, 18-and-19, etc., but rather 17-and-18, 19-and-20, etc. And, starting from measure 16 in the actual music, it is not at all difficult to hear the music itself with that metric sense at least up to measure 20:

This particularly in singing it: as we noticed earlier, the voice part actually puts a strong melodic arrival at measure 17 anyway, in the purely melodic cross section of the sketch as a whole. And stress at 17 and 19, on this level, is supported by the natural stress of the text:

Why, then, do we intuit the reverse metric reading so clearly when we hear the sketch, or the piece, as a whole? Partly this has to do with some discomfort at hearing 20-to-21 in a weak-strong relation (we shall explore that later). But mainly because our sense of the “big beat” caused by the pulse of the arrival at measure 16 overrides all other considerations in the pertinent large total context. Measure 16, that is, must be strong here because of the enormously high-level bar line we hear behind it in the pertinent context. This just as an eighth note appearing at the bar line of a \( \frac{3}{4} \) measure must be heard as a “strong eighth,” when we hear the pulse of the bar line of that measure strongly on a higher level.

So, in the context of the entire sketch, we are sure we hear measure 16 as a “strong measure.” Thereafter, we “mark time” in a very literal sense, consistent with that beat and the presence of two-measure patterns:
Similar considerations obtain regarding the metrization of measures 5–8. We hear rhythmic activity at the two-measure level, primarily due to the rhythmic a-motif here over measures 5–6, repeated with slight variation over 7–8. Failing any arrival or other harmonically overriding event over the four measures, we will naturally hear the passage in a simple metric fashion consistent with that pattern, “marking time.” Two such fashions are abstractly possible: $\frac{5}{6} \frac{7}{8}$ or $\frac{5}{6} \frac{7}{8}$. The latter can be heard plausibly enough when the four measures are heard within their own context, apart from the strophe as a whole. Again, the natural stresses of the text tend to support it, somewhat less powerfully here but still perceptibly. And we can hear a putative stress on measure 8, in this context, being supported by the accent of contrast as the vocal line finally gets off its essential low g onto the a, and as the string basses enter on the low f in the bass.

But in the pertinent large context, that of the strophe as a whole, the arrival at measure 9 overrides all the possible stresses at lower levels in more restricted contexts. We must hear measure 9 as a strong measure; this, together with the two-measure patterning preceding, entails $\frac{5}{6} \frac{7}{8}$ or

Similarly, in the large context, we naturally hear $\frac{5}{6} \frac{7}{8}$ even though we can entertain $\frac{12}{13} \frac{14}{15}$ in isolation from the larger context. So on the reduction sketch, we bar

\begin{music}
\begin{musicscore}
\clef {treble-clef} \\
\relative {c} \compound {16} \\
\note c2 |
\note d2 |
\note e2 |
\note f2 | \\
\note g2 |
\note a2 |
\note b2 |
\note c'2 |
\note d2 |
\note e2 |
\note f2 |
\note g2 |
\note a2 |
\note b2 |
\note c'2 |
\note d2 |
\note e2 |
\note f2 |
\note g2 |
\note a2 |
\note b2 |
\note c'2 |
\note d2 |
\note e2 |
\note f2 |
\note g2 |
\note a2 |
\note b2 |
\note c'2 |
\note d2 |
\note e2 |
\note f2 |
\note g2 |
\note a2 |
\note b2 |
\note c'2 |
\note d2 |
\note e2 |
\note f2 |
\note g2 |
\note a2 |
\note b2 |
\note c'2 |
\note d2 |
\note e2 |
\note f2 |
\note g2 |
\note a2 |
\note b2 |
\note c'2 |
\note d2 |
\note e2 |
\note f2 |
\note g2 |
\note a2 |
\note b2 |
\note c'2 |
\note d2 |
\note e2 |
\note f2 |
\note g2 |
\note a2 |
\note b2 |
\note c'2 |
\note d2 |
\note e2 |
\note f2 |
\note g2 |
\note a2 |
\note b2 |
\note c'2 | \end{musicscore}
\end{music}
(The “mini-arrival on ii” at measure 14 functions only in one context for the B phrase, which does not persist into the larger context we are currently considering. In this connection then it cannot be used to fix an unambiguous stress on measure 14. It does contribute to one of the metric possibilities for 12–15 as heard within their own context.)

All of this leaves measures 9–10–11 as a unique three-measure group, or “$\frac{3}{4}$ reduction-measure.” That is quite consistent with our intuition that the three measures belong together as a unit on some rhythmic level. We shall discuss the many implications of the three-measure group later. Right now, we can write out a metrized first-level reduction for the strophe:

Example 45

As always, the reader should play over the sketch, here checking the metric sense implied by the notation against his sense of the actual music, when he plays the sketch at a slow tempo; also checking the metric sense of the sketch for intrinsic syntactical plausibility at a faster tempo.

Except for those at measures 9 and 16, the bar lines on Example 45 symbolize very different aural perceptions from those we have so far discussed in connection with pulses. Let us compare them first to the notated bar lines of the score at measures 6, 7, and 8. At each of those moments, the quarter note pulse corresponds to an aural sense of coincident harmonic change. There is a fresh harmony at each pulse. Or rather: since there is no suggestion from any larger context that the harmonic changes are syncopated at this level, we take the harmonic changes as aurally defining the pulses.

The same can be said of the V-arrival at measure 9 and the I-arrival at measure 16: on a very high rhythmic level, the harmonic changes define the pulses, here the big bar lines on the sketches. We do have some suggestion that the harmonic changes here might be syncopated: the arrivals in the melodic cross section of the strophe at measures 10 and 17. But in the total context we do not hear these melodic features as overriding; rather we hear the melody itself as syncopated. From this point of view, the arrivals are simply (non-syncopated) harmonic changes on a very large rhythmic level, aurally defining pulses on that level and hence on all smaller levels. They are of course much more from other points of view: arrivals articulate the sense of large goals of the tonal impetus within a piece,
not just any sort of harmonic changes on a large level. We do not in that sense hear the harmony of measure 6 e.g. as the “goal” of any preceding impetus, even while the harmonic change itself defines a pulse on the quarter note level.

Let us now consider the reduction bar line at measure 7 in this connection: \( \frac{1}{1} \) \( \frac{5}{6} \) \( \frac{7}{8} \). Here there is no equivalent sense of harmonic change at the pertinent corresponding rhythmic level. We hear harmonic changes at a smaller level: \( \frac{5}{6} \) \( \frac{7}{8} \) \( \frac{9}{8} \). And we hear the overriding sense of tonic over the four measures as a whole at a larger level: \( \frac{5}{6} \) \( \frac{7}{8} \) \( \frac{9}{8} \). But we do not have any sense of similar harmonic change at the level of the two-measure unit here; whatever pulse we hear that makes 7 a “strong measure” is not defined by the sense of some “harmony X” over measures 5–6 changing to some “harmony Y” over measures 7–8.

Failing such a clear definition, our ears fall back on another, weaker criterion for defining the pulse: a motivic/thematic patterning which makes us hear measures grouping somehow in pairs (rather than threes etc.) together with the overriding strength of the very large beat at measure 9. In this regard, the pulse at measure 7 on this level only “marks time.”

For an analog of this listening process on a smaller level, we can investigate the following artificial example, to be considered as unaccompanied (say for solo violin):

*Example 46*

Since there is no harmonic change to define pulses at any level beyond the eighth note itself, our ears fall back on the motivic patterning as a metric criterion. The patterning groups the eighths in threes. But it cannot decide for our ears how the groups of threes are articulated. The context of the example is intrinsically ambiguous metrically. We could as well hear any of the three possible barrings in \( \frac{3}{8} \) meter:

In order to resolve the ambiguity, we will have to hear a larger context. The melody being unaccompanied, we require a temporally larger context, providing a pulse at a larger rhythmic level. E.g.
Here we have an exact analogy of the process our ears went through in deciding how to bar the first-level reduction beyond the big bar lines at measures 9 and 16. Just as the arpeggio figure of Example 46 in its own context was clearly in triple meter (at the eighth note level) but ambiguous as regards where the pulses fell, so e.g. \( \text{\textcopyright{\texttrademark}Cohn191214OUS.indb 92 6/22/2015 4:45:40 PM} \) in its own context is clearly in duple meter (at the symbolic quarter note level) but ambiguous as to where the pulses fall. And so is the actual span of the piece from measures 16 through 19 in its own context, regarding pulses on the one-measure rhythmic level. In all cases, the ambiguity can be resolved in a larger context by an overriding pulse at a higher metric level.

But (yet again and again—my apologies to the reader who has the point clearly) this does not mean that we have decided that one of the possibilities for the smaller context was “correct” after all, and the others “wrong.” We cannot say, as regards the smaller context in itself, that it “is” barred in any one of the various possible ways. In each case, the intrinsic ambiguity of the smaller context is of its essence. The fact that a larger context supports one possibility and excludes others does not deny that phenomenon; rather it indicates that the larger-level pulses are playing a crucial organizing role in this connection. This is a metric analogy to the harmonic role which e.g. the big V over measures 9–15 played in organizing the B phrase harmonically as an elaboration of V in that large context, without denying other significant harmonic organizations of the phrase in various smaller contexts and the musical importance of the resulting ambiguities as we listen through the passage.

One should note that the big pulses organize meter retroactively as well as propulsively. Thus e.g. our barring of 12–13–14–15 was heard retroactively, due to the big pulse preceding measure 16. This is a metric analog to the fact that our eventual harmonic sense for the chords of measures 12 and 13 was heard retroactively with ultimate reference to C major, as defined by the events of measure 16 and following. If the piece had gone on to modulate after measures 12 and 13, we could have organized our harmonic impressions quite differently, accordingly. The retroactive metric (or harmonic) analysis reflects the fact that our sketch symbolizes not how one hears the piece chronologically, but rather the residual framework for one’s impressions “after all is said and done.”

The analogy between large-scale metric organization and large-scale harmonic organization, just under discussion, bears considerable pondering. The big pulses at 9 and 16 serve as points of reference in organizing meter at smaller levels, just as the corresponding big V and big I do with respect to harmony and tonality. In that connection the biggest pulse, at 16, arguably carries
psychological “tonic sense” as much as does the I harmony itself. Actually, it is of course no coincidence that the “big V” and the “big I” occur precisely in connection with the large beats at 9 and 16: harmony and meter here are both components of a broader aural phenomenon that includes them both. We would not hear the pulse at 16, for instance, so strongly if we did not respond to the force of the harmonic arrival at that moment. Conversely, we would not respond to that harmonic event so strongly without the sense of the large pulse, convincing us that the tonic has really “arrived” at just that moment, carrying the metric weight of the pulse. There is no point pursuing theoretical discussion of these matters any farther here; it would be out of place, and it would also involve us in very sophisticated and contentious theoretical issues. For present purposes, it is sufficient that the reader take note of the phenomena as they function in the piece we are currently analyzing. In this regard, we can think of the voice’s melodic arrivals at measures 10 and 17 as “metric dissonances” clouding somewhat the “resolving” sense of the big beats at 9 and 16.

Meanwhile, on the basis of our work so far, we can formulate some “criteria” for metrizing reductive sketches, and for analyzing meter in general.

(c) any metric ambiguities in smaller contexts should be resolved in a large context so as to be consistent with any clear higher-level pulses one hears.

(d) where harmonic changes create a rhythmic pattern heard at a higher level, lower-level pulses should generally coincide with those changes (unless there are compelling grounds for hearing the changes as syncopated).

(e) Unless (c) or (d) override, regular motivic or thematic patterning will generally be reflected by consistent metric hearing within the patterns. E.g. patterning in groups of twos will generally be heard either as \(\frac{\text{||}}{\text{||}}\) or as \(\frac{\text{||}}{\text{||}}\). In general, (d) will yield to (c), which is pretty secure. And (e) will generally yield to (d). To explore how the ear can override (e) by (d), we can consider our earlier violin arpeggio and add a viola part:

\[\text{The viola part also groups eighths in threes. However it does imply harmonic changes. If we now consider the total context of our imaginary duo over this span of the piece, even letting the instruments bow in groups of three eighths:}\]
we will experience decided difficulty hearing the passage in triple meter, no matter where we try to hear the bar lines. That is because, failing any larger context to suggest syncopation, the harmonic changes imply \( \frac{2}{3} \) (groups of four eighths) very strongly:

![Music notation](image)

The contour patterns and the bowings will create accents cutting across this basic metric feeling, but they will not destroy it.

We can add a further “criterion” also:

(f) Any accent (sharp contrast in any respect to immediately preceding material) will generally try, to the extent it can, to project a metric stress on the pertinent rhythmic level.

It was this phenomenon which made us uneasy about trying to hear measure 20 as weak, even though we could hear 16 \( \mid \) 17 \( \mid \) 18 \( \mid \) 19 easily enough within the context of those four measures alone. The high f of measure 20 in particular combines (i) strong (rhythmic) accent with (ii) stepwise motion to the next tone, together with (iii) the sense of being ornamental to that next tone, which is “essential” on the pertinent level. The combination of those three features creates the sense of “appoggiatura-and-resolution” in our ears, and we always try to hear that gesture in a metric context of strong-to-weak on the pertinent rhythmic level. Our sense that measure 20 is “strong” is accordingly reinforced.

In this connection, one hears the treatment of the text extension: the biggest stress of the line is on \( \text{geben} \) and we noted that this stress contributes to the metric ambiguity about measures 16–19 in their own context. That is, in that context the text stress supports \( \text{geben} \). At measure 20, though, the text is curtailed so that the crucial syllable also underlies 20, now over the whole three beats of the measure and not just on its first beat: \( \text{geben} \). The sense of text stress is thus first “corrected” so as to fall at the bar line of a “strong measure” for the total large context. And second, it is rhythmically expanded so as to function at the one-measure level rather than at the earlier quarter note level, as in \( \text{geben} \). From the latter point of view, we can hear that some of the force of the text stress at measure 17 (though by no means all of it) expended itself at that smaller rhythmic level.

Criterion (f) is a particularly useful guideline for large-context metric analysis when we hear one measure in an appoggiatura-resolution relation to the next. This happens not infrequently, particularly in Schubert’s songs. Recapitulating
the aural sense we so labeled: as it involves two tones on the same rhythmic level, the sense comprises:

(i) decided accent (of some sort, often rhythmic) on the first,
(ii) stepwise motion from the first to the second, and
(iii) the sense that the first tone ornaments the second, which is “essential” at a higher level.

Generally, the stepwise motion will be down. If it is up, we may have trouble hearing the sense of melodic “push” unless the interval is a half-step (up) rather than a whole step. If all of the features of (i), (ii), and (iii) are strongly present to our ears, we will have trouble hearing the relation as metrically weak-to-strong unless there are powerfully overriding factors at work on larger rhythmic levels.

Appoggiatura sensations are only particularly strong cases of criterion (f): in general, we will always experience some feeling of metric stress about any highly accentuated event, at the pertinent rhythmic level, unless other aspects of the context make us hear the accent as “offbeat.” However, this can happen quite easily. For example, the rhythmic pattern $\text{\(\frac{\text{3}}{\text{4}}\)}$, $\text{\(\frac{\text{3}}{\text{4}}\)}$, $\text{\(\frac{\text{3}}{\text{4}}\)}$, $\text{\(\frac{\text{3}}{\text{4}}\)}$, $\text{\(\frac{\text{3}}{\text{4}}\)}$, $\text{\(\frac{\text{3}}{\text{4}}\)}$, etc. will normally suggest the metric organization of the sixteens which follows the rhythmic accents:

This as in the number from Cox and Box: Rat-a-plan, rat-a-plan, I’m a military man. But the sense can be overridden e.g. by a pattern of harmonic changes at a higher rhythmic level (than the sixteens), via criterion (d):

Example 47

In the symphony, to be sure, there is a larger context which makes it clear that the harmony is not syncopated. But even within the context of Example 47 itself, one hears the harmony as not syncopated. While one can hear the first and second chords “anticipating” the third, and the fourth and fifth anticipating the sixth, one cannot hold the sense of “anticipations” very well over the melodic figuration which follows. Accordingly, the harmonic changes without syncopation govern one’s metric sense of the passage in its own context, as regards strong and weak eighths.

Criterion (f) is phrased very cautiously, and with good reason. There is a decided problem in using it as an analytic tool for determining metric structure: the more
one becomes aware of all that is going on in even a simple musical context, the more profile-creating accents one hears at all moments in all sorts of musical dimensions. Not only accents caused by contrasts in dynamic level and duration, but also accents caused by melodic leaps, by melodic convergences, by harmonic inflections, by leaps or convergences in a bass line, by changes in texture, by changes in motive structure (melodic, rhythmic, etc.,) by changes in instrumentation, etc. etc. It is all too seductive to select from this storehouse those particular accents one “wants” to support a metric reading, and to shut one’s ears to those accents one does not “want” for that purpose. One can almost always find some sort of accent almost anywhere. The criterion should be used with particular caution where any possible ambiguity is heard about a metric context, so far as the criterion is intended not simply to explore the ambiguity, but purportedly to resolve it at a higher level.

Since we are being relatively formal about “criteria” for the moment, it will be a good idea to formulate another one:

(g) Unless overridden by (c) or other factors, the metric implication suggested by an established train of pulses at regular temporal intervals will tend to persist psychologically for some time thereafter, by its own momentum or inertia. Other things being equal, the tendency will have greater force according to the amount of time the regular pulsing has been functioning before it breaks off.

This criterion is mainly a formal description of the process by which we can hear certain types of syncopation functioning. E.g. if we imagine a context which does nothing to contradict the metric implications of the rhythmic accents, would normally tend to be heard as not as

This sort of metric inertia contributed to our overriding the “$\frac{2}{3}$ sense” of the melodic fragment representing the voice part in measures 9–10, earlier, though it was not the only factor involved.

Criterion (g), to the extent it functions strongly, can often override (d) in particular as well as (f). We shall examine an instance later.

It goes without saying that all these “criteria” (one could formulate yet others) are intended for our purposes only as guidelines in describing what specific aspects of a piece are creating certain aural sensations one already experiences. We shall go into the pitfalls of ignoring that qualification a bit later.

Several “criteria” above can be (and generally are) functioning at once. Often they are in tension one against another. Common sense, both musical and methodological, is to be urged in invoking them. Specifically, it may be that after careful and contemplative listening, one is really convinced of hearing at least two possible alternatives equally plausibly and consistently in even the largest context
of a piece. In that case, there is no analytic reason not to reflect that valid description of one’s hearing by alternative versions of sketches. It is not for us here to worry about the theoretical or aesthetic implications of such “ambiguities in the largest context.” Maybe one feels that there “ought not” to be any; maybe one feels that to a certain extent at least they are not only “legal” but “enriching.” These considerations are relevant to you here, however, only indirectly: insofar as they may be predisposing you to hear, or not to hear, such ambiguities in the largest context. What is of direct concern is only that you listen carefully to what you are in fact hearing, without invoking such predispositions in any deliberate way outside the listening process itself. In particular, if you are convinced that two or more alternate hearings are valid to your ear, you should reflect that hearing in alternate sketches, rather than attempting to resolve ambiguity, that you in fact hear unresolved in the large context, by mechanical application of some “criteria.”

On the other hand, one should also specifically guard against the danger of taking the above advice as an invitation to sloppy or incomplete listening. This can lead to a profuse jungle of “alternate readings” for the large context, which says: the large context sounds to a considerable degree amorphous and plastic, without solid framework, like an amoeba or jellyfish rather than an organism with a shell or skeleton. Now there is nothing wrong with amoeba and jellyfish as organisms. If in fact you do hear so much ambiguity at the highest levels of a piece, then a profusion of alternate sketches is quite to the point as reflecting that hearing correctly. But to the extent that you are hearing ambiguities on smaller levels, in smaller contexts, and the largest context as solidly framed you are again not reporting your hearing accurately. The greatest technical pitfall here is probably an urge to transfer valid ambiguous sensations about smaller contexts to larger (not “more significant”!) contexts in which the ambiguities are resolved. But the greatest psychological pitfall is more dangerous: the inclination to listen lazily and carelessly, bolstered perhaps by some aesthetic preconception that ambiguity is of itself “a good thing” regardless of its actual function in a given context of a given piece.

In connection with these and earlier methodological issues we have discussed, as well as others to come later, one can infer a very broad methodological rule-of-thumb I am belaboring over and again. Perhaps this is a good place to make it explicit.

METHODOLOGICAL RULE-OF-THUMB: Every valid analytic statement is of the basic form “I hear this about this specific piece,” as qualified by an implicit “and I think you can too.”

“This” may be a very complicated phenomenon. It may require a great deal of theoretical terminology for its description. Or it may be the understood aural implication of a symbol on a sketch, or of a sketch as a whole. Etc. etc. Each symbol on such a sketch, in particular, is itself an analytic statement in the sense of the rule-of-thumb.

I am claiming: if a statement cannot be made or rephrased in the form of the rule, it is not a valid analytic statement, regardless of any validity or truth it may have in other respects. Thus, statements of form: “We generally hear . . .”; “Schubert usually . . .”,

Morgengruß
“In Lieder . . .”, “Conventionally, . . .” etc. are not analytic. They may be useful to an analyst so far as they bring certain aspects of a certain piece to his attention, but that is a different matter. This is particularly the case with the theoretical “criteria” we have just been discussing. Statements such as “Ambiguity is the essence of art” and “Ambiguities are always ultimately resolved in art-works” are also not analytic.

The statement “There must be a pulse at the two-measure level somewhere between measure 153 and measure 157” is also not analytic as it stands (check it against the rule-of-thumb). The statement “I feel a pulse at a two-measure level somewhere between measure 153 and measure 157, exactly where I am not sure” is analytic. So is the statement “I can hear such a pulse, equally consistent with the large context, either at measure 154 or at 155.” So is the statement “I hear measures 151–158 as essentially metrically amorphous at the two-measure level.”

Strictly speaking, one cannot say of any such analytic statement by another person that it is “true” or “false.” I cannot verify, that is, that somebody else does or does not hear what he says he does; nor that he does or does not think I can hear the same thing. What I can do is to assent or dissent to his statement: “I too hear what I think you are describing about the piece” or “I do not hear it.” Beyond such simple extremes, I can respond with a whole range of qualified assents and dissents. E.g. “I hear something which I think is related to what you are indicating. But your description does not fit my own impressions completely (/to a considerable extent/to a large extent/at all). Rather, in connection with the aspect of the music under discussion, I hear (also) this and this and this. I think you can too, and if so I think you will modify your reportage accordingly.” To which my communicant could respond back to me in exactly the same vein. We are then engaged in a valid and presumably useful analytic controversy. Useful in that each of us stands to hear more in the piece as a result. This is the sort of dialectic that one frequently goes through internally, too, in trying to work out a consistent overall context for one’s various impressions.

As our theoretical vocabulary and store of analytic techniques become larger, it is all the more essential to fix the rule-of-thumb firmly in mind and spirit. We must specifically guard against obsessive fascination with these tools in themselves, or superstitious awe of them, so that they become toys or ikons.

After all these theoretical and methodological excursions, I am as eager to get back to the song as any reader. However, I am still a bit troubled at leaving all the “criteria” in such an abstract list, with some high-minded cautionary remarks at the end. This particularly since we have not yet encountered any musical situations of much complexity as regards their functioning. I think it would be helpful for a number of reasons to examine a passage of more complexity right now, as a paradigm for practical analytic use of the criteria and the rule-of-thumb. For that purpose, we can examine how we hear the metric structure of the opening of Beethoven’s Piano Concerto #4 cited here with the metric notation of the composer:
“Straightforward application” of various criteria would yield a rebarred version of the passage:

This barring is just as compatible as was the actual notation with the highest-level pulses within the phrase: the I and V pulses at the asterisks, articulating the phrase into 3 + 2 measures of the original notation. The rebarred version thus satisfies criterion (c). It also satisfies criterion (d) (which was next in the “pecking order”) throughout. Following criterion (e), it bars all the recurrent motivic patterns consistently. It stresses almost all the biggest accents, following criterion (f). The only exception in this respect is the rhythmic accent on the chord before the big a minor chord. That accent is, however, clearly less strong than the accent on the a minor chord itself, which the rebarred version does support with a metric stress, contrary to the original notation. Since we are considering the opening of the piece, no earlier regular pattern of recurrent pulses has been established, as per criterion (g), to suggest that we might hear any of the “pulses” of the rebarred version as syncopations. Does the reader catch himself asking “Well then, why don’t we hear the passage according to the rebarred meter?” If so, he has not yet assimilated the full gist of the methodological rule-of-thumb. Namely: if we don’t hear the rebarred version to begin with, as at least an aural possibility of some force, we have no business “applying the criteria,” whether straightforwardly or no, to describe it. The criteria are to be used only for clarifying aural impressions we already have; these may be vague or ambiguous but must be there as a point of departure. The rebarring is analytically meaningless unless it says “I hear this.” It is specifically analytically meaningless if it says “I don’t hear this, but I can’t for the life of me figure out why I don’t.”

If some reader should object “But then can’t you use the criteria to prove anything you want?” I would reply “Of course I can. Why does that bother you? In the first place, we are not in the business of wanting and proving here, but of hearing
and describing. In the second place, being sufficiently flexible so as to be able to describe anything I might hear is exactly what I demand of the tools I use in that connection.”

Before continuing the methodological discussion, I should first describe how I do hear the passage in the received metric notation, specifically as regards the first three measures. As the context of those three measures develops, I become more and more sure that I am hearing the accent of the opening chord as a definitive larger-level pulse. Tied up with its metric definition is the definition of G major harmony (and presumptive key). In that connection, I hear the function of the motif in eighth notes strongly qualified: prolonging or resonating the harmony of the initial chord. This as regards first the first group of four eighths:

As the eighth note motif develops, I hear its function enlarging in the same respect. The second group of four eighths constitutes a medial inflection between the first and third groups, of an ornamental sort: the melodic a is a lower neighbor to the basic melodic b; the local dominant harmony only inflects the larger-level tonic to its greater resonant glory:

*Example 48*

In sum, I do not hear the four-note motif as metrically neutral when it is introduced: I hear it from its inception with a very strongly defined motivic “job” which binds it inextricably with the initial chord five eighths earlier. That sense is confirmed all the more strongly by the development of the motif over measure 2, as *per Example 48*. And it is clinched by the fact that the disappearance of the little motif coincides with the disappearance of the tonic harmony it is resonating, within measure 3. The a minor chord there in fact recalls the opening G major chord in spacing, density, and duration; this emphasizes with all the sharper motivic profile the basic grouping of everything-up-to-the-a-minor-chord as part of one gesture.

As a result of hearing the four-note motif inextricably bound to the beat five eighths earlier, I hear in groups of four eighths *back to that beat*, placing lower-level metric stresses within each group of four eighths accordingly. This process
formally involves criterion (c) and criterion (e). It is worth following it through chronologically in more detail. I do not begin to organize my hearing in this way until after the beginning of measure 2. Until the second group of four eighths begins, I can not hear even one “group of four eighths.” (This is one strong function of the local change at that point.) And until the third group begins, I can not hear plural “groups” of four eighths building a recurrent motivic pattern. So the process described above does not finally cement itself in my ear until the bar line of measure 3: at that moment (when all preceding is “said and done” within its own context) I hear

And that impression is confirmed, at exactly this moment, by the small rhythmic accent of the chord at the bar line of measure 3: \( \text{\textsl{regular}} \) instead of \( \text{\textsl{syncopated}} \). Formally, this is “only” a slight manifestation of criterion (f). But the accent here acquires a special meaning because of its function in inflecting an already established rhythmic motif with a very special “job” in the context.

Now (having reached the bar line of measure 3) I am retroactively hearing regularly spaced pulses at at least the eighth and quarter note levels, i.e. the notated beat in quarters and halves. And criterion (g) then describes accurately the process by which I hear the following big a minor chord as syncopated off the half note beat, particularly since the regular beat in halves returns at the next measure with a larger-level pulse on the dominant “mini-arrival” at measure 4.

So I hear strong and weak quarters, building the beat in halves, very clearly. The pulse at the half note level (building the beat at the measure level) is less strong. But I infer it clearly enough from the beat in halves, the large pulses at the bar lines of measures 1 and 4, and the sense that the span of six halves, over measures 1–3, articulates \( 4 + 2 \) rather than \( 3 + 3 \). The \( 4 + 2 \) articulation of the established halves is of course implied aurally by exactly the analysis I have just gone through as regards
what I hear at the bar line of measure 3. My sense of refining $4 + 2$ to $(2 + 2) + 2$ is not at all powerful; I think this is simply a matter of “marking time” consistently.

The basic point of departure for my analysis, hearing the four-note motif in the metric context of a larger pulse some time earlier (even specifically a tonic pulse five eighths earlier), is a very pervasive thematic element of the movement. That is, it is not quite accurate to symbolize the rhythmic/metric aspect of the motif simply by $\frac{4}{4}$; one should also include the preceding large pulse:

So, as predicted before, the criteria have indeed “proved just what I wanted.” Rather, they have described my hearing of the passage just as logically and consistently as they would describe the rebarred version for anyone who actually heard the passage that way. Even that is not quite precise: what is “logical” and “consistent” about my analysis, to the extent one assents to it, is not the way the criteria operate but the way of hearing the passage itself, a priori to any prose or symbolic description of that listening process.

