

〈III〉
SEEFELDER MANUSCRIPTS ON INDIVIDUATION¹

[237]

〈No. 35.〉 *The Unity of the Thing in Time as Something
Identical in Change or Constancy*²

5 Of what do I have evidence in phenomenological perception,
and by what means do I have an indirect and transcendent
knowledge with regard to this perception? I see a beer bottle that
is brown, and I restrict myself to the brown in its extension, "just
as it is actually given." I exclude everything that is merely meant
10 and not given in the phenomenon. Here is a beer bottle and it is
such and such. I distinguish the appearances of the beer bottle; I
make them into objects. I discover the interconnection of these
appearances; I meet with the consciousness of identity that runs
throughout them. I find that I express this consciousness of
15 identity in these terms: The beer bottle always appears; it
appears as continually the same and as constantly determined in
the same way. And in this process of appearing there are different
appearances. The appearances are not the beer bottle that
appears in them. They are different; the bottle is the same. The
20 appearances are themselves objects. *An* appearance is something
continuously identical. It endures "for a time." Such and such [238]

¹ All of the sketches reproduced here are taken from a bundle of sheets assembled by Husserl himself with the following inscription: "Seefeld manuscripts and older manuscripts on individuation. Seefeld, 1905. Individuation. (Historical note: I already find the concept and correct use of 'phenomenological reduction' in the Seefeld sheets of 1905)." Only the single "older" sketch included in the bundle (from "Halle" – that is, before 1900) is not reproduced here. Sketch No. 35 is precisely and expressly dated "Seefeld, summer vacation 1905." The following sketches – No. 36 through No. 38 – were written later, probably around 1909 at the latest, however; cf. the next note. – Editor's note.

² Husserl plainly dated this sketch "Seefeld, summer vacation 1905." He also made the following remark about it: "Pfänder–Daubert perplexities." The sketch therefore obviously originated in a discussion with A. Pfänder and J. Daubert during the summer vacation at Seefeld in 1905. On Johannes Daubert, see H. Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement* (Den Haag, 1960), I: p. 171. – Editor's note.

parts and moments, held in memory, must be distinguished in this enduring appearance. They again are objects; each is one and the same throughout its duration. This duration appears throughout the duration of the memory; the moment appears as having
 5 been continually identical. And so on.

What, then, is the evidence that belongs to the perception of something "internal," to adequate perception, supposed to be? Evidence is a matter of "judgment." The perception of something
transcendent – the perception of the beer bottle – can "deceive."
 10 That its object exists, and exists in this way, can be "doubted." Perhaps the beer bottle is "other than it appears"; perhaps it does not exist "at all." What does this mean? It means that the perception includes intentions that are still unfulfilled and that it can either undergo fulfillment or "closer determination,"
 15 or "contradiction" and "disappointment." It undergoes fulfillment, etc., in this or that "respect." The perception of something *immanent* includes nothing that can be characterized as "mere intention." Its "consciousness of the object" is perpetually fulfilled; its consciousness of identity is a pure consciousness,
 20 not consciousness characterized by intention and adventitious fulfillment. I grasp everything in the This of the phenomenon in the mode of fulfillment – "This brown changes."³

Perception – Phenomenological Perception

I perceive – *this brown content. It is something that endures.* It
 25 is constantly the same. It covers a certain phenomenological extension. I saw it yesterday; I remember it today. It has lasted until today. Transcendence! Of course, I should not bring in today and yesterday.⁴ Let us restrict ourselves to what is

³ Viewed superficially as it appears in the manuscript, the preceding text, separated by a dash in the manuscript, *follows* the text that it precedes here in this edition; specifically, it is placed after p. 239, line 24 – the location at which, however, according to an indication of Husserl's, the text that is reproduced here is supposed to be attached. The whole sketch therefore begins – thus superficially seen – with the heading: "Perception – Phenomenological Perception." Yet in reality Husserl may subsequently have, first, already placed the text running from this heading to p. 239, line 24 in the position it occupies here and then still later, on a second occasion, have also added (in the preceding direction) the text reproduced above at the beginning of the section. – Editor's note.

⁴ But take note! Can I not at present remember the brown, just as it was given, through phenomenological reduction of the perception of the bottle?

given – phenomenologically given – in the perception: the brown [239]
 “now” seen in its duration, *the* brown. *It* endures. *It* continually
 covers *the same extension*. Now this brown *itself* changes: *it*
 becomes darker, *its* extension changes – *the* extension that it
 5 covers.

What is the source of my absolute certainty that $\langle \text{in} \rangle$ every
phase of the duration identically the same brown is *actually*
 given – if I now understand by brown the species (the infima
 species)? And what is the source of my absolute certainty that
 10 “the same” extension is actually given? *Is there such an absolute*
certainty? What is *the* brown? Is it the species? No. Is it the
 individual, and is the individual a particular, a single case of the
 infima species brown? But that concerns only the momentary
 phase. The brown as single phase of the duration does not
 15 endure; it is merely a phase. We have many individual phases.
 Each is something different. The many do not endure; on the
 contrary, one thing – *the* brown – endures. *The* brown endures,
 and I distinguish phases within its duration. This is an abstrac-
 tion; in the strict sense I distinguish extended sections, *partial*
 20 *durations*. The brown endures in each of these extended sections,
 and it endures throughout them all. And the brown that there
 endures covers an extension, and this same brown is extended
 throughout all the parts of the extension. Separated extensions
 have “the same” brown; that is to say, in this case, browns that
 25 are perfectly alike. Separated durations have a like brown, a
 brown that belongs to the same identical species. *The* brown is
 not the infima species; it is also not, so to speak, the mathemat-
 ically exact single case of the infima species – the individual
 moment, absolutely speaking.⁵

30 And yet it is the individual moment. In the first place, it is
 something individual: it is a *this*, has its absolute individuality, is
 meant as an individual and not as something universal. It is, we
 presuppose, a perceived *this* and has its now, without this
 fact – that it is now – being meant, of course.

35 In the second place, it is not an individual possessing brown-
 ness that is meant; rather, this *brown* is meant, and it is not even
 the brown [as] belonging to this object, the brown that an

⁵ Husserl noted in the margin of the sheet that begins here: “Looked at in 1909”; the
 remark probably extends to the following sheets of the sketch as well. – Editor’s note.

individual thing has, that is meant. At least, the brown certainly does not have to be meant as belonging to the object, any more than when I intend this pleasurable sensation I must intend [240] myself and must intend the pleasurable sensation as mine.

- 5 Therefore I mean this individual brown, the particular case of the species, and – to emphasize this again – not this brown *as* a particular case of the species, as if this relation to the “universal object” were realized.

- The particular case of the species, this brown, is that which is
 10 identical in the act of meaning that the *appearance of the brown* underlies. The appearance of the brown shows the *duration of the brown*; it is an extended appearance in which an extended object stands before me. And the meaning does not aim at the duration but at the brown that endures and is identical in the duration,
 15 i.e., at the brown that *is meant in unity and self-identity*. “Reflection” shows that it is meant in this way. If we “dissect” the temporal duration or if we dissect the phenomenon or appearance in its temporal aspect, we then see concrete parts that are themselves appearances of the same kind as the whole; and
 20 on the basis of this diversity (plurality), we see the perfect likeness of the objects differentiated by the analysis: This brown and *that* one are “the same” – namely, perfectly alike. But if we reflect on the unity of the appearance, we see the identity; there exists a genuine consciousness of identity (a categorial consciousness) in
 25 which the brown stands before me as that which is continuously and identically meant, as that which is meant in unity and self-identity.

