

actualization of that material. Parts of songs may be repeated *ad libitum*, and this process of freely repeating a part is given special semantic recognition: it is called "doubling." It is in doubling that the most freedom of embellishment is permitted. The natives find particular pleasure in these improvisations and report that such repetitions "mek it sweet."³⁶ Not only is the singer permitted freedom with respect to repetition, but he also has considerable latitude with regard to the order of the several phrases of the song. One singer told Roberts: "You can change it aroun', you know, an' sing about the akee in de middle or at de en."³⁷

Embellishments also receive recognition as facets of artistic expression. The more noteworthy deviations are referred to as "flourishes." According to Roberts, the technique of embellishment, of flourishing, has reached a level of consciousness which "almost amounts to extemporaneous composition."³⁸


Evidence that such songs are indeed a kind of ideal type is furnished by the fact that the natives themselves believe that the thread of the song is all one needs to maintain the identity of a song. This process of variation is often more noticeable in the performance of instrumental music where the presence of a text does not act either as a restraining, conserving influence or as a kind of "automatic" cause of slight deviation. One flute player heard by Roberts was a particularly accomplished musician, and her report of his performance is most interesting.

No one would have been more capable of playing a part over exactly, yet this he seldom seemed able to do. The urge to embellish and play with the tune was greater than any to reproduce it exactly. I would whistle the two versions to him and emphasize the differences, which he would readily perceive, but when asked which was correct he would laughingly reply that it made no difference if one had the thread. He said the flourishes were not the tune proper, which always, (or nearly always) remained the same, and so it did within limits that are rather difficult to define.³⁹

The relationship between deviation and aesthetic pleasure (and aesthetic play) is emphasized throughout this article. According to Roberts, such folk musicians weave in "variations at every opportunity. The more clever, the more pleasure they give."⁴⁰ Changes in

detail "were welcomed with delight and it was in these that the individual expressed his own self."⁴¹

Much of this material duplicates what has already been discussed in connection with ornamentation. For in the case of folk material, successive deviation is also successive embellishment. By way of illustration, Example 104 presents Bartók's transcription of two verses of a folk song together with what he has analyzed to be the basic structure underlying the elaborately embellished version which the singer actually presents.⁴² In this example, at least, it seems quite clear that successive ornamentation is not a direct product of changes in text. The role of text changes in determining ornamentation is often overemphasized since it is almost as common to embellish and vary two verses which have precisely the same text



EXAMPLE 104 *

as it is to vary the ornaments applied to verses with different texts, though, of course, textural changes will intensify the tendency to vary ornamentation.

Real jazz, as most writers have recognized, is a kind of folk music involving both simultaneous and successive improvisation upon a basic ground plan. This ground plan is essentially harmonic, though the specific tune used as the basis for variation may also be an important departure point for embellishment and deviation.

Hot jazz melody is improvisatory, but its structure is held to a coherent formal pattern which restrains it from complete chaos. This coherent pattern is provided by the harmonic sequences of the underlying accompaniment. . . . It is the simple harmonic phrase . . . that provides the unifying influence in hot jazz improvisation. . . . This phrase is repeated over and over again, with occasional interpolations, perhaps,

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of similar chordic sequences, forming a sort of 'ostinato' on which melodic and rhythmic variations are built. . . . At each variation of the harmonic phrase a new melodic and rhythmic superstructure is improvised by the hot player.⁴⁸

Here, too, the aesthetic effect of the music depends both upon the listener's awareness of the basic ground plan, which is the norm from which deviations are made, and upon his ability to compare the successive variations as they follow one another.