As I said before, I had no analytic business making the rebarring for the passage, since the symbols reflect nothing I personally hear, so far as they differ from those explicit or implicit in the score. My only reason was to point to a methodological moral. To the extent the reader felt that my rebarred “analysis” was not an attempt to describe anything I heard, his proper reaction would have been “why are you spouting analytic gibberish?” If he thought I might have heard something underlying the rebarring, a proper response would have been “I cannot hear anything of what you apparently do.” (Or conceivably but not likely: “Oh yes, that’s just what I hear.”) As for the question “Why don’t I hear it that way?” there are plenty of things to hear in the piece already, without concerning ourselves about the infinitude of things we don’t hear. So far as the question is worth answering analytically at all, an appropriate answer is automatically provided by a description of what you do hear. Of course, it would be possible to go over the rebarred version, pointing to things which the regular hearing negates and overrides. But why spend our time paying so much attention to a symbolic structure which is not even a musical analysis, by the rule-of-thumb, when we could be listening to the piece itself instead?

The urge to do so is theoretical, not analytic: we are fascinated by how the “logic” of the criteria failed us in this instance, and we seek some explanation for how that could have happened. Perhaps we are looking for another “criterion” to explain the phenomenon, as if we were scientists contemplating an experiment that came out with an unexpected result, which perhaps might be explained by some new, hitherto unformulated “law.” This impulse is neither unnatural nor ignoble in itself; it is just not analytical. In an analytic context, it has to be watched carefully, lest it distract us from our proper job. To a certain degree, we should be aware of our general listening processes, and of the theoretical concepts we are using to describe them. These concepts are tools for us as analysts, and it is a good
idea to have a general sense of what the tools can and cannot do. In this connection, we take what we can from the investigations of theorists with thanks. Beyond that point, though, the urge to theorize, as it would lead, e.g. to further exploration of the rebarred concerto, is only a seductive distraction for the analyst.

In connection with the example, I want to emphasize once more that the methodological rule-of-thumb as I have used it is not just an abstract expression but a very practical working principle. Specifically: why can I immediately reject the rebarred analysis? Not because it fails to take this or that feature into account: we are used to ambivalent readings by now. Not because there is anything in it which is “false”: indeed, there is a sense in which almost everything it points to is absolutely “true.” Rather: because it is simply not an “analysis” at all. I.e.: it is not, so far as it differs from the received notation, a description of any metric phenomena I hear functioning in the piece. It was not even a tentative effort to describe and clarify sensations I had only vaguely. It was conceived in a totally different spirit. As a result, I need not concern myself at all with any of the analytic “implications” of the rebarred version. Except to the extent that by chance some of them might bring out aural sensations that were only latent to my hearing before. This, however, is not the case for me. If it should be so for you, then you will have to work out in your own ear how you resolve the resulting ambiguities. I cannot help you, since I do not hear any ambiguities.

A final word now about the criteria, in connection with practical application. Suppose you want to make a metric analysis of a certain passage, either because you mistrust the received notation or because there is none (as with rhythm at the “first level” of our reduction sketch and at higher levels). How do you proceed? By the paradigm of the Beethoven example, I am urging you not to consult your handy checklist of criteria, saying “Let’s see; is this one operating here? Ah yes, there it is. Does that conflict with other criteria? No, so it must be all right. How about this one? Hm. Well, the book said that (d) could override (e), so I suppose that’s all right. Etc. etc.” Even if this working method should by chance lead you to a musically plausible result (it often might), it is simply not musical analysis. Rather you must proceed from some initial aural impression. At first, the impression might be vague in many respects. E.g. “I’m pretty sure I hear a relatively large-level pulse at moment x. That seems to coincide with a large-level harmonic change from being around the ii harmony to being on V. I have an impression of a lower-level pulse either at moment y or moment z. I hear the patterning-in-threes over that span of the music as metrically self-consistent, though I am not sure where I hear the pulses in a larger context. Etc.” Now you can work on that impression, clarifying and refining it. At this point, the criteria can be helpful in bringing out latent aspects of your impressions. As any of the criteria seem suggestive, it is quite proper to use them to test possibilities on a provisional basis. After any such test, ask yourself: to what extent have I described something I am hearing? Does the context (temporal or “spatial”) affect my hearing in this regard? Etc.
going as far as you can, as you hear more. The end result may be a reading which you find quite convincing. Or it may be some alternatives among which you cannot decide aurally in the given context.

Or perhaps you will not be able to get so far with any assurance. Do not be unduly discouraged if you are a novice in these matters. Experience counts for a good deal here. It may be, too, that your ear is simply fatigued. In any case, your ear may be considerably more active and discriminating on listening to the passage again at a later time. Above all, do not try to generate new “aural” impressions artificially, in such an impasse, by studying the consequences of what the criteria may “logically suggest” independent of any prior aural impressions. That is almost bound to make matters worse, both aurally and intellectually. E.g. if you had no sure sense of meter at the beginning of the Beethoven concerto, the rebarred “analysis,” if undertaken in desperation, would make your problems much worse.

Now it is time to return to the metrized first-level reduction for the strophe of Morgengrüss:

![Mettreized reduction of Morgengrüss](image)

Probably the most striking feature of the context framed by the sketch is the unique metric status of the three-measure group 9–10–11. We noticed many other unique and complicating features about the music thereabouts, coincident with the complications of “the question.” And many readers had probably already noticed that there was a three-measure group there. But just how unique and how complicating the three-measure group is does not become clear until heard in the large overall metric context framed by the sketch. Not only is the group isolated amidst otherwise regular two-measure groupings, it is also isolated amidst otherwise regular four-measure groupings. We have not as yet investigated metric structure formally at the latter level, but it is intuitively quite clear that (1–4), 5–8, 16–19, and 20–23 are all rhythmic units at the four-measure level, representable that is as “4 measures” or “2 measures” on the present sketch. And 12–15 is certainly a clear textual unit of the same duration. We would have no trouble hearing it as a similar metric unit in the context of the sketch (and the music) were it not for the complicating metric ambiguity posed by the preceding three-measure group.

The reader may be puzzled as to my precise meaning in the last sentence above. “Metric ambiguity” is the key. Given the large context, one hears the 6/4 reduction
measure as abnormal: an extension of a $\frac{2}{3}$ model or a contraction of a $\frac{3}{4}$ model, or ambiguously (in various contexts) as both. The latter is fairly clearly the case. Within the small context of the three measures in themselves, for instance, the three is evidently an extension of two. The echo-measure passes exactly that signal at once to our ears. Hearing three as extending two persists unchanged into the larger context of phrase A as a whole (measures 5–11). It can persist comfortably even into the larger context of A-and-B. The organization of two- and three-measure groups which that hearing would imply is perfectly consistent, up to that point, with the two-part parallelisms of the text and music:

\[
\begin{array}{cccccccccc}
5 & 6 & 7 & 8 & \overset{(3 > 2)}{9} & 10 & 11 & 12 & 13 & 14 & 15 & 16 \\
\hspace{0.5em}a & \hspace{0.5em}a & \hspace{0.5em}b & \hspace{0.5em}a' & \hspace{0.5em}a' & \hspace{0.5em}a' & \hspace{0.5em}a' & \hspace{0.5em}b & \hspace{0.5em}(?) \\
\end{array}
\]

The sense of three-expanding-two, symbolized by “3 > 2” above, is cogent in connection with focusing attention on the events of measure 9 and following. The echo of measure 11 quite literally expands attention on the new features of the rhythmic b-motif. The sense of expansion carried an implication of relaxation, waiting an extra beat before the next pulse. In the context of measures 5–11 or measures 5–15, such “relaxation” makes sense in connection with a certain drop of impetus immediately following the attainment of the arrival at measure 9. One hears such relaxation specifically in the sitting of the bass on g, once it has got there.

Now, however, we begin to encounter the other branch of the ambiguity. First of all, one’s intuition about the music of 9–10–11 is by no means completely, or even substantially, that of “relaxation.” Although the g does sit in the bass, almost everything else about the three measures suggests “intensification” and “complication.” To review some of the things we have already discussed: there is the acceleration of harmonic rhythm over the measures; there is the chain of dissonant harmonies and chords; there is the introduction of substantial chromatic inflection of the harmonies. There is the introduction (hinted at by the a and d of measure 8) of substantial bifurcation within the vocal line: f–e–d against (g–a–) b–c–d going on simultaneously. There is substantial ambiguity as to whether or not the f of measure 9 resolves before the d of measure 10, leading to very subtle and complex hearings. That is connected with ambiguity as to whether the for the d, on some appropriately high rhythmic level, carries the essential weight of the V-arrival. Within the little framework of the vocal line in its own context, over the three measures, there is an implied cross-meter of $\frac{2}{3}$ against the notated meter of the piece, which is in fact heard in the total context.

As we remarked earlier, one has a decided feeling of “too much happening too quickly” over the three measures; this feeling is not one of relaxation and expansion, but rather one of intensification and contraction. It would be congruent
with the sense of 9–10–11 contracting a four-measure group \((3 < 4)\) rather than expanding a two-measure group \((3 > 2)\).\(^6\)

Now let us return to the context of phrases A-and-B. We noted that we could hold the “\(3 > 2\)” sense of 9–10–11 quite comfortably in that context, since it goes along quite plausibly with the two-part parallelisms of the strophe. This as in the diagram we just inspected, going up as far as measure 16. What the diagram further highlights, though, is that the sequel to 16 is spectacularly \textit{not} parallel to the position of 9–10–11 in this scheme. That is, 16–17–18 is not a three-measure group “answering” 9–10–11. Nor does the “extending” echo of measure 11 appear in a parallel position, at measure 18 with its pickup. Rather the echo appears either “a measure too soon,” with the entrance of the round in measure 17; or else “many measures too late” at 22–23 with their pickup. Or else we can hear the echo happening over measures 20–21, with their pickup, the voice providing a descant to the piano; 22–23 would then become an echo of an echo.

I hear the last alternative quite clearly as the one pertinent to the parallelism under discussion. The other alternatives are relevant, and the effect of the one in measure 17 is particularly striking, as it qualifies the aural implications of the round (which we shall presently examine more). But neither the piano right hand in measure 17 nor its pickup to measure 22 echoes the voice in precisely the melodically analogous way to that in which the pickup to measure 11 echoed the voice. The pickup to measure 20, in the piano right hand, however, essentially does. That is, the parallelism works out via the following transformations:

\[^6\] Lewin handwrote greater-than and less-than signs in his manuscript and examples. We have decided to leave the signs in place despite some potential for confusion. We understand that the first Arabic number in each pair connection by \(<\) or \(>\) refers to actual numbers of measures in a given phrase of music; the second term refers conceptually to a number of measures that might have been. Perhaps one could also understand “\(3 < 4\)” as “what might have been four measures become three” and “\(3 > 2\)” as “what might have been two measures become three.”
The three-measure model of 9–10–11 is thus transformed into a four-measure answer. Measures 16–17 answer 9–10 (the b-motif itself), while 20–21 with their pickup answer 11 with its pickup, the echo now covering a measure more. The other four measures of the A’ phrase elaborate the basic gesture further: 18–19 repeat 16–17; 22–23 repeat 20–21. So the thematic answer to 9–10–11 actually extends over the entire eight measures of phrase A’:

In this connection, the association of 20–21 with the first two beats of measure 11 has already been discussed: the chord at the bar line of 11 and the chord of 20 are similar in that both are not self-referential “harmonies”: each is heard as a melodic inflection of the chord that follows. The idea that 9–10–11 expands thematically to cover all of 16–23 in its answer is of course supported by the text: phrase A’ sets only one line, the line that answers the earlier b-line of text at 9–10–11. The idea is also supported by the persistence of c in the bass over the final eight measures, analogous to the persistent bass g of 9–10–11. Even the echoing octave leap in the bass is ultimately answered:

At this point, it becomes hard to continue hearing 9–10–11 metrically as only an expansion of a two-measure model. Phrase A’ relates the three measures very strongly to a four-measure model, with very square four-measure grouping going on over 16–23. Since square two- and four-measure groupings are the norm for the piece, and 9–10–11 is an exception, one naturally tends, in this large context, retroactively to hear 9–10–11 as a deviation from the normal activity of 16–23, rather than 16–23 as an expanded deviation from the “norm” of 9–10–11, which was in turn hypothetically an expanded deviation from a two-measure “norm.”

In the latter hearing, there is too much “relaxation” already about 9–10–11. We noticed that earlier in any case; here the notion of further relaxing something which was itself already relaxing seems wrong. The extra measure of the four-measure model that implicitly answers 9–10–11 is the familiar measure 20. We earlier discussed measure 20 as antipodal to measures 9–10–11.
in that the harmonic rhythm slows down here to the two-measure level, in contrast to having speeded up there to the quarter note level. Intuitively, we feel a great slackening of tension over measure 20, which is manifest also in the accompaniment rhythm. We can recall that the abrupt halt of the rhythm under the f of measure 20 terminates the continuous quickening process which began exactly under the f of measure 9. Slackening tension at measure 20 feels right if the tension being released is that of an earlier tautening over 9–10–11. But it does not feel right to the extent that those three measures are heard as already having “relaxed” a tighter two-measure model themselves. The sense of “slackening tension” about measure 20 cannot be heard convincingly only as a relaxation after the tonic arrival: tension involving the harmonic push toward the tonic was largely discharged by measure 16; tension involving the voice’s melodic push toward c was largely discharged at measure 17; and all this has had ample time to get quite settled over measures 16–19, before measure 20 comes into the picture.

At this point then, we can say that in the context of measures 5–23 there is a strong tendency to hear 9–10–11 “when all is said and done” as a contraction of a “normal” four-measure group. The tendency involves various aspects of intensification and concentration about 9–10–11 themselves; it involves the “releasing” sense about measure 20 in certain relations with 9–10–11; and it involves reference of the three measures to the subsequent “normal” four-measure activities of phrase A′ by the motivic/thematic parallelisms of the scheme

\[
\begin{array}{c|c c|c c|c c}
5 & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 10 & 11 \\
12 & 13 & 14 & 15 & 16 & 17 & 20 & 21 \\
18 & 19 & 22 & 23 \\
\end{array}
\]

This involves a context in which we hear 9–10–11 most strongly only retroactively at a certain point. However, there is yet a larger context in which we do not have to hear the three measures only in retrospect. That is the context of the-strophe-repeated-three-times. In that yet larger context, we get to hear 9–10–11 coming after 16–23 three times, and accordingly have plenty of opportunity to confirm our more tentative retrospective impressions above, made after hearing the strophe through only once.

It is time to begin investigating the latter context more intensively now in any case. As a point of departure, let us rewrite the metrized first-level reduction in the following format:
This format brings out a large progression we hear very clearly as the strophe repeats over and over. We do not simply hear a “big V measure” from 9 through 15, preceded by tonic preparation and followed by tonic resolution. Rather there are two “big measures” in the music. Specifically, the recurrences of the big V measure alternate regularly with recurrences of a “big I measure,” the latter extending from measure 16, around the repeat of the strophe, up to measure 9′ in the next strophe. Sketching this phenomenon baldly in connection with various aspects of the two-part form:

The alternation of V and I big measures is of course a very powerful manifestation of two-part form in this very large context. At this level, it overrides the three-part phrase structure in the smaller context of any individual strophe. That is really not very profound; we hear the three-part phrase structure significantly enough in any number of respects, in the smaller and important contexts.

What is more germane is the clarity with which the very bald sketch above brings out the essential autonomy of the big V measure: it functions, on this very large rhythmic level, as an equal to the big I measure. Only on a yet higher level would we entertain the notion of the I, with its super-pulse, swallowing up the V, with a subordinate lower-level pulse. On the rhythmic level of this “very bald sketch” we hear the V-measure and the I-measure as commensurate rhythmic units. Using symbolic quarter notes, as if:

Now let us return to 9–10–11 in this connection. If, in the enormous context just sketched, we are to hear the span 9–15 as able to hold its own rhythmically and metrically against the span 16–8′, we are pretty well forced to hear 9–10–11 as a contraction of four measures, rather than an expansion of two. Specifically,
the big I measure 16–8′ is very clearly heard as 3 × 4 measures of music, or three “whole notes” of the first-level reduction. If we try to hold 9–10–11 as an expansion of two measures, we will hear the big V measure 9–15 as (3 > 2)+2+2 measures of music, a rhythmic/metric variant of 2+2+2 measures of music, or three “half notes” of the first-level reduction. This will hardly do to balance the three “whole notes” of the big I measure:

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c}
9' & 1' & 16'' & \text{“balancing”} & 16'' & \quad & 9' \\
\hline
\quad & \quad & \quad & \quad & \quad & \quad & \quad & \quad & \quad
\end{array}
\]

Not only are the “six” measures (reduction quarters) of V inadequate to balance the twelve of I rhythmically; it is clear from the above sketch that the big V measure would not be functioning on a rhythmic/metric level commensurate with that of the big I measure. Given the resulting pattern, we would hear not

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c}
\quad & \quad & \quad & \quad & \quad & \quad & \quad & \quad & \quad
\end{array}
\]

but rather

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c}
\quad & \quad & \quad & \quad & \quad & \quad & \quad & \quad & \quad
\end{array}
\]

The pulses on the V measures would become tremendously subordinate to the pulses on the I measures. In fact, they would even become subordinate to implied “pulses” at this level on measures 5′, 5′′, and 5′′′. This via the evident metric subarticulation of the above scheme. Now although we hear a certain accent on measure 5 because of the voice entrance, we certainly do not hear anything like that accent on measures 5′, 5′′, and 5′′′. On the contrary, after each strophe has finished, our sense is that the next strophe begins “very low” and builds again from that psychological low point. Much less do we hear any strong pulses on measures 5′, 5′′, and 5′′′, beyond those of “marking time” at the four-measure level. There is certainly nothing about those moments to subordinate the recurrent arrival-pulses at 9′, 9′′, and 9′′′, to which impetus builds from 5′, 5′′, and 5′′′. That is, while \( \begin{array}{c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c}
\quad & \quad & \quad & \quad & \quad & \quad & \quad & \quad & \quad
\end{array} \) is very congruent with our large-scale aural sensations, the

\[\text{insert "p. 106," ?}\]

\[\text{Refer to note 6 for an explanation of Lewin’s usages of < and > signs. In Lewin’s manuscript "}(3 > 2)+2+2\text{" appears as "}(3 > 2)+2+2\text{"; he seems to have forgotten to write in the < or > sign by hand. In context, it seems clear to us that he meant "}(3 > 2)+2+2\text{."} \]
implied by the preceding hypothetical analysis is at very strong variance with those sensations. This in itself would be grounds for rejecting the hypothetical analysis. Even more so, we reject it because it more generally over-subordinates the big V measure to the big I measure, both rhythmically and metrically.

On the other hand, if we regard 9–10–11 as a contraction of four measures, all these difficulties clear up at once. The big V measure then scans:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{9 } \text{10 } \text{11} & = \text{ "4" + 4 measures of music, or two "whole notes" of the first-level reduction:} \\
\text{9 } \text{10 } \text{11} & \text{ of the big V span can hold their own against the 12 of the big I span:}
\end{align*}
\]

The rejected analytic alternative above reflects our earlier intuition that measures 16–23 would constitute “too much expansion” if we already regarded 9–10–11 itself as an expansion of two measures. Specifically, the rejected analysis worked out the formal rhythmic/metric implications of that hearing, to the point where they evidently distorted our clear aural sensations. But the distortion only became clear to the point of conviction in the very large context of the-strophe-repeated. The crucial feature was our impression of the relation of the big V measure to the big I measure, and we do not actually hear the big I measure until the strophe is repeated. Another feature was the amount of weight to be received by measure 5′ (not by measure 5) in relation to measure 9′ (not measure 9); this too does not become a factor in our listening until the strophe repeats.

So in sum, we see that the repetition of the strophe is essential in creating a sufficiently high-level context so as to resolve the metric ambiguity of 9–10–11 definitively on a high level. Now, in that 9–10–11 constitute “the question,” the resolution of any musical ambiguity involving those measures is evidently of importance in the psychodrama of the song as a whole. We are then noting here, for the first time, one definite way in which Schubert’s strophic setting does a good deal more than just go over one musical gesture four times, a way in which we can regard musical action as still incomplete, in a very real sense, after the first stanza of text.
Having thoroughly investigated the metric sense of the strophe at the four-measure level and beyond, we can now reduce the first-level reduction itself:

**Example 49**

![Example 49](attachment:image.png)

...to a metrized second-level reduction, eliminating ornamental passing tones (P) and appoggiaturas (AP):

![Second-level reduction](attachment:image.png)

Here, measures 9–10–11 have been reflected by a “normal” four-measure group ($\frac{2}{4}$ reduction-measure), following our preceding analysis. Hence the quotation marks on the echo d and g “half notes” of the second-level reduction. That it is the echo which should symbolically expand here is plausible by consideration of the later answering four-measure model, specifically as regards the answering echo at measure 20. The result is to add symbolic rhythmic extent to the d, making that tone even more prominent in the melodic structure of the second-level reduction.

The b♭, rather than b♮, in the bass of the reduction has already been discussed earlier in connection with the sense of the “big V measure.” The symbolic b♮ reflects our hearing the b♭, in any sufficiently large context, as its proxy in “elaborating the V harmony.”

In playing over the second-level reduction, one should always take the repeat at least once through, at least imagining the effect of taking it three times. At a fast tempo, one checks as always the intrinsic syntactic plausibility of the
sketch; here one can easily play the repeat three times. At a slow tempo, one should check the sense of the reduction first against the first-level reduction, and then against the piece itself in the appropriate context (more than once through the strophe).

I have temporarily left the f–d and e–c of measures 9–10 and 16–17 as quarter notes in the second-level reduction. At this level, hearing the beat in metrized reduction-halves, the quarters are decidedly submetric and convey strongly the sense of syncopation which we discussed earlier in connection with the melodic arrivals of d and c at measure 10 and 17, a measure (reduction quarter) “late” in each case. In this connection, it is in fact intellectually plausible to move those “late” quarters back to the big bar lines of the second-level reduction, removing the “ornamental” syncopations from the sketch. Playing over the second-level reduction even once, this notion makes aural sense at least as regards the quarter note c at measure 17:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{with the reduction bass, is fairly clearly syncopating} & \quad \text{and not} \\
\text{The situation as regards the melodic d of measure 10 is not as clear to my ear, at least the first time I hear it in the reduction. But as the strophe repeats again and again, it seems to assume an analogous aural function fairly clearly:} \\
\text{Example 50}
\end{align*}
\]

I can entertain Example 50 to some extent. But in that case, I simply hear its d syncopated so as to come “late” at the next higher rhythmic level:
This ambiguity will not affect anything I have to say in the sequel. So I might as well follow my own preference here, simplifying the second-level reduction accordingly:

\textit{Example 51}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{example.png}
\end{center}

(Play Example 51 over, taking the repeat three times, etc. etc.)

According to our rule-of-thumb, the meaning of my removing the quarter notes from the sketch is to say: “In my hearing, the melodic arrivals on \textit{d} and \textit{c} in measures 10 and 17 are no longer functionally ‘late,’ but only ornamentally syncopated off 9 and 16, at this rhythmic level of the piece when all is said and done in the pertinent context.”

Example 51 projects the big harmonic structure of the strophe, and of the strophe-repeated, quite nakedly. In doing so, it naturally rides over a tremendous amount of activity in “smaller” contexts. The phenomenon should be no novelty by this time. We need only remind ourselves once more of exactly what the reduction does and does not “say” about the way one hears the piece, and caution ourselves once more about drawing any inferences about what is analytically or musically “important” from the phenomenon. If e.g. we were to pretend that Example 51 and the preceding discussion “prove” that 9–10–11 “is” a contraction of a four-measure group, we would not only be in error, but we would be missing the whole point of the three-measure group itself, which is set up so as to “be” an expanded two-measure group in a smaller context of considerable extent, which then “is ambiguous” in the context of the strophe once through, and which then “becomes” a contracted four-measure group definitively only in the context of the strophe repeated. We would thus be missing a vital musico-dramatic response to the repetition of the strophe, just the context we purport to be examining.

The simplified second-level sketch is approaching a level where sketching is of more theoretical than analytical interest. That is, the sketch shows very clearly how our framework for a suitably large and high-level context of the piece is almost trivially organized in a way that clearly corresponds to our hearing the piece “in C major.” From a theoretical point of view, this is of great interest. If, that is, we are interested in the general question “how do we hear certain pieces as being ‘in’ this key or that?” the reduction techniques we have followed so far are very suggestive. If the process we have gone through for this piece generalizes to a large number
of tonal compositions (and it does), we can derive considerable insight into the listening-process of inferring a key from such a composition. But, from an analytical point of view, we are losing interest proportionally. “I hear ‘Morgengruß’ in C major” is a valid enough analytic statement to which any competent musician would assent. But it is hardly one that sends us into raptures of analytic insight into the song itself. To the extent that our sketching is now rapidly approaching the “ultimate sketch”, leaving out everything that occurs in “smaller contexts,” we are theoretically but not analytically interested in the proceedings.

However, we can still squeeze some analytic juice out of yet higher-level reductions for the song. As a point of departure, let us consider the simplified second-level reduction again. For convenience, we re-transcribe it using symbolic quarters instead of halves:

Example S2

We can obtain a third-level reduction therefrom:

Now we are at the level where we have a sketch reflecting exactly our sense of alternating big V7 and big I measures over the threefold-repeated strophe. The metric sense of the sketch has already been discussed in connection with hearing 9–10–11 as functionally a four-measure group at this level. The half note b on the sketch reflects hearing the power of b already strongly present at measure 12, represented by the proxy b♭ an octave lower. As indicated by “NB” on Example S2, I then hear the b transferred an octave up by the overall action of 12–15 “when all is said and done.”

As always, the reader should play over the third-level reduction; here it is no great labor to go through the strophe four times. At a slow tempo, he should
compare the effect to that of the second- and first-level reductions, and ultimately to the piece itself.

At a fast tempo, one becomes very aware of the hypnotically recurrent melodic gesture:

![Musical notation]

The kernel of this gesture consists of two simultaneous melodic components: α and β. The latter evidently ornaments β′. We have already discussed α and β′ at length in connection with the parallelisms of the two-part form that bring them out, both in themselves and in relation to each other.

Now, as one plays over the third-level reduction through the four strophes, an interesting phenomenon emerges, at least to my ear. Over the first strophe, one focuses very much on the α-gesture f–e. This because of the strong accent on the unprepared dissonant f, and because the gesture is occurring in the highest register of the voice. One hears β′ accordingly as accompanying α in parallel thirds below.

![Musical notation]

However, once the e has been established at measure 16 within the first strophe, the f at 9′ loses a good deal of its shocking accent: it no longer comes out of the blue, but can be heard more as a neighboring ornament to the e already established earlier. The f at 9′ has even more of that sense, and the f at 9″ still more yet. One’s progressive loss of interest in the melodic primacy of the α gesture can be heard very clearly, I think, as one plays over the third-level reduction through the repeats. The initial shock gradually fades away as the steady neighboring alternations of f with e set in, in the harmonica-like overall progression.

![Musical notation]

By the end, one has lost all interest in the f–e gesture as more than a simple ornament of the e.

To a corresponding degree, one’s interest in β′ (d–c) picks up over the repetitions. This because one naturally tends to hear a melodic drive to the tonic note of the key as structurally important, to the extent that one’s attention is not distracted by other simultaneous events. In the first strophe the α-gesture is highly distracting; but by the fourth strophe α has lost all of its initial punch and one can focus aurally very strongly on β′. At this point, α becomes only a descant to β′.

![Musical notation]

This notion seems to be very cogent in connection with the voice’s descant over the piano echo at measures 20–21. The idea of recalling the f–e of 9 and 16 as “only a descant” is very patent there.
All the play with the melodic turn motive approaching and following measure 17 subliminally reinforces the ultimate primacy of $\beta'$, via $\beta$. The latter is itself the essence of the turn motive in the high-level melodic approach to measure 17 (syncopating 16), as well as in the foreground:

```
\begin{music}
\(\begin{array}{c}
\text{(music)} \\
\text{1st - level} \\
\text{reduction} \\
\text{3rd - level}
\end{array}\)
\end{music}
```

In connection with the weakening of $\alpha$ and the concomitant emergence of $\beta'$ over the four strophes, I have an idea which is highly suggestive and also very clear to my own ear. That is: the residual e of the $\alpha$-gesture eventually hooks up to the beginning d of the $\beta'$-gesture, over the repeat of the strophe. The sense could be roughly symbolized as:

```
\begin{music}
\end{music}
```

This notion proposes an overall basic melodic action for the song which works itself out over the four strophes: ornamented e–to d–to c. The action takes that long to work out because one first has to overcome the distraction of the recurrent ornamental gesture f–e, and then one has to overcome the distraction of the e’s recurrently reasserting itself over each big c (on the third-level reduction).