- In the one case, we have the *continuous consciousness of unity*, a consciousness that gives unity: *uninterrupted unity*, identity in
 30 the continuity of time, something identical in the continuous flow of time.

- In the other case, we have a consciousness that is broken up, divided into pieces. In the separation of the parts we have a plurality of unities. Each unity is a unity in the foregoing sense
 35 relative to the temporal continuity of each part. But these are distinct unities that do not join together to make up the unity of a whole. Instead, because these unities rest on the unity of *continuous* appearance and on the unity of a continuous consciousness of unity, the identical unity in differences is again

produced. Since they belong to different extents of time, the brown of this and the brown of that part of the duration are different. But since they fill one extent of time continuously, there [241] is *one* object that “endures”; it is one and the same thing that runs throughout this whole extent of time.⁶

Perhaps we must distinguish the following.

We can understand the *continuously appearing brown* as the extended brown, the brown that is spread out and that is constantly one brown, which “extends” throughout time but which is different from phase to phase. That is to say, the *brown-extension* is a unity divided with respect to time, and every part is a different part. The brown-extension is not the duration of an object; it does not endure. Rather, it is something identical that endures, something that stretches, as identical, throughout the temporal extension, which is constantly covered with one brown. The *pervasive consciousness of unity or identity* must not be confused with the *entirely different* consciousness of a *whole made up of moments that continuously fall into sequence with one another in time*. Living in the consciousness of identity, we constantly have *one* thing in the steady continuum, in the continuous flow of the temporal extension. *The object* [of the consciousness of identity] *is not the extension but what is extended*. Evidently we can then always make the extension itself into an object, divide it, and distinguish its parts. The continuity of brown moments, as continuity, is penetrated throughout by the unity of something identical.

Continuity and Unity

This identity lives in the whole continuity; every consciousness of continuity⁷ is the consciousness of a unity, and here we must

⁶ Concerning the foregoing, Husserl noted in the margin: “Cf. Hume, *Treatise*, Lipps, 267f.” He is referring here to David Hume’s *Traktat über die menschliche Natur* [*A Treatise of Human Nature*], Part I: “Über den Verstand” [“Of the Understanding”], translation revised and provided with an index by Theodor Lipps (Hamburg and Leipzig: 1895), p. 267f. Husserl’s copy of this edition has been preserved and shows numerous marginal notes, underlinings, etc., in his hand. In particular, in the paragraph on p. 268 in which Hume speaks of the “principle of individuation,” the following marginal note by Husserl is to be found: “My lectures and investigations concerning time!” – Editor’s note.

⁷ This is precisely the continuity of something identical (of a being) in temporal extension; “qualitative continuity” – the steady gradation of color-moments, etc. – is not what is meant.

always separate that which is unitary and continues from the unity understood as the entirety of the continuum itself. The [242] latter consciousness of continuity is a consciousness of time (yet not consciousness of an "objective" time). We have to distinguish two cases of this consciousness of time: the consciousness of *constancy*, of the duration in which something identical stands before us as something unchanging, the phases belonging to the continuous consciousness of the unity not differentiated at all, except temporally; and the consciousness of *change*, in which that
 5 which is continually unitary and identical changes.

The brown *is continually preserved*; it endures. Here the unity is meant in the steady flow of brown-moments – that which in the case of the apprehension of a brown object makes up the unity of the identical *trait* brown: The object has the determination
 15 brown; it is abidingly brown.

The brown changes (from one nuance of brown into another). It is constantly brown; it is something identical in the temporally extended continuity of brown moments; it is (in ideative abstraction) identically and constantly the *species brown* as *species*, but
 20 the species is not meant. No ideating abstraction is carried out. There is a *moment* that "itself" changes, and changes again and again; an identity runs throughout the temporal continuity. The color of the object changes; the color is something identical as an individual, but something that changes, "itself," in quality.

So it is in the case of simple moments in the province of phenomenology. The perception of extension and the perception of differentiations (I differentiate the continuous extension into parts, into pluralities), the perception of things that are perfectly alike, and so on, are *based on* the perception of a continuous
 25 unity (identity) in constancy and change. The perception of a "moment": *brown* – and the "perception" of something unitary, *the bringing-about of the consciousness of unity*; the moment brown given – and then identified in repeated memories.

Then the case of *complexes*. Surely we had better say: What
 35 has already been explained applies in the case of the ultimate differences (metaphysical parts). *The spatial extension endures, changes. The tone* endures, changes, and so on, in its *intensity*, in its *timbre*. If we move to the *concrete wholes*, then the identity of the *whole*, grounded in the identity of the species of the total [243]

character, newly emerges here. To be considered: objects of a higher level: *The melody does not change*; it *endures* for such and such a length of time – it endures during the time that it “unrolls,” during the time that new tones continually make their
 5 appearance. What makes up the “repetition” of *the* melody (“the same” here means “specifically the same”)? –

Concerning the above, I can say: The *brown* endures – the brown changes; it endures, remaining unchanged qualitatively, as “brown” – it changes “qualitatively,” in its essence as brown; it
 10 changes with regard to its extension – or it remains unchanged with regard to its “extension” (it remains unchanging in quality but changes in its extension; it changes not only as brown but also in its extension). And analogously here.

On the other hand, can one say: The *extension*, understood as
 15 spatial extension, remains unchanged or changes in the same sense? Must one not say in connection with extension: The extension of *the quality, of anything extended*, remains the same or changes? Are there not distinctions and difficulties here? –⁸

Continuity and Unity

20 We have to distinguish:

1) *Temporal continuity*, understood as the *continuum of time-points* (of time-points as points of time).

2) The continuity *in time*, understood as the unity of the *time-content* – unity as continuous unity and as “*real unity*.” The
 25 temporal contents “continuously” fill the extent of time; and while they do this, the identity of something real connects them – the identity of what extends throughout the temporal duration as that which is unitary, which changes or endures without changing in this time (*abides* in constancy or change).

30 3) *The continuum of a “continuous” change*. The time-continuum is filled by a continuum of “*continuously*” *self-differentiating moments* in which the ultimate differences of a species are individuated. The continuous change of a color: The differences [244]

⁸ Concerning the foregoing, Husserl remarked in the margin: “Realization of this suggestion in the supplement”; he later corrected “in the supplement” to read “in other sheets.” What next follows has, again, the heading “Continuity and Unity,” which is reproduced here. – Editor’s note.

in color vary steadily, and the differentiation of the color-moments "coincides" with the differentiation of time.

- A "qualitative" continuum can become the object of a genuine consciousness of continuity only in a temporal extension. Then, in
 5 this temporal extension, something identical is grasped or capable of being grasped – something that "changes," and changes "continuously," without a "break." The break, the discontinuity, ruptures the unity; but the unity can also be produced and maintained by means of a different, coinciding moment – for
 10 example, the spatial continuity coinciding with a color-continuity. If the color-continuity undergoes a break, then the extension is divided but nevertheless remains a unity.