It is rather difficult to establish a relationship between successive deviation and affective responses in the realm of primitive music (see p. 239). Yet many observers have noted the fact that primitive musicians do derive aesthetic pleasure from music and particularly from the process of variation. Willard Rhodes, for instance, discusses the aesthetic play interest which singers of different American Indian tribes exhibited in each other's songs and especially in the same song performed by singers of different tribes.⁴⁴ The aesthetic importance of successive deviation in primitive music is also noted by Jones:

But it is quite wrong to think that the tunes are repeated over and over again with no variation at all. There is variation: it is frequent and it is subtle. A slight change here, an extra note there, make all the difference to those who know what they are listening to. . . . It is all a question of nuance: and it is only the practiced European listener who can perceive and enjoy this cunning compound of bold repetition and subtle variation.⁴⁵

INDIRECT EVIDENCE

The evidence advanced in support of the hypothesis that musical meaning, whether affective or aesthetic, arises when a tendency to respond is inhibited is not confined to chapters vi and vii. These chapters present what might be called direct evidence. This material has consistently demonstrated the connection between the inhibition of tendencies (deviation) and the affective aesthetic response. And while this evidence is not exhaustive, it is clearly representative.

The central thesis of this book is also supported by less direct, though not less convincing or important, considerations. First, the very fact that it has been able to furnish a basis for the analysis of

music of very different styles and different cultural levels is persuasive. For it indicates that the account presented has reached a workable level of generality.

Second, the hypothesis advanced has provided the basis for a reasonable and consistent account of many problems heretofore unsolved or ignored. For instance, it has led to a new and fruitful use of Gestalt concepts in aesthetic analysis; it has accounted for the affectivity of the minor mode in Western music without recourse to mathematical mysticism. Employing corollaries of the hypothesis we have been able to understand and explain processes previously merely described; for instance, the "filling in" of tonal systems (the tendency toward equidistance), the use of ornaments, and the introduction of new tones at the end of a musical pattern, and the function of poorly defined pattern processes.

Finally it is important to emphasize that a theory of music does not exist in a kind of splendid, irrelevant isolation. If it is to be fruitful, music theory must not only be internally consistent but it must also be consistent with and relevant to concepts and theories in other realms of thought. Thus it is significant that many of the concepts presented in this book have clear counterparts in the theory of games and in information theory. To cite only one instance of this: it seems possible to equate the inhibition of a tendency, which of necessity gives rise to uncertainty and an awareness of alternative consequences, with the concept of entropy in information theory.

A theory is valuable, not only for conclusions it reaches and the phenomena it explains, but also for the questions and discoveries to which it leads. If the ideas presented in this book can lead to new questions and through them to new answers, if they can lead to reformulations of old questions and through these to new methodologies, and if they can lead to a more fruitful analysis and criticism of music, this will be their best ultimate validation.

VIII

Note on Image Processes, Connotations, and Moods

Image Processes and Affective Experience

The affective experiences thus far discussed result from a direct interaction between a series of musical stimuli and an individual who understands the style of the work being heard. Because the forces shaping such an experience are exclusively musical, the form of the affective experience will be similar to the form of the musical work which brought it into being.

Not all affective experiences are as direct as this. Often music arouses affect through the mediation of conscious connotation or unconscious image processes. A sight, a sound, or a fragrance evokes half-forgotten thoughts of persons, places, and experiences; stirs up dreams "mixing memory with desire"; or awakens conscious connotations of referential things. These imaginings, whether conscious or unconscious, are the stimuli to which the affective response is really made. In short, music may give rise to images and trains of thought which, because of their relation to the inner life of the particular individual, may eventually culminate in affect.

But if such image processes are really unconscious, we can never know them.

... only feeling penetrates into awareness, a feeling aroused by something of which the subject is quite ignorant. Self-conscious minds seem to have a repugnance for such isolated disembodied mental phenomena: they are felt to be morbid and eerie. Consequently a process of rationalization is undertaken at once. Whatever is in the focus of attention at the moment when the affect arises is held to be the direct cause of it.¹

Thus many affective experiences attributed directly to musical stimuli may in point of fact be the products of unconscious image processes. Because neither we nor the subject himself can know anything about such unconscious image processes any discussion of such an experience is clearly impossible.

Often, however, image processes are conscious. The listener is aware of the associations which he makes while listening. Conscious image processes may be either private, relating only to the peculiar experiences of a particular individual, or they may be collective, in the sense that they are common to a whole group of individuals within a culture. The image processes of a whole community will be referred to as connotations.