The latter consideration sets up an immediate and powerful resonance in my ear, namely to the function of the round in measures 16–19. There we hear, on a foreground level, exactly the cadential melodic gesture e–d–c under discussion. And, on the same level, we hear “the distraction of the e’s recurrently reasserting itself over each c”:

```
\begin{music}
\end{music}
```

The recurrence here specifically recalls my discussion of the three “attempts” of the big e, on the third-level reduction, to pass down through d to c on that level, over stanzas 2, 3, and 4, a new big e recurring simultaneously with each of the big c’s. According to my reading of the high level, the last attempt succeeds. This would correspond to the notion on the level of Example S3 that the vocal c
is finally stabilized by measure 19, removing the sense of syncopation at the level that contains 16–19 as one rhythmic unit. (Actually, I hear the c of 17 already stable in that sense.) Hence measure 20: it says “this c is stable; f–e was only a descant.” Over measures 19²/³–21, the voice is specifically a descant to the echoing turn-motive in the piano, inflecting the now stable c in familiar fashion.

And now let us consider the dramatic context in which measures 16–19 are heard. The low-level cadential gesture e–d–c there is inextricably tied to the text “So muß ich wieder gehen,” the e being associated with “muß” and the c with “geh.” In this connection, the fact that the poet does not go after the first stanza strikes one with special force. The implication is clear: he will in fact leave when, and only when, the cadential e–d–c has been clearly projected. If one hears that line, one has moved connectively from “muß” to “geh.” But to the extent that the e reasserts itself at the expense of (e–d–)c, the psychological emphasis is thrown accordingly onto “muß.” I.e. I must be going. Yes, I must be going. I really must (be going). Etc. etc. potentially ad infinitum. The result, over the first stanza in the context of all four, is to emphasize the poet’s sense of obligation; but also to make it clear that this sense does not as yet connect itself to “going,” but rather to something which is as yet obscure to the poet himself. The transformation of the opening vocal melodic motif at measure 16, so as to put the local stress on the high e, with its “muß,” is very clear and cogent in this regard. So is the denial of the vocal arrival at measure 17 by the arrival of the total context at 16, contradicting the natural text stress: not but . According to my notion about the high-level melodic action, the big e–d–c “à faire” finally hooks together unequivocally only in the final stanza, from the e of 16, 16′, and 16′′, through the d of 9′′′ (syncopated to 10′′′), to the c of 16′′′ (syncopated to 17′′′). The c in question coincides with the final psychological resolution of “der Liebe Leid und Sorgen”: what the poet “must” do, over the four strophes, has been to find his own psychological position in the situation. (We shall elaborate that a bit more later.) Now e–d–c has been accomplished, and he can finally really “go”: the song is over. The recall of Morgen in the text of the final stanza, to rhyme with Sorgen, involves exactly the big d and the big c under discussion. This supports the β′-gesture there with extra psychodramatic force.

The notion of the line e–d–c gradually hooking together (from the e to the d) over the four strophes is highly interactive with the progressive feature of that very large context we noted earlier: the gradual fixation of 9–10–11 in that context as functionally a contracted four-measure group, rather than an expanded two-measure group. As reflected by the “half note” in quotation marks on the earlier second-level reduction, the melodic tone that receives the implicit extra rhythmic/metric significance as a result is d (not f). That is, in the large context, one eventually hears not as if
but as if \( \text{\footnotesize \textit{Morgengruß}} \). Accordingly, as this phenomenon works out over the repeated strophes, one hears the associated “big d” assuming more and more significance. And it is just growing awareness of that big d which is required, in connection with loss of interest in the f (–e), in order to hear the big e ultimately move down to and eventually through the big d, performing the required E–D–C:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>(f)</th>
<th>(f)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>e</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| (the growing d) : | (d) | d | D | D |
| (c) | e | C | C |

Eventual loss of interest in the big f and growing focus on the big d as coming from an earlier big e, in connection with our hearing of the repetitions of 9–10–11, also ties in suggestively with features of our earlier alternative micro-analysis for those three measures. To review: the alternative analysis, which we decided we could perhaps maintain in the context of 5–11 but not of 5–23, heard the f of measure 9 as an ornament to a hypothetical e in the voice part of measure 9. That e, becoming the hypothetical essential tone for measure 9, then resolved as an ornament to the essential d of measure 10. This gave rise to a first-level reduction which did not have any high f in it at all, beyond the descant f of measure 20. It specifically read:

emphasizing “e–to–d” on this level and “f merely an ornament to e” on a lower level. Both “e–to–d” and “f merely an ornament to e” are of course sensations which would be highly pertinent to our hearing the big e moving down essentially to the big d at, say, 9′′′–10′′′–11′′′. To the extent that we can regain the alternative micro-analysis then, not for 9–10–11 but for 9′′′–10′′′–11′′′, we will be even more strongly and explicitly hearing the big e moving down to the big d at that point.
fact, the aural implication of the alternative first-level reduction would make this virtually automatic:

*Example 54*

To what extent, then, can we regain the alternative hearing of the micro-analysis for 9′′′–10′′′–11′′′? To explore this, let us review the feature of that hearing which gave us difficulty at 9–10–11. We had to hear:

This involved hearing the f at the bar line of measure 9 resolving to a hypothetical “high e” in the voice part on the third beat of that measure. In order to do so, we had to imagine that the singer was essentially doubling the tenor line of the piano at that point. This was hard to hear for a number of reasons. The strongest was that the high f itself was basically too forceful, as it burst in on us at measure 9: we could not hear its urgency sufficiently dissipated in such an oblique manner.

Consider now the difference at measure 9′′′: no longer does the f strike us out of the blue; rather it is by now simply another little wave in the train of incessant undulations on e–and–f we have been hearing in the context of all-the-strophes. Specifically, by this time we have already heard
And now we hear another f at 9′′′. *This f* is not at all urgent and pressing, as was the f at measure 9. We can let go of it quite easily, and we already hear it as an ornament to the massive stable e that is now in our ears before the attack of the f: the e from 16, 16′, and 16″, as confirmed by 20–21, 20′–21′, etc. etc. We can now refer to our hypothetical e for the voice on the third beat of measure 9″′ not just to the tenor line in the piano there, but to all the preceding massive doses of high e in the voice. All of this makes the force of the alternate reading much stronger at 9″′–10″′–11″′. The discussion in fact indicates how the alternate reading grows in force the more often we have heard f–and–e oscillating. Thus the reading is tenuous at 9–10–11, a bit stronger in the second strophe, stronger yet in the third, and finally strongest at 9″′–10″′–11″′. This goes along precisely with the sense that the big e tries more and more to move down to the big d, as we hear the three repetitions of the strophe. As we saw a bit earlier (Example 54), the alternate reading for 9″′–10″′–11″′ reduces, through three levels, so as to make the gesture very clear on the highest level. Accordingly, we would always have a faint hint of e

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{e} \\
\text{d} \\
\text{c}
\end{array} \]  

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{16} \\
\text{9} \\
\text{16″}
\end{array} \]  

and a stronger hint of e

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{e} \\
\text{d} \\
\text{c}
\end{array} \]  

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{16} \\
\text{9} \\
\text{16″}
\end{array} \]  

as the alternate reading grows in aural force over the three repetitions of the strophe.

I am personally convinced by everything cited in connection with the notion of the e–d–c gesture building over the four strophes, aurally as well as intellectually. Many readers who find themselves largely persuaded intellectually will probably experience difficulty in focusing the appropriate large-level aural sensation, even while hearing nothing to contradict it. They are probably not used to hearing, or even considering hearing, on such a large rhythmic level. The reductions are helpful in cultivating such a widening of one’s aural sensibility, though one must always keep in mind just what they do and do not say: e.g. the third-level reduction four times around is not the context itself, but only a framework for it at a high rhythmic level.

The notion is critically very attractive in any case (always supposing one at least has no positive large-scale sensations that conflict with it). Specifically, it ties together all of the progressive aspects of the strophe-repeated-three-times. It does so in a way that throws suggestive light on the crucial cadential spans 9–10–11 and 16–19 (as well as 20–21), as they are heard the first time and as they are heard three more times. Finally, it does all this in a way which is highly suggestive in relation to the text, both in its progressive aspect over the last three stanzas and particularly as regards the setting of the two key lines “So muß . . .” and “der Liebe . . .” which frame that text progression. The reader who assents to the notion in any degree will see now why I cautioned long ago that we should withhold critical judgment about Schubert’s strophic setting until after considerably more analysis (i.e. careful listening to the pertinent very large context).
We have seen that in spite of their radically stripped-down structure, the second- and third-level reductions were still quite useful for analytic work. The technique of passing from first- to second-level reduction, or from second to third, was basically the same as that of passing from the actual score to the first-level reduction. The “ornamental tones” of the first-level reduction were indicated as such on the sketch immediately preceding the second-level reduction (Example 49). The barring of the second-level reduction was mostly plausible “by ear” (as all such reduction should be to begin with). When pressed to it, one can qualify “by ear” with pertinent criteria. E.g. except for the bar line before measure 12 on the second-level reduction, the other bar lines (beyond 9 and 16) fall naturally into place because of the sharp thematic and textural contrasts setting off the indicated four-measure groups. These contrasts create accents on the pertinent rhythmic level and, failing any aural sensations to contradict their tendency to assert themselves as pulses, the accents so assert themselves. The bar line at measure 12 required more careful thought, even though the textural grouping of measures 12–15 is clear enough. We had to consider the possibility of hearing 9–10–11 as an extension of two measures. If so, 9–10–11 would be commensurate not with 12–15 at the four-measure level, but with each of 12–13 and 14–15 at the two-measure level. We considered that possibility and rejected it not because of the accent at measure 12 (nor of course because of the phrase structure) but because of the metric implications of that reading at a higher level. In fact, it was just here that we began invoking the context of the-strophe-four-times: to hear the big I measure going around the repeat, and to hear the alternating big I measures and big V measures as rhythmically and metrically commensurate. In deciding that 9–10–11 must be a contracted four-measure group in this context, we were invoking criterion (c) in spirit: hearing clear higher-level metric structure as determining lower-level in any context. We also invoked criterion (c) more explicitly when we noted that hearing 9–10–11 as an expansion of two measures in the context would force us to hear S′ as carrying more stress than 9′, contradicting our clear aural intuition to the contrary.

From a theoretical point of view, it should be noted that, even though the techniques were similar, passing from the first-level reduction to the second or from the second to the third was a very different sort of activity from that of deriving the first-level reduction from the music. In the latter case, we were symbolizing directly certain aspects of an actual musical experience. In passing on to higher-level reductions, we were symbolizing directly only certain aspects of structures which were themselves symbolic; the relation to the actual musical experience was accordingly a “level” further away in each case in terms of abstraction as well as notated rhythm and meter. The theoretical implications of this observation need not concern us for present purposes. The value of the reductions for us is utterly practical: we use them here only for what they suggest of
analytic interest, without having to worry about their theoretical significance. But the theoretical observation is important as a methodological caution: the higher we proceed in levels of abstraction, the more important it is for us to check the sketches “by ear” against our musical intuitions of the piece itself. Not that this is unimportant on the first level! But one is much more likely to fall into erroneous description of one’s actual hearing of the piece in higher-level sketching. One must remember at all times that every symbol one puts down, e.g. a sixth-level reduction of a symphonic movement, says “I hear this about the piece.” It does not say “this can be inferred from the structure of the fifth-level reduction.” It also does not say (and this is an important finesse) “if the fifth-level reduction were a piece of music, I would hear this about that piece.” Or rather, to the extent it says either of those things, it is not a valid analytical symbol. One must work in each case to make sure one has a clear aural sense of the “this,” of “I hear this,” in connection with the piece itself.

We will now have a basic overview of the song as a whole, once we have considered the four measures of piano introduction. The introduction does not repeat along with the strophe (some introductions do, in Schubert’s songs, functioning more as what would technically be called “ritornellos”). Its sharpest impact is accordingly in the context of measures 1–23, as it qualifies the first strophe. We shall examine that presently in some detail.

Meanwhile one can note that the extra four measures of tonic preparation also exercise some qualifying effect on the context of the strophe-four-times. One can hear the effect by adjoining a half note, representing the introduction, to the beginning of the earlier third-level reduction:

Example 55

The extra four measures, together with 5–8, build a unique opening “big tonic measure” on this level. This initiates some sense of alternating big I and big V measures earlier than we had previously discussed. The seven measures of 9–15 specifically already balance the eight measures of 1–8 pretty clearly; this prepares us for later balancing 9-15 against 16–8′. The initial big tonic measure also weakens the pulse on measure 5: in spite of the accent of the singer’s entrance, 5–8 is clearly a “weak four-measure group,” i.e. a “weak half” in Example 55. The group 5–8 thus acquires a stronger “pickup” sense, as regards the approaching measure
9, even during the first strophe (after hearing the piano introduction first). And this prepares us subtly for “picking up around the repeat” at 5, 5′, and 5′′, propelling the repeats around.

These, however, are pretty much only niceties. The impact of the opening four measures is much more direct and clear in the context of 1–23. Not simply because one gradually forgets the introduction thereafter, but more because its overall progression has very striking relationships with the overall progression of the strophe itself. We can begin by contemplating the following pair of sketches:

The sketches illustrate how the strophe follows the model of the introduction very closely in many respects. They illustrate even more strikingly how the strophe distorts that model. The intrusive effect of the high f at measure 9 is highlighted very strongly: this accents the f yet more. Aside from that f, the voice essentially follows the model of the introduction as regards the pertinent points of association.

Even more striking, though, is the progressive rhythmic distension of the introduction-model by the strophe. The strophe begins by following the rhythm of the model literally over measures 5 and 6. (Of course, everything else here is literal repetition, except that the voice sings the tune the piano played.) Measures 7 and 8, though, are each three times as long as the corresponding events of the model. Measures 9–15 are twenty-one times as long as the corresponding event of the model; furthermore, 9 takes a very high-level metric stress in sharp contrast to the model, which is metrically weak at even the quarter note level. This is the climax of distortion; 16–23 are “only” eight or twelve times the length of the model, depending on whether one hears the chord of measure 4 as rhythmically equivalent to a full measure, or only to two-thirds of a measure.

The musical relations just discussed suggest a concomitant dramatic relationship. That is: one can take the piano introduction as a musical image of the poet’s anticipated “scenario” for the action to follow. We can combine an exposition of that notion with a “staging” of the scene:

It is early morning. The maid is at her window (let us suppose stage left). The poet enters (I think stage right, because I hear him complete a stage-cross later).
He sees the maid. I am not sure whether she does not see him or whether she looks at him with an indiffernce he probably takes as drowsiness. Music.

Measures 1–2: the poet thinks “I will say ‘Good morning’ to her.”

Measure 3: the poet thinks “She will reply ‘Good morning,’ of course; then we will get into conversation; etc. etc. etc.’ The imagined “etc. etc. etc.” is reflected in the quickening rhythm of the music and in the new motivic material (which, appropriately, we never hear again). The quickened rhythm also suggests to my ear a completed stage-cross at this point: heightened activity on the poet’s part, physical as well as imaginative, as he hastens to implement his plan.

Measure 4: the poet gets under the window, ready for action. Their eyes meet.

Measures 5–6: the poet says “Good morning.” Exactly according to the musical plan of measures 1–2. The maid pulls her head in from the window.

Measures 7–8: “Why do you pull your head in?” Things are not going so briskly as in the imagined model of measure 3; the rhythmic distension begins. Why does she pull her head in? I’ll slow down a bit; let’s wait and see. Maybe there is a plausible reason; perhaps she will come right back.

Measures 9–15: the high f strikes as a musical thought absent from the model. “As if”: no, her gesture was too abrupt and rude. She is behaving “as if” I were accosting her. But I’m not: my intentions are honorable; my plan is quite naive. What can explain such a strong rejection of such an innocent overture? Do I really disturb her that much? I must be broadcasting emotional waves I am not aware of myself.

The rhythmic distension of the model, the last chord of measure 3, reaches a climax as the poet is inundated by this sudden flood of imaginative impressions. Of course he holds onto the big dominant sense as long as he can: the tonic resolution “ought to” occur when the maid returns to her window and responds to him. Meanwhile, he goes through all the musical convolutions of 9–10–11 and the various earlier “stages” regarding the B phrase. But she is evidently not going to return to the window.

Measures 16–23: so I must go. Or rather “I must . . . I must . . . I must . . .” I must sort all this out. The poet leaves the window and slowly crosses back to stage right. From there, he will continue with stanzas 2, 3, and 4 “from far away.” He is specifically back in his fantasy zone of the stage, where he conceived the introductory scenario. Here he will eventually sort out, in his fantasy, the “emotional waves” he feels himself broadcasting. This as in our earlier analysis of the text for the last three stanzas. Then his unsassness as to his own position, the “as if” of the doubting subjunctive
wär’, the shock of the f at measure 9, will have disappeared; the big e–d–c can hook together; and, having achieved his psychological insight, at the final line of the text, the poet can finally really leave.

The sense of all this, or the gist of it as regards the stage action for the first strophe, is quite suggestively projected by hearing that strophe in a context together with the four measures of introduction. The heightened imaginative activity of measure 3, as the harmonic and accompanimental rhythm breaks into quarters, also serves as a model for the imaginative activity of measures 9–10–11, where the same musical features occur, even though the overall sense of the big V remains stable. One can even hear measure 3 itself recurring in quarters, over the bass g, in measures 9–10, though in highly distorted harmonic/metric guise: the “etc. etc. etc.” of measure 3 is not at all as anticipated, though the poet’s imagination is equally active:

We can return now to the original impression that the song was “simple.” Evidently that impression no longer stands without qualification. But it is still there very strongly: even now, one would not deny it, but rather say “the song projects an apparent naive simplicity, behind which a complex structure unfolds.” The aesthetic pertinence of that projection is now clear, if one takes the apparent naive simplicity as a metaphor for the naive original “Guten Morgen,” and the unfolding latent musical complexities as a metaphor for the convolutions through which the poet has to go in clarifying to himself the emotional implications of that apparently naive gesture, as received by the maid, when he is left to sort out how he feels about them.

One does not ever really finish analyzing a piece; rather one simply stops at a certain point. We have reached an appropriate point for our purposes. It is far from the case that we have discussed everything worth hearing in the piece. For instance, we could examine the melodic motive-structure much more carefully. We can hear, e.g., how the bass line of measures 9–15, over the big V measure, is a motivic variation on the little melodic figure associated with the first dominant harmony in the piece:
The little b–a–g of the latter gesture is in turn the “dominant form” of e–d–c, as in Example 56, which reappears transformed later at measure 16 and following; the latter in turn relates as we have discussed to the very large-level gesture of e–d–c over the four strophes. Of interest also is the melodic inversion of the motive of Example 56, into the sense of the vocal line at the question-music of measures 9–10:

Etc. etc.

Or we could develop certain general senses we have presently formulated with yet more detail and nuance. For instance, it can be heard that the sense of “oscillation on e–and–f,” which emerged very strongly in the context of the-strophe-four-times, is latent literally everywhere in the music except uniquely at measures 3\(\frac{2}{3}\)–4 (!). I.e.:

These further insights, cogent as they are, do not, however, fundamentally alter the basic sense of the piece that has been developed. Rather they only inflect it with further depth and nuance. For a specific purpose, one might want to pursue one such line of analysis with more care. But for our purposes, we can stop here.

Or rather, I can stop here. Or, I can stop here until such time as I might suddenly hear something fundamentally new going on in the piece. Something which would make me say “Oh of course; why didn’t I hear that before?” This just as some readers probably reacted when they first became aware of the “two-part form” of the strophe. Experience accustoms one not only to live with this possibility, but to enjoy it.
PART II

DAVID LEWIN’S MORGENGРУФ

Context and Commentary
Proust’s madeleine was not always a madeleine. In his unpublished manuscript *Contre Sainte-Beuve*, the soft, scalloped madeleine was something far less palatable—a dry, hard rusk.

One snowy evening, not long ago, I came in half frozen, and had sat down in my room to read by lamplight, and as I could not get warm my old cook offered to make me a cup of tea, a thing I never drink. And as chance would have it, she brought me some slices of dry toast. I dipped the toast in the cup of tea and as soon as I put it in my mouth, and felt its softened texture, all flavored with tea, against my palate, something came over me—the smell of geraniums and orange-blossoms, a sensation of extraordinary radiance and happiness. . . . [Proust 1958, pp. 19–20]

You might be surprised at what follows. Yes, the tea-soaked toast revives a memory of childhood long forgotten, but rather than have it last for a few thousand pages, Proust discards the recollection after merely a paragraph. It is succeeded by other vagrant sensations, accidentally encountered, which arouse dormant memories: a paving stone in Venice reveals a fluttering “fragment of life”; a piece of green canvas in a pantry window recollects the pieces of a distant summer; the collision of a spoon and a plate recalls the sound of a linesman on a childhood railway trip. Instead of disclosing a specific world of inner experience, as the madeleine does, Proust’s rusk serves a different purpose. Concatenated into a series of examples, the rusk functions as evidence for a *theoretical* point: that memory and intellect are different in kind; that the former can be summoned only through sensation; that the latter cannot be the source of artistic inspiration and must always be considered inferior; that even the greatest masterpiece is merely “a net of intellect [cast] round jewels of feeling” (p. 25).
I raise the specter of Proust not to make some claim about Lewin’s reading habits (or favorite teatime snack) but to fend off a temptation that is perhaps irresistible. Just as one might read _Contre Sainte-Beuve_ as the prototype for _Remembrance of Things Past_, one might similarly read Lewin’s _Morgengrüß_ manuscript as the prototype for “Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes of Perception” (Lewin 1986). And, just as the rusk fails to live up to the magnificence of the madeleine, perhaps the manuscript fails to live up to the profundity of Lewin’s “p-model.” For why should we be interested in an essay that Lewin himself did not bother to publish, in which the most fecund ideas were farmed out to other essays, and which is intended for readers with moderate to little training in music theory? Why swallow Lewin’s rusk when we can enjoy the madeleine?

A madeleine does not a masterpiece make. Indeed, there are many reasons for readers of Proust to care about _Contre Sainte-Beuve_ and also many reasons for readers of Lewin to care about _Morgengrüß_. In this essay, I will try to bring a few of these reasons to the reader’s attention by offering a close comparison of _Morgengrüß_ and “Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes of Perception” (hereafter MTP). My comparison will be organized around two sets of contrasting terms—music theory and music analysis, and recursion and dialectics. I select these two sets of contrasting terms for heuristic purposes, to underscore features that differentiate the two texts most dramatically and allow us to see how Lewin’s thinking about a constellation of important topics (such as theory, analysis, perception, evidence, and temporality) undergoes subtle but significant changes in the interval that separates _Morgengrüß_ from MTP.

I begin with a broad generalization, which at first glance will undoubtedly appear banal: _Morgengrüß_ is an essay primarily concerned with musical analysis, while MTP is primarily concerned with some issues in music theory. By musical analysis and music theory, I am intending the terms in the sense that Lewin defined them in his famous response to Edward Cone, “Behind the Beyond” (Lewin 1969). A theory of music attempts to “describe the ways in which, given a certain body of literature, composers and listeners appear to have accepted sound as conceptually structured, categorically prior to any one specific piece” (Lewin 1969, p. 61), while the goal of a musical analysis, which may draw on many music-theoretical concepts in the course of its presentation, “is simply to hear the piece better” (p. 63).

To develop this broad generalization, let us assume that the goal of _Morgengrüß_ is “simply to hear the piece better.” Hearing “better” means hearing a richer variety of aspects of the Lied than given in one’s first impression. In the opening pages, Lewin neutralizes the impression that “Morgengrüß” is “a basically simple and straightforward piece” (p. 16), not by “raising artificial barriers” against this impression but by exploring “how [such impressions] can
be made richer and more exact, so that one can hear more and more clearly” (p. 16). In the name of richness and clarity, Lewin offers not only multiple readings of every bar of the piece, but keeps driving toward an account of the piece as a whole, in which the temporality and cumulative force of each repeated strophe is brought into audibility. Yet Morgengruß goes further; Lewin uses Schubert’s Lied as an opportunity to develop and expand his methodological views concerning analysis generally. The essay contains many reflections and insights about presentation, ethics, evidence, truth, and intersubjectivity within the sphere of music analysis.

For instance, “in general,” Lewin writes, “one should mistrust any argument that tells you not to examine the piece any more. Such an argument is always specious, an excuse for evading analytic responsibility and (worse) aural receptivity” (p. 28). There is an ethical dimension to this sentiment, evidenced by the fact that a “should” or “ought” accompanies the analyst’s enterprise. When this should or ought is not directly stated, it is implied through the use of the imperative mood. For example, in MTP, Lewin advises the reader to “mistrust anything that tells you not to explore an aural impression you have once formed; mistrust anything that tells you not to listen any more to music that once gripped you, as soon as you have heard one thing going on (or two things, or three, four, . . . five hundred . . . things)” (MTP, p. 81). Analysis ethically demands a space for every aural impression to be explored and given its due. It is a radically egalitarian enterprise, gathering impressions in a quantitative furor. All analytical impressions should be considered, since they play an evidentiary role, supplying the perceptual foundation upon which analytical statements are ultimately grounded. Additionally, analytical impressions must be made communicable. In “Behind the Beyond,” Lewin claimed that “the task of the analysis is ‘merely’ to point out things in the piece that strike [the analyst] as characteristic and important . . . and to arrange his presentation in a way that will stimulate the musical imagination of his audience” (Lewin 1969, p. 63). The responsibility to make one’s impressions perspicuous to others motivates the analyst’s act of presentation. We can call this aspect of analysis its communicative imperative.

Lewin’s notion of an analytical impression preserves the traces of music theory’s mid-century attachment to positivism: analytical impressions might be usefully compared with protocol sentences, documenting individual bits of perceptual experience or sense-data (“I hear X at Y”) without consideration for their relationship to other impressions. Such an attachment to sense-data may also have shaped Lewin’s predilection for phenomenology later in his career, in which intuitions of all variety—but most importantly perceptual intuitions—play a similarly evidential role. One important difference between the protocol sentence and a phenomenological intuition (in Lewin’s employment of phenomenology) is that intuitions include relations to other percepts via retention, protention, etc.
In *Morgengrüss*, Lewin formulates a “methodological rule-of-thumb” for analysis that concisely expresses both the evidential and communicative dimensions of analytic statements:

**METHODOLOGICAL RULE-OF-THUMB:** Every valid analytic statement is of the basic form “I hear this about this specific piece,” as qualified by an implicit “and I think you can too.” ([Morgengrüss](#), p. 98)

The methodological rule-of-thumb introduces two criteria of every valid analytic statement: (1) the evidential criterion that an analytic statement must describe some impression that was immanently heard by the analyst; and (2) the communicative criterion that the content of the statement must be intelligibly communicated through some manner of presentation, since it makes a claim on the other to hear it as well. \(^2\) “‘The statement ‘there must be a pulse at the two-measure level somewhere between measure 153 and measure 157’” (p. 98) is not analytic, since it does not meet the first criterion; it does not describe an impression actually heard by the analyst, but rather is based on a *theoretical* demand that a pulse must be present according to some system of conceptual structuring of sound. It does, however, meet the second criterion: it clearly presents to another listener an intelligible claim. But the statement “I feel a pulse at a two-measure level somewhere between measure 153 and measure 157” (p. 98) is analytically valid. It describes an immanent perceptual impression possessed by the analyst, and communicates this impression in an intelligible manner such that another listener could check it against his or her own immanent perceptions.

\(^2\) The form that Lewin uses to describe the implicit, communicative imperative of every analytic statement is reminiscent of Kant’s views on the Beautiful. In the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant argues that when people describe something as beautiful, they are doing something more than noting a subjective feeling concerning the object; they are also making a claim on others that they too ought to perceive the object as beautiful. The beholder “imputes the same delight to others: he judges not merely for himself but for everyone, and then speaks of beauty as if it were a property of things” (Kant 1790 [1952], §7, p. 212). Similarly, analytic statements are not simply reports of subjective impressions of the listener, but also make a claim on others to regard the piece in the way that the analyst has described it. However, for the sake of clarity, I remind the reader that my comparison between Lewin and Kant is focused on the form of the claim—the elevation of a subjective content to the level of intersubjective validity—and not its content. Clearly, there is a difference between Lewin and Kant concerning the kind of content elevated: unlike the Kantian Beautiful, which is a subjective *feeling*, Lewin’s analytic statements are not feelings but *observations*. For a clear and thorough exposition of this aspect of Kant’s aesthetics, see Guyer 1997, pp. 118–130.
Lewin is also aware of a perpetual problem when one appeals to perceptual impressions as evidence, namely, that they are immediately available only to the person claiming to have the impression. Thus there is always a skeptical worry that analysts may not actually possess the impressions that they claim to have. “Strictly speaking,” Lewin notes, “one cannot say of any such analytic statement by another person that it is ‘true’ or ‘false.’ I cannot verify, that is, that somebody else does or does not hear what he says he does; nor that he does or does not think I can hear the same thing” (p. 98). Analytic statements are not falsifiable, since their criterion of truth is dependent on a listener’s impressions, which cannot be made directly intersubjective. Thus analytic statements are like statements of feeling or affect: they cannot themselves be proven or disproven. This is why the communicative imperative is an important addition to the evidential role played by perceptual impressions. By adding to each analytic statement a claim on the other, Lewin understands analysts as asking others to hear it in the way they do—to try to accept their analytic statement as if it were their own. Of course, nothing guarantees the truthfulness of someone’s analytic statement, but this lack of guarantee is tempered, since a claim is made on others to check analytic statements against their own immanent impressions. Suasion is the onus of the analyst. At the same time, the analyst is in a reciprocal position: others have the right to communicate their perceptual impressions back to the analyst, to challenge him or her to try and hear it their way. In situations in which communicants try to elicit the proper impressions in each other through the use of perspicuous presentations, “we are then engaged in a valid and presumably useful analytic controversy. Useful in that each of us stands to hear more in the piece as a result” (p. 99).