Extension of a "Spatial" and Qualitative Continuum over a Time-Continuum

- 15 The time-continuum is not "something real." Time, as time, is nothing that endures or changes; a series of temporal differences is not again in time and includes nothing identical that extends throughout the series (the universal, "time," is something different). But everything that extends throughout time is real; the
 20 temporal content that fills time "continuously" and, in doing so, establishes identity in this continuity is real. The identical is the real. The real endures or changes, and "is determined" as possessing such and such a character – a in the time-moment t , a' in t' . It endures without changing when the determination in the
 25 extent of time $t_0 - t_1$ continues to be identically constituted in the infima species; it changes when the determination varies, shades off continuously, or is subject to a number of discrete breaks. In the latter case, must the identity be preserved through other determinations –?⁹

⁹ Here there follows this sentence, which was later crossed out: "The question now is how far this carries us in the analysis of 'empirical' reality." Apparently at the moment he crossed it out, Husserl made the following note beneath the sentence: "The concept of the 'real' understood as the concept of the identical thing that endures. 'Enduring' here often means not changing, and duration often means the same thing as constancy." – Editor's note.

Personal Identity; Identity of the Same Thing, That Which Is Identical in Change [245]

Socrates. Is the *individual* a *quality* that remains identical in change? That would be nonsense, of course: for every quality,
5 infinitely many bearers are conceivable.

The individual is *not discoverable* in intuitive representation; complex of qualities, *continuously* changing, but in the *continuity* of change we “confirm” identity. (The confirming is naturally not the finding of a *content*.) *One and the same thing* changes;
10 where we perceive continuous change, there we suppose the identity of something changing – of the object, not of the quality. The quality is not identically the same: red changes into orange, but orange is not identical with red. *Only the Aristotelian genus remains identically the same.* The object that earlier was red is
15 now orange; the object is the same. Is what is identical perhaps something abstract? Is the complex form of the object, the Aristotelian genus (in a certain amplification) identically the same for the changed as for the original form? But one will not be satisfied with that: *The thing is the same.*

20 Dependency of changes in different things. Causality. If a_α changes into a_β , then b_α must change into b_β .

*That Which Is Identical in Temporality, in the Continuity of the Temporal Flow; That Which Is Identical in the Sense of Individual or, What Amounts to the Same Thing, Temporal Being. That Which Subsists (Abides) in Time. That Which Subsists Phenomenologically in Phenomenological “Time,” That Which Is at Rest Phenomenologically and That Which Is Changing Phenomenologically. (The “Immanent”)*¹⁰
25

This – this color, this colored extension, this unity of color and
30 extension – endures, changes.

Reflection: I “find” temporal continuity, duration, in which I can distinguish flowing “parts.” Not a strict partition, I find [246] “color” and I find it *again and again*. The color endures. The genus color or the generic complex (color-extension) – the specific
35 in the different extensions of the duration – $\langle \text{is} \rangle$ “always the

¹⁰ Husserl specifically characterizes the investigation that follows this heading – to page 257, line 8 – as “the fundamental Seefeld consideration”; he refers to the double sheet on which it is written as the “principal sheet” of the sketch. – Editor’s note.

same.” The color (or the color-extension) is “temporally extended” and divisible as far as its temporal extension is concerned. That is:

- 1) the *color as that which fills time*. On the other hand:
- 5 2) the *color that endures*, that extends throughout the time, that is something identical in the temporal continuity of color, something identical extending throughout the continuity: The *individual*, determined generically as color, is the same throughout or in the extension of the duration. *The individual* endures; it
- 10 is that which subsists throughout the continuous temporal filling, subsisting in it continuously. Or it is determined as spatial color-extension and has “*at any time*” color-determination and determination with respect to spatial extension; and it has the
- 15 ultimate determination: in each extent of time and in each phase of time the same differentia of color and of extension. Phase – that is merely a limiting case: Extents of time, however small, are
- also specifically alike *in content*, whether with respect to their common genus or their differentia (that is to say, durations and the parts of a duration are similar to the whole: “specifically”
- 20 like it). Irrespective of the order of temporal parts and of that extension which we call temporal and which can have different degrees (“size”), we always have things that are perfectly alike – in the case of constancy.

Change and Alteration. (Sudden Transition)

- 25 The *filling* in the temporal continuity. The concrete continuity: the filling *with* the temporal extension.¹¹ The continuity of content. The content *in concreto* permits a *comparison* of larger and smaller *temporal extensions*. Over against this is what makes up the *content* of the extension.¹² “The same” content – for
- 30 example, the same continuity “red-green” – is capable of being extended over different extents of time.

We hold on to the extent of time, or we disregard the gradual distinctions that belong to the temporal extension of the content. [247] We carry out *other lines of comparison* and abstraction.

¹¹ “With”: Can one not equally well say “in” the temporal extension? Everything is only figurative.

¹² This would, no doubt, have to be worked out in the case of duration.

a) *Constancy*. In constancy's case, no matter how many "divisions" of the duration are undertaken, these contents are perfectly alike again and again, without differences other than those of temporal position (order) and temporal "size." In the
 5 continuity of time-consciousness, we constantly find self-sameness, which is determined as being without differentiation, determined in perfect likeness – pure *likeness with respect to the "quality"* (of the total being that fills time).

b) *Change*. In the case of change, on the other hand, we find
 10 (when the color changes) *diversity in that which fills time* – irrespective of the degree of temporal extension and the temporal order. But we also find *identity* as the self-sameness of *what "changes."* This What remains within the higher genus "color," which establishes something in common that is determined in
 15 different ways. No matter how many divisions occur, each part, considered by itself, has its unity; and all of these unities (substrates) are of the same genus color, as is the total substrate grounded in them, while, on the other hand, the infima species of the partial unities are different. If we go to the limit, we have
 20 punctual divisions and punctual differences that no longer permit division within themselves and no longer permit the distinguishing of different species in the various parts.

(Color here must not be taken as the higher genus for *different species of color-quality* in the usual sense {understood as pure
 25 qualities, pure red, pure hue}, but rather for the *unity of what fills time*. We abstract from the magnitude of the temporal extension, from the distinctions in the degree of magnitude that differing temporal extension or division within temporal extension produces: there remains left over for us the *temporal filling* as unity
 30 {as somehow temporally extended}. Time also exists here, but the time in its magnitude is not what matters in this case. The situation is similar to that of the "coloring" of a spatial extension.)

If we divide the fillings according to their temporal extension,
 35 then, in the case of continuous change, we find again and again an equality as far as the universal genus is concerned – we always find coloring; on the other hand, we find diversity – we again and again find a different <coloring>. But not merely the universal that there is always coloring – that would even be true in the case [248]

of a "sudden transition in color"; there rather exists a *qualitative continuity* – there is no sudden transition in any part.¹³

Still, a sameness does exist: Fillings, however they may be separated in time, show a similarity, and within the similarity
5 show relations of comparison that need not go hand in hand with temporal relations of comparison; they also show relations of order. This would require further description.

In the case of a varying *rate of change*, unequal extents of time are "changed proportionately" in quality; these unequal tempo-
10 ral extents differ in quality but nevertheless have an identity. Equal division in this continuity is different from equal division in the temporal continuity, although a division in the one continuity always takes place together with a division in the other.

15 *Sudden transitions:*

- 1) sudden transitions between two durations;
- 2) sudden transitions between two continuous changes that do not join together to form the unity of one *continuous* change;
- 3) sudden transitions from a constancy to a continuous
20 change or vice versa.

Swiftness and slowness of the continuous gradation in quality. The slower the gradation in quality, the greater the similarity to a qualitative constancy (an unchanging quality); qualitative constancy is the limiting case of continuous gradation in quality.