Private images, even when they are brought to consciousness without psychic distortion, are problematical because it is almost impossible to trace the relationships existing either between the musical stimulus and the image processes aroused or between the image processes and the resultant affect. The peculiar experience of an individual may, for example, cause a "happy" tune to be associated with images of a sad occasion.

Even where the original association appears to be relevant and appropriate to the character of the music being played, affective experience may be a result of the private meaning which the image has for the particular listener. For example, the image of a triumphal procession might within a given culture be relevant to the character of a piece of music; but the association might for private reasons arouse feelings of humiliation or defeat. Thus while the image itself is relevant to the music, the significance which it has for the particular individual is purely personal.

Image processes, whether private or collective, are tremendous temptations toward extramusical diversion. For an image, even though originally relevant to a particular passage, may itself initiate further image processes. The development and proliferation of these may, however, proceed without reference to the subsequent successions of musical stimuli. That is, one image may follow another, not because of the associations which obtain between the images and the progress of the music, but because of the associations in the mind of the listener between the images themselves.²

Neither the form nor the referential content of such experiences, however affective they may be, have any necessary relationship to the form and content of the musical work which presumably activated them. The real stimulus is not the progressive unfolding of the musical structure but the subjective content of the listener's mind.

Yet, in spite of the many and cogent objections which can be leveled against the relevance of such responses, it seems probable that conscious or unconscious image processes play a role of great importance in the musical affective experiences of many listeners. Indeed, it is often difficult for even the most disciplined and experienced listeners to escape the deep-seated power of memory over affective experience.³

It should be noted in this connection that not only do memories frequently result in affective experience but affective experiences themselves tend to evoke memories and arouse image processes appropriate to the character of the affective experience, whether sad or gay, noble or tender, as determined by the objective situation. In other words, even the most purely musical affective experiences may give rise to image processes which, developing their own series of associations, may become independent of the musical succession itself.

Connotation

By connotations, as distinguished from image processes, are meant those associations which are shared in common by a group of individuals within the culture. Connotations are the result of the associations made between some aspect of the musical organization and extramusical experience. Since they are interpersonal, not only must the mechanism of association be common to the given cultural group, but the concept or image must have the same significance for all the members of the group. The concept must be one that is to some extent standardized in cultural thinking; it must be a class concept that has the same meaning for, and produces the same attitudes in, all the members of the group. In the West, for example, death is usually depicted by slow tempi and low ranges, while in

certain African tribes it is portrayed in frenzied musical activity; yet this results from difference in attitudes toward death rather than from differences in the associative processes of the human mind. The particular way in which a connotation is realized or represented in music cannot be understood apart from the beliefs and attitudes of the culture in question.

Some connotations are entirely traditional. Association is by contiguity; i.e., some aspect of the musical materials and their organization becomes linked, by dint of repetition, to a referential image. Certain instruments become associated with special concepts and states of mind. The organ, for example, is associated for Western listeners with the church and through this with piety and religious beliefs and attitudes. The gong is linked by contiguity to the Orient and often connotes the mysterious and the exotic. In fact, even where this association does not seem intended, as in Varèse's *Ionisation*, it tends to modify our response to this music. Certain modes of tonal organization may awaken connotations. The pentatonic mode, for example, is used in the nineteenth century to represent things pastoral. Certain intervals may be used to indicate special concepts or states of mind. For instance, the diminished fifth was closely associated with expressions of grief and anguish during the baroque period. Or specific tunes may be employed to evoke concepts, memories, or image processes. This is a frequent device in the music of Charles Ives.

As a rule such associations are used in combination so that each reinforces the other. If the composer wishes to evoke connotations of piety and those connected with religious beliefs, he will not only employ the appropriate instrument but he will also use techniques of composition—modality, polyphony, and so forth—that have the same associations.

Notice that all these associations are intracultural. The gong will not have a special exotic meaning for the oriental in whose music it is common, though it may have other different associations for him. Nor will the pentatonic mode connote things pastoral to peoples who use this mode for all kinds of music, for cultivated art music as well as for folk music.

