

our steps and taking up a position diametrically opposed to the one we left.

We will, then, no longer speak of tonality, set-structure, etc., as existing "in-themselves" but rather, "for-me." We will methodologically deny that the "in-itself" plays a role in the intuitive experience of music, and methodologically suspend all beliefs and assumptions about the reality of music which cannot be found on this level of experience. In short, we will "claim nothing that we cannot make evident by direct reference to consciousness, viewed immanently" (Farber, 1966, 56). The reality of music is no longer assumed as a fixed and stable reference point; it will, in fact, have to be constituted by a human act. Such is the proposed task of this article. However, since the process of constitution is infinite in principle, I can only hope to present the outline of its movement, and duly note the loose ends which will appear. It should also be understood that I am not about literally to constitute the particular composition to be studied here (Webern's *Bagatelle No. 1 for String Quartet*, Op. 9), but rather, its *meaning* as it emerges from the world of my *Erlebnis*. In this space, I cannot directly confront and dispel understandable fears that the point of view suggested here is subjective or solipsistic, and hence counter-productive. At best, I can divert them by referring the fearful reader to the treatment of these issues at the hands of the seminal phenomenologists.

The procedure to be used here sounds deceptively simple. I will treat as "meanings" those objects of my consciousness of Webern's *Bagatelle* which can be experienced as immediately and predicatively given. I will reflect on both these objects and the experiential acts connected with them. In this way, I intend to relate general essences to their specific configurations as manifested in the *Bagatelle*. This is in keeping with the purpose of the essence, namely, to elucidate the objectivity of a meaning-object by demonstrating the variability of the universal and the necessary (cf. Dufrenne, 1966, 60). In this manner, we save the essence from being reduced to a tautology from which we can learn nothing.

What, then, are the essential acts of experience by which this *Bagatelle* becomes constituted? What are the meaningful objects of these acts? To the former belong those actions of the body by which

feeling, understanding, time, motion, and play are all directed *toward* something. That something is the object of the act: a possession, a concern, a project, a relation, a form, or a problem. There is no rigid one-to-one correspondence between object and act: a single object, e.g. a form, may be the correlate of all experiential acts; conversely, the activity of time can involve the collaboration of many objects. The remainder of this article can be regarded as a journey across this complex "network of intentionalities" (after Merleau-Ponty).

If we listen in such a way that we take nothing for granted, we find ourselves confronted by a major problem: how do we know that these strange events all belong to a single work? How do we know that, from instant to instant, we are experiencing the same *Bagatelle*? The answer is implicit in the question. It is not simply a matter of knowing; "knowing that" the piece has unity can only be preceded by an awareness *of* its unity, and if I care enough about the experience of the *Bagatelle* to raise a question concerning its self-identity, then I am already affirming such identity. I am already aware, in a non-thematic manner, of being present at a single, unified experience which underlies the very possibility of contrast. We must, then, recognize that "unity" cannot precede experience, cannot be demonstrated apart from experience, and cannot be sustained apart from a certain attitude which the experiencing person adopts toward the object of experience. When we say that a composition has unity, we are really saying that it is our experience of the composition which is unified. This experience is not preceded by epistemic awareness of the historical conditions surrounding the work, or by the apodictic certainty that it was indeed composed by Webern and is not a counterfeit, or by Webern's own attitude toward the work (he may have wanted to play a joke on us), or, finally, by any purely "factual" existence of unity. In other words, its unity is not presupposed, but constituted by a conscious but pre-predicative act. Such an act is not possible without its accompaniment of feeling. This suggestion calls for a consideration of feeling as an essential and irreducible aspect of the musical experience.