25 *Towards the Clarification of the Distinction between Substrate and Filling*¹⁴

If we reflect on the temporal extent and if we consider it as a whole, as a form across which the content spreads itself, then the filling spreading itself is nothing other than the *continuum* of

¹³ Husserl subsequently made the following annotation: "Missing here is the definition (clarification) of the concept of 'sudden transition' [*Sprung*]." This note might have been introduced even later than the lines about "sudden transitions" that follow – lines, to be sure, that themselves possibly represent a later addition to the text. – Editor's note.

¹⁴ The paragraph following this heading was added later by Husserl in the margin of the preceding text. – Editor's note.

substrates that belong to the temporal parts set off in the flowing and, ultimately, to the temporal moments. Thus we also have to say: Momentary substrates (which are the limit of extensions of [249] substrates), when they fulfill the conditions of a certain continuity of contents (therefore substrate-continuity) within a continuous temporal succession, constitute *one* substrate, which is not itself the continuum of these momentary-substrates but extends throughout them and in this way *lasts* for that extent of time.

10 *The "Species Belonging to Time" (a) – the Species Belonging to That Which Fills Time (b)*

Phenomenologically:

Concerning b), I find *several moments* that I call "*white*" in my field of vision; they have something specifically in common. The visual field – we assume here that our eye remains at rest – \langle is \rangle a phenomenological duration-unity. It is "seized" as an unchanging unity in the consciousness of unity. On or in it I find *a white* and then find *a white again*. Each is apprehended at a different "time" within the extent of the duration but is not meant along with this time; instead, both are meant as duration-unities. Now the duration does not matter; both whites are "specifically identical": unity in identification. Each is individually different: this is a different white from that one. Each has a different "place" in the field of vision: each part of the field of vision is different, and these parts have a certain ordered connection. I can say that a part "shifts *its* place" in the field of vision. There, in the visual field, the part has, in addition to its color, its "*shape*," which again is something that can be apprehended specifically. This is an identity in change. Real change: In the alteration the same unity again and again has a different "location." But also change that is not real: I can *think* of a unity, consisting of shape and color, as now here, as now there (but in this case the individuality is no longer the same).

35 *The temporal duration remains freely variable here.* The white endures for a longer or shorter time; it changes, more swiftly or more slowly, in a greater or smaller extent of time.

Concerning a) and b): *Temporal extension* is a *determination of what is extended*, of what "fills" time. What is identical in time is

the *individual*. The universal common to different individuals is the species, the internal (constitutive) determination of the individual, that which this individual can have in common with others: *independently of time*. [250]

- 5 The individual is indeed that which is identical in time and is therefore the unity that the temporal filling grounds independently of temporal extension. What is constitutive of the individual is therefore inherent in *what is identical in the temporal filling*, and consequently there emerges the concept of the *species*
 10 *belonging to the constitutive determinations* that different individuals can have in common in the same or in different extents of time. Therefore:

α) what is identical *in time*, what is continuously identical in the temporal flow;

- 15 β) what is identical in *species* is what is identical in the *specification* that posits "what is common" to different individuals.

Concerning b). But what about the *temporal determinations* that are nevertheless *universalities*? Identification can concern the
 20 *content* of two individuals; this gives the constitutive species (real species). But it can also concern the individuals with respect to their "*temporal form*," their temporal extension; both of them can fill *the same* extent of time – they are simultaneous.

The extent of time is not there twice, whereas what fills that
 25 same extent of time can be there twice, as perfectly alike (specifically identical) in the two cases. Of course, since time does not belong to their constitutive content, the individuals do not "coalesce" when they are simultaneous. The extent of time is something abstract. It is necessarily the temporal extent of some
 30 individuality or other. But it is not an individual moment and it is not something to be duplicated, not something to be specified. *It is not individual*. Individuality is *in* it, and necessarily in it. Assume that a single extent of time taken *in abstracto* (which, of course, presupposes an individuality that fills it and from which it
 35 is abstracted) is filled by a single instance of the species color, and that by virtue of being so filled, *individuates* this species – well, the *extent of time* does not constitute *individuality* in this way. For several individual cases of color can fill the *same* extent of time.

The identity proper to the extent of time is *an identical moment belonging to a plurality of individuals*, but not something specific multiplied in the individuals (all of which fill this same time). The [251] consciousness of plurality is excluded here.

- 5 Time can be specified as follows, therefore: different extents of time can be *equal* and *unequal* in the identical unity of one encompassing extent of time – genus: temporal magnitude, temporal extent; species of the temporal magnitudes. The temporal extensions of individuals and of moments constitutive of individ-
- 10 uals also possess species with regard to *duration* and *change*: speed, acceleration, and so on. We can take and specify in unity the *temporal filling together* with its time.

Spatial Species

- What about “space”? The *sensuous quality* can be given
- 15 *repeatedly* in the unity of a phenomenological – pre-empirical – extension. But the *part of space* can be given only once. The ultimate specific difference of the sensuous quality can be duplicated; but the place, the extension that a quality fills, cannot be duplicated. The extension is *something never repeatable* and yet
- 20 something *abstract*. How is one sensuous quality distinguished from another completely equivalent to it in species, when both belong to the same concrete extended unity that endures without changing? By means of the parts of the extension, by means of the “*places*.” They are spatially different. But the parts of the
- 25 extension, or the places, are not distinguished by means of the colors, which are indeed the same! The place can never be overlaid at one and the same time by two (*visual* or *tactile*) qualities belonging to the same genus – whether by two *equivalent* or by two *different* qualities. If the species of the quality is
- 30 determined and if the place is determined, then (for the time being, within the unity of an encompassing enduring spatial concretion) the *concrete individual part* is determined.

- The place “makes” the infima species of quality into an individual quality. The place is the *determination that determines*
- 35 *individually*.

Two individuals can exist within the same *duration*; place and quality (spatial form and spatial filling) belong to their constitu-

tive content. But two *places* within one and the same duration belong to one "*space*." In lieu of "place," the following would be a better way of putting it: Two *never-repeatable extensions* belong to a single never-repeatable extension that embraces them [252]
 5 as parts; specifically, as exclusive parts, if the individuals are separated.¹⁵

Such never-repeatable extensions are always extensions of *something*; taken in *abstracto*, they are the *ultimate forms of what is incapable of being repeated*, single cases that cannot be multi-
 10 plied in a duration. These never-repeatable extensions (spatial individuals, as it were) can be compared, specified; the *spatial species* grow up: the genera extension, magnitude, figure, etc.

The Spatial Individual

There is, in addition, an identification that elevates the identity
 15 of the individual above the *absolute place*. The *spatial individual* is *that which remains identical while the place varies*, that which is identical in the change of place (change, no matter what the temporal change). If the spatial filling is preserved in its identity (in its species) and if it *moves* while what is specific in the filled
 20 spatial form (shape) is preserved, then the spatial individual is the same. We can also *disregard* the spatial filling – that which is identical, therefore, in the change of place. The constitutive content is: specific shape and specific qualities. The individual is that which is always determined as specifically the same and that
 25 which changes its absolute location. There is, of course, no qualitative individual; the possibility of the spatial individual depends on the peculiarities of space and time.¹⁶

If I disregard the filling content, then <the> spatial individual is a *fixed* spatial thing or "geometric" body. If I retain the *filling*
 30 content, then I have a fixed body = what is identical in the change of place.¹⁷

There is no space in the *tonal field*. Two tones, identical in species, can occur only at different times. In a given time there is

¹⁵ I say "never-repeatable" extensions here – that is, *individual* extensions, extensions of (possible?) determinate single individuals, or the lowest possible abstracta of extension.