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necessary, they are subject to change. Old associations die and new ones come into being. In Western music, for example, the harp is no longer associated, as it was in the Middle Ages, with religious subjects. Because of its use in French music of the late nineteenth century, it is much more likely to be associated with a certain tender vagueness.

A particular epoch may develop quite an elaborate system of connotations in which certain melodic, rhythmic, or harmonic practices become signs of certain states of mind or are used to designate specific emotional states. The composers of the baroque period developed such a system of connotations. Other composers, notably Wagner, have invented their own systems of connotative symbols, in which a specific melody, not just a more or less general figure, indicates and symbolizes a specific idea, concept, or individual.

If our responses to such special systems of connotative or designative symbols are to be really effective, they must become habitual and automatic. This requires time and repeated encounters with a given association. We do not need to learn that an oboe is traditionally a pastoral instrument. By hearing it used in this context time and time again, by reading about pipes and shepherds in literature, and by seeing such instruments depicted in paintings of Pan or Marsyas, we gradually build up a set of powerful associations. Once such an association has become firmly established, our response to it will be just as direct and forceful as if the response were natural.

However important associations made by contiguity may be, they constitute but a small fraction of the total group of connotations evoked by music. Most of the connotations which music arouses are based upon similarities which exist between our experience of the materials of music and their organization, on the one hand, and our experience of the non-musical world of concepts, images, objects, qualities, and states of mind, on the other.

There is a great deal of evidence, some of it intercultural, which indicates that our experience of musical stimuli is not a separate, special category of experience but that it is continuous with and similar to our experiences of other kinds of stimuli.

Both music and life are experienced as dynamic processes of growth and decay, activity and rest, tension and release. These processes are differentiated, not only by the course and shape of the motions involved in them, but also by the quality of the motion. For instance, a motion may be fast or slow, calm or violent, continuous or sporadic, precisely articulated or vague in outline. Almost all modes of experience, even those in which motion is not directly involved, are somehow associated qualitatively with activity. Spring, revolution, darkness, the pyramids, a circle—each, depending upon our current opinion of it, is experienced as having a characteristic motion. If connotations are to be aroused at all, there will be a tendency to associate the musical motion in question with a referential concept or image that is felt to exhibit a similar quality of motion.

The unity of perceptual experience, regardless of the particular sense employed, is also demonstrated by the fact that in experience even single musical tones tend to become associated with qualities generally attributed to non-aural modes of sense perception. This tendency is apparent not only in Western culture but in the cultures of the Orient and in many primitive cultures. In Western culture, for example, tones are characterized with respect to size (large or small), color value (light or dark), position (high or low), and tactile quality (rough or smooth, piercing or round). Furthermore, it should be noted that these qualities are interassociated among themselves; that is, volume is associated with position (e.g., a large object is generally associated with a low position), and both of these are associated with color.⁴

Through such visual and tactile qualities, which are themselves a part of almost all referential experience, tones become associated with our experience of the world. Thus the associations, if any, evoked by a low tone will be limited, though not defined, by the fact that in Western culture such tones are generally associated with dark colors, low position, large size, and slower motion.

Often referential experiences are themselves partly aural. A city, the wind, solitude, or the expressions of the human voice—all have a peculiar quality of sound which music can imitate with varying

success. Such imitation will tend to awaken connotations similar in some respects at least to the experiences which originally conditioned the musical organization.

To what extent the associations arising from similarities between our experience of music and our experience of the non-musical world are products of cultural conditioning and to what extent they are in some sense natural is difficult to say. The many studies made by psychologists, although they present ample evidence of associative consistency within Western culture, throw little light upon the problem of the naturalness of these responses; for the subjects in such experiments have, almost without exception, already been saturated with the beliefs and attitudes of Western culture.

Evidence from primitive and non-Western cultures is not conclusive. Frequently the associations formed are ones which appear natural to us. But sometimes a connotation strikes us as odd or unusual. In the latter case, however, it must be remembered that the association evoked by a given musical passage depends upon the attitude of the culture toward the concept as well as upon the mechanism of association. In other words, although in a given culture one attitude toward an object or process will usually be dominant, others are possible. For example, although in our culture death is generally considered to be a solemn, fearful, and majestic summoner, it has also been viewed as an old friend or as the sardonic mocker of human pretensions. And obviously each of these attitudes would become associated with very different types of musical presentation.