1. FEELING AS AN IRREDUCIBLE STRATUM

Two fundamental feelings underpin a complex of more conscious feelings: those of concern and possession. The Bagatelle can only become meaningful to me if I am concerned for its well-being. It becomes a pro-ject, something in which to "throw" oneself, the location of *Dasein*, the disclosure of Being, and an object that matters (cf. Heidegger, 1962, 172–179). Concern is occasioned by the recognition that the Bagatelle, as a meaning, is inherently labile. At any moment its meaning-structure can be destroyed by an assertion of my freedom: I can choose, within its brief duration, to literally or figuratively walk out on it. But, in a more concerned mood, I can also choose to become the Bagatelle's accomplice. In any case, my feeling implies an object of feeling, accessible, in principle, to other people. The meaning of the Bagatelle is not "in" me in the manner of a purely private hallucination, but "in" a *there* which the feeling of concern urges me to grasp. Or, more precisely, the meaning is not "in" the music either. The "there," then, refers to the music-as-perceived. The direction of feeling is more circular than linear: my consciousness is directed toward the music-as-perceived, which in turn completes the circle by affecting me. It is this circularity of feeling which invokes the experience of possession. I intend, or tend-toward, the object of feeling, but at the same time, submit to it by allowing it to "touch" me. Possession itself is thus two-directional: I possess the music, and it possesses me. It is this quality of "ownness" which enables us to say that a composition is phenomenal because it is ours. If I find meaning in the musical world of Mozart, Webern, or acid rock, it is because, first of all, I experience this music as relating to my own present; it is, literally, mine. To argue the other way around—that is, to argue that it is mine because it has meaning—is to suggest that meaning is a changeless property, completely independent of me. But it is precisely because meaning is cumulative and open-ended and in need of sustenance that it is an object of concern. Meaning, then, is not something to be assumed to be already there, along with empirical data. Meaning is an achievement, a performance (*Leistung*) of the listener, a goal to be aimed at by the performance (*Aufführung*)

of the musical score. "Being in possession of, and possessed by," describes the experience of a composition as a meaning-object for me which provides the foundation for thinking of a composition as an empirical object, with a history and a tradition. It is because of this fundamental bond between myself and the composition that feeling, as a positive value, can be said to reside more in the act of participating than in manipulating. Manipulation is done by those who are either masters of the situation or who are confronted with an object from a totally alien world, as would be a monkey manipulating a typewriter. The participant, on the other hand, voluntarily gives up a bit of his freedom as the price for owning the composition.

There is much more to be said about this stratum of feeling. What about the relation between such experience and language, for example? Can one develop Heidegger's association of *hören*, *hören*, and *gehören* (to hear, to harken, to obey)? What can one make of the association of such Latin words as *perceptio* (taking, gathering), *per-cipere* (to seize, hold) with the German word *fassen* (to grasp, understand)? What can be said about the thorny problem of possession and so-called cultural conditioning? Can we distinguish "music" from physical tone sequences by the way we live through these events? These and other problems must be left, as the saying goes, as "exercises for the inquisitive student," because it is time to become a bit more explicit.

At the moment, the Bagatelle is nothing but a localization of one's Being, a general meaning about which we show some concern, and a possession which implicates one while in the very act of possessing it. This meaning is still very much on the non-thematic, implicit level of givenness, corresponding to a "background" of first order (as opposed to first-hand) experience. From this background of feeling, we can either work forward to the uncovering of more explicit feelings, or proceed linearly to other types of experiential background. I have opted for the first choice merely for the sake of convenience.

To aid in understanding our feelings about this Bagatelle, we can ask ourselves what it would be like to dance to it. What sort of bodily gestures would help to render this Bagatelle visible? Does

it make some sense to say, "I feel graceful?" (This is the more correct way of saying that "the music sounds graceful.") More specifically, do not the first $2\frac{1}{2}$ measures require expansive (convex, curving outward) motions but conducted in a smooth, uninterrupted, unexaggerated, *graceful* manner? To be graceful implies, at least, a "seemingly effortless beauty or charm of movement, form or proportion" (*American Heritage Dictionary*). Would one not choose to express gracefulness and expansiveness by slow or moderate (*mässig*) gestures rather than violent jumping or pacing? Would one not differentiate between the first $2\frac{1}{2}$ measures and the next $1\frac{1}{2}$ (through measure 4) by maintaining the graceful motions but somewhat reducing the size of the gesture?

Example 1.

Several events in measures 3 and 4 suggest the feeling of tending-toward-compression: the narrower space of the cello and viola melody (as compared to the opening melody), the isolated tones of the upper strings in measure 4, and the first occurrence of a relatively "thick" vertical sonority on beat 3 of measure 4. But there is only a tendency, which has to wait for measures 7 through 9 to fulfill itself. As one moves through measures 5 and 6, this tendency toward compression is interrupted (that is, one experiences the

feeling of interruption) by events of a different sort. A primary condition for the experience of interruption lies in the more spastic, disconnected events of these measures. But reflection on this experience suggests a more "hidden" condition, namely, that figure-ground relationships seem to be reversed. In the first four measures, the foreground was primarily melodic, with the viola's 16th-notes in measure 2, and the isolated tones in measure 4, functioning as background. However, in measures 5 and 6, it is melody which recedes into the background, while a texture of isolated tones comes forward. This reversal of relationships, together with the overall increase in dynamics and acceleration of tempo, seems to encourage the feeling described above as "spastic." Is it possible, though, to be more specific about why this word was chosen? Let us examine a single event: f^3 in measure 5:

Example 2.