¹⁶ Compare *Kant's* space and time arguments!

¹⁷ The last paragraph was added later to the foregoing. – Editor's note.

only one tone with the same specific determination. Here there is *simultaneity* only of *what is different*, and even that is transformed into a unity, into a fusion. Tones do not constitute [253] sensuous physical things; they are only *awakened* by these and
 5 are only *indirectly included* in them and in the space in which they are “propagated.” –

As far as possible, we have tried to proceed phenomenologically up to this point. (Of course, everything is in need of checking in this respect.) Are temporality and spatiality, provided
 10 they are understood phenomenologically and not empirically – that is, not as transcendent temporality and spatiality – actually complete principles of individuation? How is the step from the phenomenological to the empirical to be taken? And above all: How is the individuality of the *Ego* and of “its” phenomena – of
 15 its sensuous appearances and of its psychic experiences in the narrower sense – related to phenomenological individuality? It is difficult, of course, to say what makes up the phenomenological content of the “Ego” here.

20 <No. 36. On the> Seefeld Reflection. <The Typical, the Mathematical, and the Unity of the Temporal Object>¹⁸

I perceive this brown; I carry out phenomenological reduction, therefore take the pure datum of sensation just as it is given phenomenologically, as “now” *enduring*. *It* – this *brown* – endures: it abides without changing; it always has the same
 25 extension throughout its duration. It changes: it – this brown – changes in quality, in brightness (it becomes darker); its extension changes – *the* extension that it fills, that it covers.

We presuppose that what is in question here is a *perception*. To what extent are absolute certainties inherent in it – that is, in
 30 the *phenomenological* perception? If the perception is one in which I find the brown enduring without changing, do I have and can I have absolute certainty that the brown is unchanged in quality, brightness, extension – in all of these moments or in one

¹⁸ The very circumstance that this sketch is superscribed by Husserl himself with the words “Seefeld Reflection” and that the superscription was not added at a later date indicates in any event that the sketch was written later than No. 35. – Editor’s note.

of them – or that the extension is constantly the same unchanging extension?

In perception we have the perceived, just as it is perceived, [254] given with evidence. That the perceived does not change or, on the other hand (in the contrary case), that it is something changing – that from phase to phase or from duration-part to duration-part it is one or the other – presupposes division and comparison. We will be able to say that the *type* “constancy” and the *type* “change” can be grasped before the division – specifically, by means of the comparison of similar cases – and that the one type becomes separated from the other in evidence.

It belongs to the type (to the essence of the type) “constancy” that “any” division has the result that the parts distinguished are themselves once again of the type “constancy” and are therefore “the same” as far as their content is concerned; or it has the result – when the temporal parts are selected so that each part is equivalent to the others (and every duration can be divided into equal parts) – that the filled parts are merely repetitions in relation to one another. It belongs to the type “change” that unlike concreta correspond to equal temporal parts. *How* unlike, and which types of unlikeness are possible here, would still have to be considered *a priori*.

I speak of the *type* “constancy” and of the *type* “change.” If I remain in the order of the typical, then I will have to speak of the type “same duration,” of the type “difference of temporal objects in the same duration” or “the same duration with different fillings of the duration”; on the other hand, I will have to speak of the type “the same duration with the same fillings of the duration” or “equivalent temporal objects, equivalent with regard to duration and filling.” Then in the case of difference I will have to say: Temporal objects that endure for the same amount of time or fill the same duration are different; they are the same with respect to their extension but different with respect to the qualitative filling of this (“spatial”) extension. They are perfectly alike with respect to quality in the narrower sense but changing with respect to their intensity (brightness, etc.).

These would be *typical* occurrences above all. Therefore we would not speak of a temporal division *in infinitum* here but say

only that division is a typical occurrence and that to this occurrence belong the types: division in terms of what is the same and division in terms of what is different.

However, [let us examine] beforehand the cases of comparison
5 of several temporal objects and the corresponding typical forms of unity.

In the typical relationship "longer-shorter" (or the relation- [255]
ship in which one thing is relatively long and the other relatively short: in their being-together), we always find two temporal
10 objects with respect to duration. Or: Before two "temporal magnitudes" given undividedly in the unity of one perception are put into relation, there belongs to them a typical sensuous unity, the unity which is the foundation of the difference of the
"temporal magnitudes" and to which the relationships "a longer
15 than b" and "b shorter than a" belong. There belongs to this type of sensuous unity a gradation that brings it near and continuously allows it to pass over into the unity-type "equality understood as equality of temporal magnitudes." Obviously these occurrences are then passed on to the parts, resulting from
20 a division, that belong to some temporal extent or other.

The following stands in essential connection with the typical occurrence of division: Every temporal object has a duration, as they say. But in the type that is duration we have a distinction between the expanding, flowing durations and the momentary
25 durations; and we have this distinction before the attempts at division. This is, as it were, a qualitative distinction in the total-type. Correlatively expressed: the expanding or flowing duration – the momentary duration, the lightning-like.

Of course, relations and relational occurrences, or types of
30 founding forms of sensuous unity, are involved here as well. An expanding duration can expand for a longer time or shorter time, or two expanding durations can expand for the same length of time. They have equal temporal durations. All of the extensions that form a group of equivalent extensions have the same
35 temporal magnitude or extent (the same difference in extent for all). On the other hand, momentary durations, moments, have no temporal magnitude, no extension, although, for all that, we do find gradual distinctions in their case as well. Even here we speak, as we do universally in cases of augmentation, of "magnitude,"

of greater or smaller. Even here, with our conceptual classes formed, we are able to think of the same "magnitude." But we cannot speak of stretches, of extensions.

Divisibility belongs to the essence of phenomenological extensions, stretches. Yet one cannot say that, with division, extended sections must always break down again into extended sections; [in this process] we finally come to *moments*. Every extended section can be divided into a greater or smaller number of [256] moments, depending on whether the moments are greater or smaller. On the other hand, a gradation of moments leads over into extended sections. Small stretches do still present themselves as extensions but are closely connected with moments, and the gradation that allows the separation of greater and shorter moments leads over – in the direction of the expansion of the moment – into small stretches. Finally, we still have to treat the *quasi*-qualitative distinction between the long and the short outside a comparison or combination of what they have in common as sensuous moments, at least in the case of extensions. Moments surely are classified as "short" here, but we must ask to what extent a hidden intentionality plays a part in the comparison.

Now, how does the typical lead us over into the *sphere of ideas*, into the pure limit-concepts of a mathematical sort: the mathematical point, mathematical lengths or straight lines, division *in infinitum*? Humean problems.

But let us return to the Seefeld problems.