This much, however, is clear: (1) In most cultures there is a powerful tendency to associate musical experience with extramusical experience. The many musical cosmologies of the Orient, the practice of most primitive cultures, and the writings and practices of many Western composers are striking evidence of this fact. (2) No particular connotation is an inevitable product of a given musical organization, since the association of a specific musical organization with a particular referential experience depends upon the beliefs and attitudes of the culture toward the experience. However, once the beliefs of the culture are understood, most associations appear to possess a certain naturalness because the experiences associated are in some sense similar. (3) No matter how natural a connotation may

seem to be, it undoubtedly acquires force and immediacy through cultural experience.

Obviously a complex and subtle connotation is not defined by any single element of the sound organization. Taken individually any one aspect of the musical organization is a necessary but by no means a sufficient cause for defining a given connotation. For instance, while it would not be possible in Western culture to depict the joys of youth in the lowest ranges of the bassoon, high ranges alone would not assure such an association either. Other aspects of the musical organization, such as tempo, dynamics, rhythmic character, and texture, would have to play a part in defining such a connotation.

But the degree of specificity attained in association, the degree to which a given musical disposition will evoke the same or similar connotations in all listeners within the cultural group, is not merely the function of the number of elements defining the connotation. All the elements of music are always present if there is any music at all. That is, there is always texture, whether it be that of a single melodic line or that of a complex polyphonic web; there is always dynamic level, whether it be that of a striking fortissimo or that of a mezzoforte.

The specificity of a connotation depends upon the divergence of the elements of sound from a neutral state. A tempo may be neither fast nor slow; a sound may be neither loud nor soft; a pitch may seem neither high nor low, relative either to over-all range or the range of a particular instrument or voice. From the standpoint of connotation these are neutral states. Connotation becomes specified only if some of the elements of sound diverge from such neutral states.

The elements of sound are interdependent with respect to neutrality and divergence. For instance, changes in pitch are generally accompanied by changes in dynamics, timbre, and sometimes tempo. The relationship is physical as well as psychological. If a 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ r.p.m. phonograph record is played at 78 r.p.m., pitch will get higher, dynamics louder, and timbre more piercing. Thus it is possible to build one divergence upon another. For instance, if tempo is fast and pitches are high, very soft dynamics will be experienced as a

divergence, not only from the neutral state of moderate loudness, but also from the "contingent neutrality" in which a rapid tempo and high pitches are generally accompanied by loud dynamics.

In general, the more markedly the elements of a sound pattern diverge from neutrality the more likely they are to evoke connotations and the more specific those connotations are liable to be. Note that this accounts for the fact that many musical works arouse a wide variety of connotations. For the connotations aroused by a piece of music which, on the whole, employs normal ranges, moderate tempi, and so forth will be determined more by the disposition and susceptibility of the particular listener than by the nature of the musical organization itself.

But even where the most complex disposition of the musical materials and the most effective deviations are presented in a piece of music, they function only as necessary causes for the particular connotative experience aroused.

In the first place, unlike literature or the plastic arts, which generally speaking cannot be understood apart from the designative symbols they employ, most musical experience is meaningful without any reference to the extramusical world. Whether a piece of music arouses connotations depends to a great extent upon the disposition and training of the individual listener and upon the presence of cues, either musical or extramusical, which tend to activate connotative responses.

In the second place, unlike verbal symbols or the iconic signs used in the plastic arts, musical sounds are not, save in a few isolated instances, explicit in their denotation. They limit and define the associations possible but, in the absence of either a specific musical symbolism such as Wagner's or a definite program furnished by the composer, they cannot particularize connotation. The musical materials and their organization are the necessary causes for a given connotation but, since no summation of necessary causes can ever amount to a sufficient cause, the sufficient cause of any connotation experienced must be supplied by the listener.