We must never be deceived by the notation. This tone doesn't appear out of nowhere, nor can we always safely assume that it is merely prolonging itself briefly but uni-directionally in time. Simultaneously with the instant of audition, one can detect, in the silence of the upper registers, the sharply ascending path cut by its own coming-to-be. It is this "audible silence" which precedes f^3 , or rather, which throws f^3 up to its register, that requires a sharp, jerky movement known as "spastic."

other. Neither identity nor temporality is assumed in advance: each is the result of an activity of pre-reflective consciousness. In other words, synthesis applies not so much to the tone-in-itself (since I am abstaining from any judgments about the factuality of this tone) but to its meaning for me. It is this meaning which is synthesized, and part of its meaning is that it is one with itself. The process of meaning-synthesis can be described more precisely by referring to a "field of presence."

This field precedes the tripartite division of time into past, present, and future, and in fact makes this division possible. In addition, the field of presence precedes memory and expectation. Memory, for example, can be invoked only "after" an event has been perceived. In other words, memory presupposes some cut-off point which separates the percept from the image. But in experiencing the Bagatelle, I do not experience an instantaneous percept in one part of consciousness and a non-temporal collection of images in another part. If, in saying that I experience the Bagatelle, my language makes any sense at all, it is because I experience the *whole* Bagatelle as present. Thus Husserl writes:

The whole melody . . . appears as present so long as it still sounds, so long as the notes *belonging to it*, intended in the *one* nexus of apprehensions, still sound. The melody is past only after the last note has gone. (Husserl, 1969, 61.)

Husserl is describing a form of consciousness prior to memory, which he calls *retention*. This term describes the perception of a tone as "just-having-been," which is distinct from "having-gone-by." I can, with memory, recollect the whole Bagatelle, but I perceive it, in actual or imaginary performance, as *passing*. As measure 1 passes away, it does not cease to be. Were this to be the case, I would be forced constantly to refer back to measure 1 to prove that it once was. On the contrary, it is still there, but in the mode of "has-been." Merleau-Ponty speaks of retention as the act of maintaining a direct contact with a living past, a past which reaches into, and influences, the experience of the present. Similarly, Husserl's word, *protention*, is to be distinguished from mere expectation. Protention influences the "now" from the side of the future, which is, in Chapman's phrase, "abouting to be" (Chapman, 1966,

86). The meaning-vectors of protention surge toward the present, making it not merely "now" but a "now" which will soon be past. About the "now," Merleau-Ponty writes that

We must feel the pressure upon it of a future intent on dispossessing it; in short the course of time must be primarily not only the passing of present to past, but also that of the future to the present (Merleau-Ponty, (1967), 414).

Protention is more like anticipation than expectation (a distinction well-known to readers of Heidegger). Anticipation implies a more active involvement in events by implicating the present beyond itself: the present can go forward to meet the future, which makes available the possibility of choice. Thus Merleau-Ponty writes:

Our future is not made up exclusively of guesswork and dreams. Ahead of what I can see and perceive, there is, it is true, nothing more actually visible, but my world is carried forward by lines of intentionality which trace out in advance at least the style of what is to come (although we always wait, perhaps to the day of our death, for the appearance of *something else*) (*ibid.*, 416).

The field of presence, then, is a complex of significant "nows" interacting with retentions and protentions. These can influence the "now," and, in its turn, the "now" can project forward and backward to other "nows" which have-been or which may-soon-be. It is this complex which must be evoked in any account of such experiences as "unity," "identity," or "continuity," since we know now that it is not only in the nature of musical events to be in flux, but that allegedly more stable objects (paintings, tablecloths) are also in motion, or rather, our relationships to these objects are inherently in flux. In short, the identity of the Bagatelle is a constituted identity, brought about by the recognition that one awareness of it is "one with another awareness, that is to say, these are one because they are awareness of the same thing" (Husserl, 1967, 17). It can be concluded (for now) that the process of change does not destroy identity, but, on the contrary, contributes toward its definition. Change is possible only within a *situation* which either does not change or which changes at a different (slower) rate than the objects so changed. This situation is what I have been describing as the field of presence.