The brown – what is it really? Is it the species? Then we would have to ask: How is the "species" related to the mathematical and typical occurrences making their appearance here? Obviously the concept presupposes the same process of mathematization; exactly and logically understood, it is a mathematical limit-concept. We do indeed distinguish between what is the same in type, by which we mean total equality of type, and equality of type in different "respects"; we then acquire, as limit-concepts, the exact equalities and the exact universal or essence, the concrete or abstract universal or essence – all understood exactly and logically. For *logic* is the sphere of the ideal and not of the merely typical. But we reduce *these ideas* again in the mathematical attitude. That is to say, concrete parts correspond to the

temporal division; specifically, concreta that have or are a mathematical extent of time and a mathematical extent that is filled. And the mathematization here stands in contrast to what is exactly the same in temporal form and what is exactly the same in temporal filling. The division *in infinitum* leads to indivisible points of time as limits, and these points have "no magnitude"; they are mathematically indivisible as magnitudes (they are just points) and have their magnitude in this punctuality. The punctual filling belongs to these points as corresponding limit-concept – that is to say, as the species of what fills a point; and this punctual residuum of the concretum breaks down, as every extended concretum does, into its abstract "moments," into the different species of color, intensity, extension, or whatever else may come into consideration in connection with the contents in question.

Now if we have these mathematizations already behind us and if we apprehend the given sensuous data along with such ideal concepts, then we have to say: *The brown* is not the species, either the punctual species that belongs to the points of an extent of time (the points of the duration) or the species of the concrete duration-filling, which is apprehended in mathematization as the continuous fusion of the punctual series in their order conforming to the points of the duration. *The brown* is not the concrete *individual* either. The brown as punctual phase of the duration does not endure, and the continuum of brown-moments in the continuum of time-points does not endure; the temporal extent is rather filled out in a definite order with the punctual fillings: precisely point by point. The temporal extent is not properly called *duration* with respect to these fillings. *The brown* endures and is extended throughout this time and in its duration is continually *the same* – throughout all points and throughout all fillings of these points, which as temporally different are themselves different. Ideally, I can divide the temporal extent, the time of the enduring, and each part then has its fillings; but not only that: each part has its color (its brown) that endures throughout the part, throughout the part's temporal extent, which says again that the same thing, the same color, exists throughout all the filling contents.

Moreover, depending on the circumstances, the *brown* may be

something that "itself" changes; or it may be something that does not change, something that remains constantly the same. The identity of which we have spoken is therefore not the identity of the species that perhaps connects all the parts and points of the duration. That concerns the case of constancy. But even in the case of constancy, we certainly must see that we find, opposed to the identity of the species as something different from it, the identity of what endures; what endures "remains the same" in all points of time, that is, extends throughout different but, with respect to the species, identical fillings. But we must also see that in the case of change, that which "itself" changes is one and the same throughout the entire change; it is the one objective something, the one "color," the one brown that changes and in changing is something different in each point of time. But that seems to be a contradiction. What we call the one brown, namely, the one something that is changing, is here precisely not the brown filling of the time-point but something that presents itself in the brown filling, so to speak – something identical that is the same in ever new fillings and is what it is only as existing in such ordered temporal fillings. [258]

The brown, one could say, is the one and self-identical something that "appears" in the continuous and manifold brown-"appearances" (in the fillings of the time-phases) and that, as "unity of appearance," also runs throughout the concrete parts of the filled duration. We have a continuous consciousness of unity whose correlate is an unbroken unity, an identity in the continuity of time, something identical in the continuous flow of time and in the continuous flow of what fills time. In another case, we have an interrupted consciousness in the separation of the concrete parts of time or of the parts of the filled time. In the case of such an interrupted consciousness, we have a plurality of similar unities, which, however, do not join together in the manner of a sum to make up the unity of a whole. Rather, because this division concerns a unity – namely, cuts up the unity's filled extent of time – it brings out the unities belonging to this temporal extent, unities *in* which the total unity exists in a certain way.

The brown of this and the brown of that part of the extent of time are different, since they belong to different extents of time;

but since they continuously fill one extent of time in a certain way, it is “*one object*” that endures, one and the same thing that *lasts* throughout this entire extent of time.

I said, “fill in a certain way.” Namely, in one sense we have a
 5 filling for each point of time and for each extent of time; and what fills the extent of time is the continuous sum of what fills the points of time belonging to this extent and also the sum of what fills the partial extensions belonging to any disjunctive division. In the other sense, we call that which endures and only
 10 manifests itself or appears in the filling, that which continues to exist (*lasts*) throughout the multiplicity of filling and also appears as filling time, as continuously existing in time, as precisely *lasting* in time – that, we say, is what we call the unity of the temporal object.

15 Or we also distinguish:

[259]

1) the *temporal object*, that which endures, that which exists in time and continuously lasts throughout time;

2) the temporal filling that *spreads* itself out, the *spread of brown* understood as the unity that is cut into little pieces
 20 according to time such that each piece is different from the others.

The spread of brown does not *endure*. It is an extent of time that is continuously filled up, covered over, with brown. But something identical – the temporal object – shows itself throughout such a spread of time.

25 Correlatively, the continuous consciousness of unity or identity, which we have as the consciousness that “something endures” (a color, a sound endures), must be distinguished from the consciousness of a *whole* made up of moments continuously arranged next to one another in time. Both belong together, are
 30 inseparably united, but it requires different directions of regard in order to grasp thematically the unity or the whole. The temporal object is that which spreads itself out, not the spread; or it is that which *persists* in time.

What belongs to the possibility of the constitution of such an
 35 abiding object (of *something real in time*)? A continuum of time-fillings; more clearly: What we find necessary to unity in our example is that the brown does not pass over into another brown discontinuously, or certainly not into a blue, etc. If it did, there would no longer be any transition on hand at all.

〈No. 37.〉 *The Temporal Object*

I have a *phenomenon* “brown,” or, let us say, a sensuous *datum* taken in full concreteness. It *persists* (*endures* in the sense of *something persisting*); it is a unity belonging to a constancy or
 5 a change. It persists, unchanged with respect to its quality, intensity, extension (*quasi-spatial*); or it changes with respect to its quality, intensity, extension.

Can one also say: *The quality* – or the intensity, the extension – *persists* –? *One says*: The quality remains unchanged, then
 10 it changes, etc. The magnitude and shape (the spatial corporeality) remains unchanged or changes.

If I focus my attention on the quality, I grasp its identity with [260] itself in change or constancy. I carry out no “*ideating* abstraction”; I do not grasp the pure essence but the individual unity
 15 that runs throughout this temporal continuity of quality. Is this the case for each of the moments? If I focus my attention on the extension, on the spatial corporeality, it may, for example, remain unchanged and then become deformed, etc. Likewise, I focus my attention on the intensity and speak similarly about it.
 20 On the other hand, the moments do not stand on the same footing; they are moments in the total unity that continuously endures.

This concrete tone-datum is given (constituted) as enduring. *It* remains unchanged; and “implicit in remaining unchanged” is
 25 the fact that it does not change *with respect to* all of its moments, and again implicit in this is the fact that each of these moments is in itself something that persists, but *not something self-sufficient*.

The concrete unity is the substrate, the principal substrate; it
 30 bears in itself the “property”-substrates. Its being, which is to be abiding, “*is*” in the properties whose being is again to be abiding, but to be abiding in the manner of properties that only exist as properties of something. The something, however, is a unity that is the unity of all properties; it is not a combination of objects
 35 but a multiplicity in the being of the abiding substrate, which exists precisely *in* the persisting properties. Thus the persisting of the property assumes a particular sense by virtue of its non-self-sufficiency. This non-self-sufficiency, on the other hand, is

surely not non-self-sufficiency in (so to speak) an external sense, according to which some law requires for the being of one thing the being of another thing belonging to some correlative genus or species. The non-self-sufficiency that concrete individuals have in
 5 connection with other concrete <individuals> is entirely different from the non-self-sufficiency of properties. Properties are substrate-objects, but they are productions of a substrate that lives and moves in them, so to speak, and is what it is only in them.