In contrast to the detailed analytical treatment of Schubert’s Lied in Morgengruß, MTP centers on a theoretical point, namely, that music theory habitually commits itself to an ontology that reifies chords and other musical entities according to a schema that prohibits entities from having multiple meanings. The various names that designate this schema change in different essays—in MTP, Lewin blames reification on the “Euclidian/Cartesian score-plane” (MTP, p. 81), while in “Some Problems and Resources of Music Theory,” he attributes it to the “Platonic THE” (Lewin 2006, p. 389)—yet the problem remains: a commitment to this musical ontology forces the view that musical entities possess unique, context-free meanings. Rather, Lewin supports a more contextually dependent position, where entities may possess multiple, even logically contradictory senses. To draw out the theoretical point, he employs a perceptual model (the “p-model”) as a technology for presenting an analysis of measures 9–15 of Schubert’s Lied. In showing how musical impressions in various contexts protend and retain various other impressions—confirming, denying, or modifying them—Lewin is forced to
make a number of analytical statements about how those impressions are heard.\(^3\) But those analytic statements are subordinate to Lewin’s theoretical challenge to musical ontology.\(^4\)

In 1991, more than two decades after the publication of “Beyond the Beyond,” Lewin reasserts his commitment to the notion of music theory presented there. Referring to his previous statement that music theory “attempts to describe the way in which, given a certain body of literature, composers and listeners appear to have accepted sound as conceptually structured, prior to any one specific piece,” Lewin states that he is “still reasonably satisfied with that view of music theory” (Lewin 2006, p. 386). In the same article, Lewin develops “some aspects” of that position by reasserting the theoretical findings of MTP. After offering examples from Zarlino and Rameau in which an ontological commitment “improperly restricts the pertinent conceptual sound world,” by prohibiting multiple senses for some particular musical entity, Lewin explicitly connects his critique of these historical theorists with the theoretical point made in MTP. “In my article on phenomenology and music theory,” Lewin writes, “I went so far as to challenge the Platonic THE in expressions like ‘THE B♭ in measure 12.’ I also challenged the word ‘IS’ in statements like ‘THE harmony of measure 15 IS such-and-such.’ The issue in greatest generality might be termed ‘Hidden prior restraints in common linguistic conventions’” (Lewin 2006, p. 391).

The final sentence is worth consideration. The “hidden prior restraint,” which prohibits a musical entity from possessing multiple (even contradictory) senses, is grounded in a “common linguistic convention,” that is, a manner of speaking about musical entities. More specifically, Lewin seems to be claiming that the habitual musical ontology arises from the difference between our language about music and the musical experience as it is grounded in contextually defined perceptual impressions. When our language about music is privileged, it brings with it logical and conceptual baggage that is not necessarily adequate for presenting the musical impressions in all of their clarity and richness. This view is not new to “Some Problems” but has its roots in Morgengruß. When forced to choose between alternative senses of some bit of music in the name of logical (linguistic, theoretical) consistency, Lewin writes,

A large part of the conceptual problem arises from the fact, I think, that the logic of the musical experience is not completely congruent to the

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\(^3\) For example, any individual percepts recorded via the p-model constitute valid analytic statements.

\(^4\) Lewin 1969 offered a statement pertinent to this moment in MTP: “… a theorist who wants to validate his ideas … is naturally going to point out passages in the literature as support for the putative pertinence of his notions. He may indeed dig pretty hard at such passages in order to focus his readers’ ears on what he is interested in. But, TO THE EXTENT HE APPROACHES THE MUSIC WITH THAT AIM, HE IS NOT ANALYZING IT!” (Lewin 1969, p. 62).
logic of (the English) language. . . . This may be only a deficiency in technical vocabulary. But I do not think so myself. I believe the problem to be inherent in the attempt to use language in describing the effect of music. Beyond a certain point, I think the best one can do is to use language to stimulate a reader’s aural imagination to perceive those things which the language cannot begin adequately to describe. [Morgengruß, p. 50]

The view also persists in MTP, for the purpose of the p-model is to clarify the relationship between the logic of musical experiences and the logic of linguistic statements about music. In developing a model that can make us sensitive to the contextually determined differences of musical sense that arise in the process of listening and re-listening—what Lewin calls a sensitivity to “occupational” times—his goal is to supplement a deficiency in our language about music, a language that typically ignores such “occupational” times. According to Lewin, “Any phenomenological theory [like the one that grounds the p-model] should . . . make us sensitive to the necessity for conceptually distinguishing among various ‘occupational’ times . . .” (MTP, p. 80). When we habitually embrace the ontology promoted by our adoption of the Cartesian-Euclidian score plane, we are constrained to “logically” conclude that some musical entity cannot possess multiple, contradictory senses. Under the sway of a logic that is “not completely congruent” to the logic of musical experience, “we begin trying to deny and suppress various of our perceptual phenomena . . . not realizing that our conceptual [that is, linguistic, geometrical, metaphorical] tools are inadequate for the analytic task at hand” (MTP, p. 81).

So how does the p-model achieve its end? How does it clarify the relationship between the logic of musical experience and the logic of language about music? The p-model captures the “recursive” aspects of musical experience and models them in some given language, which Lewin calls “Language L.” In Part I of MTP, Lewin is drawn toward, “the idiosyncratically recursive aspects of Husserl’s perception-structures” (MTP, pp. 55–56). By “recursion,” Lewin intends the way that musical perception-structures “characteristically involve themselves in loops with other perception-structures that are among their objects or arguments.” The other perception-structures are typically in characteristic relationships to the given structure (e.g. of retention, protention, implication, realization, denial), and those relationships, as well as other sorts of relations between perceptions, can also enter into recursive configurations as object or arguments of perception-structures” (MTP, p. 56). Lewin offers as an example a simple cadence

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5 The term “recursion” is neither Husserl’s term nor that of Izchak Miller, Lewin’s main interlocutor regarding the details of Husserlian phenomenology. Rather, the term is Lewin’s own coinage. For a comprehensive account of Lewin’s engagement with phenomenology, see Kane 2011.
in C major, comparing the perception-structure heard at the arrival of \( V^7 \), labeled Perception(a), with the perception-structure heard one beat later at the resolution of the chord to tonic, labeled Perception(b).\(^6\)

According to Lewin, Perception(b) cannot simply be described as "The C eight-three chord," since it includes Perception(a) as one of its arguments; in this case, it retains Perception(a). "We could describe the relationship by saying that what-we-perceive in Perception(b) includes Perception(a) in a relation of implication-realized" (MTP, p. 58). At the same time, Perception(a) cannot be adequately described as simply "the G dominant seventh chord," since it includes the protended (or anticipated) arrival of Perception(b) as one of its arguments. The two chords recursively include each other as arguments. "We can isolate the recursive aspect of the situation by formulating expressions IMP and RLZ . . . : IMP = (a)'s implication of RLZ; RLZ = (b)'s realization of IMP" (MTP, p. 58).

The p-model promotes the view that a musical impression (or "percept") includes, as part of its content, other (retained, anticipated, realized, denied) percepts. While the p-model makes the "recursive" relationship between percepts explicit, this factor often goes unacknowledged due to "hidden constraints" caused by music-theoretical systems. Such systems, which are concerned with how sound is "conceptually structured, prior to any one specific piece" (Lewin 2006, p. 386), place certain logical demands on discourse about music. One of those implied demands is that musical discourse be subject to the law of noncontradiction. However, musical impressions do not necessarily obey the same set of logical demands; that is to say, their logos is different from the logos of theoretical consistency. The problem concerns how to make the theory adequate to the impressions.

Lewin offers a striking example from *Die Walküre*, which demonstrates how the law of noncontradiction does not apply to musical impressions. Two statements (XDY and YDX) are posited: XDY states that "Event X functions harmonically as a dominant of Event Y" and YDX states "Event Y functions harmonically

\(^6\) Lewin is explicit that the example is intended to "explore . . . the recursive aspects of musical perception-structure" (MTP, p. 58).

\(^7\) Lewin formulates this in terms of the difference between "the logic of sentences in L" and "the logic of perceptions" (MTP, p. 88).
as a dominant of Event X.”8 As Lewin notes, both statements are well formed, but their conjunction (“XYD and YDX”) cannot be posited without producing a contradiction. Then the passage is presented:

According to Lewin’s gloss, we have “a perception-structure that involves exactly the sentence just branded as false, that is the logical conjunction of XYD and YDX . . . It seems that we must deny the one perception or the other, in order to avoid a logical paradox” (MTP, p. 89). Yet to deny a perception would violate Lewin’s ethical rules concerning analysis. The p-model parses the musical impressions in this passage and reveals that two “contradictory” perception-structures, XYD and YDX, occur at temporally distinct moments:

Our difficulty is only apparent. The confusion arises from our having improperly reified one percept (as opposed to sentence) called XYD and one percept called YDX; the confusion is compounded by the fashion of speaking that makes us believe we have both perceptions “at the same time,” so that we try to imagine one composite perception called “the perception of both-XYD-and-YDX.” [The p-model] enables us to avoid just these confusions, by articulating a variety of perceptions, at a variety of places in phenomenological space and time. [MTP, p. 89]

Lewin brings this discussion to a close by addressing the Gestalt figure that has come to be known as a duck-rabbit.9 The figure can be seen in two different ways,

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8 I read these as analytic, not theoretical, statements, since I would argue that they report actual musical impressions in Lewin’s text, and do not simply acts as placeholders for possible impressions. In other words, XYD is not demanded by theoretical logic (“There must be a dominant for chord Y”) but reports something akin to “I hear Event X functioning harmonically as a dominant of Event Y,” in which Event X and Y refer to specific musical impressions and should not be mistaken for variables.

9 Although he did not invent the “duck-rabbit,” the psychologist Joseph Jastrow first employed the figure to argue for the notion that perception is more than simply a product of sensory stimulus but requires mental constitution. However, most people first encounter the figure thanks to its appearance in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations*, Part II, section xi. See Jastrow 1900 and Wittgenstein 1958.
as depicting a duck or a rabbit, depending on how the various parts of the figure are interpreted. While the line drawing remains intact, the two different figures cannot be seen at the same time. Although “I perceive rabbit” and “I perceive duck” are both valid analytic statements (in that they accurately report perceptual impressions), we cannot infer the validity of “I perceive rabbit-and-duck” without demanding a change in our theoretical language, since it would break the law of noncontradiction. One solution would be to alter our theoretical language to include a new word describing the entity, like “dubbit.” “By changing my language in this way,” writes Lewin, “I could say ‘I see a dubbit’ and thereby solve the problems involved in saying both ‘I see a rabbit’ and ‘I see a duck.’ But it is just the ‘problems’ in the perceptual situation that we find characteristic and interesting, worthy of extended analysis; our linguistic expedient has turned the interesting phenomenon into a humdrum affair. So you see a dubbit. Who cares if you see a dubbit?” (MTP, p. 91). The characteristic and interesting phenomena are at the level of the musical impression—not in evading them with the multiplication of concepts.

It is no hidden secret that the duck-rabbit acts as an exemplar not only for the passage from Die Walküre, but also for measures 9–15 of Schubert’s “Morgengruß.” Readers of MTP will recall that Lewin’s analysis focuses on a clash between two percepts, p_6b and p_7a, which “hear” the harmony of measure 14 in two different, perhaps contradictory, ways. The first perception-structure, p_6b, includes the harmony of measures 12 and 13 as part of its context, hearing those bars as a functional progression, as subdominant and dominant in d minor, protending the arrival of tonic harmony. The chord that arrives in measure 14, a half-diminished seventh chord in second inversion, is heard according to p_6b as realizing the protended tonic-resolution and thus acts as “a substitute harmony for a d tonic triad (MTP, p. 75).” The second perception-structure, p_7a, also includes measures 12 and 13, but hears them sequentially rather than functionally. The chord that arrives in measure 14 is heard as the continuation of the sequence, so iv_g and V in d minor is followed by iv_g and an anticipated V in c minor. There arises a conflict between the two (p_6b hears the harmony of measure 14 as a d chord; p_7a hears the harmony as an f chord) parallel to the conflict between the two figures depicted in the duck-rabbit. We cannot hear both simultaneously and in good faith cannot authorize a change in our theoretical language. Lewin writes,

10 Lewin’s characterization of the conflict at measure 14 is strongly influenced by a particular school of phenomenology, known as West Coast Phenomenology. The West Coast Phenomenologists offer a reading of Husserl’s theory of the noema; this reading is strongly beholden to Gottlob Frege’s distinction between sense and reference. In that reading, p_6b and p_7a relate to one and the same referent (that is, the acoustical object of measure 14) through a different mediating sense. Because sense and reference are non-identical, and references are given through their mediating senses, there is no contradiction between the two percepts, although there is a conflict. For more on the influence of West Coast Phenomenology on MTP, see Kane 2011.
The intermodifications of $p_{7a}$ and $p_{6b}$ in this connection involve something like Rameau’s double emploi brought into our present model. In one perception, $p_{7a}$, the acoustic signal of measure 14 signifies “f chord.” In another perception, $p_{6b}$ . . . the same stimulus signifies a “d chord.” . . . To say these things about the two distinct mental objects (or acts), that is about $p_{7a}$ and $p_{6b}$, is very different from having to assert that there is one acoustic object, “the chord of measure 14,” which “is” both an f chord and a d chord “at the same time.” [MTP, 75, my emphasis]

Yet, when discussing the same passage in Morgengrüß, Lewin characterizes the situation differently.

For the reader with little vocabulary in the way of harmonic jargon: it is not necessary to know the nomenclature for the new chord $\flat a / d / f / c$ that arises [at measure 14]. For him, and also for some readers who may have had considerably more formal exposure to harmonic theory: it is also not necessary to worry intellectually about how the chord in measure 14 can be at once an “f chord” and also an understood “d chord,” particularly when no d is actually sounding in the acoustical sonority. These matters have been investigated in generality by theorists since the early eighteenth century, and terminology has been developed to discuss them. For the present purposes, though, we need not know the jargon. Nor need we speculate about why our ears can hear this way in general. We need only note that we in fact can hear the phenomenon functioning in the passage under consideration, and that to a considerable extent we do. [Morgengrüß, p. 37, my emphasis]

In MTP, Lewin is claiming that, at the level of the musical impression, there are two distinct percepts that have different senses, contexts, and recursive relations. Although they ostensibly reference the same harmony (measure 14), the musical impression does not involve hearing both an f chord and a d chord at the same time. However, in Morgengrüß, Lewin seems to be asserting just the opposite, namely, that the musical impressions are precisely those of hearing the chord of measure 14 as both an f chord and a d chord at the same time. Although the musical impressions are generated (within the flow of the essay) by considering different aspects of the Lied, there is a sense that the two readings are reconcilable—that there is a musical impression that hears them both.

Before we leap to our feat and yell “Gotcha,” we might want to reflect a bit about what exactly our apparent indictment entails. A single statement that says that the chord in measure 14 can be “at once an ‘f chord’ and also understood as a ‘d chord,’” is pretty scant evidence on which to hang a conviction (especially since it is not crystal clear how to construe the difference between the chord being
an “f chord” but also *understood* as a “d chord.” Is “understanding” aural?) In the paragraph that follows, Lewin writes that the chord “does the work of two harmonies at once” (p. 38). Yet, in both cases, are we authorized to read “at once” as equivalent to “at the same time”?

What is at stake in the two passages concerns the nature of the musical experience posited, how it is (linguistically) presented to others, and for what purpose. If *Morgengruß* is indeed intended as an analytical essay for a reader with perhaps a year of training in harmonic theory, it is understandable that Lewin wants to avoid getting into the difficult theoretical issues raised by Rameau’s theory of the *double emploi.* Yet, while perhaps avoiding an arcane discussion, it is not clear that Lewin isn’t also making an excuse, one that presumably defers his analytic responsibility. By alluding to the fact that theorists have worried about such phenomena, he seems to be assuring the reader that there is indeed some theoretical concept that can explain how the perception of measure 14 can be “at once an ‘f chord’ and also an understood ‘d chord’” when it seems logically (and, more important, perhaps aurally) impossible. Later in the essay he will argue for the theoretical legitimacy of studying general listening habits, for example, “how we can generally hear certain classes of chords in certain general situations functioning as both ‘ii’ and ‘IV’ simultaneously” (p. 62). Here, it is the aural possibility of the experience that is in question. By assuring the reader that music theory has put the issue to bed, Lewin seems to be coercing the reader to accept that such a perception is possible. This assurance is of great interest, since it flies in the face of Lewin’s privilege and defense of musical impressions over the logical demands of theoretical language, elsewhere in *Morgengruß* and in *MTP*.

To press further, we can follow how this controversy over the harmony at 14 plays out. The two ways of hearing the chord in measure 14 contribute to a formal question: is the Lied in two or three parts? In a contrast to an initial assumption that the song is a “clear ABA’ form” based on the “obvious phrase structure of the piece” (p. 26), Lewin develops the relationship between the arrival of V\(^7\) in measure 9, with the note f in the melody, and the “resolution” of this chord on the downbeat of measure 16. The hearing is offered as an analytic possibility to the reader: “the underlying conceptual basis is to hear the music intervening between measures 9 and 16, in a suitably large context and from a certain point of view, as a highly elaborated ornamentation of the gesture of Example 1 [that is, a two-part voice-leading sketch of V\(^7\) resolving to I]” (p. 25).

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11 Given the reference to Rameau in MTP and *Morgengruß’s* reference to “theorists since the early eighteenth century,” I think it is correct to assume that the eighteenth-century theorist invoked is indeed Rameau, although it is not explicitly stated.
An analytic controversy is posited, since the three-part reading based on phrase structure “does not have anything to say about the whole complex of aspects of the piece” (p. 26) that are made available when measures 9 through 16 are associated as a large “peripatetic” succession prolonging dominant harmony (p. 25).

The ambiguous chord of measure 14 offers evidence for both formal readings. On the one hand, the harmony of measure 14 can be heard functionally (as a d chord) as ii in C major, setting up the arrival of the dominant in measure 15. Measures 12–15 then become a self-contained half-cadential phrase, which is strengthened by the presence of a “4th degree harmony”—Lewin’s term in *Morgengruß* for subdominant. Hearing measures 12–15 in this way strongly supports a three-part reading of the Lied. On the other hand, the harmony in measure 14 can be heard sequentially (as an f chord), reflecting a linear relationship between voices. The voice leading overrides the phrase’s harmonic function, and the entire passage becomes a sequence that prolongs the dominant harmony of measure 9. Lewin notes how the harmonies fill out a framework of parallel thirds between the melody and the bass (d–c♯–c–b, over b♭–a–a♭–g, and offers various frameworks for hearing how this linear motion can be heard as “passing through” dominant harmony (pp. 43–45). In sum, “This parallel motion emphasizes the sense of one basic linear gesture in which both lines are participating (here, ‘moving through V’) at the expense of the autonomous harmonic profile of the phrase (‘building 4th degree harmony’)” (p. 44).

The issue comes to a climax when Lewin presents a slate of alternatives—a table that will look familiar to readers of MTP as the precursor of the “political/legal” table. As in the later essay, the table is presented to expose a problem about the relationship between our theoretical language and perceptual experiences. We feel coerced theoretically to select one alternative over the other, at the expense of the various perceptual experiences that comprise the two hearings. As Lewin puts it,
The point is that the format itself [that is, the “political/legal” table] is not legitimate as a way of presenting our aural sensations for intellectual consideration. . . . It is the play among these modes of organization that actually constitutes our response to the piece as a whole. . . .

A large part of the conceptual problem arises from the fact, I think, that the logic of the musical experience is not completely congruent to the logic of (the English) language. If we are careful, we shall avoid saying that the strophe is ‘in’ two parts or ‘in’ three parts. [Morgengruß, pp. 50]

We can perhaps get a better sense of what Lewin means by the “play” between these two formal readings by noting what musical features are emphasized by each reading: the three-part reading is based (primarily) on the phrasing of the Lied into three distinct sections; the two-part reading is based (primarily) on the priority of metrical stress—in particular, the metrical stress created at measure 9 by the arrival of V and its prolongation through measure 15. Because the two readings organize and privilege different musical impressions, they are not contradictory. “The two forms,” writes Lewin, “coexist perfectly happily since the phrasing can function independent from metric context. . . . It is only the abstract and false intellectual notion, that a piece must be ‘in’ one and only one form, that may be causing the reader difficulty in hearing both aspects of the strophe in their joint effect. . . . The trick is to hear all of this at once” (pp. 34, my emphasis). Again, the language of hearing “all at once” is perplexing, for it seems we are being offered the aural equivalent of a “dubbit.” At the very least, the passage should make us hesitant before assuming that Morgengruß and MTP are unilateral in their musical impressions of Schubert’s Lied. Unlike what he stated in MTP, Lewin is not necessarily saying that the two formal readings perceptually alternate with each other (by occupying different “occupational” contexts) or that they are acting as distinct, mediating senses for one and the same referent. If we take Lewin at his word, “the trick is to hear all of this at once”—that one can hear both forms at once, or at least hear them in some context in which all the relevant aspects are simultaneously audible. If that is so, perhaps Lewin is suggesting that the two hearings are reconciled in some other, more comprehensive musical impression.

One way to pursue this suggestion is to note Lewin’s language in Morgengruß, in particular, his repeated use of the word “aspect.” The term is present in the

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12 The point is also made earlier: “There is no reason, that is, why the strophe must be ‘in’ either three-part or two-part form. The mistaken notion to the contrary, propagated assiduously by all too many academics, is yet again a manifestation of a desire to stop listening at a certain point, shutting out the musical experience in all its richness rather than coming to grips with it. . . . [The only analytic value of textbook forms, like two- or three-part forms] is to help us perceive and enjoy what is going on in the music itself; when they inhibit that process, one should ignore them” (p. 30).

13 For more on the role of sense and reference in Lewin’s phenomenology, see Kane 2011.
passage previously quoted, in which Lewin describes the difficulty of hearing “both aspects of the strophe in their joint effect,” and in many other places in the text. But for the sake of comparison, I would like to present a comparison of two passages, one from *Morgengruß*, one from MTP, both of which appear in a similar context, namely, in conjunction with the presentation of the “political/legal” table, and note the difference in language.

*Morgengruß*: If we are careful, we shall of course avoid saying that the strophe is “in” two parts or “in” three parts. We can do somewhat better by saying that it has a two-part aspect and a three-part aspect, which interrelate dynamically and organically in the course of the listening process. But it is not easy to go much beyond that, to formulate a prose description of how those “aspects” are subsumed by the piece into the projection of one coherent experience. [*Morgengruß*, p. 50]

*MTP*: [The p-model] enables us to bypass certain false dichotomies in analytic discourse, dichotomies that arise when we implicitly but erroneously suppose that we are discussing one phenomenon at one location in phenomenological space-time, when in fact we are discussing many phenomena at many distinct such locations. [MTP, p. 79]

The contrast is between the subsumption of various aspects of Schubert’s Lied and the discrimination of phenomena that appear at distinct “phenomenological space-times.” (Note: the language of “phenomenological space-time” does not appear in Husserl, Miller, or any of the phenomenological literature cited by Lewin. As far as I can tell it is his coinage. I take the term to be shorthand for contextually and temporally delimited situations in which “recursive” percepts occur.) Unlike the language of “different phenomenological space-times,” the language of “aspects” implies the coexistence of many aspects attributed to a single entity. Objects possess various (even infinite) aspects, all simultaneously. The language of aspects places emphasis on the object, by predicating features to it; in contrast, the language of phenomenological space-times places emphasis on subjects, beholders whose experience of an object is affected by their position, context, familiarity, temporality, and such. Aspects cohere as parts of some whole, capturing qualities of a single entity. They are “subsumed” into one coherent experience of an object.  

Wittgenstein also uses the language of aspects when discussing the “duck-rabbit” in his *Philosophical Investigations*. But unlike Lewin, Wittgenstein emphasizes the sequence and temporality of aspects by using the term “dawning” of an aspect. After presenting the figure, Wittgenstein points out its two basic aspects: “[The duck-rabbit] can be seen as a rabbit’s head or as a duck’s.” But he is careful to note that, “I must distinguish between the ‘continuous seeing’ of an aspect and the ‘dawning’ of an aspect” (Wittgenstein 1953, Part II, section xi). The two aspects are not seen simultaneously; in fact, their sequence is crucial to Wittgenstein’s
Other evidence from *Morgengruss* substantiates these assertions about the subsumption of aspects to a whole. For instance, when explaining how “the simultaneous functioning of different musical contexts” is possible, Lewin resorts to a “geometrical analog”:

A better geometrical analog yet would be to conceptualize the extraction of melody-and-its-rhythm from the total context over a fixed span of time not in terms of the excision of a smaller area from a larger, but rather in terms of regarding a very multidimensional structure as it projects onto only some of those dimensions. The picture this sort of projection yields can often be very startling when compared to one’s intuition about the whole. Startling in that it is both unexpected and at the same time reveals aspects of the large structure which one had not noticed before.

For instance, I take a solid piece of wood in the form of a cube and pass it through a bandsaw, cutting it in half. What is the two-dimensional form of the cross section? Of course it is a square. Or is it? Suppose, instead of holding the cube by two opposite faces as I pass it through the saw, I hold it by two opposite corners, bisecting the line between those corners perpendicularly by the plane of the saw-band. The cross section will be a hexagon. [*Morgengruss*, pp. 68, emphasis mine]

The point of the analogy is to draw our attention to the way that musical aspects predicated of some large structure can be simultaneous without contradiction, even if they at first seem intuitively as odds. “If certain [musical aspects] appear to ‘contradict’ our earlier intuitions . . . the nature of the phenomenon is somewhat analogous to that by which a hexagon ‘contradicts’ a cube. . . . [W]hat we have to hear now is analogous to the insight that the hexagon ‘qualifies’ rather than ‘contradicts’ the cube, without being any the less a hexagon” (pp. 69). But these hexagonal projections, which may bring out various “aspects of the large structure” in a non-contradictory manner, are still understood as being subsumed to a single object.

The problem with the analogy is that temporality becomes irrelevant. The hexagonal cross section, or (for that matter) any other cross section one derives

interest in aspects, since it contrasts with the permanence of the line drawing as a configuration of material marks.

15 Lewin acknowledges this problem: “The little metaphorical experiment should not be taken too exactly for present purposes. First, the total context of a span of music has a great many more than three ‘dimensions’ in any intuitive sense; and the melodic/rhythmic subcontext over that span has a good deal more than two. More important, those contexts are not static objects like cubes, squares, and hexagons; they are forms critically immersed in time” (*pp. 68–69*).
from a cube, will always be simultaneous with the cube. This is why Lewin’s “hexagons” (or “aspects”) differ from his “phenomenological space-times.” The latter are designed to capture and present musical impressions that are not only temporal, but pretend and retain other percepts as arguments or objects. But even though Lewin is aware that his analogy does not address temporality, he is stuck with the predicative nature of “aspects” when he finally drops the metaphor.

So why does Lewin stick with the language of aspects? My hunch is that he is interested in presenting an analysis of Schubert’s Lied in *Morgengruss* that is synoptic. By synoptic, I mean an analytical account that touches on every measure and all four strophes, ethically considering as many musical impressions as possible. While offering analytical statements that describe listenings taking place at some very large time spans, Lewin also wants to preserve all of the details he has developed on the way. The details are always subsumed (not negated) in the whole, yet Lewin is careful to articulate that analytical statements associated with large contexts are not necessarily more important than those occurring in small contexts.\(^{16}\) The analytical approach in *Morgengruss* is *dialectical*. I intend the term in its Hegelian sense, as a progression of states, each of which develops out of the last, succeeding yet preserving all of its moments in the totality. The dialectical approach of *Morgengruss* is in contrast to the emphasis on *recursion* in MTP, in which percepts are locked in a dense web of temporal relations—relations that pretend, retain, imply, deny, cancel, realize, and block other percepts. In MTP there is no synopsis of Schubert’s song, no demand to analyze every bar, but simply enough as is needed to make a theoretical point. In contrast, *Morgengruss* is interested in presenting a dialectical account of the entire Lied. The essay reads like a *Bildungsroman*, in which each moment unfolds toward the development of a fully formed analytic account. The temporality of *Morgengruss* is not recursive, knotted, and networked, but rather cumulative.\(^{17}\)

Is it legitimate to describe *Morgengruss* as dialectical? Lewin might have bristled. At one point in *Morgengruss* he entertained the notion, only to cast it aside. Describing the cumulative process of generating an analytical presentation, Lewin reminds us that the latter stages “include everything that has gone through your perception,” since the very beginning, “in a very complex sort of dialectic process. . . . [I]f one wants to conceive of one’s ultimate impression as a sort of

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\(^{16}\) In Part IV of MTP, Lewin explicitly addresses this point.