From all this, the attentive reader might conclude that words like "change" and "occur" refer, respectively, to objects and events, but not to time itself. Past, present, and future do not "occur," nor is time some kind of object which "flies." It could only do this with respect to a meta-time, the consideration of which would lead to an infinite regress. This demands that we reverse traditional psychological interpretations of time as a "datum" of consciousness, and say, with Merleau-Ponty, that "consciousness unfolds or constitutes time" (Merleau-Ponty, 1967, 414). In short, time is not a thing which flows at all, but, rather, is a measure of our implication with the events of the world-as-lived-in. The breadth and depth of time have more to do with our relations to events than to any absolute measurement, which is why it is meaningless to think of Wagner's music as "absolutely long" and Webern's as "absolutely brief." The experience of time is rather a matter of the amount of work required of consciousness to constitute a meaning. Regarded in this light, the field of presence for Webern's music is very broad indeed.

But these last few sentences point up the impossibility of describing time-relations purely in terms of the temporal. We cannot describe time in terms of time, as Aristotle discovered, but only in terms of our consciousness of things changing. Where this statement differs from empiricist doctrine is in the notion of "thing," interpreted here to be purely an object of consciousness. Hence, the discussion of movement and gesture in the Bagatelle was placed under the heading of feeling, since one is conscious of the flux of feeling in relation to kinds of motion. Similarly, the brief reference to the form of the feeling implies that musical space as well as musical time contributes to the definition of form. Accordingly, in turning to the next kind of constitutive act, we should bear in mind that time-consciousness permeates all such acts, or, more generally, that all constitutive acts permeate each other.

3. THE SYNAESTHETIC ACT

The time of the Bagatelle includes definite beginning and end

points. The first tone does not come after I have taken my seat in the correct hall, nor does the last tone of the program precede my exit from the hall. The Bagatelle, as a plastic, pulsating form, is not "in" the time of the world; its sounds are not connected to those of my neighbor rattling a program or of the fire engines rushing past the concert hall. Its time creates a line, a boundary, perhaps with world time as its ultimate background, but the Bagatelle has form because it stands out from such a background. The difficult question is, what *is* the form? Can one talk about a temporal form apart from considerations of how that form is deployed in space?

The Greeks thought of time as circular, with the "now" representing a point at which the past ended and the future began. But this gets us into talk of the "flow" of time, of the past receding from the "now," etc. It seems more accurate to talk about the past in terms of a sedimentation of meaning, and to say that as the piece moves, the accumulation of meaning fills out the incompleteness of the moment. We can then talk about the form as cyclic because of the experience of similar meanings at the beginning and end of the Bagatelle. The piece begins and ends with a single line: d¹ in measure 1, c² in measure 10; from the line in measure 1, it grows into a more complex texture of several lines moving across a two-dimensional space. Not until measure 4 does a planar structure present itself, in the form of the vertical sonorities on the third beat. Purely linear movement reasserts itself in measure 5, but with the increase in dynamics, this movement becomes more three-dimensional. That is, certain lines stand out more from the context, such as the accented, isolated tones of measures 5—6, as well as the 1st violin gesture between measures 6 and 7. This three-dimensional linear form lasts through the first half of measure 9; further complexity is added by the return of planar surfaces (the vertical sonorities cutting across measures 8 and 9). Finally, one returns to the two-dimensional lines of the opening measures, and thence to the single line of the final c². So if we say that the piece is cyclic, this does not mean that we have returned to the beginning, or that we have experienced a reversal of direction. To describe the form as cyclic signifies that *part* of the meaning of measures 9.3–10 is similar to the meaning of the opening measures: similar, but not

equivalent. We have returned to smooth, quiet motions, but these are not the *same* motions as previously felt; in addition, they appear slightly more disconnected than those of the opening measures. Thus, the circle may have been completed from one perspectival view, but, when viewed from another perspective, the return seems to be located at a different level than occupied by the beginning. In short, the ending is not a complete closure, but already looks forward to another Bagatelle.