10 But now, in addition, we take note of essential differences in the sequence of steps in the successive grounding of the moments that appear here as summarized under the title "properties."

In the example of the "tone-datum" as a substrate-unity, we distinguish the *duration*, which is not a property in the true sense
 15 (the duration itself does not endure, does not persist), from the [261] properties that, in conformity with their essences, do endure, or from the whole *essence proper* to the abiding object. What does this distinction between object and proper essence signify?

Honestly speaking, either it is a merely verbal distinction, that
 20 is, the object itself *is* identically the same as what is here called its proper essence; namely, the proper essence is what persists in the duration. Or it signifies the fusion of the essences of the properties (the fused whole) and accordingly expresses the "object," the temporal object as unity of its properties. Or it
 25 expresses the *eidetic* essence that many temporal objects can have identically in common and that becomes singularized in them. The particular individual being (the singularization of the *εἶδος*) is the temporal object itself. It itself is that which persists; and it persists precisely in the manner mentioned above – that is, in such
 30 a way that components can be distinguished in it, components that are therefore abiding. And since they are joined together (but not combined; they do remain differentiated) to make up the unity of something that persists, this persisting something, the concrete individual temporal object, exists *in* the abiding proper-
 35 ties; it is spread out in them and yet in its being transcends each of them. And conversely: The properties are not only necessarily combined in the individual temporal object, but they also exist because the temporal object exists – exists in them as having such and such properties.

But let us return to the tone-datum.

It exists in its tonal quality, intensity, timbre, etc. – but these properties are not on an equal footing. We say that the quality – c, for example – is more or less intensive; we say that c has a
 5 certain intensity, and perhaps a varying one. But we do not say that the intensity has a quality, and perhaps a varying quality. (If one quality steadily passes over into another quality, then the intensity may remain constantly the same. But we do not say and we do not see that an abiding intensity is variously qualified, as
 10 we do see, conversely, that an abiding quality assumes different intensities or changes in its intensity.) The situation is the same in the case of timbre and other determinations, which <are> always <related to> the quality understood as fundamental property. The latter is only determined more closely in such determinations [262]
 15 without thereby having to undergo changes itself (namely, as quality).

If we take as another example a color-datum, then something similar is true of the quality “color,” and more precisely, of the quality “red” and the like. But what about the spatial (or
 20 *quasi-spatial*) *extension*? Obviously spatial extension is again in a different position. <The space> individualizes that which is extended in the extension.

The color-datum is extended, just as it has a color-quality with intensity, etc. The extension belongs as a “property” to the
 25 color-datum (as an abiding datum), but it does not belong to the quality in the way in which an intensity belongs to the quality, etc. The characters grouping themselves around the quality as *its* determinations present a relatively concrete unity, which as a whole “extends,” spreads, communicates itself, stretches,
 30 expands over the extension. Each part has its particular quality and therefore its particular intensity as well, etc.; and the whole extension has *one quality (a unity of qualification)* to which the *unity of a total intensity* and of a total property in every other qualitative respect belongs. –

35 How does the continuity become a theme? How, running through the continuity itself, can I regard it thematically? I run through a process in memory – the sequence of changes in an object, for example – but I hold each phase, each continuum of phases, the whole continuity belonging to the succession, firmly

in my grip. And thus in each moment I have in my grip, simultaneously and in "coexistence," a continuum; only in each now there is something different – namely, the old together with the new extensions. If I am finished, I have the whole in my grip
 5 in the now and I have it as my theme. Even if I had not made the process of change into a theme, I can reflect in memory and direct myself towards it and cause the process to be produced again memorially in a productive recollection; in doing this, I obtain a continuous series of coexistence-continua, which, in
 10 growing continuously, make the theme come into being again originally. To be sure, I do not have the continuous succession (meant concretely), the process, given simultaneously in one point of time and in one extent of time as an extended present, as I do in the case of spatial extension (of a filled extension). But I do
 15 have given, extended in a present, the continuum of pasts as pasts; and I have it given in the way in which something of that [263] sort can be given. A certain analogy with a <co>existing continuity (a spatial continuity) is available, since the continuum of pasts too <is> meant, and meant in a certain originality, in the now
 20 and in an extent of time – continuously meant throughout them (in a certain sense, persistently meant throughout them). Conversely, a continuum and any sort of plurality or change can be given in "explicit" form only by being run through, and therefore can only be given successively. The grasping of a single
 25 particular, the putting-in-relation, the taking-together, and so on, are carried out in succession on the ground of inexplicit coexistence.

The unity of the continuous succession of temporal contents; the unity of the *temporal succession of the phases* of the temporal
 30 object; the temporal succession itself as *form* of the being of the temporal object; the being of the temporal object is a being-in-succession of "object-points," which form a continuum by virtue of this continuous form of being –:

What do we mean by "*phases*"? The unity of the object as an
 35 abiding object is the unity of a continuous form, and we can focus our attention on the unity and on the parts of this form. Corresponding to the parts, we find non-self-sufficient objects that are the unities belonging to the continuous form's partial forms in such a way that the object of the total duration exists *in*

these parts and, in its own way, is composed of them. The continuous succession of these component unities is a succession in which objects are combined. The *unity* of the object belonging to the total duration, however, is not only the unity of a
 5 combination; it is also a unity that extends throughout the unbroken continuity (fusion) of phases, exists in each phase and draws sustenance from each phase, enriching the content of its being. But the unity itself <is> not the bare continuous succession of phases (and of concrete parts that are being built up from
 10 phases or that can be picked out from the continuous whole by means of division). If I run through time following the objective content, I have an objective continuity. The unity of the temporal object extends throughout this continuity, but the continuity is not the theme. If I live in the stream of time, the objective
 15 continuity (the process) does flow on, but it is not the theme. The unity of the temporal object and the objective continuity exist inseparably.

Hence the extension of spatial concepts to temporality: the [264] apprehension of time in the image of a line, of a duration in the
 20 image of a section of a line, together with which the one-dimensional order in time also finds its pictorialization. Conversely, in the case of a series in coexistence, we speak of a succession of points – of a continuous succession of colors, of shades of color: temporal concepts carrying over into coexis-
 25 tence, therefore.

A *temporal series* has *unity* in itself if what runs off in temporal succession fulfills certain conditions; if [for example] what runs off in succession shows a certain continuity in content and has the mode of continuous transition that, fixed in a
 30 constantly enduring regard, possesses the analogy with the continuum of coexistence that we discussed above. The unity is the unity of the identical substrate for this continuum, understood as *process*.