\(^{17}\) In *Morgengruss*, Lewin integrates and assimilates analytic impressions until arriving at a presentation that considers all four occurrences of the strophe and offers an analytic impression at the time span of the entire piece, resulting in an idiosyncratic and unorthodox four-line. In contrast, the cumulative effect of the entire Lied is not addressed in MTP. The p-model is not a technology for producing a reading of an entire piece, even a short Lied like "Morgengruss."
Hegelian ‘synthesis,’ that is legitimate enough (though I personally do not find the notion very suggestive aurally)” (p. 53). Fair enough. But the figure of Hegelian philosophy was suggestive enough for Lewin to mention it repeatedly in his work after Morgengruß. In MTP, Hegel reappears affirmatively, in terms that seem quite faithful to Lewin’s intentions in Morgengruß. Describing Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a portrayal of a journey of Enlightenment, Lewin reminds us that a journey must be distinguished from its destination: “a trip from Des Moines to Chicago to New York to Paris to Damascus is not the same thing as Damascus, nor does it deny Des Moines” (MTP, p. 94, n. 38). The analogy is presented to remind the reader that music analyses are also journeys, and that we should be wary of valuing the destination (the “structural” or “syntactic” musical features) over the journey, that is, the process of acquiring musical impressions and presenting an analytic account. (In other words, you won’t gain anything by skipping to the last page of *Morgengruß*.)

Despite Lewin’s rejection of the term “dialectical” as not “very suggestive aurally,” it was “legitimate enough” for him to introduce it. What is the significance of this double gesture, this moment of rhetorical *paralipsis*? I wonder if it doesn’t register Lewin’s worry about the audibility of the analysis presented in *Morgengruß*. Upon completing the manuscript, one might be left wondering, what kind of listener is capable of hearing this synoptic totality? Even in a small strophic song like “Morgengruß,” the attention required to preserve all of Lewin’s various analytic insights would be Herculean. The *dialectical* listener hears a totality; in a single act of listening spanning the entire piece, this listener, through a long process of incorporation and assimilation, gains a comprehensive overview of all that has come before. Despite the essay’s music-analytical orientation, Lewin portrays listening as theoretical in the strictly etymological sense of the term: *theoria*, to look or gaze at, to have an overview of the whole, to contemplate. This is the problem at the center of Lewin’s “hexagonal” metaphor; the sensory mismatch between listening and looking underscores the reification of temporality. The whole is less heard then surveyed. Multiple acts of listening are objectified in *Morgengruß*, gathered up like so many snapshots of a single object. I am drawn to the word “retrospective” as an apt description of the mode of listening found in *Morgengruß*—a temptation to which I am willing to succumb, so long as the emphasis is placed squarely on the visual metaphor that animates its meaning.

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18 In addition to this passage from MTP, Lewin notes a connection between Beethovenian temporality and Hegel’s *Logic* in his essay on Schubert’s “Ihr Bild” (2006, p. 146, n. 15). Also, Lewin stresses the prominent role of Hegelian *Einheit* leading to *Entzweiung* in his interpretation of Brahms’s “Die Schwestern” (2006, p. 235 and 243).
In contrast, the recursive position of MTP supports a mode of listening that is partial, apprehensive, even incomplete. Multiple “percepts” cannot be simultaneously entertained or retrospectively surveyed. Although Lewin employs the technology of the p-model, replete with its computer-scientific formalism of parser, data arrays, and temporal windows, the mode of listening portrayed is more akin to a finite and fallible human actor than a clock-driven computer processor. Listening is comprised from the sequence, conflict, and intercalation of musical percepts (especially their retentions and protentions), not their simultaneous assertion. Despite its music-theoretic orientation, in MTP, Lewin makes no gesture toward a theoretical listener who synoptically surveys the song in a single act. Listening is left incomplete. However, this incompleteness is not a failing on Lewin’s part. It is the effect of a music theory accountable to the finitude of embodied listening, rather than compensating for this limitation. Recursion is the precipitate of finitude.

Certainly, Lewin’s later work is driven in part by the desire to articulate an embodied music theory. While his most important attestations of this program are found in Part V of MTP, the lineaments are legible earlier in that essay, in the temporality of listening captured by the p-model, and in the vehement critique of the Cartesian-Euclidian plane. These passages should be read alongside Lewin’s occasional remarks that that the transformational attitude presented in Generalized Musical Intervals and Transformations should be understood as “the attitude of someone inside the music, as idealized dancer and/or singer” (Lewin 1987, p. 159). They should also be read in conjunction with Lewin’s emphasis on the acquisition of skills in the Stockhausen essay of Musical Form and Transformation (Lewin 1993). Together, those moments reveal Lewin’s ongoing concern with embodiment. Alongside its other virtues, *Morgengruß* affords a glimpse of an

19 Smoliar (1990), taking Lewin’s computer-scientific formalism at face value, offers a strategy for programming Lewin’s p-model. Two major departures are noteworthy: (1) Smoliar suggests that the program could be implemented by using a “system of agents,” as outlined in Minsky’s Society of Mind; (2) Smoliar is eventually forced to revise the p-model radically because STatements made in Language L lack systematicity, due to Lewin’s “ad hoc approach to supporting terminology” (p. 9).

20 The success of this project is another matter entirely. In the final section of Kane 2011, I discuss some of the possible routes that Lewin could have explored in devising a phenomenological and embodied music theory in the wake of MTP. It should be noted that for all of Lewin’s interest in phenomenology—and its bevy of resources for addressing the problem of embodiment—he appears to remain entirely within the scope of Husserl’s work, as mediated by Izchak Miller and Hubert Dreyfus. I have seen no evidence that he gave much consideration to Merleau-Ponty or the early work of Heidegger, both phenomenologists and both explicitly concerned with issues of embodiment. Moreover, I find the literary-critical route taken in MTP to be unsatisfactory, for reasons presented in Kane 2011, note 48. However, MTP is not the only source for Lewin’s thinking on the topic. Anyone interested in Lewinian embodiment should work from the widest possible context, which would include the passages previously mentioned and, as I have tried to argue in this essay, *Morgengruß*.
early formation of this concern. In the double gesture of Lewin’s deployment and dismissal of the word “dialectic,” we might detect a note of hesitation, an emerging scruple: a dissatisfaction not only over the word “dialectic,” but about the continuation of music theories that “deny or suppress various of our perceptual phenomena,” that fail to recognize when their “conceptual tools are inadequate for the analytic task at hand,” or—to quote Lewin in Morgengrûß at his most laconic—are not “very suggestive aurally” (p. 53).
Lewin’s Listeners Listening

The Beholder’s Share

RICHARD COHN

1. Lewin’s Listener and Its Antecedents

During the third quarter of the twentieth century, analytical writing about music rarely referred to a listener. Analysts characteristically retraced the process of compositional genesis, or observed properties of a score. But they rarely attended to the relationship between the reader, intellectually equipped to understand the reported structure, and the listener, musically equipped to experience it as reported. The relationship between knowledge and experience elicited little curiosity or attention from those musical intellectuals whose training and experience placed them in the best position to explore it. This is not to say that the listener is completely absent from the central analytic traditions of Schenker, Babbitt, and Forte. That listener, when occasionally acknowledged in passing, has special powers, sharing the analyst’s specialized training, aural acuity, and synthetic command of an entire composition.

There are exceptional writers who do give sustained attention to the lay listener’s behavior in real time. The most important contemporaneous music theorist to grant such an agent a robust position within a semiological matrix, and attend carefully to “his” behavior, is Leonard B. Meyer. Meyer’s listener is an analytic Everyman whose experience represents that of an entire population. The following passage is characteristic:

1 Forte 1973 is characteristic, but see also Lewin 1968. In her examination of music-analytic writings of the following decade, Marion A. Guck (1994) notes the degree to which the listener is smuggled into the analytical frame, but displaced onto ghostly surrogates, including the composition itself.
The listener is uncertain about the outcome of the case. From measure 90 on the listener begins to expect a strong cadential progression. . . . In measure 96 the situation becomes clear and certain, and the listener eagerly awaits the cadence which he now knows will be in the tonic. [Meyer 1956, pp. 117–118]

Similar attributes are shared by the listener identified in post-Toveyian musico-metrical connoisseurship, such as Joseph Kerman and Charles Rosen.

Set against this backdrop, the listener of David Lewin’s Morgengruß has unusual qualities. He lacks special qualifications, experience, or aural powers. He is an individual agent, not a monolith. And he is seeking to make sense of what he hears in the moment of hearing. He is capable of suspending present interpretation, and revising past interpretations to which he is already committed. And he is capable of doing so indefinitely, so that the analysis can remain in a permanently indeterminate stage, as a valued property of a composition, and of human perception and aesthetic engagement.

Did Lewin invent this listener, or appropriate him from predecessors or contemporaries? In a 1994 essay, “Second Immediacies in the Eroica Symphony,” Brian Hyer suggests that some aspects of Lewin’s listener can be found in the historical writings of Gottfried Weber, and others in the contemporaneous writings of Edward T. Cone, one of Lewin’s teachers at Princeton. Hyer’s focus is on Lewin’s 1986 article, “Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes of Perception” (hereafter MTP), but applies with equal force to its 1974 predecessor. The Morgengruß essay, however, chronologically leapfrogs the Cone essay to which Hyer refers, which was published in 1977. In what follows, I propose a third antecedent, Lewin’s friend and Berkeley colleague Andrew Imbrie.

Gottfried Weber’s 1832 analysis of the opening measures of Mozart’s “Dissonance” Quartet has, according to Thomas Christensen, “emerged in recent years as probably the most closely raked-over passage of historical music analysis in the literature” (Christensen 2007, p. 344). Introducing his 1994 translation, Ian Bent writes that Weber’s analysis offers “a real-time experiential model, complete with feedback” (Bent 1994, p. 157). Weber’s das Gehör reinterprets at each incremental moment of emergence. Presented with a new note or chord, “the ear” assigns it an interpretation in light of what has preceded it, or identifies a range of interpretive hypotheses without deciding among them. Das Gehör can also revisit earlier events, in order to confirm a prior interpretation, or decide between competing hypotheses, or even reverse a prior interpretive commitment.

Weber’s listening subject, like Lewin’s, is an autonomous amateur listening in real time. Hyer identifies two respects in which Weber’s listener differs from

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2 Bent 1994 translates das Gehör as “the ear,” Moreno 2004 as “consciousness.”
Lewin’s Listeners Listening

Lewin: he does not engage in speculation about future events, and the ultimate goal of his activities is a determinate final-state hearing (Hyer 1994, p. 94). Jairo Moreno reads Weber differently on both of these points. Noting that Weber refers to the ear’s yearning for “a G major chord simple and unadorned,” and “for all we know, ... the chord [may] come to rest on a C minor triad” (Moreno 2004, pp. 132–133), Moreno concludes that expectation, along with contradiction and reinterpretation, “play[s] a crucial role in Weber’s interpretive method” (p. 142). Whereas Hyer’s Weber aggressively seeks to “wrest” a correct interpretation, Moreno’s is ever locked into a cycle of suspicion and self-negation. Elaborating a link suggested by Kevin Korsyn (2003), Moreno affiliates Weber’s attitude with the Romantic irony of Novalis and Schlegel, “an analysis of thesis and antithesis” without synthesis (Moreno, 145). For Moreno and Korsyn, Weber’s listener is no less subjective and no more determinate than Lewin’s.

Hyer identifies more limited affinities with Edward T. Cone’s “Three Ways of Reading a Detective Story—or a Brahms Intermezzo.” Cone shares with both Weber and Lewin an interest in the capacity of the listener to come to different interpretations of the same musical event at different moments of engagement. Hyer understands Cone, as Weber, to be engaged in “a semi-circular process that has a terminus, the apprehension of the determinant structure of the music” (p. 98). Lewin explicitly rejects this view in Morgengruß, and in the MTP essay of a decade later, instead viewing the analytical mill as endlessly turning with respect to any well-defined interpretive question.

Andrew Imbrie was primarily a composer and composition teacher, ten years Lewin’s senior, a fellow student of Roger Sessions, and Lewin’s colleague at Berkeley during the 1960s. His few scholarly publications were mostly occasional pieces, and transcriptions of conference remarks related to composition and pedagogy. His masterful 1973 article, “‘Extra’ Measures and Metrical Ambiguity in Beethoven,” is a one-hit wonder, the music-analytic equivalent of Charles-Marie Widor’s Toccata or Pachelbel’s Canon. I shall now examine Imbrie’s paper in considerable detail, in order to make the case that it marks a pivotal moment in the development of the analytical methodology that Lewin perpetuated.

Listening to the first movement of Beethoven’s D-major Piano Sonata, Opus 10, No. 3, Imbrie initially hears a two-bar hypermetric pulse starting at the downbeat of measure 2, and sustained by the even-numbered downbeats. Measure 22 presents a measure of silence, which throws the hyper-pulse onto the odd-numbered

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1 Korsyn 2003 wrote briefly about the Weber/Romantic irony link, further connecting both to Lewin. Korsyn writes that he is the first to recognize the affinity between Lewin and Weber, indicating that he was not familiar with Hyer 1994’s treatment.

downbeats, where it remains from measure 23 until the end of the exposition. I have summarized this hearing symbolically in Figure 3.1a, “prima volta.” The silent measure 22 has such a strong impact that Imbrie considers revising his hearing of the opening measures, propagating the “odd” hyper-pulse backward to the first downbeat of the movement. Although he identifies some features that support this hearing, ultimately he deems them insufficient to reverse the initial analysis. They are nonetheless robust enough that, with the right kind of boosting, they can surge to the forefront and turn the meter inside out, effecting a strong-weak reversal. When the performer takes the indicated repeat of the exposition, the requisite boost is provided by metric inertia from the end of the exposition, which projects the hyper-pulse accent onto the first notated downbeat. This projection primes the listener to sustain the “odd” hyper-pulse throughout the entire repeat of the exposition. This hearing is summarized at Figure 3.1b, “secunda volta.”

In the recapitulation, an analogous process reverses the reversal, restoring the initial state. The metric inertia of the retransition throws the metric weight onto the equivalent of measure 2, restoring the hyper-pulse to the “even” downbeats (more precisely, to the measures that correspond to the even-numbered measures of the exposition). By omitting the extra measure of rest, the music corresponding to the measure 23 of the exposition shifts into the hypermetric position previously occupied by that silent measure, eliminating the need to recalibrate the pulse. The primed hyper-pulse now projects forward for the remainder of the movement, without perturbation. This hearing is summarized at Figure 1c, “recapitulation.”

From a certain standpoint, Imbrie’s analysis adheres to a standard script. Because the meter of each sounding segment is fully determined, the analysis embodies no internal contradictions. Imbrie concludes this analysis (p. 51) by suggesting that the movement toward clarity in the recapitulation follows a familiar teleological course consistent with classical aesthetic ideals. What complicates this conclusion is that, even though the three realizations of the movement’s
opening measures sound at three different moments of the performed composition, the first two realizations are represented in the score by a single set of notational symbols, while the third is an exact copy transposed to a different page of the score. If we tend to hear parallel passages in parallel ways (Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983), all the stronger must be our propensity to hear identical passages in identical ways, stronger yet when those passages are as extended as this one. Yet Imbrie recognizes that, in the case of this Beethoven sonata movement, the force of the priming context is strong enough to motivate a listener to override that tendency.

The notational conflation of the exposition and its repeat causes Imbrie, at moments of his analysis, to consider them not as two successive realizations of a single set of symbols, but rather as a single acoustic event that has two distinct analyses. When he first considers revising his hearing of the exposition, he asks “How, then, are we to choose between these two contradictory readings?” (Imbrie 1973, p. 49), a question that would not arise if it applied to two different segments of the performed composition. They would appear to be contradictory, however, if one maintained the illusion that the unitary symbols referenced a unitary acoustic realization. (Such conflations are natural; otherwise, Lewin’s progressive analysis of “Morgengruss”’s four stanzas would not be so counterintuitive.) They would also arise as a contradiction if one held the “identical passages in identical ways” constraint as an absolute, rather than as a strong propensity that can in principle be overridden by context. In that case, it would be contradictory to assign distinct interpretations to the two volte, and so one would need to choose a single interpretation that governed both.

By assigning the two realizations of the exposition two different structural descriptions, Imbrie ultimately elects to resolve rather than recognize their contradictory potential. But that potential has a residue that continues to ring, leaving open the possibility that the contradiction is after all quite real. And indeed, this is the position that Imbrie advances, just after his summary comments on the Sonata movement have seemingly foreclosed on that position:

I am suggesting that we accept the following notions: that two contradictory metrical interpretations of the same event can be simultaneously entrained in the mind of the performer and listener; that the subjective “color” of that event is partly attributable to this contradiction; and that the composer can, wherever the event recurs, favor one or the other side of the contradiction. [p. 51]

Imbrie’s analysis of the Allegro from the Fifth Symphony, which concludes the essay, confronts this possibility explicitly. The movement stimulates the listener to entrain hyper-pulses at both two- and four-bar units. At both hypermetric levels, the pulse is perturbed by extra segments that span half of the unit’s duration.
These perturbations force the listener to recalibrate the pulse from a new point halfway between two beats projected by the former pulse. The default point of recalibration occurs only after the point of perturbation: we fall, pick ourselves up, and start running again. Yet as with the Sonata analysis, Imbrie recognizes that these recalibrations have the potential to propagate backward, sometimes across a number of hypermeasures. Entertaining these alternative analyses of the Fifth Symphony movement, he finds that they resolve anomalies that arose in the first analysis. And it is here that Imbrie explicitly declines to choose: “The point of the comparison of these two readings is, once again, not to make a final decision as to which is correct, but to show that both are possible” (pp. 60–62). It is in response to these ambiguities that Imbrie introduces his influential distinction between two interpretive strategies, the conservative, which “will persist in interpreting our experience for us as long as possible within an established framework, even in the face of increasingly disturbing events” (p. 62), and the radical, which shifts the framework as early as back-propagation from a point of perturbation plausibly permits. Rather than endorse either interpretive strategy, or sort listeners into categories according to their propensities, Imbrie emphasizes the malleability of his own hearing (“There have been times when I have found myself hearing the passage in this way,” [p. 65]), and more generally of the “experienced listener . . . at his peak of alertness and receptivity” (p. 65).

Imbrie’s listener shares a number of significant attributes with Lewin’s. Both actively construct interpretation from, rather than discover it in, the music; revise interpretations to which they have already committed; and decline to arbitrate between competing hearings. Both argue that successive passages through the same musical text (Beethoven’s exposition, Schubert’s strophe) can stimulate different hearings. And both offer a script of double reversal, Lewin with respect to the form of “Morgengrüss” and the harmonies in measures 12–14, Imbrie to the hypermeter of the opening theme of Beethoven’s sonata.

Although Imbrie’s name does not appear in Morgengrüss, nor in the letters to Neighbour, nor in any of Lewin’s writings that pertain to methodological matters, it does appear in a context close to the technical, if not methodological, heart of the 1974 essay. In an analytical article on Schubert’s “Auf dem Fluße” from 1982, Lewin writes that his approach to metric reduction “combines aspects of Schenkerian technique with metric considerations first suggested to me by Andrew Imbrie at Berkeley in the early 1960’s. The published sketches which mine most closely resemble, I think, are those presented by Imbrie in his [Beethoven] article” (Lewin 1982, p. 59). It does not follow that Lewin, in 1974, was familiar with Imbrie’s paper published the previous year, nor that Imbrie directly influenced Lewin on the methodological questions of concern here. The influence may

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This formulation is indebted to Hyer 1994, pp. 102–103, after Gadamer.
well have been reciprocal, the product of conversations and shared writings; or mutually assimilated from a single source, perhaps Sessions, who taught them both at different times; or mutually absorbed from ideas that were in the air at Princeton or Berkeley.  

My search for predecessors to Lewin's listener has identified one distant figure and two contemporaneous ones. Why the chronological gap? Jairo Moreno argues that Weber's subjective listener could not have appeared any earlier in history than he did.

Moreno positions Weber at the end of a historical process that spans early modernity, from the moment that music became essentially affiliated with acoustical sound rather than planetary alignment. The listener was granted the role of music's receiver; with that role came status as a rational subject, with autonomous responses and the desire to represent them. That desire led to a bifurcated subjectivity, as the temporality of representation detached from that of direct experience, leading to the endless loop of “modern self-questioning subjectivity” that Moreno ascribes to Weber's das Gehör (Moreno 2004, p. 19). Moreno argues that Weber's listener is a consequence of Kant and German Romanticism, and was thus proper to his time and place.

In his review of Moreno 2004, Thomas Christensen adds a postscript that fleetingly speculates on that listener's fate: “How . . . did the mature, autonomous agent of musical self-knowledge and imagination described in Weber's Versuch become subjected in the course of the nineteenth century to various disciplinary pressures that coerced, redirected, and even abrogated his hearing?” (Christensen 2007 p. 344). In response, Christensen suggests that the codification of musical pedagogy in the conservatory (which ironically converted Weber's roman numeral from a tool of subjective exploration into a weapon of ontological truth) applies to “the ear” the same surveillance, discipline, and regulation that Foucault identified with respect to other bodily capacities. Projecting Christensen's provocative speculation into a much later historical moment, we might conjecture that Weber's mature, self-knowing, ever-anxious Gehör did not perish under those institutionalizing pressures, but rather was sublimated, only to rise again, first tentatively in Andrew Imbrie's short essay on Beethoven, and then decisively in David Lewin's long essay on Schubert and his subsequent writings.

If Weber's subject is produced by a particular historical moment, as Moreno argues, and is forced underground soon thereafter, as Christensen suggests, then

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6 In this connection it is worth noting that similar ideas appear, in passing, in the writings of Edward T. Cone, also a Sessions student whose base in the Princeton Music Department spanned the time from Imbrie's undergraduate years there in the early 1940s to Lewin's graduate years there in the late 1950s, and beyond. Cone 1968 mentions that it is not always desirable to choose between incommensurate analyses (p. 35), and suggests the possibility of interpreting repetitions in a different way from that of their antecedents (p. 45).
what are the forces that provoke its revival more than a century later? By way of preliminary speculation, one might hypothesize a general catalyzing role to the cultural iconoclasm of 1960s Berkeley, where Imbrie and Lewin both taught. These conditions may have promoted or merged with David Lewin’s personal iconoclasm, one tendril of which was a deep-seated aversion to institutional pedagogy. Although his sense of scholarly decorum ordinarily motivated Lewin to keep those aversions private, they do flare in the final section of MTP, where he savagely mocks his high-school Latin examiners (Lewin 1986, p. 379), and laments an educational system that incentivizes students to “dissociate understanding of music from its production and performance” (pp. 386–88). The same theme arises persistently and passionately in two private letters to Neighbour, the first of which is excerpted in the appendix. Those letters, dated May 22 and June 10, 1974, were written at exactly the moment that he was otherwise writing, in a white heat, about Schubert’s “Morgengrüss” and the conflicted subjectivities that it elicits.

2. Hearing How One Hears

Having identified Lewin’s listener and assigned him attributes, we now turn our attention to a more complicated matter, which will consume our attention for the remainder of this essay: what does Lewin’s listener do? What activities does he engage in? What functions does he discharge? And how does the analyst’s response to the same aural stimulus relate to those activities and functions?

Lewin’s listener listens or hears. He has aural sensations, impressions, and perceptions. Musical phenomena are audible to him, or strong or forceful to his ears. There is a broad intersection between the italicized expressions, and often they are used interchangeably. There are, however, some significant distinctions in reference, which I shall explore. He most frequently uses hear and hearing, which I shall provisionally take to represent the entire phalanx of terms as they range across the various shades of meaning to which they apply.7

In the simplest and least common cases, to hear something is just to be exposed to the sounding music, perhaps with the additional qualification of being attentive in its presence. More frequently, to hear something is to identify some factual attribute about it, e.g., “at the bar line of measure 12 . . . we just hear the lone b♭” (p. 41). But in most cases, to hear something involves an aspect of comparison: “Hearing X” is equivalent to “hearing X as Y.” In many cases, the entity to which X is compared is a technical category, to which X is assigned membership. A tone

7 Bent (1994, p. 158) points out that Weber’s das Gehör is similarly malleable; it is transformed mid-analysis from an instrument of cognition to a scale of judgment.
is heard as an appoggiatura, a chord as a subdominant, a measure as an echo, a phrase as a reprise. This seems to be analytic business as usual; such claims are the components from which analyses of tonal music are normally constructed. The difference is that Lewin characteristically assigns the property or category to the score or to the sounding music only indirectly. Something in the sounding music stimulates the listener to make the assignment, as an act of contingent interpretation rather than of absolute factual identification. In many other cases, the entity to which the sounding music is compared is more particular and ad hoc: a musical sketch. In either case, to hear something is to assign it an interpretation that is pertinent to one’s experience of the sounding music.

Several considerations complicate this preliminary analysis of Lewin’s hearing, and its associated terms. Consider the following phrases from the essay: “the ear responds to an aural sensation” (p. 50); “the ear . . . balks considerably at this hearing” (p. 75); “listen carefully to what you are in fact hearing” (p. 97); “he will then ‘hear how he hears’ the passage” (p. 44). Each of these phrases suggests that the larger category of hearing, including its associate terms, is distributed across several distinct stages. An early stage of aural engagement receives sensations or impressions, or perhaps recognizes or constructs them spontaneously. These sensations can be strong and vivid, but they can also be vague (p. 100), latent (p. 104), or subliminal (p. 26). Later stages interpret those sensations, represent the interpretations, and evaluate the representations. The evaluation may take the form of verification or rejection (I do or do not hear X as Y), but it can also be qualified: I hear X as Y “in some respect” (p. 25), “in some sense” (p. 39), or “to a considerable extent” (p. 37). A hearing can become clarified over time, suggesting that the passage through the stages can be gradual. This passage usually involves mental labor, is assisted by the tools and standards of ordinary intellectual activity, and is often rhetorically framed by the terms of logic.

Lewin develops at least six distinct attitudes or conceptions toward the relationship between the early and late stages of hearing, and the role of technical and deductive labor in mediating them. These attitudes are related to each other in a chain, so that the passage between them is fairly subtle But there is a significant distance between the two ends of the conceptual chain, conferring a considerable internal tension on the methodological attitudes of the essay. The situation is further complicated by Lewin’s tendency to conflate two different scenes through which analytical semiosis is staged: as a communication between an analyst who hears and a reader whom he educates, and as an internal conversation within an analyst who has raw sensations and wishes to refine them into verified interpretations. To simplify the presentation, I shall characterize the six following conceptions in terms of the first of these semiotic scenes.

First Conception: I hear that, and you do too. The listener has aural sensations of which he is unaware, that he lacks the technique to identify, or that he lacks the language to report. The role of interpretation is to bring these aural sensations
to awareness and articulation. What distinguishes this attitude is that Lewin assumes that the reader will accept the interpretation immediately and spontaneously once it is articulated to him. An example is the second-level metric reduction (p. 88 ff.), which interprets two-bar units as large measures. Lewin assumes that the reader is already hearing two-bar hypermeter, as in Ex. 45, but has heretofore lacked an apparatus through which to explore and articulate that hearing, which the technique of metric reduction now furnishes. On this conception, the labor is exclusively in the acquisition of technique and analytical language. Once those are acquired, the reader does not need to “work at” the hearing; it arrives spontaneously and fully formed.

Second Conception: I hear that, and you will, too, once you uncover it. The second conception resembles the first, except that in order to attain the analyst’s hearing (and not just the representation as in the first case), the reader must exert effort. This effort involves removing an intellectual overlay that prevents the reader from accessing aural sensations that would otherwise be immediate, as in the first conception. An example is the interpretation of the f minor triad at measure 14 as a distorted supertonic triad, at the same time that it is also a minor subdominant. Lewin writes that we can “derive our aural experience” of this chord from the Ex. on p. 37, which show “how our ears compress the ‘understood’ [supertonic] together with the actual chord”. The language indicates that we are already in some sense having the musical experience that the interpretation claims. In order to access that experience, we need only overcome a dogma induced by prior training: that every chord be rooted on a single scale degree.

Third Conception: I hear that, and you will too, once you dig it up. The third conception resembles the second, except that the aural sensations are vague and premonitory. The labor involves refining those sensations and bringing them to awareness. The proffered interpretation is intellectually plausible for the reader, but he must still exert effort before he can link it to those premonitions. The interpretation gives the listener the tools to bore down to his premonitions, but the hearing doesn’t actually exist until the excavation is complete and the implements shed. An example is the interpretation of measures 9 through 15 as a dominant prolongation: “The notion that the phrase elaborates V, so far, is mainly just a vague aural sense” (p. 39) deriving from the dominant status of the phrase’s bounding triads. Having considered some evidence in favor of the interpretation, “the reader can begin to form a more exact aural impression” of it (p. 40). Further evidence leads to an analytical sketch for these measures. The reader is urged to play through the sketch in various ways until he is able to “‘hear how he hears’” the passage as “‘elaborating V’” (p. 44).