What have I been talking about, if not a visual experiencing of the sound-structures of this Bagatelle? Let me be quite clear in saying that the first three pitches (for example) do not "represent" or "symbolize" a sharply rising line; there *is* such a line, as an object of my consciousness. The problem here is not so much the validity of synaesthetic perception; it is, says Merleau-Ponty, the rule rather than the exception (1967, 229). But philosophers aside, one need only recall the interest in synaesthesia shown by the Expressionists: think of such paintings as Kandinsky's *Green Sound* (1924), or his *Three Sounds* (1926). The problem for synaesthesia lies in the nature of the status which the synaesthetic object is accorded. One might initially think that terms like "rising lines" or "planar surfaces" are too personal to be helpful. But consider that I could not even begin to describe a meaning in this way if these terms did not also transcend the particular object being experienced. But this doesn't imply that I am abstracting the meaning of "rising line." It is not a matter of surveying a collection of objects to see what they have in common; it is the other way around, meaning that an essence, like "rising line," is something discovered as belonging to many objects. We then arrive at a proposition significant for musical analysis, namely, that it is the essence which defines a collection, not a collection which defines an essence. This can be re-stated in many ways: (1) unity is not determined by set-structure, unity *determines* set-structure; (2) rhythmic elements do not define time and space, time and space are experiences which define rhythmic elements; if I had no direct experience of time and space I would not know what a rhythmic element was. We could go on like this for several pages, but the point to be made here is that essences like "rising lines" are accorded the status of

nothing less than an *a priori*, for the following reasons: (1) This experience is not a mere subjectivism, since it does not depend on a mood for its existence; rather, as I have tried to indicate, mood and motion-in-space are parallel and connected *a priori* structures. (2) "Rising line" is descriptive of an irreducible experience, not of a definition presumed in advance of the experience. (3) It arises spontaneously from the evidence of experience rather than systematically from the evidence of empirical observation. (4) It designates a structure of the object as an essential aspect of it, if the object itself is to appear at all. I recognize "rising line" in *this* texture because "rising line" is already an acquisition of my body. I can communicate with the synaesthetic meaning of music because my body is in communication with itself.

So far, I have only described the synaesthetic experience of motion and form (the form of the motion, the motion of the form) in terms of feeling, time, and space. Another type of synaesthesia, however, involves the experience of tactile qualities. The admission of such qualities might even be recognized in the German terms for major and minor: *dur* and *moll*. These words have as much to do with texture as with tone color. In the absence of pre-defined conditions for consonance and dissonance, a great deal of the tension of a composition can come from the experience of "hard," "rough," or "gritty" sounds. This might be one reason why measures 7 and 8 sound "closer" than measures 1 and 2. There is a metallic hardness and opacity in the gestures of the former, especially in the plucked sounds. These seem to "rebound" from the overall sonority, whereas the plucked B⁶ in measure 4, for example, is more "harmonious" in its capacity to be absorbed by its context. But these remarks should not be used for purposes of inductive generalization. Nowhere in this article is there any attempt made to stipulate cause-effect relations, or laws of perception which make "softness" a requirement of certain textures. It should be understood that I am not predicating "softness" of the texture of the opening measures, but rather, of the texture-as-perceived. I have been speaking throughout of the Bagatelle as such a meaning-object, and indeed I have no choice, since I have not the slightest idea of what could be meant by the Bagatelle-in-itself—nor does anyone else.

We can arrive at some interesting conclusions regarding synaesthetic perception. If we want to distinguish "movement" or "hardness" as a phenomenon from their empirical interpretation, we shall have to speak of "movement as interpreted by my conduct," and not "conduct as interpreted by movement." There are two reasons why the former expression is preferable:

1) The latter expression confuses the perceiving subject, "I," with the subject's physical properties: his nerves, muscles, etc., with the result that the "movement" becomes a stimulus impinging on the subject's body. But we can regard the matter in a different way, if we consider that a description of a composition's "movement" is really a description of our bodily behavior. In the presence of a composition, *we* move; if it "changes tempo" it is because *we* do so. In short, if it begins to make sense, it is because we are there, attuned to the world of that composition, and because it is I who give sense to the composition. Thus, to talk of its "inner logic" or "inner necessity" is to engage in non-illuminative metaphors. Without a person to constitute the sense of a composition, its meaning is non-existent. This point of view is different from cause-effect theories, but also from conditioned response theories. I think it is unwise to equate meaning with conditioned response as long as we are confronted with the problem of how a person (e.g. Heisenberg) can demonstrate the unpredictability of nature while he himself allegedly constitutes an "operant" whose behavior can be invariably predicted.