Verbatim from the Seefeld sheet:

35 *In one case*, we have a continuous consciousness of *unity*; and it yields (the substrate as) *unbroken* and, properly speaking, even indivisible unity, something identical in the continuity of time:

that which is identical in the continuous flow of time. In the other case (the case of the division of the enduring brown's temporal extension), we have a consciousness that is broken up, divided into pieces; and with the separation of the parts, we have
 5 a *plurality* of *unities* in the foregoing sense. These unities are not added up or taken together to form the unity of the enduring substrate brown, the unity of the brown that belongs to the total extension.¹⁹ We rather have these two very different things: on the one hand, in an undivided running-through, the consciousness of
 10 unbroken unity; on the other hand, division and the consciousness of multiple unities corresponding to the divisions. If we annul the division again, so to speak, we acquire the substrate of the total extension; and since the total extension is divided and the bringing-about of the ordered succession of apprehensions of
 15 the partial unities essentially "coincides" with the bringing-about of the unbroken consciousness, the total substrate also coincides with the partial substrates, but not in such a way that it is divided into pieces with them. Living in the continuous running-through, [265]
 living continuously in the enduring consciousness, I have in each
 20 moment what endures. And in each moment what endures is identical with the substrate belonging to the corresponding part, but in no moment is it the sum of elapsed substrates. The brown of this and the brown of that part of the duration in question are different substrates; but since they continuously fill *one* extent of
 25 time, it is *one* substrate, *one* enduring something that runs throughout this extent of time and its substrates.

"The pervasive consciousness of identity must not be confused with the entirely different consciousness of a *whole* made up of moments that continuously fall into sequence with one another in
 30 time (or without division: the consciousness of a continuous flow). Living in the consciousness of identity, we constantly have *one* thing in the continuous flow of the filled time. The temporal object is not the extension, the *flow*, but *that which* is extended. But evidently we can make the extension itself into an object,
 35 divide it and differentiate it. The continuity of the brown-

¹⁹ Compare the preceding, from the heading "Verbatim from the Seefelder sheet" on, with No. 35, p. 248, lines 28-37. Husserl has placed what follows above in square brackets, which end after "substrates" on line 22. — Editor's note.

extension with its brown-moments is *permeated throughout* by the unity of the identical substrate.”²⁰

〈No. 38.〉 *Objection to This Whole Seefeld Way of Considering Things*

5 A *color* appears and endures. It does not change for a time; then it changes. A tone sounds for a time. It remains unchanged for awhile; then it changes – it becomes another tone, changes into a second tone or steadily changes into ever new tones. It would be better to say in this case that tone c constantly remains
10 tone c, and then it changes into a peculiarly *sliding* phenomenon, into a flow of quality; and if occasion should arise, it can change into a new sliding tone-phenomenon – say, into h.

Let us look at the typical occurrences here somewhat more closely. All temporal extents continuously filled with *tonal* content furnish us with *concreta*²¹ that have a universal community of type; we call these concreta *tonal phenomena*. All extents [266] continuously filled with tonal content – extents that in the partitioning of time into equal temporal parts are equivalent in the sense of mere “*repetition*,” as further analysis shows – have in
20 common a typical essence of a particular sort that yields an original equality prior to analysis. Each such individual concretum we call *the same tone*, a tone-individual of *the same material essence*; and two such tones are said to be *identical in content*. At most, then, they are *distinguished* by their *location* and by their
25 temporal magnitude (or temporal duration). Two individual concrete tones of the same duration signify tones of the same concrete essence; they are different merely 〈in their〉 temporal positions. (Yet we may also say, if the occasion should arise, that two tones are mere repetitions of the same tone, only at a
30 different location and with a different temporal duration.)

In the content, however, the *quality in the specific sense* is isolated from the other moments of content. In ordinary lan-

²⁰ Compare the preceding paragraph, which Husserl put in quotation marks, with No. 35, p. 249, lines 16–26. – Editor’s note.

²¹ It is probably better if I proceed from examples, from so-called tones that are taken in full concreteness; sensuous concreta – e.g., tonal concreta and concrete tonal individuals.

guage, the same tone, apart from determinations of temporal magnitude and location, is not the same in concrete content (that is, in the indicated abstraction from those temporal determinations that remain variable). We rather speak of the same tone –
 5 the same tone, only repeated – in connection with a plurality of tones in cases in which we merely mean that one is loud or louder and another soft or softer, or that one has the timbre of the violin and another the timbre of the flute.²²

In such cases, an identical essence makes its appearance in the
 10 content as determining or as that which makes up the *quale* in the distinguishing sense. From different points of view, however, the *quale* has varying determining parts. The *quale* only becomes concrete through the fixing of these parts while it remains identical during their change.

15 This *quale* has its genus (the genus: tone quality, color quality). But it becomes separated further; or rather, the whole presentation comes to vacillate. Does not what was stated above refer to the cases in which division again and again yields equal concrete parts? Can one acquire a concept of *quale* otherwise?

20 If we proceed from the type of extensions that are continually [267] qualified in the same way, they are reduced mathematically to continua of time-points of the same quality; and quality is a punctual concept. What is extended does not have a quality but a qualification – a coloration, a tonality built up out of punctual
 25 qualities; or the concretum is a unity fused from quality-points, or, rather, from time-points with their “concrete” temporal filling.

The *qualification* in the wider sense of quality (not the *quale* in the specific sense) is *isotropic* – point by point constantly the
 30 same – or *anisotropic*. If we start from any “place,” any moment or concrete part of the filled temporal extent, and run through the neighbouring moments and concrete parts, then everything flows away in the sense of coincidence, of equivalence; or it does not continually flow away in this sense. If I begin with tone c,
 35 which is continuously the same for an extent of time – that is, the same in its concrete essence and even in its species of quality –

²² We therefore have the same tone: a) when the full concrete essence is identical (the location different); b) when the “content” is the same and only the temporal duration is different; c) when the distinguishing essence, which here means the quality, is identical.

then tone *c* “itself changes; as the tone advances, the species is no longer the same but different, and different again and again. *The tone c* changes – it remains the same. It endures; it lasts. The quality remains the same; I experience “the same” in the
 5 unbroken coinciding in quality.²³ –

The individual object: It has its *own concrete essence*, which is “built up” from “constitutive” moments, from properties, or which becomes separated “by abstraction” into such moments or properties. It “*has*” its concrete essence; it itself is the
 10 individuation of this essence. A place in time, a *location*, belongs to it; and a *duration* belongs to it too, and in conformity with the duration, a continuous *succession* of the object’s essence: a process belongs to it. It exists as a unity of something that is in the process of going forward; it exists as enduring.

15 Every object has its content and form; or it *is* the content, but only as content of the form.

Now how does the old theory of *self-sufficient and non-self-sufficient contents* stand in relation to all these statements about constitutive contents, properties, etc.? Does it make sense [268]
 20 beyond the sphere of the *essence* proper, that is, beyond the sphere of the individual essence? *Location* is surely not a non-self-sufficient content (as if it were an “objective moment” in the proper sense). On the other hand, do we not have different universal time-determinations along with genus and species? At
 25 present, everything remains unclear here. This must be one of our next themes! –

Can one think of objects as built up from moments? As if a combination of fusion of moments would be non-self-sufficient until a final moment joins those already there.

30 Must we proceed according to this schema in which ultimately each such “final” moment would be individualizing, or is it not rather a false schema?

Self-sufficient is that which can exist by itself, independently of anything else: without being completed or supplemented by some

²³ Husserl later added the following remark to this text: “To the Seefeld sheet: Objects of a higher level – a melody does *not* change; it endures for such and such a length of time; it endures while it *unfolds*, as ever new tones continually make their appearance.” See No. 35, p. 250, lines 3–6. – Editor’s note.

other thing. To what extent is that a meaningful way of representing things?

Is temporal duration a moment about which I can ask whether it can or cannot exist by itself?

- 5 And what about place and spatial extension, understood as form over against content?

Concept of "*form.*"