Fourth Conception: I hear that, and you will too, once you manufacture it with my guidance. The fourth conception resembles the third, except that the interpretive claims are not assumed to match premonitory aural sensations on the part of the reader. The analyst is introducing the reader to new ways of conceiving
of music, which will lead him to new ways of hearing it. Because the reader has no premonition of what the analyst is asking him to hear, he may have to dedicate considerable labor before he is able to attain the hearing. The interpretation thus resembles a dumb nail that must be hammered into the reader with logical and rhetorical force, rather than a magnetized one that, upon approach, is drawn effortlessly toward its target. An example is the much-worked-over idea that the f at measure 9 resolves to the e at measure 16. When Lewin first advances this hearing, he declines to justify it, writing that “it would be premature” to go into the details yet (p. 25). Time and again, he returns to this interpretation, and time and again he punts away the opportunity to explain it. The form of these deferrals slyly reflects and illustrates their substance: in raising a question and then deferring its answer until much later in the essay, he is modeling by analogy how a dissonance (question) can be heard to resolve (be answered) much later in the song. The concealed parallel surfaces at p. 32: “At this point, it is not clear how something which is not yet musically resolved . . . might become resolved later on . . . We will pick up this issue much, much later on.” The matter is provisionally settled on p. 76, and definitively only on p. 79. Only ninety manuscript pages after proposing the hearing does Lewin express confidence in the reader’s capacity to internalize it.

Fifth Conception: I don’t hear that, and neither do you, but let’s try to manufac-ture the hearing together. The fifth conception resembles the fourth, except that the interpretive claims do not match any premonitory aural sensations on the analyst’s part, either. Hearing is thus used here, paradoxically, to characterize not something that one hears, but rather something that one might someday hear, “a hypothesis of what can be learned to be heard.” An example is the hemiolic half-note pulse in measures 9 and 10, first proposed at p. 69 but ultimately dismissed after eight pages of focused effort. In order for this hearing to arise as a possibility for consideration, one must sing the vocal line of these measures alone, while “ignoring as best one can” the accompanying piano part, as well as the metric inertia of the previous measures. The labor involves the analyst’s effort to override his own initial hearing, and accept an alternative that arose in the process of stripping away the context. Pronouns shift to “we,” as the reader is invited to join the analyst in the quest to validate the proposition: “it now seems that we might not hear . . . rather we are contemplating a hearing . . .” (p. 71). Verbs express labor quite explicitly: “We are to try to hear. . . .” (p. 72).

Sixth Conception: I don’t hear that, and neither do you; let’s explore why not. The sixth conception resembles the fifth, except that the interpretive claim is declared unhearable at the outset, for both analyst and reader. The stillborn “hearing” is presented for autopsy in order to investigate why it had no chance for survival,

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8 The expression is from Benjamin Boretz (1970, p. 6), who attributes it to Milton Babbitt.
despite its evident viability on the grounds of consistency and logic. An example is the contra-metric interpretation presented at p. 89 as an alternative to the second-level metric reduction. As already noted in connection with the first conception on this list, Lewin assumes that any reader technically equipped to interpret the original reduction will spontaneously validate it as a hearing. He nonetheless offers the contra-metric reduction in order to frame the question: “Why . . . do we intuit the [initial] metric reading so clearly when we hear the sketch, or the piece as a whole?” The considerations that he cites in response to this question will soon be recruited, in general form, to serve as a basis for the reductive criteria to be formulated a few pages later (p. 94).

This final class of interpretive claims leads not to better hearing of the passage at hand, but to general principles banked to capitalize future analytical projects, and to reflections upon “general aspects of our listening habits, apart from the piece” (p. 62). The claim thus contributes not to analysis of the piece at hand, but to theory, as Lewin distinguishes these enterprises.

3. Criteria for Analytic Validity, and What Is at Stake

The relationship of theory to analysis takes center stage near the end of the essay, in connection with what Lewin labels, in caps, a METHODOLOGICAL RULE-OF-THUMB. The function of that rule is to establish criteria for determining what counts as a “valid analytic statement.” The methodological rule is initially stated as “every valid analytic statement is of the basic form ‘I hear this about this specific piece,’ as qualified by an implicit ‘and I think you can, too’” (p. 98).

Thus analytical validity is inextricably bound to hearing. As we have seen, though, hearing is a complicated business, which ranges across at least six different construals. Claims that fall under the first four conceptions previously sketched are clearly validated as analytical, since they all involve aural sensations, and those that fall under the fifth conception become analytical if they terminate in a successfully manufactured hearing. Only the sixth conception is not analytically valid, for reasons already noted. So most of the analytical work in Lewin’s essay survives his rule of thumb.

In the course of illustrating and explicating the methodological rule, though, Lewin introduces new considerations that change its substance in a way that he does not acknowledge, strengthening the criteria for analytical validity beyond those given in the original. After introducing a deliberately perverse metric interpretation of a passage from a Beethoven piano concerto, and showing that the interpretation can be generated by his metric-reductive criteria, Lewin admonishes, “If we don’t hear the rebarred version to begin with, we have no business applying ‘the [analytic] criteria’ . . . to describe it. The criteria are to be used only for clarifying aural impressions we already have; these may be vague or ambiguous
but must be there as a point of departure” (p. 100, emphasis Lewin’s). This formulation introduces a chronological limitation that was missing from the original “rule of thumb.” The emphasized expressions indicate that analytical validity is not insured merely by reporting something that one hears, at some stage of engagement. What is required, in addition, is that the hearing be incipient at an early stage of aural engagement, prior to the application of those analytical criteria that suggest the possibility of the hearing. The hearings clarified by the application of the analytic criteria must reach back and make contact with aural sensations that arose earlier. Analytical claims based on hearings that arise ex nihilo after the invocation of deductive or inferential criteria are excluded a priori, and should not be explored, much less reported to readers.

In addition to this chronological shift, this second formulation also suggests a semiotic and epistemic one. The dialogue is not between an analyst and reader, as in the weaker initial statement of the rule, but rather between the analyst and himself. First the analyst has aural sensations. Later application of analytic criteria suggests hypothetical ways that the analyst might further engage with the piece, and represent the products of his engagement. The analyst is warned not to pursue those hypotheses unless they correspond to some aspect of his aural sensations in advance of applying the criteria. This interpretation emerges more clearly in a subsequent formulation: “I need not concern myself at all with any of the analytic ‘implications’ of the rebarred version” (p. 104; emphasis Lewin’s). The hypothesized hearing has implications, but the analyst ought not try to verify them unless they correspond to something fore-heard.

The stronger version of the methodological rule invalidates the fifth conception of hearing, in which the analyst forges a hypothetical hearing on theoretical grounds, and enlists the reader in a quest to verify it aurally. In the example, the hemiola of the vocal line at measures 9–10 emerges by artificially suppressing features identified through ordinary, pre-analytic hearing. What motivates Lewin to shed the vocal line of its accompaniment, manipulate his hearing of the pulse, and reintegrate the new hearing into the larger context is the hypothetical need to locate a resolution for the dissonant f at measure 9. Lewin himself feels no such need; he himself is clearly comfortable with keeping the dissonance unresolved until measure 16. But he worries that the reader’s training will lead him to insist on a local resolution, and he is making his best effort here to locate one. The need to locally resolve the f, then, is an artificial one, based on

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9 In a letter to Neighbour of July 12, 1974, excerpted in the appendix, Lewin writes that the Beethoven mis-analysis was added in a second draft of the essay, in response to comments by June Lewin. David Lewin explains his motivations for introducing this part of the essay, and defends it against Neighbour’s evidently critical reaction (not preserved). Some formulations in the letter are parallel to ones in the final version of the essay, suggesting that the letter may have been a rehearsal for a second revision undertaken in response to Neighbour’s critique.
theoretical inference rather than aural sensation. Yet this is a strategy that Lewin admonishes us to avoid: “Above all, do not try to generate new ‘aural’ impressions artificially, . . . by studying the consequences of what the criteria may ‘logically suggest’ independent of any prior aural impressions” (p. 105). By this standard, the quest for the elusive hemiola was evidently misbegotten. He ought not have pursued it privately, much less enlisted the reader’s collusion for twenty pages before abandoning the hunt.

Moving one step up the enumerated list, let us now consider how the fourth conception of hearing fares in connection with this stronger methodological constraint. In claims of the fourth type, the reader has no prior sensations, even latent ones, that correspond to what the analyst is hearing. There is no reason here to question the validity of the analyst’s hearing, which may well have corresponded to early-stage aural sensations. The difficulty arises when the reader accepts the claim, by internalizing the hearing that the analyst has impressed upon his ear. He may wish to pass the claim back to the analyst (“Yes, I do hear what you hear”) or along to an interested third party (“I want to teach you to hear it, just as Lewin taught me to hear it”). But the revised methodological rule enjoins him from doing so, since the analytical claim corresponds to no aural sensation that the reader had, prior to reading the analysis. He arrived at the hearing only after he had been exposed to the chain of logical deduction that the analyst employed in the course of teaching him to hear what he now hears. This outcome suggests that the stronger form of the rule has undesirable consequences and, to that extent, overreaches.

The stronger version of the rule has other undesirable consequences. Imagine a young keyboardist, ignorant of fugal theory, playing her first fugue. She has aural sensations of the recurring theme, but the challenge of playing the notes in tempo leaves her no mental space in which to observe which voice is sounding it at a given moment, what scale degree it begins on, or whether it is an exact or transformed copy of the original melody. Accordingly, the recognition of the recurrent melody remains vague, beneath the threshold of consciousness and articulation. When she happens now upon a text on fugal theory, its opening chapters lead her to identify the melody and its transformations, and supply her with a language for framing and representing what had previously been aural sensations. Clearly these representations qualify as valid analytic claims, since everything that she is reporting about the piece is something that she initially heard, if only vaguely.

Reading further, she learns that the final measures of some fugues introduce a stretched version of the theme, expanding the duration of each note by some fixed proportion. It had never occurred to her that those slow notes in the bass had any function beyond supporting the local harmonies. Singing them through, she discovers that they present a version of the theme that stretches beyond the limits of a single human breath. The insight comes in a flash, and becomes permanently
absorbed into her aural image of the fugue. Proudly auditioning the new terms she has just acquired, she claims that “I hear the bass in these measures as an augmentation of the fugal theme.” Yet Lewin’s rule of thumb disqualifies this claim on a priori grounds. She had never before intuited the “aural possibility” that these slow notes constituted a melody and so she “had no analytic business applying the criteria” of fugal theory to describe their sequence.

Once the hypothetical keyboard player hears the bass line as a version of the theme, that hearing becomes permanently attached to her image of the piece, such that she wonders how she could have not recognized it in the first place. Her experience thus makes contact with a central image of MTP: the duck-rabbit figure. What interests us about that figure is that, in what seems to be a universal inter-subjective response, one sees only one interpretation at a time. On first encounter, one sees, let us say, a duck, without adumbrating the vision of the rabbit. Seeing now the rabbit, the duck is occluded. How is it that we ever saw the duck? And how could we have failed to see the rabbit in the first instance?

We are now in a position to identify a significant point of difference between Morgengruss and its successor of the following decade. Whereas the earlier essay insists that late-stage hearings must be adumbrated by premonitions, the later one acknowledges the value of hearings that come out of nowhere in an instant. Yet Lewin’s views on this topic did not change in an instant. One can find a harbinger of them in a central image of Morgengruss: the wooden cube that conceals a latent dipyramid or hexagon. “The hexagonal cross section reveals something about the structure of the cube which many people do not intuit immediately” (p. 68). Once one sees it, or is prompted to imagine it, one is immediately convinced of its latent presence. The implication of the cube parable works against the stronger version of methodological rule of thumb, and perhaps is the seed of its undoing in Lewin’s subsequent work.

What is at stake for Lewin? If this stronger version of the methodological rule invalidates the analytical status of two of the six categories of hearing, and problematizes a third, then much of the analytical work of the essay does not adhere to its strongest methodological principles. What is lost? Does analytic invalidity signify absence of value in some absolute sense? If the mis-analysis of the Beethoven concerto analysis is indicative, it would certainly seem so. Lewin assesses that analysis as “gibberish” (p. 103), “nonsense,” and “hideous.”

His treatment of that analysis hints at an explicitly moral dimension: “I had no . . . business making the rebarring for the passage, since the symbols reflect nothing I personally hear. . . . My only reason was to point [to] a methodological moral” (p. 103). A subsequent appeal to the Calvinist/Franklinian value of time conservation suggests a specific form for that dimension: “Why spend our time paying so much attention to

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10 Lewin to Neighbour, July 12, 1974.
a symbolic structure which is not even a musical analysis, by the rule-of-thumb, when we could be listening to the piece instead?” (p. 103). Here he evidently associates analytical invalidity not with the absence of value, but rather with the presence of pernicious ones.

Part of what gives the question its moralizing aroma is its evidently rhetorical status: why in the world would you ever do that? That fragrance recedes somewhat when the question elicits a substantive response:

The urge to do so is theoretical, not analytic: we are fascinated by how the “logic” of the criteria failed us in this instance, and we seek some explanation for how that could have happened. Perhaps we are looking for another “criterion” to explain the phenomenon, as if we were scientists contemplating an experiment that came out with an unexpected result, which perhaps might be explained by some new, hitherto unformulated “law.” This impulse is neither unnatural nor ignoble in itself, it is just not analytical. [Morgengruß, p. 103]

Here Lewin’s description evidently retreats from the moral ground, conveying the sense that the theory/analysis binary is merely taxonomic, without asymmetric valuation. And yet, by the end of the same paragraph, Lewin has clearly let his reader know which side he believes himself to be on:

To a certain degree, we should be aware of our general listening processes, and of the theoretical concepts we are using to describe them. These concepts are tools for us as analysts, and it is a good idea to have a general sense of what the tools can and cannot do. In this connection, we take what we can from the investigations of theorists with thanks. Beyond that point, though, the urge to theorize, as it would lead, e.g., to further exploration of the rebarred concerto, is only a seductive distraction for the analyst [Morgengruß, p. 103].

The pronouns indicate his position on the analytical side of the river, from which he judges the theorist across the way as a generally good fellow who is nonetheless susceptible to hedonistic and unproductive activity.

What is going on here? Why does Lewin’s methodological manifesto circumscribe analysis so narrowly that it disqualifies so much of the evidently analytical activity of this essay? Having expelled that activity from the domain of analysis into the bin of theory, why does he push that bin so far away, as if it vaguely reeked? Why does he cultivate the illusion that theory is an activity pursued not by David Lewin and his readers, but by some anonymous external other? In short, why is Lewin so uncharacteristically conflicted about methodological matters at this moment during the spring of 1974?
Some biographical circumstances, already sketched in the introduction to this volume, suggest a provisional response. Lewin had spent the first six months of his sabbatical in completing a book on mathematical applications to music, which he considered to be “pretty straight theory.”11 His heart was not in that project, and he yearned to turn his attention to the volume of Schubert essays, which he provisionally titled “analytical.” Thus it is entirely possible that he mentally framed Morgengruss in terms of a permanent turn away from theory, which enervated him, toward analysis, which invigorated him. That frame might have caused him to believe that whatever emerged from his pen was a priori analytical, in which case he might have had difficulty recognizing that he was uncannily doing theoretical work at the moment that he believed himself to be fleeing it.

Indeed, Lewin was hardly finished with theory. His most important theoretical work, beginning with Lewin 1977, in which he began to distinguish between intervalllic and transformational thinking, was just on the horizon. If Lewin convinced himself that he was undergoing a transition from theorist to analyst, that conviction was clearly transitory.

An examination of Morgengruss against the backdrop of Lewin’s earlier writings indicates that another internal transition was underway. His analytical work was suggesting new ways of thinking about the goals and methods of analysis, and about its relationship to theory; yet he was not fully prepared to shed former commitments, on behalf of which he had argued publicly and forcefully. In short, the tensions and contradictions in Morgengruss were symptoms of shifting methodological priorities. The remainder of this essay assesses some of the elements that contributed to this transition, and that made it a particularly complicated and fraught one for its subject.

4. Beyond “Behind the Beyond”

Five years before Morgengruss, Lewin had issued a methodological manifesto that worked intensively at the same theory/analysis boundary that was to occupy him in the 1974 essay. That publication arose as a response to Edward T. Cone’s essay, “Beyond Analysis,” which appeared in a 1967 issue of Perspectives of New Music. Two years later, PNM published Lewin’s “Behind the Beyond: A Response to Edward T. Cone.” Accusing Cone of “dangerous fuzziness,” Lewin writes that “confusion of theory and analysis runs rampant through Cone’s paper” (Lewin 1969, p. 60). Among the impulses from which theoretical claims can arise, and the evidentiary bodies to which such claims can appeal, Lewin identifies “the practice of great composers.”

11 Lewin to Neighbour, February 6, 1974.
A theorist who wants to validate his ideas by making such an appeal is naturally going to point out passages from the literature as support for the putative pertinence of his notions. He may, indeed, dig pretty hard at such passages in order to focus his readers’ ears on what he is interested in. But, TO THE EXTENT HE APPROACHES THE MUSIC WITH THAT AIM, HE IS NOT ANALYZING IT! Or, rather, he is making a partial and selective analysis, to indicate how his theoretical conceits can provide a useful tool for analysis. (p. 62)

The capitalized sentence, with its exclamation point and italicized negation, is remarkable from several different standpoints. By disposition a measured and temperate writer, here Lewin comes as close to yelling as the prose medium will allow. A writer who generally selected his words with great care, here he feels compelled to immediately reword the claim. The rewording changes the claim considerably. “He is making a partial and selective analysis” implies that he is making an analysis of some kind, which does not logically align with “HE IS NOT ANALYZING IT!” This rewording suggests that the intemperance of the initial outburst masks a wavering commitment to its substance.

Equally anomalous is the content of the capitalized sentence. The substance of a claim, Lewin implies, is not sufficient criteria for determining its analytical status. One needs in addition to know the intention of the individual making the claim. Yet as the son of a Freudian psychoanalyst, Lewin was surely aware that intentions are complicated, and often plural and contradictory. Indeed, in other writings he frequently and eloquently debunked the notion that the intentions of composers are recoverable from the compositional traces that they left behind. It is difficult to imagine shakier grounds from which to determine analytic validity than the ones that Lewin stakes with the capitalized claim.

The modification turns out to be no less vulnerable. In a response published immediately after “Behind the Beyond” in the same issue, Cone exploits that vulnerability: “Mr. Lewin’s immediate modification . . . won’t do either, for every analysis is partial and selective.” Cone goes on to write, “proper theory feeds on analysis; proper analysis feeds on theory” (Cone 1969, p. 70).

It would appear that the dangerously fuzzy Mr. Cone convinced Lewin on both points. If there is one methodological conviction that a reader cannot fail to identify in even a cursory reading of Morgengruß, it is that interpretation is inherently partial and selective. And if there is one principle that drives Lewin’s mature analytical practice, it is the one that Steven Rings identifies in his review of the Lewin project: “Energy cycles continually between theory and interpretation, as new interpretive insights suggest the formation of new theories, which then abet new

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12 See Lewin to Neighbour, September 7, 1974, excerpted in the appendix.
interpretations” (Rings 2006, p. 119). That circulation is very much in evidence in Morgengrüß. So it is tempting to conclude that, during the five years that separated the publication of “Behind the Beyond” from the drafting of Morgengrüß, Lewin changed his views on the nature of analysis, and of its relationship to theory; that what fueled those changes was Cone’s 1969 challenge to Lewin; and that Morgengrüß was the moment when Lewin’s new epistemological framework was permanently installed.

Yet if Cone’s views influenced Lewin, they did so beneath the threshold of his awareness. In February, only three months before drafting the essay, Lewin reproduced the capitalized sentence from “Behind the Beyond” and recommitted to its substance: “This seems so crystal-clear to me that I was chagrined to find that Ed couldn’t even see what I meant, in his reply, let alone concede anything toward my point” (Lewin to Neighbour, February 6, 1974). Three weeks later, he restated his commitment to the notion that theory and analysis are different in kind, while at the same time acknowledging the vulnerability of that position: “When you get around to Lewin/Cone, you’ll see what I mean by distinguishing [my Theory hat] from my Analysis one. You probably will not agree with me that it is possible (much less desirable) to distinguish the hats conceptually. On that issue, you would be on Ed’s side and not mine” (February 26, 1974).

Lewin’s ambivalence toward theory is partly underwritten by a tension between two distinct meanings of the term. In Lewin’s mature work, theory is primarily a process, a way to make sense, a flexible res fabricans. There are many passages in Morgengrüß where that conception comes through very clearly. In “Behind the Beyond,” theory is a product, a hypostasized thing that is already in the world, consolidated and inert, a res facta. The theorist has “ideas” that he wants to validate; his “theoretical conceits can provide a useful tool.” This attitude is particularly clear in his references to “tonal theory” and “serial theory” (p. 61) and his assessment of Schenkerian theory (p. 62, n. 3), as if each set of concepts and techniques was monolithic, closed, and fully coherent. When Lewin adopts a critical and distancing attitude toward theory, it is characteristically directed toward the application of such a body of prefabricated “analytic techniques.”

This attitude comes through particularly clearly in the letter of February 6, where he accuses William J. Mitchell (1970) of running a Lassus motet “through a Schenker meat-grinder.” “The trouble,” he writes, “is that WM has his priorities reversed: instead of using the (any and all) analytic techniques at his disposal to get into a piece that fascinates him, he is finding a piece that exempl he can twist a bit in order to fit a predetermined abstract idea about how all this these pieces ‘ought to’ behave.” After objecting to particular details in the Mitchell analysis, he continues: “If one uses (any methods of) analysis properly, in that sense, they shouldn’t should only help you do whatever it else you want to do, and not lead in the ‘opposite direction’ from it” (February 6, 1974). It is at this point that he
reproduces the capitalized text from “Behind the Beyond,” indicating that he considers Mitchell’s infelicities to be prototypically that of the theorist.

The notion that theory leads away from the piece, rather than back toward it, is of particular interest in light of Rings’s characterization of Lewin’s “mature working method,” in which theory and analysis eternally loop. In the Cone essay, and in the letter just cited, theory and analysis sit at opposite ends of a tunnel. Lewin imagines that music-theoretic energy naturally blows away from the composition and the analytical claims that attach to it. In Morgengruss Lewin concedes that, with pressure and vigilance, those energies can be redirected toward the piece, and some analytic profit can be made from them. In Lewin’s later work, as Rings characterizes it, those same winds blow in a very different environment. The tunnel is shaped into a Cyclotron, and the flow toward theory is naturally directed back toward the composition and the analytic claims that it inspires, rather than redirected from some other default destination.

The reference to the “Schenker meat-grinder” merits independent attention in this context, as it opens a window to another theme that arises elsewhere in Lewin’s letters to Neighbour: the association of theoretical activity with mechanical technique. In the same vein, he writes of another colleague that “his mechanistic style always makes me very uncomfortable. . . . he exemplifies the ‘pure theory’ attitude I discussed in my response to Ed Cone” (January 26, 1974). Lewin associates machinery in general, and the application of analytic techniques to music in particular, with a mindless and lazy attitude toward the world: “Most people are only too happy, given some shiny new ‘criteria’ to play with, to turn whatever mechanical crank that they can find to see what comes out of the computer when you feed the score in” (July 12, 1974). “Children, monkeys and scholars by and large love shiny new toys, and they will not pay attention to anything anyone else says until they have played with the toy enough to get used to it and a bit tired of it” (May 14 1974).

The association of technical theoretic machinery with negative human values comes through most clearly in his critique of Mitchell, which achieves an almost Schenkerian fervor: “Now for my Schlusskadenz [final cadence]: the problem isn’t with methods of analysis. . . . [T]he problem is with the musical and intellectual honesty and responsibility and maturity of the analyst, whatever techniques he uses. In short, alas, with the nature of the Allzumenschlich [all too human] human race. The obsession with technique for its own sake is only one symptom of that disease” (February 6, 1974). The passage suggests how easily Lewin’s suspicions about music theory become absorbed into ethical values and principles, with ideas about how to live properly in the world.

Disease, honesty, maturity, responsibility: we are now in a position to see just how very much might be at stake, if it should turn out that much of the work of Morgengruss fails the test of analytical validity, and gets consigned to the bin of theory. Or rather, how much would have been at stake, had Lewin’s private
anxieties become public ones, and had he continued to cling to the image of music theory, cultivated in “Behind the Beyond,” as product rather than process. Fortunately, introspection about the kind of analytic work that he was undertaking in Morgengruß, and about the role of theory in molding that work, was allowing a new image of music theory to take root. That image, in turn, was leading to a new set of methodological convictions and practices, which were to stabilize and underlie the work for which Lewin is most broadly and justly celebrated.

5. Hearing, Thinking, and Schoenberg

The methodological issues that Lewin is confronting in Morgengruß have, at their substantive core, the relationship of thinking and hearing. He endorses an analytic practice in which the goal of intellectual work is to refine and represent preverbal aural sensations. He warns against an analytic practice in which intellectual work substitutes for musical experience, or takes the lead in manufacturing “artificial” hearings that have no correspondence to premonitory sensations. Yet, when he is analyzing “Morgengruß,” his analytical behavior runs his methodological stop signs, suggesting that his ideas on this issue were not fully settled. Three excerpts from Lewin’s published writings and correspondence support this hypothesis. Read individually, against each other, and against Morgengruß, they indicate that his view of the relationship between thinking and hearing was in transition, and suggest some reasons that they would be, at precisely this moment. As with the capitalized sentence in “Behind the Beyond,” the rhetorical force with which those principles are enunciated masks an underlying anxiety about their ultimate pertinence and value.

I begin with an excerpt from a 1967 analysis of the first scene from Schoenberg’s Moses and Aron, where Lewin’s primary concern is with the patterning of hexachordal regions and their relationship to dramatic events in the opera. Following Babbitt, Lewin groups the forty-eight serial row forms into twelve regions on the basis of hexachordal content, and labels each region with the letter A followed by a subscript from 0 to 11.

A₈ and A₉ are the principal secondary areas of the scene; A₉ is “supposed” to inflect A₈. . . . Hence the progression may be “reduced” intellectually. . . . Thence it will be noted that there is an inversional balance which ‘motivates’ the choice of A₉ to balance A₈ about A₅, ‘tonicizing’ A₅. This idea seems to go nicely with all the previous analysis of the passage, and the actual rows involved, RI₈ and S₉, do have a harmonically inversional relation. Whether one is actually aware of this, or to what
extent one is, at m. 16 3/4 and m. 19, is somewhat hazy, to say the least, but possible to my ear. [Lewin 1967a, p. 7; 2006, p. 373]

In this passage, thinking precedes hearing. This ordering is standard for contemporaneous serial analysts, yet it stands out when read against the admonishments in Morgengrüss. Of particular interest here is the awkwardness of the final sentence, when Lewin attends to the aural implications of his intellectual work. The sentence has a double subject and a double predicate, and its well-formedness requires that each subject/predicate combination be coherent. One of these combinations, which we can gloss as “the extent to which one is actually aware of this is possible to my ear,” is not. A grammatical infelicity from the pen of such a literate and meticulous writer suggests the impossible narrowness of the conceptual needle that Lewin was trying to thread.

The second passage evidently responds to a point that Neighbour made in a letter to him (which is not preserved):

I too am sure AS [Arnold Schoenberg] meant what he said about listening for the series, and would agree with that as advice for the listener. My theoretical opinion is that the structuring effect of the series will, automatically, register on the listener without his having to expend any conscious effort (beyond sympathetic ordinary listening). It had better, hadn’t it, if the whole serial technique is not some sort of solipsistic Alexandrine game As [sic] was playing with himself, which strains credulity. [Lewin to Neighbour, February 6, 1974]

Lewin indicates here that, in the case of Schoenberg’s serial music, hearing precedes intellectual work. The implicit consequence is that claims about serial structure correspond to premonitory aural sensations, thereby validating those claims as analytical according to the criterion of the stronger methodological claim advanced in Morgengrüss. Lewin advances it, however, as a “theoretical opinion.” He believes it, but does not know it empirically. He worries about the consequences if that belief is false, but then immediately doubts his doubts and reaffirms his faith in it. The insecurity of Lewin’s conviction comes into strong relief when compared with a parallel claim that substitutes “tonality” for “the series,” “tonal” for “serial,” and Schubert for Schoenberg.

The final passage is from a letter from later in 1974, after he had completed Morgengrüss, sent a copy to Neighbour, and moved back to the United States:

I could never report publically any feature about a piece that I could “infer” intellectually, no matter how convincing in that respect, that did not correspond at least to some vague or inchoate aural sensation that
I felt had something to with the phenomenon I was formulating intellectually, though not necessarily in any very clear or simple fashion. . . .

If I found myself intellectually convinced by some phenomenon in a score, without such an aural sensation, I would take that as a symptom that I had not lived with the piece enough. I would keep working or perhaps put [it] aside for a shorter or longer time, pending a fresh hearing. I would not try to force myself to “hear” it, for obvious reasons. But also I would not immediately conclude that the intellectual idea was completely a false trail. The latter for the simple reason that the reason that I analyze e.g. AS’s music is because I believe he heard things I don’t, that my ear can learn from his. If I’m intellectually convinced he was ‘doing’ something (Consciously or no), my presumption is that he was hearing something somehow related to what he was ‘doing’ and that there is thus something around that I would catch aurally sooner or later if I kept plugging. The tricks here are patience and honesty. [September 7, 1974]

The first paragraph is consistent with the methodological rule of thumb in its weaker original form. The second paragraph, however, is inconsistent with the stronger version of the rule that emerges under explication, which enjoined the analyst from pursuing intellectual inferences that did not correspond to prior aural sensations. Here Lewin expresses comfort with pursuing those inferences so long as they result in aural experiences at the end of the inferential chain.