2) The expression, "conduct as interpreted by movement" implies that the movement of the piece remains invariant. But this confuses not only object with event, but empirical object with phenomenal object. While it is self-evident that "I perceive movement," it is not at all self-evident that "there is movement" or even that "the movement is always the same." If it were the same, there would seem to be no reason why my "responses" to it should be any different now than they were ten years ago. On the contrary, the movement of the perceived Bagatelle has since changed because the meaning of the Bagatelle has changed, just as it is likely to continue changing. Again, this is why constitution is an endless task, and why the "reality" of the Bagatelle can never be completely disclosed. It is

also why the identity of the Bagatelle can never be a proven identity, but is always a believed identity. Thus Merleau-Ponty writes that "perception is pinning one's faith, at a stroke, in a whole future of experiences, and doing so in a present which never strictly guarantees the future . . ." (Merleau-Ponty, 1967, 297).

4. THE PLAY ACT

The final experiential act to be considered in this article is the element of play. The first question to be answered, of course, is, "Why is play an essence of the musical experience?" The second follows: "What is playful about this Bagatelle?"

The first question can be answered only by a consideration of the essential aspects of play itself. In this space I can discuss only two such aspects: ritualistic and heuristic behavior. Ritualistic behavior involves all forms of controlled play. Aside from music, this form is to be observed in such diverse areas as religion, politics, and sex, as well as sport. An important aspect of ritualistic behavior is the experience of being absorbed in an activity whose continuation is desired. We can ask ourselves if such an experience does not accompany the audition of the Bagatelle. If it does, we can conclude that the experience of continuity is as much a matter of will as it is of cognition and feeling: continuity becomes necessary *for us*. The aim of ritual is to permit an experience of achievement or accomplishment (*Leistung*, again). To this extent, it is far from being purposeless: a composition is experienced as a personal acquisition to the extent that one is personally involved in it. Again we can ask if this is true of the experience of the Bagatelle. It is precisely this experience of acquisition which synthesizes the frivolous with the serious into a single experiential act whose function it is to constitute the non-empirical object of that act. Thus we "play" a composition which is a "work" of art—even if it is a Bagatelle.

A few connections between music and ritual can now be drawn. Both involve directed action rather than mere movement. An action, or activity, is goal directed, if "goal" is taken to be the constituted meaning. Even if the goal is "non-directedness," still this is the

meaning toward which an activity may be tending. Words like "directed" or "activity" imply that there is someone who directs or acts, and therefore, the goal comprises the meaning *for* that someone. In other words, directedness and activity are intentional words, whereas movement need not be exclusively intentional (as in the movement of stars or non-sentient organisms). The upshot of all this is that the actual movements in a ritual (people walking or gesturing) are not what constitute the meaning of the action. Rather, the meaning of the action suggests which kind of movement shall be appropriate *to* the meaning.

To ask if the Bagatelle is a form of controlled play seems to place too much emphasis on the composer's intentions and thought processes while in the creative act. We should rather ask if the experience of the Bagatelle is ordered or chaotic, or, to make things a bit more complex, an ordered picture of disorder. This is not a question for a census taker but for a philosopher concentrating purely on the *a priori* character of these experiences. Weighing all the possible alternatives, I can describe the Bagatelle best (at this writing) by saying that it presents an order of a highly complex sort, which is probably why it has maintained its composure all these years, in the face of so many well-intentioned analyses (such as this one) and evil-intentioned criticism. But there is a more profound reason for regarding it as a play-form. Let us go back to ritual for a moment.

In addition to the characteristics of ritualistic behavior described above, it also involves a re-combination of previously discrete experiences. Ritual selects from the world in order to express the same world, but in a more concentrated and economical manner. A great deal of evidence exists which suggests that play, far from being an escape from the drudgery of reality, is constitutive of reality. It is this constitutive function of play which draws the Bagatelle toward it, so that we begin to regard the Bagatelle not as a ludicrous and irrelevant spasm but as an insight into reality (always meaning, of course, reality-for-me). Its "Bagatelle-ness" doesn't imply that its experiences are of no, or little, consequence. On the contrary, it is through such "abstract" compositions that we really learn to see and hear. In general, it seems incorrect to think of play as "an intermezzo, an interlude, in our daily lives"

(Huizinga, 1970, 9). This point of view presupposes a mode of thought which creates a dialectic between play and reality, which makes play a symbol of reality, and reality the basis of play. We simply cannot make any pronouncements about whether music, as play, constitutes a rise or a fall from reality since, it is not clear what aspect of reality should provide the norm against which the rise or fall is measured. The question of whether the Bagatelle or, say, political expediency presents the world of "reality" is beautifully raised by Dylan Thomas:

How light the sleeping on this soily star,
How deep the waking in the worlded clouds.