The fact that music cannot specify and particularize the connotations which it arouses has frequently been cited as a basic diffi-

culty with any attempt to theorize about the connotative meanings of music. Yet from one point of view, this flexibility of connotation is a virtue. For it enables music to express what might be called the disembodied essence of myth, the essence of experiences which are central to and vital in human existence.

The human mind has an uncanny power of recognizing symbolic forms; and most readily, of course, will it seize upon those which are presented again and again without aberration. The eternal regularities of nature, the heavenly motions, the alternation of night and day on earth, the tides of the ocean, are the most insistent repetitions forms outside our own behavior patterns. . . . They are the most obvious metaphors to convey the dawning concepts of life-functions—birth, growth, decadence, and death.⁵

What music presents is not any given one of these metaphorical events but rather that which is common to all of them, that which enables them to become metaphors for one another. Music presents a generic event, a "connotative complex," which then becomes particularized in the experience of the individual listener.

Music does not, for example, present the concept or image of death itself. Rather it connotes that rich realm of experience in which death and darkness, night and cold, winter and sleep and silence are all combined and consolidated into a single connotative complex.

The interassociations which give rise to such a connotative complex are fundamental in human experience. They are found again and again, not only in the myths and legends of many cultures, but also in the several arts. For example, the connotative complex discussed above is made explicit in Shelley's *Ode to the West Wind*:

O thou,
Who chariotest to their dark wintry bed
The winged seeds, where they lie cold and low
Each like a corpse within its grave. . . .

Connotative complexes may be more and less specific. Additional divergences in timbre, dynamic level, and so forth may help to limit the quality of the complex. Association by contiguity or the imitation of actual sound processes heard in the extramusical world may

also play a part in defining the extent of connotation. Finally, connotation may be specified by the presence of a text, a plot, or a program established by the composer.

Ultimately it is the listener who must make connotation concrete. In so doing the listener may draw upon his stock of culturally established images, including those derived from literature and mythology, or he may relate the connotative complex to his own particular and peculiar experiences. But in either case there is a causal connection between the musical materials and their organization and the connotations evoked. Had the musical organization been different, the connotation would also have been different.

Mood

Since, however, connotations are not necessary concomitants of musical experience (see p. 246), a potentially connotative passage may fail to evoke any concrete images whatsoever. Instead the listener may become aware of how the musical passage "feels" in relation to his own designative emotional experiences and the observed emotional behavior of others. The music may, in short, be experienced as mood or sentiment. For not only are connotations themselves intimately associated with moods, in the sense that youth or spring, for instance, are traditionally considered to be times of exuberant and carefree gaiety, but the same psychological and musical processes which arouse specific connotations also evoke definite, though perhaps less specific, mood responses.⁶

In a discussion of the communication of moods and sentiments two important considerations must be kept in mind.

1. The moods and sentiments with which music becomes associated are not those natural spontaneous emotional reactions, which, as noted in chapter I, are often diffuse and characterless. Rather music depicts those modes of behavior, conventionalized for the sake of more efficient communication, which were called "designative emotional behavior." In Western culture, for example, grief is communicated by a special type of behavior: physical gestures and motor behavior tend to minimal; facial expression reflects the cultural picture of sorrow; the range of vocal expression is confined

and often sporadic; weeping is customary; and dress too serves as a behavioral sign. It is this special, culturally sanctioned picture of grief which is communicated in Western music. But such designative emotional behavior is not the only possible way of denoting grief. Were the standardized expression of grief in Western culture different, were it, for instance, that of an incessant and violent wailing and moaning, then the "expression" of grief in Western music would be different.

This is important because it allows for and accounts for variation in mood expression between the music of different cultures. That is, different cultures may communicate moods and sentiments in very different ways, not because the psychological mechanism of association is different but because the behavior patterns denoting mood and emotional states are different.

2. Just as communicative behavior tends to become conventionalized for the sake of more efficient communication, so the musical communication of moods and sentiments tends to become standardized. Thus particular musical devices—melodic figure, harmonic progressions, or rhythmic relationships—become formulas which indicate a culturally codified mood or sentiment. For those who are familiar with them, such signs may be powerful factors in conditioning responses.