Is it a coincidence that all three passages arise in response to the serial music of Arnold Schoenberg? Perhaps methodological matters surfaced most frequently with respect to Schoenberg and serialism because those were the central topics of Lewin’s publications before 1974. It was their mutual interest in Schoenberg that initially connected Lewin and Neighbour, dominated their early letters, and recurred frequently even after they had established a more broadly based connection. If Lewin was interested in the relation between hearing and thinking, it is only natural that that interest would manifest in relation to whatever music he was specifically writing about, which just happened to be Schoenberg in this case.

But I think there is more to it. It seems likely that Lewin was specifically conflicted about aspects of Schoenberg’s music, and that those conflicts were intertwined with the methodological ones that surface with respect to Schubert’s song. Lewin had been deeply engaged with Schoenberg’s music since childhood. He wrote that “on first exposure to Schoenberg’s music, at age 11 or so, I was seized with the immediate conviction that THIS was the music of our time that was compelling, that expressed with complete mastery the sorts of ideas that were meaningful to me as a point of departure for whatever I might have to say as a composer” (May 14, 1974). His engagement with Schoenbergian serialism was stoked during his graduate years at Princeton, which he jokingly referred to as “the Six and Twelve Store” (February 26, 1974). The first decade of his career was
primarily devoted to composing serial music, and to exploring the serial music of the second Viennese school and technical issues attending that music.

Lewin was fascinated by Schoenberg’s twelve-tone music both viscerally and intellectually, loving it with both heart and mind, but the passages just quoted suggest that connecting the two aspects was a challenge, and that the disconnection troubled him. He was critical of students and colleagues whose intellectual/technical claims did not evidently correspond to aural experience, and his criticisms were tinged with ethical judgments; in his harshest moods he privately accused them of laziness, immaturity, even dishonesty. It is not difficult to see how such a self-critical, introspective thinker would be moved to reflect that same critical light back onto his analytical activities. He increasingly came to privilege analytical claims that reflected or enabled some aspect of audible experience. And he found those correspondences arriving more naturally, with less labor, in the music to which his analytical energies were now increasingly directed: the pre-serial music of Schoenberg, and the vocal music of Schubert.

Two other passages from early 1974 further indicate Lewin's conflicted relationship to Schoenberg's serial music. On February 17, he asks

Why did he himself feel the need to develop serialism (or something else beyond the former idiom.)? Was this simply a Teutonic obsession with method for its own sake? Perhaps, but I don't believe it and I don't think you do. Was it an intellectual/artistic retrenchment from the “permissiveness,” in reaction to the cultural trauma of the War and personal traumas in his own life? This I think was almost certainly involved, but that attitude sidesteps the question of the intrinsic value or validity of the method itself, regardless of why it appeared on the scene and when. In short, having noted that AS told Kolisch not to worry about counting the notes, one is still confronted with the facts a (a) it was necessary, at that time, for him to discover a “substitute” for tonality, enabling him (as he thought) to construct large instrumental forms without text (b) the 12t method did, in fact, provide such a substitute or analog. Since he did, in fact, proceed to write a substantial number of extended instrumental 12t pieces, one must then ask whether or not he was kidding himself? [February 17, 1974]

The theme of self-deception arises again in his next letter, this time in connection with his own work as a composer:

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13 One of his most successful compositions was a set of variations on a theme from Schoenberg’s Opus 25 Suite. See Levy 1969.
I feel that I can use “the method” as a vehicle for my own expression, to a considerable extent without feeling bound not only by Schönb’s personal manner, but more significantly by his general “style,” the latter involving predilections for certain kinds of musical situations, and certain ways of treating and working out their musical implications. Of course I realize that this may be largely an illusion on my part. I don’t think it is, but even if it is, it is would be I don’t pretend to Olympian stature as a composer, but I’m very sure that every composer who has ever written twelve-tone music has experienced a similar feeling, if he is worth his salt as an artist, of whatever rank . . . I’m sure Webern felt this, and I’m sure Berg did too, though he probably would never have dared admit it to himself. It’s more than obvious that Stravinsky felt it.

Now perhaps I, together with this lesser constellation of luminaries and other others, we have been all been—are we all just kidding ourselves? [February 26, 1974]

Self-deception arises initially in the crossed-out passage that would have begun the second sentence quoted here, and then again in the final one. In both cases, the suspected self-deceiver is not Schoenberg, as composer of serial music, but rather Lewin and other composers responding to that music. As he continues to muse on the issue, however, the two become temporarily conflated:

Very possibly, but even it may be that all “the method” amounts to is a certain way means by which obscure electrical circuits in the brains, or endocrine secretions in the blood, of many composers at a certain period in history have been stimulated, in such a way as to inspire the creative results: results when the composers play the appropriate mental games. I’m not being completely sarcastic about this, I think there is probably at least a grain of truth in it, and possibly a good deal more. I would however, argue that even to the extent the method is such an illusion, it has been and is a composers have been and are fooling themselves, in considering that they can use the “method” without being bound by Schoenberg’s “style” (as above), the illusion was/is artistically necessary, in order to accomplish anything; and it has turned out to be quite productive.

“The method is such an illusion.” Does Lewin withdraw the claim because he doesn’t believe it? Because he doesn’t wish to entertain its implications? Or because he realizes that he has strayed off topic? And why does he stray off topic exactly here, replacing “we were deluded about whether we could use the method” with “Schoenberg was deluded in creating the method?”

Lewin’s rare reference to his own activities as a composer suggests one final context in which we might consider the methodological tensions in Morgengruß.
If the disconnection between thinking and hearing that Lewin problematizes in the Schubert essay were connected to conflicts about Schoenberg’s serial music, as I have argued, then that conflict very likely would have also transferred onto his own compositions, which took that music as their cardinal inspiration. This argument raises the possibility that the methodological transition evident in Morgengruß was intertwined with a transition in Lewin’s identity as an artist and as a professional. The most outward sign of that transition came five years later, when Lewin accepted a position as Professor of Theory at Yale, stripping his artistic identity from his professional calling card. If that external shift reflected an internal rebalancing of his activities as an artist vis-à-vis scholar, one might conjecture that the transition in his ideas about the relationship of thinking to hearing, and of theory to analysis, was related to a transition in what David Lewin saw when he greeted his image in the Morgenglas. As that conjecture presumes a lot, I merely post it for future consideration by others who might be positioned to pursue and address it.
Technology, Methodology, Theory, and Analysis in Lewin’s *Morgengruß*

HENRY KLUMPENHOUWER

1. Introduction

The appearance of *Morgengruß* brings it into a constellation of works whose starting point is the posthumous publication of Lewin’s *Studies in Music with Text* in 2006 and that continues with the reprint editions of his *Generalized Musical Intervals and Transformations* (GMIT) and *Musical Form and Transformation: Four Analytical Essays* (MFAT) in 2007. Reviewers of those volumes generally took the opportunity to reinterpret the grand sweep of Lewin’s career and reassess its meaning to the discipline of music theory (Clampitt 2006; Hall 2009; Hook 2007; Rings 2006). With another element of the constellation now in place, we might reasonably consider how the four publications relate to one another. We would most likely link *Morgengruß* with *Studies in Music with Text*, forming a pair that balances the reprints of GMIT and MFAT. In a very real sense, *Morgengruß* prepares the reader for *Studies in Music with Text* in the way that GMIT provides the groundwork for MFAT. Conversely, *Studies in Music with Text* and MFAT fulfill the promise of *Morgengruß* and GMIT, respectively.

The doubling and pairing reflect and extend in various ways a common thematic animating the reviewers of the three earlier publications, which was to observe distinct authorial personae in Lewin’s writings: the “mathematical” Lewin on one hand, and the “human and musical” Lewin on the other (Hook 2007, p. 155); the formal Lewin and the poetic Lewin (Rings 2006, p. 115); the “soft,” “subjective” Lewin and the “hard,” “objective” Lewin; Lewin the theorist and Lewin the analyst (Rings 2007, p. 117). In some cases, the binaries were presented rhetorically, in order to posit a way to understand his work as following a single unified project. Hook’s argument is that the dichotomies in Lewin’s work are called for by the nature of music itself, that its beauty lies in its complexity (p. 155). Rings’s review does an excellent job of providing a perspective—represented in the form of a
transformational network—within which these oppositions may be understood. We will return to Rings’s remarks a little later.

Certainly, one assumes that the oppositions and binaries were transcended or entirely absent within Lewin’s own personality, so that the terms involved did not appear to him as a fundamental conflict or ambivalence about his professional interests and motivations. Accordingly, the appearance of multiple, irreconcilable Lewinian personae emerges not in the first instance from his own ambivalence but rather from an ambivalence in his readers. In other words, the distinctions themselves—between formal, mathematical interests on one hand and “human” and “musical” interests on the other—reflect an unresolved dichotomy in the field at large and not a dichotomy in Lewin’s personality. This is not simply a result of diverse interests and abilities among music theorists—that one reader of Lewin is impressed with passages that are technical in orientation and another reader focuses on Lewin’s analytical passages. Rather, the dichotomy goes to the heart of a foundational problem in the way the discipline organizes itself.

The division of the field into “hard,” “objective” and “soft,” “subjective” wings is surely based on a very coarse evaluation, even if we enrich it somewhat by observing that the binary exists within each term of the theory/analysis split as well as between the two terms themselves. Nevertheless, it does get at a dominant problematic in the discipline. Superficially, the dynamic in question recalls the two cultures of academic life as a whole, a certain updating of Kant’s “conflict of the faculties.” Rest assured, I have no plans to engage in this conflict in any of its forms. I am skeptical that the dynamic in operation, namely, the conflict that results in perceiving in Lewin’s work two distinct Lewinian personae, is simply another product of the standard image of two conflicting academic cultures or sets of values. Moreover, I am fairly sure that the dynamic I have in mind is peculiar to the nature of music theory itself and is not simply another instantiation of the arguments for and against the appropriateness of the hypothetico-deductive method. We recognize that this particular debate has had some liveliness in our discipline, and so the reader will be spared a review of its history. Nevertheless, I do wish to subject the reader to certain of Nietzsche’s observations in *The Gay Science* (1882/1974). I have long had the impression that, although Nietzsche’s comments are directed in the first place to developments in late-nineteenth-century German philosophy, they also correspond to the dynamic I detect in contemporary music theory, which is in turn reflected in a perceived binary in Lewin’s work. In a section entitled “The Origins of Scholars,” Nietzsche describes different styles of philosophy, different philosophical research standards, as “intellectual idiosyncrasies,” determined in large part by the occupational family history of the philosopher concerned. He writes,

Where the feeling finds expression “Now this has been proved and I am done with it,” it is generally the ancestor in the blood and instinct of the
scholar who approves from his point of view “the finished job”; the faith in a proof is merely a symptom of what in a hard-working family has for ages been considered “good workmanship.” One example: When the sons of clerks and office workers of every kind, whose main task it has always been to bring order into diverse materials, to distribute it over different files, and in general to schematize things, become scholars, they manifest a tendency to consider a problem almost as solved when they have merely schematized it. There are philosophers who are fundamentally merely schematizers; for them the formal aspect of their fathers’ occupation has become content. The talent for classifications, for tables of categories, betrays something; one pays a price for being the child of one’s parents. [p. 290]

Nietzsche continues his catalog of intellectual idiosyncrasies characteristic of scholars: “The sons of Protestant ministers and school teachers may be recognized by their naive certainty when, as scholars, they consider their cause proved when they have merely stated it with vigor and warmth; they are thoroughly used to being believed, as that was part of their fathers’ job” (p. 291).

However seriously one takes Nietzsche’s linkage of parental occupation with research values, one can certainly recognize a certain similarity between the two “intellectual idiosyncrasies” he describes and the two terms of the binary with which we have been dealing. As we consider our own writing as well as the writing of others, I think we can detect in varying degrees elements of one or the other of Nietzsche’s two intellectual idiosyncrasies: on one hand, the concern with schematization, with bringing “order into diverse materials, to distribute it over different files,” an emphasis on correct answers, on giving the impression of “the finished job”; and on the other, a conviction that we may persuade others through “warmth” and “vigor,” out of the confidence that one will be believed. Projecting this content into the earlier binaries, we may speak of detecting in Lewin’s writing a schematizing Lewin, concerned with good workmanship, and a warm-and-vigorous Lewin, one who is used to being believed—but bearing in mind the earlier contention that these values are a projection of the idiosyncrasies that characterize the discipline itself, so that Lewin’s readers may be divided into those who are impressed with “a job well done” and those who respond to claims made with warmth and vigor.

I find the passage from Nietzsche great fun, and never tire of bringing it to mind in the various spheres of my academic life. Yet I have spent this time ruminating on the putative double personae of Lewin as a reflection of double personae of the discipline not simply to cite a charmingly provocative passage from The Gay

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1 It is worth recalling that Nietzsche came from a long line of Protestant ministers.
Science, but also because I think it helps bring into focus not only the problematic at the core of Lewin’s project in Morgengrüß, but also the problems the essay itself directly causes us.

I’ll start by asking a potentially troubling question about the essay. Does it have anything to teach us today, so many decades after it was written? Hasn’t whatever usefulness it can claim already been sufficiently exploited in subsequent publications? Certainly, its technological innovations have been either transcended by Lerdahl and Jackendoff or at least satisfactorily presented in Lewin’s later Lieder analyses. True, the essay might be useful in a limited way to those interested in the development of Lewin’s thinking, or in the early development of the American stage of Western music theory; and in the case that one considers the putative relationship between the essay and the analyses in Studies in Music Text to be genuine, the essay may serve as preparation for a fuller appreciation of its song analyses. And, yes, the essay does provide an analysis of Schubert’s “Morgengrüss.” But what else could the essay possibly offer its contemporary reader?

It seems like a reasonable question. It is raised, however, from a particular perspective, one that esteems technical innovation over analysis as such; or, put another way, from the view that analysis carried out in the absence of the valorization of some technical innovation is an uninteresting project. It’s an orientation about which one hears a great of informal complaint, yet that still seems to dominate the research arm of the discipline. However, even if one is open to appreciating musical analysis in its own right, one cannot simply focus on the essay’s purely analytical passages and ignore its technological ones. Its value for us is not just that it elevates analysis in general by providing an admirable and impressive analytical performance. Rather, it presents a particular image of the discipline entire, with its various activities organized and contextualized in a particular way. In other words, properly read, the essay can function as a cat among the pigeons, as a wayward particle in an oyster. We shall see whether it produces pearls or dead pigeons. I hope to help the process along, by emphasizing ways the essay defines and organizes various aspects of what we might call, following Adorno (1982), “the problem of musical analysis.”

2. Technology, Methodology, Theory, Analysis

In his review of Studies in Music with Text and the reprint editions of GMIT and MFAT, Steven Rings (2006) encourages us to regard Lewin’s writings in the context of three nodes of a transformational network (pp. 115–116). The nodes contain “Theory,” “Interpretation,” and “Methodology.” To add content to the first of these nodes, Rings draws on the definition of “theory” in “Behind the Beyond” (1969), Lewin’s response to Edward T. Cone’s “Beyond Analysis” (1967). Lewin’s critique of Cone argues that the confusion of the structures and functions of
theory with the structures and functions of analysis leads to various problems evaluating the limits and potential of both (1969, p. 60). On Lewin’s view, theory “attempts to describe the ways in which, given a certain body of literature, composers and listeners appear to have accepted sound as conceptually structured, categorically prior to any one specific piece” (p. 61), a view that captures the essential elements of Babbitt’s definition (1972, p. 13). With that definition in mind, Rings associates the node’s contents with Lewin’s “mathematical modeling, so that aspect of his project (in its theoretical as opposed to analytical modalities) resides in this node. But the node also includes his other theoretical endeavors, including his extensive engagement with, and reanimation of, historical music theories (including Schenker’s); his thoughts on rhythm and musical time; and his theories of perception and phenomenology” (2006, p. 116). Rings fills the “Interpretation” node with what he calls “all acts of hermeneutic engagement with specific pieces,” which extends to “humanistic interpretation, technical interpretation, and all admixtures of the two” (p. 116). The third node of Rings’s network, “Methodology,” deals with “matters of method, presentation, language, and conceptual foundations.” According to Rings, Lewin’s methodology centers on “an insistence on the plurality of musical experience, paired with an ethical injunction that theory and analysis should help us explore that plurality, not seek to close it off” (p. 116); he also includes in the node “Lewin’s careful attention to the poetics of analytical and theoretical writing,” by which Rings means “first of all, his careful attention to our use of language, especially his advocacy for a self conscious choice of words in an effort to avoid Platonic rigidification of musical experience” (p. 117). Furthermore, Rings regards “methodology as the point of origin of the system’s energy and activity” (p. 117).

Rings’s understanding of Lewin’s overall theoretical project is remarkably astute, and, in many respects, provides the best perspective available for comprehending the value and meaning of Morgengruß. In that sense, my remarks take Rings’s insights into Lewin’s grand project as a point of departure.

With these distinctions, Rings is adopting the outlines of Lewin’s own strategy in responding to Cone, which rests on a careful sorting out of the terms “theory” and “analysis” (Lewin 1969), a binary Rings then supplements with the foundational term, methodology. A reading of Morgengruß causes us to modify somewhat Rings’s dynamic. This modification is so because in addition to instruction in the particular analytical technology of metric reduction, the essay seeks more generally to instruct its reader in analytical methodology. The distinction between analytical technology and analytical methodology is not one many music theorists—other than Rings—generally make, using the terms “methodology” and “technology” (or tools) as synonyms. Morgengruß, however, is reasonably careful about sorting out technological from methodological issues. Even so, Lewin does not explicitly define what he means by either term. Yet it is possible to infer from the essay his distinction between the two spheres. By technology,
I think he means the formal apparatus of an analytical approach: its objects, its symbols, its protocols and policies for application. By methodology, I think he means something like the philosophy of music analysis, which deals with the personal and social functions of analysis, the relationship between analysis and theory, the use and meaning of analytical technology, the evaluation of technical results, the nature of analytical knowledge, the uses of criticism—matters that extend beyond technical apparatus of analysis. I think the idea of methodology coincides to a great extent with Rings’s node of the same name. The definition of analytical technology does not, however, correspond comfortably to his “Theory” node, which I sense extends to what we are characterizing here as technology. Yet, in Morgengruß there is a genuine distinction to be made between theory (as a “categorically prior” mode of conceptually structuring a musical system that underlies a particular repertoire) and technology (the objects, symbols, and protocols that enact those modes). On this view, analytical technology as such is conceptually empty: it requires the act of linkage to transfer the general concepts of a theory to particular musical contexts. Quite clearly, a particular technology associates very strongly with a particular theory. But it is not that theory.

With these definitions in mind, we now have a system of interlocking dynamics: theory and analysis on one axis; technology and methodology on another. Before moving on to a discussion of Morgengruß itself, we should remind ourselves of another aspect of Lewin’s critique of Cone, because it helps us contextualize Lewin’s thinking about the relationship between theory and analysis, one of our two axes. In the course of that article, Lewin points out that, historically, theorists have sought to validate their theories by way of an appeal to nature, an appeal to consistency, or an appeal to compositional practice. It is the latter strategy in particular that causes confusion with analysis. Lewin writes that “[f]or a theorist who wants to validate his ideas by making such an appeal [that is, by way of an empirical appeal to compositional practice] is naturally going to point out passages from the literature as support for the putative pertinence of his notions.” But, Lewin continues, switching to majuscules, “TO THE EXTENT HE APPROACHES THE MUSIC WITH THAT AIM, HE IS NOT ANALYZING IT!” (p. 62).

Indeed, this appeal to compositional practice is pretty much the fundamental strategy of the vast majority of contemporary music theory articles, including, one should add, articles written by Lewin himself. Nevertheless, his point is to articulate a difference between analysis designed to demonstrate and advocate for a particular theory—which he claims is not analysis worthy of the name—and analysis as such, which he defines as interested “not in a general mode of hearing, but in the individuality of the specific piece of music under study” (p. 62). He continues, “whatever the use to which analysis is put (theoretical, historical, the acquisition of compositional craft, aid in preparing a performance), its goal is simply to hear the piece better, both in detail and in the large. The task of the analyst is ‘merely’ to point out things in the piece that strike him as characteristic and
important (where by ‘things’ one includes complex relationships), and to arrange
his presentation in a way that will stimulate the musical imagination of his audi-
ence” (p. 63). Accordingly, Lewin identifies two competing uses of analysis: one
in which analysis is carried out largely in service of technical demonstration (in
which the technology is the placeholder of a particular theory); and another in
which analysis exists to some degree as a self-sufficient practice directed to the
understanding of musical works. The competing uses bring about correspond-
ing competing orientations: one in which analysis is directed in the first instance
 toward the advocacy of a particular technology and by entailment a particular
theory; and another in which analysis aims to enrich musical experience, to
engage musical works. In the former project, the analysis of the work is surplus or
debris; in the latter, it is the objective.

So, we find ourselves basically where we were at the end of the previous sec-
tion, noting a difficulty in the current disciplinary orientation toward analysis,
and expressing the hope that Morgengruss might serve as an element in a broader
effort to make the discipline of music theory a more comfortable place for the
analysis of music.

3. Morgengruss

With this background in mind, we move on to Morgengruss itself. On its first page,
Lewin tells us that he has several readers in mind: a musical amateur interested
in a deeper appreciation of the song; a performer interested in the analysis as a
way of exploring problems of performance; a music student looking for an ana-
lytical paradigm; and a music critic interested in text-music relations. In keeping
with its intended audience, the essay assumes little more than an understanding
of college-level harmony, or more precisely, the conventions of roman-numeral
analysis along with basic principles of voice leading.

In this light, one would assume, taking Lewin’s stated intentions seriously,
that the essay would serve as a useful introduction to analysis for undergraduates.
I certainly thought so when I assigned it to second-year music-theory students.
The utter failure of that exercise (which I insisted on repeating twice, despite iden-
tical results) was instructive. Students found the essay’s presentation tedious and
laborious, and they took the essay’s principal theme to be that one should be open
to multiple analytical interpretations, an argument they felt could have been made
with much more efficiency. They were largely unimpressed by the features of the
essay that had struck me quite forcefully when I read it as a graduate student.

I think our different responses emerge from the fact that the essay is actu-
ally not the pedagogical instrument it explicitly aims to be: it does not simply
instruct its putative readers—the amateur, the performer, the music student, the
critic—in the basics of musical analysis. Instead, it functions more effectively
as a therapeutic instrument for those trained to analyze along traditional lines. Indeed, many of the purely methodological comments in the essay operate as correctives of what Lewin refers to in the essay as “the pernicious tendency of the mind” (p. 34). I think that’s why the essay does not engage undergraduates very well: generally speaking, they have yet to develop very many ideas at all about analysis, other than as a pedagogical exercise in assigning roman numerals. For them, analysis is simply not a high-minded engagement with musical works; which is perhaps just another way of saying that they are not nineteenth-century Central Europeans. Instead, analysis is a technical exercise whose results are either correct or incorrect.

The very first thing that strikes the reader of the essay is its unusual length. The expansive scale of the essay contrasts starkly with the character of the song under analysis. Indeed, this is the very first methodological lesson of the essay: analysis, properly carried out, is a very long and very complex process, even in the case of short, simple songs. The reader will additionally be struck by the essay’s almost complete lack of obvious architecture: there is only one formal division separating the essay’s introductory remarks from the rest of the essay and that division occurs after just two typescript pages. In place of clearly defined sections addressing particular topics or problems, the essay essentially records Lewin’s own analytical process, beginning with a record of initial impressions and then raising questions and challenges, and reflecting on the conventional answers and objections. So the essay constructs its own architecture as it goes along. The ideational forward motion emerges from its spirit of skepticism about the conventional answers to the conventional questions about analysis. Generally speaking, there is a certain pattern to this process. First, an analytical procedure is carried out along traditional methodological lines. Once the results are presented and celebrated, certain contradictions are exposed and diagnosed, leading to a fresh set of analytical questions, which are in turn answered according to conventional analytical procedures. Then the pattern repeats. A particularly striking example appears at the very beginning of the essay. Lewin observes the simplicity of the song’s formal structure—a strophic setting of the text, in which the strophe has three parts—and notes that one has the feeling that there doesn’t seem to be much more than that to be said. He then investigates the musical and textual logic behind dividing the strophe into three parts. The investigation raises enough questions to cause the reader to lose confidence in the original impression of a tripartite form, bringing her to the conclusion that the strophe divides more convincingly into two parts. The narrative pattern creates a kind of ideational and emotional rhythm in the reader, leading her from a sense of absolute conviction about the analytical problem at hand, to a sense of great insecurity, confusion, and frustration, and then finally to a sense of analytical openness brought about by triaging the relevant conflicts and contradictions that have
just emerged. The pattern will remind some of a dialectical presentation, at least in the informal sense of the term. Others will simply find the presentation ponderous, needlessly elaborate, even overwrought. The latter response is not necessarily different from the former.

Having remarked on the general characteristics of the essay, we now turn to a consideration of some of its specific methodological arguments. In light of the essay’s style and organization, we will not, however, find well-defined extended sections taken up with a discussion of this or that technological or methodological point. Instead, one needs to see the various arguments about methodology as unfolding over the course of the entire essay. I have isolated here what strike me as the dominant methodological themes, focusing particularly on those that have some virtue beyond the particular case of analyzing music with text. I can focus on the broader, less specific methodological themes because, as far as I can tell, almost all of the methodological points that relate specifically to analyzing music with text reappear in the song analyses in the *Studies in Music with Text* (Lewin 2006).

Central to these themes is Lewin’s claim that, while we say we use analysis to engage more fully with the music at hand, our traditional thinking about analysis generally serves instead as a defense against the potential richness of musical experience, by providing us with arguments for breaking off our investigation of the music. Analysis carried out in this way acts as a vaccine: one ingests the dead form of an organism in order to build up an immunity to its associated disease. It is difficult to imagine, however, that a rich musical experience constitutes a disease or threat that needs to be defended against. More likely, the impulse to conclude analysis prematurely has its roots in what I earlier described, following Nietzsche, as a schematizing spirit, whose epigraph is “Now this has been proved and I am done with it” (1882/1974, p. 290). Obviously, I do not take altogether seriously Nietzsche’s claim that the origins of this spirit and its wider appeal lie in the occupation of one’s parents. For what it’s worth, my guess is that its origins lie in the two institutional models that have controlled the discipline for the last 200 years: the Napoleonic model of the university, of which the conservatory system is a rare modern instantiation; and the Humboldtian or Prussian model, out of which the modern research university emerges. Both institutional styles promote in their own way the particular intellectual values or “idiosyncrasies” Nietzsche characterizes in *The Gay Science*, either by the autocratic reduction of knowledge to particular skills or by encouraging all disciplines to conform to the methodological practices of physics. Accordingly, it is with these values—in short, the emphasis on the “finished job”—that the practice of music analysis conflicts because it does not innately contain its own limits; and in order to protect these institutional values we are eager to find ways to tie off our own analytical investigations, and to dismiss the analytical investigations of others when they threaten to reopen up our finished jobs. Put another way, the impulse to stem
the analytical process provides us with the sensation of having standards, so that keeping the process alive seems profligate and dissolute.

In the course of the essay, Lewin presents a number of defensive strategies one launches to stop analysis, and then demonstrates how they involve either false dichotomies or confusions about the nature and the meaning of the technological results. Again, each strategy is marshaled against an analytical claim or line of inquiry that compels us to keep the analytical process open; as such, the strategies aim to resolve a contradiction that has emerged—a contradiction produced by two apparently conflicting, yet equally plausible, analytical claims—by providing a mechanism for choosing between them. In general, the impulse is to protect the first analytical claim one makes or accepts and to dismiss subsequent analytical claims. Lewin discusses three such strategies: argument from convention or compositional process; argument from structural importance; argument from practicality. The argument from convention or compositional process asserts that the relevant musical feature is forced into existence by stylistic convention or compositional process and so should be set aside as a musical feature worthy of analysis (pp. 18, 27–28). The argument from structural importance asserts that competing analytical claims can be ranked (according to some principle) so that lower ranked claims may be set aside (p. 34). The argument from practicality asserts that while there may be no intellectually respectable way to resolve contradictions brought about by conflicting analytical claims, the exigencies of the real world compel us to pursue a single analytical narrative. According to Lewin, the argument explicitly rests on an analogy to performance: a performer must select from a number of respectable options and so should an analyst (p. 76). Lewin meets these arguments by demonstrating that each involves some form of mystification: by failing to respect the particularity of the music in question; by asserting the importance of certain musical elements over others; or by confusing the goals and functions of analysis and those of performance. Lewin’s own method for resolving contradictions that arise between conflicting analytical claims is to assume that the conflicts are illusory and emerge because we have insufficiently determined or qualified the two (or more) claims. One needs to think carefully about the precise contents of the claims in question and then about their relation to the musical features that determine them.