[from "I Fellowed Sleep" (Thomas, 1957)]

Finally, we may consider heuristic behavior as a play form. The word "heuristics" is used to describe an experience which is essentially non-algorithmic. However we may engage in current jargon about the "rigorous specification of register," etc., it remains true that the next event is simply unknown—but not unknowable. To a greater or lesser degree, then, the listening experience is involved with the perception of problems, and as we know from games like chess, an important aspect of play involves the very process of working toward a solution to a problem. This implies a kind of foreknowledge of the general outline of the solution (or else we would not know where and how to begin the solution), simultaneously with the hiddenness of the solution (otherwise there would be no problem). For example, Husserl writes that

In every action we know the goal in advance in the form of an anticipation that is "empty," in the sense of vague, and lacking its proper "filling-in," which will come with fulfillment. Nevertheless we strive toward such a goal and seek by our action to bring it step by step to concrete realization (Husserl, 1969a, 149).

Let us take as a listening problem a question raised before, concerning the self-identity of the Bagatelle. This question was briefly considered from the point of view of the retention and protention of time-consciousness, but it can also be approached from the side of its sound qualities in a way not previously discussed under synaesthetic perception. The problem is whether the overall form

is heard as a movement of pitches and intervals or as a more general movement of "sonority." The same question can be raised with such compositions as Beethoven's *Grosse Fuge*, Chopin's *Prelude No. 14*, or Boulez's *Le Marteau sans Maître*. In fact, once the twin idols of pitch and interval are overthrown, this problem of sonority becomes more pervasive than is generally acknowledged. It seems that here, Webern takes great pains to minimize the importance of pitch and interval (as meaning-objects), so that what is perceived contributes to the "field of presence" mentioned above, in the form of a sonority which, for any given moment of the Bagatelle, provides us with, as it were, the same cross-section in a more or less concealed manner. The elements of this sonority are carefully built up by the tentative opening measures:




Example 4.

In measure 4, this sonority is presented as a background to the melody in the cello and viola:



Example 5.

Not until measure 5 does the sonority reveal itself with any distinctness:



Example 6.

But from measure 6 to 9.2, the sonority recedes behind wisps of melody and pizzicato explosions, while still adhering to these:

Example 7 is a musical score consisting of three systems of staves. The first system includes handwritten annotations such as *pp*, *sf*, *f*, *ppizz*, *arco*, and *pizz*. The second system features large, overlapping circles drawn around groups of notes on the staves. The third system also includes handwritten annotations like *sf*, *ppizz*, *arco*, and *f*, and has smaller circles around specific notes.

Example 7.

Finally, in the last $1\frac{1}{2}$ measures, the “empty anticipations” felt in the opening measures are “fulfilled” in a highly concentrated manner, with a presentation of two versions of the same sonority:

Example 8 shows measures 9 and 10 of a musical score. Measure 9 is marked *rit...* and includes annotations like *arco*, *d-Saite*, and *p*. Measure 10 is marked *ca 44* and includes *ppp*. Below the staves, there are two large circles with handwritten labels: $[0,1,4,5,6]$ (01256) on the left and $[6,7,10,11,0]$ (01256) on the right. Arrows point from these labels to the circles on the staves.

Example 8.

What shall we think of this? We know, with immediate certainty, that the sheer sound of the Bagatelle is quite different from the sound of Webern's musical ancestors, even different from Berg's and Schoenberg's music, but not so different from other works by Webern. In fact, one can hear the self-quotation, in measures 9 and 10, of the opening to the second movement of his Op. 5, *5 Sätze für Streichquartett*:



Example 9.