Association by contiguity plays a considerable role in the musical definition of mood. A melodic figure, a set of modal relationships, or a harmonic progression is experienced time and time again in conjunction with texts, programs, or extramusical experiences which either designate the mood directly or imply it. In oriental music, for instance, a particular mode or even a particular pitch may become associated with a specific sentiment or humour as well as with connotative concepts such as winter, night, and blackness. Once such associations become habitual, the presence of the proper musical stimulus will, as a rule, automatically evoke the customary mood response. In Western music of the baroque period, to cite only one example, melodic formulas, conventionalized for the sake of communication, attain precision and force through contiguity with texts and programs which fix their meanings within the culture and style.

Mood association by similarity depends upon a likeness between the individual's experiences of moods and his experience of music. Emotional behavior is a kind of composite gesture, a motion whose peculiar qualities are largely defined in terms of energy, direction, tension, continuity, and so forth. Since music also involves motions differentiated by the same qualities, "musical mood gestures" may be similar to behavioral mood gestures. In fact, because moods and sentiments attain their most precise articulation through vocal inflection, it is possible for music to imitate the sounds of emotional behavior with some precision. Finally, since motor behavior plays a considerable role in both designative emotional behavior and in musical experience, a similarity between the motor behavior of designative gestures and that of musical gestures will enforce the feeling of similarity between the two types of experience.

Like connotation, mood or sentiment depend for their definition upon divergence. If the elements of sound are neutral then the mood characterization, if any, will depend largely upon the disposition of the individual listener. That is, there will be no consistency in the responses of various listeners. But, and this is of paramount importance, the fact that the mood is indefinite does not mean that affect is not aroused. For a lack of divergence in the elements of sound does not preclude significant deviation in those dynamic processes which form our affective responses to music.

It was observed earlier that image processes, whether conscious or unconscious, and connotations often result in affective experience. Whether mood responses can eventuate in affect is doubtful. Merely because the musical designation of a mood or sentiment is comprehended by the listener does not mean that the listener responds affectively. It is perfectly possible to be aware of the meaning of behavior without responding as though the behavior were our own. But even an empathetic response to the materials delineating mood or sentiment does not require a resultant affective experience. We may sympathize with the mood of another individual without having an emotional experience ourselves. In fact, although such empathetic behavior may create a psycho-physiological condition in which affect is likely to arise, it is difficult to see what direct causal connection could exist between mood and affect. It appears more

likely that mood eventuates in affect only through the mediation of image processes or connotations. That is, a mood arouses image processes already associated in the experience of the individual with the particular mood response, and these image processes are the stimuli which actually give rise to affect.⁷

The Role of Mood and Connotation in Affective Experience

Not only do mood and connotation frequently give rise to affect but they also color and modify the affective experiences evoked by the musical processes discussed in the preceding chapters. The converse of this is also true; namely, the character of the deviations embodied in a particular work play a part in conditioning our opinion of what, in general terms, its designative content is. If, for instance, we compare the first theme of the rondo of Haydn's Symphony No. 102, in B-flat, with the first theme of the rondo of Beethoven's "Waldstein" Sonata, it is clear that the designative character of each, the roguish and spirited playfulness of the Haydn and the flowing lyricism of the Beethoven, is a product not only of such factors as tempo, phrasing, accompaniment, melodic contour, and so forth but also of the fact that the theme of the Haydn rondo involves considerable irregularity, abruptness, and deception, while the theme of the Beethoven rondo is quite regular and forthright. Once the listener becomes aware of this difference in character, he is definitely prepared for different kinds of movements—for the witty and highly sophisticated surprises of the Haydn and the striking but not unexpected contrasts which mark the Beethoven.

It was stated in the first chapter that an affective experience is differentiated and characterized by the stimulus situation in which it occurs. Both the stimulus and the situation serve to differentiate musical experience from "real-life" experience.

Since musical affective stimuli are obviously different from the referential stimuli of real life, there will always be a generic difference between musical affective experience and the experiences of everyday life. From this point of view musical experience is unique.