

dehiscence that is constitutive of man' (E, 21). This split is also the division between culture and nature which means that man's relation to the latter 'is altered by a certain dehiscence at the heart of the organism, a primordial Discord' (E, 4).

**gaze (*regard*)** Lacan's first comments on the gaze appear in the first year of his seminar (Lacan, 1953-4), in reference to Jean-Paul Sartre's phenomenological analysis of 'the look' (the fact that the English translators of Sartre and Lacan have used different terms obscures the fact that both use the same term in French – *le regard*). For Sartre, the gaze is that which permits the subject to realise that the Other is also a subject; 'my fundamental connection with the Other-as-subject must be able to be referred back to my permanent possibility of *being seen* by the Other' (Sartre, 1943: 256 – emphasis in original). When the subject is surprised by the gaze of the Other, the subject is reduced to shame (Sartre, 1943: 261). Lacan does not, at this point, develop his own concept of the gaze, and seems to be in general agreement with Sartre's views on the subject (Sl, 215). Lacan is especially taken with Sartre's view that the gaze does not necessarily concern the organ of sight:

Of course what *most often* manifests a look is the convergence of two ocular globes in my direction. But the look will be given just as well on occasion when there is a rustling of branches, or the sound of a footstep followed by silence, or the slight opening of a shutter, or a light movement of a curtain. (Sartre, 1943: 257)

It is only in 1964, with the development of the concept of *OBJET PETIT A* as the cause of desire, that Lacan develops his own theory of the gaze, a theory which is quite distinct from Sartre's (Lacan, 1964a). Whereas Sartre had conflated the gaze with the act of looking, Lacan now separates the two: the gaze becomes the object of the act of looking, or, to be more precise, the object of the scopophilic drive. The gaze is therefore, in Lacan's account, no longer on the side of the subject; it is the gaze of the Other. And whereas Sartre had conceived of an essential reciprocity between seeing the Other and being-seen-by-him, Lacan now conceives of an antinomic relation between the gaze and the eye: the eye now looks is that of the subject, while the gaze is on the side of the object, and there is no coincidence between the two, since 'You never look at me from the place at which I see you' (Sl1, 103). When the subject looks at an object, the object is always already gazing back at the subject, but from a point at which the subject cannot see it. This split between the eye and the gaze is nothing other than the subjective division itself, expressed in the field of vision.

The concept of the gaze was taken up by psychoanalytic film criticism in the 1970s (e.g. Metz, 1975), especially by feminist film critics (e.g. Mulvey, 1975; Rose, 1986). However, many of these critics have conflated Lacan's concept of the gaze with the Sartrean concept of the gaze and other ideas on vision such as

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● **The genital stage** The stages of psychosexual development are conceived by Lacan not as natural phases of biological maturation but as forms of desire which are structured retroactively (S8, 238-46). In the oral and anal stages desire is eclipsed by demand, and it is only in the genital stage that desire is fully constituted (S8, 270). Thus Lacan does follow Freud in describing the genital stage as a third moment which comes after the oral and anal stages (268). However, Lacan's discussion of this stage focuses on what Freud referred to as the *infantile* genital organisation (also known as the phallic phase); a stage when the child knows only one sexual organ (the male) and passes through the castration complex. Thus the genital phase is thinkable, Lacan emphasises, insofar as it is marked by the sign of castration. 'genital realisation' can only be achieved on condition that the subject assumes his own castration (S4, 219). Furthermore, Lacan insists that when the polymorphous perverse sexuality of the pregenital phases comes under the domination of the genital organisation, this does not mean that pregenital sexuality is abolished: 'The most archaic aspirations of the infant are . . . a nucleus that is never completely resolved under some primary genitality' (S7, 93). He therefore rejects the concept of a final stage synthesis; synthesis is not possible for human beings, in Lacan's view; human subjectivity is essentially and irremediably divided.

● **The genital drive** The genital drive is not listed by Lacan as one of the partial drives. Given that Lacan argues that every drive is a partial drive, it is tantamount to questioning its existence. In 1964, Lacan makes this explicit. He writes: 'The genital drive, if it exists, is not at all articulated like the other drives' (

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