The content of analytical claims is produced by the analytical technology at hand. On Lewin’s view, the application of an analytical technology is largely concerned with the task of translating musical symbols into the relevant technology’s symbols. Although Lewin has his time-span reduction in mind, there is no reason that his remarks cannot extend to all analytical technologies. Zugs, set classes, roman numerals, function labels, time-span reductions are all instances of technological symbols. There are a number of problems we need to bear in mind. The symbols themselves represent abstracted, pre-analyzed packages that one applies to particular real musical situations. There is nothing wrong with this in itself: in
fact, it is precisely why we use technologies. They spare us the task of analyzing each slice of musical time-space from scratch. The problems emerge when one insists upon the concreteness of the abstractions involved, claiming that the symbols successfully capture all of the structural and experiential richness of the corresponding musical situation, a particular slice of musical time-space. The confusion of technological symbols with the concrete musical situation increases dramatically when symbols of the technology at hand—I have in mind Schenkerian analysis, Rameau’s fundamental bass, and Lewin’s own time-span reductions—look very much like musical symbols. Furthermore, the string of technical symbols one produces under a given technology does not itself constitute analysis in any serious sense of the word: the technology abstracts certain features from the real musical situation and transforms those features into symbols. That is all the technology produces for us. We require the additional step of actualizing and evaluating the symbolized version of the music. On Lewin’s view, central to this step is conceiving the technical symbols as “frames” for directing our experience of the music at hand. In other words, the symbols become analytically meaningful only when directed away from themselves and their claims of completeness, and employed to link the symbols’ associated theoretical content to the musical situations they represent. Bridging this gap is not a matter of testing whether the technology has properly engaged with the music. That orientation is premised on the idea that there are facts about the music that transcend theorizing and with which any analysis (which is to say, any string of technological symbols) must comply. (Allan Keiler’s [1978] very useful critique of empiricist approaches to theory and analysis provides a fuller dismantling of this line of reasoning.) Instead of testing the analysis against the music, Lewin examines exactly which aspects of the music the analytical symbols capture in connection with the theoretical concepts they represent and which aspects they do not, so that one is able to direct one’s experiences to settle upon the framework they provide. The experiences that result are heavily qualified and highly contingent. That is their nature.

So the benefit for us of Lewin’s distinction between analytical technology and analytical methodology is that it allows us to sort out and organize our thinking about the various issues and problems of analysis. A further benefit emerges from the particular characterization of the formal systems of analysis as instances of technology: it allows us to import various theories of technology into our thinking about theory and analysis. In other words, we might benefit from understanding Lewin’s use of the word “technology” not as an instance of figurative language, but quite literally. Now, I am fully aware that in order to be genuinely respectable, my claim that formal apparatus of analysis are meaningful instances of technology requires a suitable working definition of “technology” that will allow us to disperse items like Zug, set-class type, and interval under its denotative umbrella.
For present purposes, however, it will suffice to let the reader supply her own definientia.

The horizon of theories of technology is extensive and I have no intention whatsoever of surveying even a small sample of it here. Instead, I will invoke just one such theory, one I imagine Lewin himself would have found interesting and, more importantly for us, one that seems to capture certain aspects of Lewin’s remarks about analysis and extend them in helpfully provocative ways. I have in mind Freud’s remarks on technology in *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930/1961). I’ll begin by citing the relevant passage:

> With every tool man is perfecting his organs, whether motor or sensory, or removing the limits to their functioning. Motor power places gigantic forces at his disposal, which, like his muscles, he can employ in any direction; thanks to ships and aircraft neither water can hinder his movements; by means of spectacles he corrects defects in the lens of his own eye; by means of the telescope he sees into the far distance; and by means of the microscope he overcomes the limits of visibility set by the structure of his retina. In the photographic camera he has created an instrument which retains the fleeting visual impressions, just as a gramophone disc retains the equally fleeting auditory ones; both are at bottom materializations of the power he possess of recollection, his memory. With the help of the telephone he can hear at distances which would be respected as unattainable even in a fairy-tale. Writing was in its origin the voice of the absent person. . . .

> All these assets he may lay claim to as his cultural acquisition. Long ago he formed an ideal conception of omnipotence and omniscience which he embodied in his gods. To these gods he attributed everything that seemed unattainable to his wishes, or that was forbidden to him. One may say, therefore, that these gods were cultural ideals. Today he has come very close to the attainment of this ideal, he has almost become a god himself. Only, it is true, in the fashion in which ideals are usually attained according to the judgment of humanity. Not completely, in some respects not at all, in others only half way. Man has, as it were, become a kind of prosthetic god. When he puts on all his auxiliary organs he is truly magnificent; but those organs have not grown on to him and they still given him much trouble at times. [pp. 37–39]

Freud’s remarks cause us to think carefully about the work carried out by a given technology. In the first instance, he tells us that technology perfects inadequacies or overcomes limitations of a human motor or sensory organ. We have already noted that analytical technology allows us rapidly and efficiently to relate musical objects and processes to pre-analyzed packets, by transcoding musical symbols
into other symbols, whose meaning we link to particular musical concepts. But that is not all it does: analytical technology abstracts and then concentrates or intensifies the experiential and conceptual processes of the technology’s author. Accordingly, Schenkerian technology, for example, does not simply convey Schenker’s personal modes of hearing and thinking—we can have no accurate idea what his experiential life would have been like—but rather, the technological apparatus of Schenkerian theory conveys Schenker’s modes of hearing and thinking as he would like them to be; which is to say he selected and extended out of the manifold of his musical experience particular elements and then deposited them in his technology. One could say the same thing about any analytical technology and its author: Lewin and his time-span reduction, for another example.

A second theme in Freud’s discussion, emerging from the first, is his characterization of technology as a prosthetic. The point of the image is to emphasize that technology, as an extension of some human capacity, is simultaneously a native and an alien element: it is something we “put on.” Working from Freud’s remarks, McLuhan (1994) points out in his study of media that the characteristic power of technology to extend human capabilities demands a corresponding act of autoamputation in order to implement it (p. 46). All of this interacts suggestively with Lewin’s various methodological warnings that we adequately qualify and determine the “frames” for experience that our analytical technologies produce. Clearly, in this context, the conventional notion that analytical technologies are simply modes of presentation for one’s individual concrete musical experience is an unhelpful mystification.

I have left for last Lewin’s own summation of his various methodological discussions, scattered through the essay, in his “methodological rule-of-thumb”: “Every valid analytical statement is of the basic form: ‘I hear this about this specific piece,’ as qualified by an implicit ‘and I think you can too’” (p. 98). I must admit I cannot see how this rule-of-thumb adequately covers the main methodological lessons of the essay. And, in trying to implement the rule-of-thumb, I have no idea how genuinely to employ “and I think you can too” as a regulative principle. Furthermore, the formulation has a certain piety about it, and appears to lean quite heavily for its authority on a degree of “vigor and warmth” in its expression. Yet the rule accrues a certain power, and its piouness dissipates somewhat, when one recalls that “hearing” for Lewin is a rich phenomenon that one seeks constantly to transform and deepen. He tells us that the reason for analyzing music in the first place is our belief that the composer “has something to teach our perception” (p. 21). As such, it is appropriate, I think, to link Lewin’s general project

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2 In that sense, whatever else the essay represents, it is a suitable answer to Mark DeBellis’s “paradox of analysis,” namely, that “analysis must be true to the hearing and at the same time go beyond” (1999, p. 492).
for music theory with Humboldt’s enlightenment project of Bildung, even though Lewin’s version misses many of the moral particularities of Humboldt’s original expression. David Sorkin (1983) provides a summary of Humboldt’s two essential conditions for self-formation:

An individual’s development depends upon finding appropriate outlets for his energy so that he can engage in activity by means of which he realizes his potentialities and increases his abilities. One essential condition for such activity is freedom: one must be assured of the freedom to act for oneself, that is, to be self-reliant. A second essential condition is “social intercourse”: one develops through the voluntary interchange of one’s individuality with that of others. Self-formation, in other words, requires social bonds. [pp. 58–59]

Humboldt’s two conditions for Bildung are reflected in the two halves of Lewin’s methodological rule-of-thumb, particularly when one bears in mind that the assertion “I hear this about this specific piece,” must be conditioned by a great deal of reflection and qualification, and hence is always provisional. In this context, the second stipulation, “and I think you can too,” is not in the first instance a projection of the abilities of others, but the initial stage in the “voluntary interchange of one’s individuality with that of others.” It would be fair to point out that in contrast to Humboldt’s project, Lewin’s self-formation is limited to the music-theoretical self, that his interest is in the development of his musical potentialities and abilities rather than his more broadly moral ones.
APPENDIX

This appendix contains a selection of excerpts from David Lewin’s letters to Oliver W. (Tim) Neighbour during, and shortly after, his sabbatical year in Paris. The correspondence from this period consists of thirty-seven letters, from April 1973 until October 1974, ranging in length from a short paragraph to five single-spaced typed pages. Neighbour’s responses from this period are not preserved. The original versions of the letters were maintained by Neighbour for more than thirty years. After David’s death in 2003, Neighbour presented the letters to June Lewin, who donated them the Library of Congress as part of the David Lewin Collection. Paul Sherrill, who created a preliminary inventory of that collection during the summer of 2008, made a complete copy of the correspondence with Neighbour, from which the following selections are transcribed. Some of these excerpts illuminate aspects of the genesis of *Morgengruß*, as discussed in the introduction to this volume. Others are referred to in Richard Cohn’s essay, and are furnished here to provide a fuller context for those quotations or references.

**June 28, 1973, typed from Stony Brook**

A Bach/Schoenberg parallel which has interested me at times: both come on with the impression of tremendous logic, rigor, and organization; while both are essentially rhapsodic improvisational types. This seems an interesting piece of creative psychology . . . hiding oneself behind such an image. For me, Beethoven is exactly the opposite in this respect . . . his come on is that of a wooly anarchist and iconoclast, while actually his music is the most logical and tightly organized of any I know, from any point of view one examines it. These notions I think contribute to my sense of tension in the works of those composers, in a positive way. Though I don’t think this sort of schizophrenia
in style is essential to a first rate composer . . . viz Schubert, Wagner, et al. . . . and similar psychological attitudes I believe to have been harmful to some, viz Brahms, Stravinsky et al.

August 21, 1973, handwritten from Paris. The letter evidently responds to a query from Neighbour to elaborate on his judgment of Schubert in the letter of June 28 quoted above.

Schubert's Hinrichtung [summary judgment]: So many of the songs are among the most profound and subtle and powerful dramatic conceptions in music that I know, that I unhesitatingly place him in my private first rank without even considering the instrumental music. And I don't mean Erlkönig, Junge Nonne, etc. I mean things of the sort I was getting at in my footnotes on Ihr Bild.¹

[continuing, after some analytical remarks on “Ihr Bild”]

Or the fantastic formal complexity of Morgengruss, a “simple” song, where Schubert “misses” the obvious 2-part form of the poem with a 3-part musical phrase structure (not to mention the through-composed rhythm of the accompaniment, from ♩ ♩ etc., thru ♩ ♩ etc, thru ♩ ♩ ♩, to ♩ ♩ ♩ etc). but actually does set the 2-part form too, not in the rhythmic motives, but in the large harmonic structure:

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  phrases:
    poem: a a b a a b
    harmony: I → V(7) → I

  (AND AROUND AGAIN!)
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so that the high e of So muss . . . answers the high f of als wär . . . in the most literal sense (the V(7) “measure” above being all the questions of the 1st stanza of the text, the I being the answer; the high f 7th of the V, resolving not until the high e of So muss . . . ). The way the distinguishing rhythmic motives of the “b” line of the text are used in this connection:

♩ ♩ ♩ ♩ ♩ ♩ ♩ ♩ ♩ ♩ . . . the first (V) echo simply emphasizing ♩ ♩ ♩ ♩ ♩ ; then the triplet element taking off at the corresponding I echo at m. 16, the “echo” becoming a little round, and the ♩ element augmenting into ♩ ♩ ♩ ♩ ♩ ♩ ♩ ♩ ♩ ♩ at the very end, to recall the high f—high e of the large structure as well as the initial accompaniment rhythm.

¹ The reference is to a paper that Lewin had shared with Neighbour in typescript, which was later published as Lewin 1973.
And how everything ties up with the strophic structure (can’t go into that here) and the state of mind of the poet (ditto).

February 6?, 1974, typed from Paris, pertaining to the music of Orlando de Lasso.

You want to know a great deal more about Orlando Pensieroso Penseroso than I do, so I can’t really respond in any constructive sense to your ideas. The only juvenalia I know of his is the chromatic Sybil-songs piece, which immediately struck me as an offensive bit of business. It would be hard for me to say why, except that my immediate reaction was: what a perfect piece for someone in PNM [Perspectives of New Music] to analyze! Then I discovered that Bill Mitchell had actually run it through a Schenker meat-grinder in Music Forum! He “proves” that it is really in C (sic!) and that you can brush all the sharps and flats away like flies if you know the inside information. Well! This “new method of analysis” certainly doesn’t bring anything forrader. But, I think, the trouble isn’t with the method (at least not necessarily); the trouble is that WM has his priorities reversed: instead of using the (any and all) analytic techniques at his disposal to get into a piece that fascinates him, he is finding a piece that he can twist a bit in order to fit a predetermined abstract idea about how all these pieces “ought to” behave. (Too bad if they don’t!) In the course of doing so, too bad if the piece is obviously in a plagal G-mode, because Schenker would think that was naughty; so to make the piece more respectable (and “advanced” too!) we can just pretend that all the tonics are dominant and all the (plagal) dominants are tonics. My point would include, though, that the kind of linear analysis WM undertakes can yield just as much (which I don’t think is very much here) if he would call a spade a spade... the lines are either there or they aren’t, whether C or G is a “tonic.” WM also ignores what to me is the most striking harmonic feature of the piece: the balanced excursions through the circle of fifths, first in the sharp direction, then in the flat. Of course I’m riding my own hobbyhorse here, but those gestures are so clear to me, particularly as they coincide with the phrase structure, that I have no immodesty about applying the notion for what it’s worth... however (and this is crucial) with the idea of enjoying the piece more as a result, not with the idea of finding an interesting exemplar for my abstract theoretical notions about inversional balance! Of course WM has to ignore that, in order to remove all the chromaticism and reduce the piece to a diatonic structure, which is what he wants to do with it (he certainly doesn’t want to listen to it.) Now for my Schlusskadenz: the problem isn’t with methods of analysis, new, old, or middle-aged; the problem is with the musical and intellectual honesty...
and responsibility and maturity of the analyst, whatever techniques he uses. In short, alas, with the nature of the Allzumenschlich human race. The obsession with technique for technique’s sake is only one symptom of that disease. If one uses (any methods of) analysis properly, in that sense, they shouldn’t only help you do whatever else you want to do, and not lead “in the opposite direction” from it. I went over this, of course, in my response to Ed Cone’s article in PNM; it’s exactly what I had in mind when I wrote “… TO THE EXTENT HE (a theorist) APPROACHES THE MUSIC WITH THAT AIM (of finding an example to fit his theories), HE IS NOT ANALYSING IT!” This seems so crystal-clear to me that I was chagrined to find that Ed couldn’t even see what I meant, in his reply, let alone concede anything toward my point.


Now, attitudes toward AM [AS, that is, Arnold Schoenberg], the “method/system”, etc., chapter 4: the issues remain cloudy, but the cloud is beginning to assume sort of shape, in our exchanges. Your overriding interest is in the man and his music. Mine is too, when I have my Analysis hat on. That is when I make Dr. Jekyll type statements which, from your point of view. But I have at least two other hats which I wear on occasion, which is when I say those nasty things. One I would call my Theory hat. When you get around to Lewin/Cone, you’ll see what I mean by distinguishing this from my Analysis one. You probably will not agree with me that it is possible (much less desirable) to distinguish the hats conceptually. On that issue, you would be on Ed’s side and not mine. Incidentally, I have a great deal of respect for EC also; among other things, I took several courses from him with great profit at P’ton (or, as we used to call it, the Six and Twelve Store.) Then I have still another bonnet which, however, I don’t wear in print; my Composer hat. With that hat on, my interest in either AS or serialism is as completely self-serving as my interest in Mozart or tonality… more so as regards tonality in any case. Baldly, what interests me then is “what’s in it for me to use.” From that point of view, my tendency is also to try to separate AS’s technique “the system”, to the extent that I can, from AS’s personal musical profile; I am interested in using “the system” as a matter of public domain, so to speak, but of course not interested in writing watered-down pastiches of Schoenberg’s personal discourse. And of course, in between the system and AS’s personal manner lies a large area which one could classify as the “usual” sorts of technical things a composer can learn by studying the work of another
a great composer of another generation. This area, I think, contains such things as control of rate-of-change that you cite (here one can learn much from Mozart also, and beyond that, from concurrent study of both composers.) And this area merges fuzzily, for me, into “the system” at one extreme and personal manner at the other. Now one of these fuzzy boundaries exists for any composer; the one between craft and personal manner. It seems to me that what we are arguing, in this context, is whether or not there is also a fuzzy boundary at the other end, between craft and “method” (to vary the terminology,) in Schoenberg’s case. I am claiming that there is such, and you are claiming that there isn’t (more or less, when all the endless qualifications are made.) A lot of the reason I am prepared to maintain and defend that position, personally, has to do with my intuition as a composer. That is, I feel that I can use “the method” as a vehicle for my own expression to a considerable extent, without feeling bound not only to Schbg’s personal manner, but more significantly by his general “style,” the latter involving predilections for certain kinds of musical situations, and certain ways of treating and working out their musical implications. Of course I realize that this may be largely an illusion on my part. I don’t think it is, but even if it is, it would be. I don’t pretend to Olympian stature as a composer, but I’m very sure that every composer who has ever written twelve-tone music has experienced a similar feeling, if he is worth his salt as an artist, a self-respecting artist, of whatever rank. (At least until recently, when it has become possible and even fashionable to write serial music without having heard any of Schbg’s music . . . or any music at all, for that matter.) I’m sure Webern felt this, and I’m sure Berg did too, though he probably would never have dared admit it to himself. It’s more than obvious that Stravinsky felt it. Now perhaps I, together with this lesser constellation of luminaries and others, we have been all been. Were/are we all just kidding ourselves? Very possibly, but even it may be that all “the method” amounts to is a certain way means by which obscure electrical circuits in the brains, or endocrine secretions in the blood, of many composers at a certain period in history have been stimulated, in such a way as to inspire the creative results: results when the composers play the appropriate mental games. I’m not being completely sarcastic about this, I think there is probably at least a grain of truth in it, and possibly a good deal more. I would however, argue that even to the extent the method is such an illusion, it has been and is. Composers have been and are fooling themselves, in considering that they can use “the method” without being bound by Schoenberg’s “style” (as above), the illusion was/is artistically necessary, in order to accomplish anything; and it has turned out to be quite productive. And then, to what extent can one separate a tenet which is necessary and productive for artists, from one which is artistically “true.” The solution to this puzzle will appear in next week’s issue. Best, David
May 22, 1974, typed from Paris

Our culture, among the classes who aspire to “education” (and in the US that is virtually everyone,) puts an impossibly high premium on “having SOMETHING TO SAY” with that sort of emphasis. Much as I imagine all Spartans had to keep up the pretense of being superheroes: I doubt that the level of actual courage and fortitude was very much higher than would normally be found anywhere, it was just that they put on a better show of it. . . . very likely for the original highly practical purpose of keeping richer and more populous cities from attacking them. I cannot recall much in my own education that ever suggested, as more than a literary conceit, that there might be something to be said for the ideal of simply living an honest life, doing an honest and useful job with some pride and care, and spreading companionship and cheer among one’s fellow creatures. Not one bit of it; rather, what was not technique and craft in one area or another was all: “in your opinion, do the ideas of Marx or those of Freud pose the greater problem for our times?” I turned in my paper roughly as follows: “I do not consider myself qualified to answer this question. I doubt very much that anyone is, and I do not see why you expect a college freshman who has studied little psychology and a good deal less economic and political history to be able to give you any sensible discussion on the basis of a few general lectures and a little basic reading.” My tutor was most sympathetic (I cherish a fantasy that he was secretly pleased,) but explained carefully to me that I really must hand in some sort of theme, if only as evidence that I had attended the lectures and done the required reading. He said that the topic was assigned simply to “stimulate thought” among the students. I replied that I found the lectures and reading quite stimulating, and that I would be very interested in learning a good deal more about either or both of the gentlemen in question, and what they had to say. But I did not find what I had to say about either of them, at that point, all that interesting or stimulating. After some smoking and drinking, I gradually caught the sense that I was being a bad sport about all this, so I went back to my room and eventually turned in the expected maunderings. Naturally, since I happen to be had the good fortune to be a reasonably studious, intelligent and articulate type, I ended up with an excellent grade in the course. But I never did shake a mild nausea over the whole thing. And, after I had started teaching myself, the whole business, and countless other similar incidents in my “general education”, returned to hit me with a sudden shock: what of the many students who did not have the academic talents that I did, who were not able to look at the whole affair as a silly game. Who must have felt “my God, what a helpless dunce I am: I can’t think of SOMETHING TO SAY.” And who doubtless felt that all the other students in the course, save themselves alone, were turning out masterpieces of insight and analysis. Well, what of them? There they are, the Harvard Class of ’54, in their early forties
with a median (not average) income of $40,000, infesting the Establishment all over. (Those of us who pull the median down are infesting the academic Establishment to the same extent.) And what is their impression of education? What can it be? One of us, incidentally, was Teddy Kennedy, who was expelled for cheating on an examination, which seems to me by no means the least sensible reaction to the situation. (He was later readmitted and graduated, for reasons unknown to me and perhaps better not known.) Well, my guess is that most of these people are still feeling like helpless dunces. And they think their education has enabled them to fool others into thinking they are not, when circumstances require. And they live in quasi-superstitious awe of people who can fool them in that respect. Why? Because first, they have been brainwashed into believing that SAYING SOMETHING is the most wonderful thing anyone can do. And, second SAYING SOMETHING (always in capitals) has been impressed upon them as a deed which requires grandiose genius far beyond their imagination, let alone their capacity. Nobody has ever taught them either the means ability or the value of saying something (in lower case) how to say something (in lower case), nor the value of doing so; nor have they been encouraged to see if they have anything worth saying (as opposed to SAYING). Nor have they ever been encouraged to feel that, even if they have nothing to say (as opposed to SAY), this is not a matter for shame and disgrace, but a perfectly normal and natural human condition, and that the exploration of the issue itself, while they were in school, is worthwhile in any case for the knowledge of themselves they can acquire in the process of the experience. And, worst of all, the whole system, as you point out, is self-perpetuating: the new generation of academics, with nothing to say but a great talent for putting on the act of SAYing, intimidates the new generation of students. As far as the teachers themselves are concerned, I think it is only reasonably humane treatment that they should be put into a pleasant asylum, such as a university, where they can indulge their fantasies and mock-combats and mutual back-scratchings. But they should be kept in a different ward from the students. The students, in my academic Republic, should all be given their degrees upon entrance (they are probably brighter and better informed at that point than they ever will be again in their lives.) They should then be told that those who wish to withdraw, with their degrees, are free to do so; those who wish to remain are also free to do so for a certain number of years, with free access to the library and the privilege of visiting the faculty ward at certain regular hours (not so much as to disturb the professors unduly.) After reaching a certain stage of immunity to the disease, their visiting privileges can be extended accordingly. Ah well. I told you I was cynical.

The impetus of the book has at least propelled me into beginning the Schubert analysis, which I think you will enjoy very much. I don’t imagine anyone will want to publish them, but I’ll send you a typescript in any case. So far I have 70
longhand pages all on Morgengruss, interspersed with much discussion on what the analysis is and is not doing, what Schenker how to hear “both/and” instead of “either/or” without intellectual confusion, why a “larger context” is not the same as a “more important context,” what Schenker sketches do and do not mean in the latter regard, how to handle them for what they are worth without anxiety that they should be worth more, and without pretending they are either worth more or worth-less, etc. etc. But mainly a lot of interesting things to hear in the piece, along with perhaps too much rubbing the reader’s nose in the fact that this is the point of the project. I thought I would do seven or eight songs, but now I feel that four or five will already be a pretty hefty project.

July 12, 1974, typed from Paris. Lewin had sent Neighbour a draft of the Morgengruss essay, and is responding to Neighbour’s response, not preserved.

You are actually guinea-pig #2: I tried it first on June, who has played flute at a good amateur level, taken a year of academic harmony, and had a lot of experience in theater, academic and practical. Your reaction to the “ring structure” agrees with hers completely. So I must suppose that the more Byzantine of my Talmudic convolutions (is this metaphor possible?) remains unsichtbar, unvorstellbar, etc., from all but myself. And I’ll come back to the organization after a suitable period of oblivion, when I can sense better just where the convolutions don’t make the points I am evidently hallucinating into them.

You and she diverge sharply, though, on the rebarred Beethoven. In fact, one reason I put that whole unsavory episode in was that, upon reading up to that point, her reaction was “all these criteria are clear enough, but I still don’t have the feeling I would know how to go about applying them to a passage I wanted to analyse.” On hearing that, I got the wind up (also recalling similar past reactions from students in courses) and decided that I had better be more explicit in cautioning the reader against the whole idea of “applying the criteria” in any such sense. I thought that the hideous example of what could happen if one does “apply the criteria” in that way would be very much to the point, as a warning in that respect. And also to point up exactly what my lofty “rule-of-thumb” really means as a matter of common-sense practice: if you don’t hear it first, don’t “analyse” it. I still think it works. And she found it clarifying also. My impression Your immediate response was what I indicated as the proper one: why are you spouting nonsense? (Such nonsense that I couldn’t even keep my rebarring straight... thanks for the correction. Also for the correction of the actual score, which I was temporarily just quoting from memory... but what you point out there just makes the rebarred version even
more musically nonsensical without destroying its “logic” one iota . . . all the better for my diabolical purposes.) I have some sense that you didn’t perhaps get the drift of my diabolism at this point. Partly perhaps because I sneak it over on the reader with a straight face initially, rather than warning him in advance of what I’m doing.

September 7, 1974, handwritten from Belmont, Massachusetts.

Now your three categories (i) what I (you, one) hear(s); (ii) what I (et al) think AS planned; (iii) what I (et al) infer that is going on but is not consciously planned: all this, it seems to me, is mainly an analytic red herring. Of the “three-part form” for the strophe of Morgengruss. Did FS consciously conceive three phrases to set a blatantly 2-part text? Intellectually, one suspects so, by the very nature of the situation. But musically, what does it matter? What is important is that I hear the 3 phrases and with a certain effect, part of which I can communicate. And a lot of the effect has to do with the very relation to the 2-part text and concomitant 2-part musical features. How does one know what “consciously” means here, anyway? Do composers ever write “consciously” in the most literal sense of that word? These are interesting questions, but not for analysis of the music. Coming back to (i), (ii), (iii) above in that context, I would say (and this is quite personal):

(i) I could never report publically any feature about a piece that I could “infer” intellectually, no matter how convincing in that respect, that did not correspond at least to some vague or inchoate aural sensation that I felt had something to with the phenomenon I was formulating intellectually, though not necessarily in any very clear or simple fashion.

(ii) If I found myself intellectually convinced by some phenomenon in a score, without such an aural sensation, I would take that as a symptom that I had not lived with the piece enough. I would keep working or perhaps put aside for a shorter or longer time, pending a fresh hearing. I would not try to force myself to “hear” it, for obvious reasons. But also I would not immediately conclude that the intellectual idea was completely a false trail. The latter for the simple reason that the reason that I analyze e.g. AS’s music is because I believe he heard things I don’t, that my ear can learn from his. If I’m intellectually convinced he was “doing” something (consciously or no), my presumption is that he was hearing something somehow related to what he was “doing” and that there is thus something around that I would catch aurally sooner or later if I kept plugging. The tricks here are patience and honesty. Unfortunately these virtues are not those to be cultivated in most scholar musical circles, academic or performing. I am happy with a student in a beginning analysis course if
I am convinced he has really heard, with full awareness, a fair amount of what there is to hear in two or three good short pieces. But this doesn’t prepare him for his typical “analysis” exam question, e.g. “Analyse the first movement of Beethoven’s 3rd Symphony (30 minutes).” Or if he is a performer, the equivalent: play in the Eroica under a new conductor with one hour of rehearsal.

(iii) conscious or unconscious: how do I know? All I know is what I hear and intellectually surmise. Personally, I don’t care. I admit the problem is interesting, biographically, psychologically, culturally, etc. But not, for me, analytically; and I am personally not all that interested in the other tacks. I suspect most composers have had many experiences similar to that of AS with the f minor theme in the Op. 9 . . . I know I have (I also don’t find his analysis of that theme so wonderful as he does, even though I empathize with his excitement.) All composers I know have been struck at times, hearing or looking at an old piece, by the feeling “my, how clever I was.” Some more than others. But it seems reasonably uncorrelated with the amount of deliberate cerebration going on at the time of composition. So? Best, David


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