But can we also say, with immediate certainty, that we hear this sonority throughout the Bagatelle? It would be more accurate to say, paraphrasing Merleau-Ponty, that we hear *with* it, or *according to* it. Certainly, with the exception of measures 5 and 9.3–10, the essence “sonority” is meant to serve as a sonic background to the flutterings of surface events. Conceivably, it could contribute, on a more explicit level of interpretation, to the problem of self-identity. What has to be further considered is that this type of background, unlike the *Ursatz* of tonal music, is itself highly mobile. In moving in and out of the texture, in creating holes in itself, and in distributing itself throughout the range of any given pitch activity, it brings up the question of distortion and, possibly, self-destruction. But this question was answered long ago by Kandinsky, whose words will form a fitting close to this venture:

Every form is as sensitive as a cloud of smoke. The slightest obvious change in each of its component parts alters it completely; in fact, it is perhaps easier to obtain the same note or harmony by means of various forms than by repetition of the same form. A truly exact repetition cannot be produced. As long as we are susceptible to the composition as a whole, this fact is mainly of theoretical importance. When we perceive a finer and stronger feeling through the use of the abstract forms, which will accept no material interpretation, this fact will gain more in practical significance. On one hand, the problems of art will increase. Yet, at the same time, the abundance of forms will grow, as the quantity and quality of form-expression increase. At the same time, the question of distortion in drawing will automatically be abandoned and replaced by another one of much higher artistic import. How far is the inner appeal of a particular form concealed and how far does it give full expression? This changed viewpoint will lead to further greater possibilities of expression because concealing or veiling plays an enormous part in art. The combination of the veiled and fully expressed will suggest a new possibility of “leit-motifs” in form composition (Kandinsky, 1946, 53).

5. CONCLUSIONS

By no means does the process of constitution end here. Obviously,

the experience of the Bagatelle also includes the remaining Bagatelles of Op. 9, as well as Webern's total output, and ultimately the sedimentations of all music ever heard, all pictures and films ever seen, all books ever read, all people ever met, in short, the infinite web of relationships formed by, and constitutive of, the “I” who has perceived the Bagatelle.

If there is one common element hovering over the constitutive acts of feeling, temporality, synaesthesia, and play, it is the implicit involvement of understanding. In moving from general to particular considerations of essences, the assertions made here already represented an interpretation of, revealed a point of view toward, and a complicity with, the constituted object. But these assertions did not spring up from nowhere. They were grounded in what Heidegger calls a fore-having, a having-in-advance, which means that as analysis moves from the implicitly given to the explicitly expressed it already reveals something “taken together” as well as “taken apart” (cf. Heidegger, 1962, 201). Interpretation does not necessarily impose new structures on the given structure, or replace the latter with some other structure, but simply brings to light the original structure as given by experience in a non-thematic manner. What does this do to the meaning of “truth”: in other words, where is the “true” Bagatelle? Let us answer this by reversing the relationship between “truth” and “Bagatelle,” by asking not whether, and how, true statements can be asserted of the Bagatelle, but how the Bagatelle reveals the idea of truth. If we do this, we form a picture of truth which is not a matter of propositional tautologies but of a revelation of possibilities. In this way, truth, and philosophy with it, becomes a relevant issue.

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A phenomenological inquiry into the musical imagination: the experience of orchestra conducting

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INTRODUCTION

To ANYONE familiar with symphonic orchestras, it is a well-known fact that the conductor is the single most important member of such an ensemble. Over the past several years his publicized image has occasionally been exaggerated to unwarranted extremes. Sometimes his notoriety has even eclipsed the contributions of the instrumentalists themselves. Nevertheless, in spite of all that, orchestra conducting justifiably remains the most challenging artistic task that can be demanded of any musician. A conductor is required to fulfill a great many diverse functions that are not expected of an instrumentalist. He must select and edit music appropriate to the ensemble which he directs and to the audience which hears it, he must be thoroughly knowledgeable about all the music which he conducts, he must properly prepare the orchestra through group and individual rehearsals, and, finally, he must organize and lead his ensemble authoritatively.

At the heart of the conductor's craft, however, lies the most important requirement of his profession—he must be able to imagine how a piece of music would sound before it is played and communicate this inspiration to others. Without this ability of conceptualization and communication, scholarly authoritativeness, personal charisma, or musical versatility will not result in a good musical performance. A defined intent prior to rehearsing the orchestra is absolutely necessary for any significant musical leadership to occur.

To conduct implies to lead, counsel, advise, or otherwise direct. A